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Abstract
The setting for research is Abkhazia a small country south of the Caucasus
Mountains and bordering Europe and the Near East. The Abkhaz hold onto
custom – apswara – to make of state law an adjunct to custom as the state
strives to strengthen its powers to ‘modernise’ along capitalist lines. This
institution of a parallel-cum-interwoven and oppositional existence of
practices and the laws questions the relationship of the two in a novel way.
The bases of apswara are its concepts of communality and fairness. Profound
transformations have followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the
breakaway from and subsequent war with Georgia, none of which have
brought the bright prospects that were hoped-for with independence. The
element of hope in post-Soviet nostalgia provides pointers to what the
Abkhaz seek to enact for their future, to decide the course of change that
entertains the possibility of a non-capitalist modernisation route and a
customary state. Apswara is founded on the direct participatory democracy of
non-state regulation. It draws members of all ethnicities into the generation of
nationalist self-awareness that transcends ethnicity and religions, and forms
around sacred shrines and decisions taken by popular assemblies. It has
topical significance for other societies where custom and law co-habit
through contestation, and questions some widely accepted theories about the
relationship of the two, as well as problematising anthropological concepts of
‘legal pluralism’ and post-Sovietics. The study suggests new topics for
research. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction - Custom and law
among the Abkhaz  1
Apswara  (literally Abkhazness) is the historically formed  manifestation of 
national self awareness and assertion of the Abkhaz; the unwritten code of 
popular knowledge and values, encompassing the system of customs and 
concepts of a person’s spiritual and moral existence, the violation of which is 
‘equivalent to death’.                     Inal-ipa. 1996: 21-22
Azhvla – the basic kinship unit, [and], as a relict of the patrilinial clan to a large 
degree retained its force in the conditions of class society also – under feudalism, 
and even developed bourgeois relations in Abkhazia. As a social unit, azhvla was 
characterised by a supposed or real single origin, exogamy, a recognised common 
territory, some economic interests and religious life, […]the rules of clan 
revenge, hospitality, and mutual aid […] All members of the given azhvla were 
regarded as brothers, which was reflected in [strict incest prohibitions and] certain 
principles for mutual aid. It was one of the most important foundations of Abkhaz 
social organisation... [my emphasis. MC]. Inal-ipa. 1965: 406
Here I set out first a guide to the values and institutions of the Abkhaz, of a
little-researched area on the boundary of Europe and Asia Minor, then recount
some of my initial encounters entering Abkhazia, on the street and in a court
room, followed by demography and history. The following chapters  will
discuss the issues that are raised but not fully answered in anthropological
literature, data from field work, current problems, the role of the belief
system and some detail on post-Sovietics, nostalgia and hope, and then the
options that are open for state-building.
I will be arguing, in chapter eight that there are features about
Abkhazia that do not allow us to see it as just another ex-Soviet state that has
followed the general pattern of descending into chaos through being taken
over by predatory and self-enriching “oligarchs” and other bandits, because
of special conditions that pertained in the Soviet period of Abhazia and have
been carried though into the present. Its history in the 20th century and its
most recent history does not fully mirror that of any other post-Soviet
1 For brevity and other than when I draw a necessary distinction between the use the two
terms - apswara to mean etiquette, and apsua tsas to mean the normative rules within
society, I use apswara to cover both, for Abkhaz custom as a whole; a usage employed by the
Abkhaz themselves.
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republic. At the same it appears possible that what might be Abkhazia's
special circumstances might carry with them anthropological and historical
facets that could prove attractive and applicable elsewhere with time and this
makes comparatives with other ex-Socialist states part of a valid
anthropological project. The specificities of the Abkhaz lie predominantly in
the great extent  to which they have held onto the power of customary
practices to be dominant in the regulation of daily life. The details of this will
be found in this dissertation. I would, therefore, say that the Abkhaz are
exceptional, while at the same time they are very relevant to the course of
development in human societies elsewhere.
For the moment I put down a marker to show that recent history has
left a different mark on Abkhazia, when compared with other post-Soviet
states. Abkhazia was not opened to the depredations of Western companies
and e neo-liberal reformers that have hit the economies and social systems of
other former socialist countries in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, of
the kind described by the anthropologists Badalov (2012) and Ghodsee
(2012), to which I shall be returning in greater detail in chapter eight. The
option of modernisation a la West was not available to the Abkhaz because of
the political and economic isolation that has been imposed on it, as against
what has been attempted in almost all former Soviet Republics. Caroline
Humphrey (2002) has described in detail the techniques for survival that have
been tried in post-socialist Russia and Mongolia. In the case of Abkhazia the
hold of custom’s principles of egalitarianism and direct democracy have held
their dominance and act as brakes on those who would give full reign to
capitalist transformation. Whether this can continue remains a moot point. 
My conclusions offer up for consideration the possibility of custom
absorbing and embedding law and the state, with the prospect of a modern
society that would retain the pre-eminence of custom. This problematises a
number of anthropological approaches that have selected from one of three
theories as the basis for research on custom and law: one, their coexistence,
another, the evolution of custom into the law of the state and, third, their
incompatibility leading to the whittling away and destruction of custom. I
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found in Abkhazia signs of the state, taken as a system for administration,
existing as an adjunct to customary practices, as the Abkhaz employ
traditional social and cultural practices and values to organise anew their
society following the collapse that followed the dissolution of the Soviet
Union.
The literature, documents and other sources on the Abkhaz are
examined to discover unanswered questions relating to my research topic and
then elucidate the basis of today’s Abkhaz nationalism and the involvement of
custom and the state. The dissertation explores the framework of new laws
and the Constitution to see how they might mesh with practices that examine
the call made for Abkhazia’s “cultural nucleus of apswara [to be] joined to
the pragmatic values of modern civilisations” (Arshba, V., Kamkiia, B.,
Kamkiia, F. 2003: 4). That programme is not a conspiracy of academics but
reflects the facts that emergent states today, including Abkhazia, face political
and economic pressures to adopt western capitalist modernity for
development. These are looked at through the lens offered by Weber’s
imagined ideal type of impersonal bureaucracy, but with retention of the
interpersonal agencies of custom. 
But people do not change so quickly and their customary defences are
often labelled nepotism, corruption and favouritism, bad governance, the
running of black and grey economies and the like, as extensively discussed in
sociological and anthropological literature, by Alena Ledeneva (1998, 2001,
2013), among others as will be shown. To question this is not to gainsay the
advantages and privileges that powerful people (oligarchs or insider dealers)
are acquiring at the public’s expense in conditions of uncertainty as – (in
Rusian) v mutnoy vode ryba lovitsa - there are fish to be caught in turbid
waters. Among the Abkhaz “informal” relationships are not necessarily
negative but can reflect customary values.
The Abkhaz are negotiating between what Scheele (2008:1) has called
different regulatory “legal systems”, using the word “legal” to embrace both
custom and law, while conferring customary legitimacy on what is new. This
presents a new form of pluralism in which law and custom do not conflict. I
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examine what the Abkhaz mobilise to attain desired outcomes in the pursuit
of objectives in their changing circumstances and to assess the degree to
which these bear the hallmarks of previous historical periods clothed in the
rhetoric of “tradition”. This sheds light on how the Abkhaz currently integrate
tradition and modernity across ruptures in concepts and practices.
Popular understandings and a rich local ethnography hold that many
traditional non-state institutions based on family, lineage and belief structures
have survived through Tsarist Russian rule and the subsequent Soviet periods
despite the passing of laws on property that would challenge customary
values, rules and practices (Paula Garb 2000). The hold of traditional ideas on
the Abkhaz has been noted by travellers from the 18th century onwards and
more recently by Feldbrugge (1977). The advocates of today’s national
project in Abkhazia claim to retain customary practices alongside newly-
instituted state laws. Popularly, customary structures and enactments are not
conceived of as dependent on what the laws stipulate and, in practice people
only use laws selectively to support custom. I draw on Abkhaz expressions of
commitment to their values of collectivity and etiquette as they expect these
to be the foundations of a society with state-made laws and Constitution.
What this means has required examination of different institutional functions
of the state as such. The Soviet experience contributed greatly to some of
today’s understandings, especially those of ethnicity and collectivism.
My approach takes in insights from the related disciplines of
anthropology, history, economics, folklore and politics. The dynamics of
adaptation in Abkhaz outlooks and practices reveals features of a changing
society that adds to studies of those modern states whose foundations were
laid down in the Soviet period (Martin 2001). It also carries comparative
relevance for other societies that are undergoing transformations, including in
other newly-independent entities that have been born from the break-up of
federal states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as those
undergoing neo-colonialist “globalising” actualities.
********************
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I examine Abkhaz lineage, gender and extra-legal agencies and procedures
focussing on data from dispute resolution. The regulation of disputes is
through reconciliation and mediation by the parties in dispute – through direct
participatory democracy2. This is maintained, certainly conceptually, in
conditions of urbanisation, demographic shifts, and property privatisation
challenges to the communalism of the moral economy (Pardo 2004: 73). 
My research on dispute resolution as an entry point allowed
examination of cultural and symbolic conceptions of tradition, custom and
law and to see how the ideals and stipulations in their conduct are modified
by contingency, instantiating this to cover how the idealised symbolic
constructions of reality and actual behaviour are accommodated (Fischer
2006) - how the contradictions that arise are lived with, explained and
remedied. Thus, custom among the Abkhaz is not seen as a “thing” in itself,
as reified, but as a collection of social conceptions and practices that are
adapted and changed by people  to meet the shifting demands of individuals
living in society. Custom is present as an institution that envelops and
modifies the law of the state. Law is often perceived to operate without
customary restraint in ‘advanced’ capitalist countries, ones which are highly
industrialised and described as ‘civilised’ or ‘democratic’, as by the Abkhaz
scholar Liana Kvarchelia (2012).  Modernisation is itself a complex term and
will not be treated as a “thing” with independent agency, any more than is
custom.
The data collected is employed to discuss the relationship of Abkhaz
custom to law, and of the state to non-state institutions in what I consider is a
novel way, to suggest an evolution that can retain the principles of customary
regulation of society. Dispute resolution is interpreted in a broad sense to
include disputes which have reached customary resolution, law courts and
also what has been tackled within the family circle and are resolved with
reconciliation as a central element.
2 This term covers an organisation of society in which all its members participate directly in
all decision-making, without such decisions being taken by the mediation or intervention of
agencies with powers over society – the police, courts and such like.  
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1.1 Field delimitations –   apswara   and  apsua tsas   
The field that is principally regulated by non-state customary institutions and
procedures is now introduced in summary.
Abkhaz conceptions of custom and its procedures is within the
coupling of understandings of apswara and apsua tsas  - put by the Abkhaz
scholar Fatima Kamkiia as: “…to mean the traditionally derived rules of
behaviour that, as a result of its long practice, has become habitual, a
tradition” (Kamkiia and Costello 2013: 10). Accordingly, apswara is defined
as the Abkhaz etiquette for personal behaviour, beliefs, values and language;
and apsua tsas as the customary institutions for socially regulating conduct
(Kamkiia 2008: 42). These are spoken of as justified by history, beliefs and
the knowledge of the myths that exert strong influence on much in daily
conduct, and includes all manner of intra- and inter-lineage relations,
including those governing property. Apswara (using the term as explained in
footnote no. 2) includes the growth of social standing with age, what is
considered worthy conduct and what unworthy, often associated with the
conduct that is described in the Abkhaz epic tales of ancient Heroes, the
Narts (Abaev 1957, Colarusso 2002, Inal-ipa 1977, 2003, Japua and Hewitt
2008), rules for gender relations and the general ideas of collectivity
alongside individual responsibilities. It includes notions of honour (alamys),
any challenge to which must be rebutted and punished with retribution. These
will be looked at through cases, and compared with the legislation the state is
enacting to modernise.
The law is generally not seen as in conflict with custom as such, as
customary practices take precedence over the laws and order everything that
affects people as individuals, families and members of patrilinies, the
existence of each of which is defined by the holding of a surname in common
and notions of common descent in the male line.
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The azhvla, which I will translate as names and patrilinies (Dasania
2006) link in traditional co-operative units, called kiaraz, that bring families
together on a residential basis for ploughing, harvesting, helping the poorest
in the villages and, in the past, for war. That is the situation in the rural areas
which until recently included the overwhelming majority of Abkhaz.
Nowadays, with urbanisation, the denomination kiaraz has been almost
universally replaced by the Soviet term brigady, meaning work teams.  Such
structures are shared by other peoples in the Caucasus (Inal-ipa 1965: 399-
413), as they are to some degree by the zadruga of the Balkans as described
by Eugene Hammel (1968: 17-38). In Abkhazia the kiaraz, like the Balkans’
zadruga, was the term used for the collective farms in the socialist period.
The extraordinarily extensive rules of exogamy forbid marriage with
anyone who carries the same name and with anyone who is traceable through
patriliny and matriliny of affines, going back seven generations at least.
Incest taboos and avoidance practices are enforced by social pressures that
include the banishment of those who infringe the order of apsua tsas.
Matters that arise and affect the lineage are decided within it. It might
be correctly observed that in all societies, some ‘family’ disputes are settled
without recourse to law, but the context for this among the Abkhaz is of a
qualitatively different kind because the relations of custom and law are also
so - law is not permitted to intervene in matters that according to the Abkhaz
are customary matters. Inter-lineage disputes are settled by systems for
reconciliation and compensation, as will be discussed in chapter four. 
Action outside the law justifies those taken in defence of honour and
the ‘cleansing’ of the lineage of shame, (akh’ymdzg, pkhash’aroob). Primacy
is accorded to the protection of the status of the lineage, azhvla, to prevent
anything that besmirches its name. An Abkhaz lawyer who specialises in
advancing the cases of those who claim they have been aggrieved by state
agencies and who is himself state registered to practice, explained that the
Abkhaz, himself included, put matters this way: “Rights and laws are not the
same thing” (personal communication 2011). A prominent member of the
Abkhazian scientific community said about a dispute between lineages over a
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case of rape and two killings: “If the law intervenes there will be war.” His
view was shared by judges I spoke to.
The term itsasym is used to denote shame in the sense of being the
result of anything that generates a sense of shame, including one’s own
inappropriate conduct and the behaviour of someone else, and is contrary to
apswara. Such behaviour is conceived of as justifying a reaction to protect
the individual’s or the lineage’s dignity. Fatima Kamkiia found that “Studies
of Abkhaz customary law confirm the difference between an act that would be
shameful (pkhash’aroop) and behaviour that entails retribution, recompense,
necessitating punishment and/or deprivation of rights (property or non-property),
social position, honour, dignity, and respect, that is, the consequences of
behaviour judged to be itsasym - contrary to custom” (2008:41).
There is general acceptance that apswara and apsua tsas must be the
foundation for social conduct. What this actually means divides
‘traditionalists’ from those who would build new state structures to
‘modernise’ along capitalist lines and take away the influences of the
lineages. The latter, according to traditionalists would undermine what is the
prime feature of apsua tsas, namely, its notions of collectivity and a
contingent approach to decision-making that claims legitimacy in the
tradition of subordinating judgements to the prime demand for restoring
harmony between all parties to a dispute according to the pertaining
circumstances. Decisions on how this might be brought about are taken by the
immediate members of the social communities involved in dispute through
the i r direct democracy that excludes unsolicited involvement of state
agencies. Herein lies one of the loci of contradiction between customs and
laws. .
Abkhazia has the trappings of a modern state: a Constitution3, an
elected parliament, a presidency that is the chief administrator as well as the
initiator of statutory law, decides the candidates for government structures
and the police and judges. The practices of convening popular assemblies –
3 Adopted in 1999. On the eve of Constitution Day, November 26 the government’s paper
carried an editorial article which referred to the 18-year-old Constitution of independent
Abkhazia as “the basic founding document” Respublika Abkhazia 23.11.2012. 
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the skhods – that on occasion overrule presidential or parliamentary decisions
give real meaning to those words of the Constitution which state:
The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of authority in the Republic of 
Abkhazia shall be its people – the citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia. The people 
shall exercise authority directly or through their representatives (2001: 27). [My 
emphasis added MC]
Here it is appropriate to list what the law does control and enforce - its
qualified province of revenue collection to finance its activities: through
taxation on incomes, trade and excise. It finances the structures of
government, the police (state security), courts, the prison, armed forces
(defence of the state), as well as education, a national health service,
pensions, roads and rail, the electricity network, provision of water, the
maintenance and building of museums, theatres and other structures for the
arts; kindergartens, municipal housing and a broad array of projects such as
assistance to attract ethnic Abkhaz emigrants back to Abkhazia, mainly from
Turkey and the Middle East. The financing of all state activities is highly
centralised, as local authorities exist largely to carry out instructions from the
presidential office, which, in the final analysis, controls the spending of state
income. Local authorities act principally as arms of the central state
executive. Two features about the laws should be noted here: it is silent on the
body of customary practices and the state has, in reality, no monopoly on
violence, and does not claim it. Laws that have bee passed in recent years do,
however, encourage the formation of private companies in areas which, in
Soviet times, were not permitted. The effects of this change in property
ownership have yet to be determined, although informants often expressed
opposition to this. On January 28 2015 the Cabinet of Ministers announced
“The first phase of the Strategy for the Socio-economic Development of the
Republic of Abkhazia up to 2025, for which The Centre for Strategic Studies
(CSS) under the President of the Republic of Abkhazia has recruited a group
of experts which includes well-known economists, ecologists, sociologists
and other research figures of the country to form the work group of the
project” (Apsny Press 29.1.2015). However, referring to arguments about
18
how the national cake should be divided an owned, the immediate sardonic
comment of one Minister was that at present there was not much to be
divided and the arguments are premature. 
What became apparent was that there is not simply a dichotomising of
law and custom, as that would be to forget the primacy accorded to custom
over laws. Furthermore, the underlying contextual influences include the
changing relationships to the means of production and their control. In
Abkhazia one is witnessing a transformation in these, from one of all people
having stood in a common relationship to them, to the nascent shoots of
different relations under the construction of capitalist features. It is that
change rather than a supposed change to a “market economy” that underlies
the economic changes and challenges customary power relationships. For a
market, a place and organisations for exchanges, whether as different forms
of gift (Mauss 1990) or with the intermediary of money, is to be found in
every human society. To add the word “free” to characterise one type of
market is usually to have it sound nice without having to explain what “free”
means and for whom.
1.1.1 Journey in, through and out
I now describe an experience that permits some ethnography to introduce
thoughts on conflict, multi-ethnicity, displacements, politics, town/village
residence, custom and how Abkhaz are perceived, providing hints of etiquette
that will occupy a big place in the dissertation.
The border official who stamped my passport when I flew into the
Georgian capital of Tbilisi repeatedly advised me not to go into Abkhazia: “It
is very dangerous. You should not go to Abkhazia; you should not!” On the
journey by taxi to the Abkhaz frontier 200 miles along the main east-west
Georgian highway, we passed huge road signs that included “Sukhumi”( the
capital of Abkhazia) with the claim to its being part of Georgia shown by the
appendage of the Georgian (and not Abkhaz) noun ending of “i” 4. The driver
4 The “(i)” or simple “i” added to the name of a place denotes its form in Georgian. It is used
by Georgian officialdom (and is omitted by its Abkhazian opposite number) to denote a
political claim, a marker of the Georgian state’s not recognising the independence of
19
pointed out a settlement of monotonous rows of one-story houses that had
been built for ethnic Georgians who had fled South Ossetia after bouts of
fighting between Georgian forces and the Russians who came to the aid of the
Ossetians5. In a café six curious women quizzed me on where I was going
and why. They were Mingrelians6 who all spoke good Russian. One
announced: “Muy Mingrely vot tak s Abkhazami” – “This is how we
Mingrelians are with the Abkhaz” - indicating a closeness by rubbing together
the extended index fingers of her closed fists and explained: “We have the
same customs and always lived together…until the war split us.”
A half-mile-long bridge over the River Ingur (with an “i” on the end
in Georgia) marked the Abkhaz-Georgian frontier. The bridge had been built
after the Second World War by German POWs, “a small contribution to
making up for the killings and destruction they brought to our country”7 a
stranger in the small café on the border told me. Its state of disrepair created
an atmosphere of being in no man’s land and a miserable one at that. Huge
Georgian and Abkhazian flags opposing each other across the river, a few
observation and radio towers in the woods on both sides, a statue of a twisted
artillery piece and something of concrete that was camouflaged on the
Georgian side, and a military vehicle and gun emplacement on the Abkhazian
one pointed to my being in a militarised and contested area. 
At the end of the slow haul on a horse-drawn cart over the bridge the
rain, subtropical heavy air and the low cloud made everything look grim. I
paid the fare of one lar of Georgian money to the carter and thought of the
Ancient Greeks, who knew this coastal country well: this was the land of
Jason’s Argonauts and the Golden Fleece and of Prometheus who had defied
Abkhazia and Abkhaz toponymics, thus a  retention of spelling of place names that were in
force when Abkhazia actually was under  Georgian jurisdiction.
5 These were refugees from the two unsuccessful Georgian invasions in 1991 and 2008 to
deny South Ossetia its independence.
6  A people that spans the border of Abkhazia with Georgia, with its own language. This is a
member of the Kartvelian family of which the largest group of speakers is that of the Kartli
of the central and eastern regions of today’s Georgia. Other related languages from the same
family are spoken by the Svan (Georgia and Abkhazia) and the Laz (Georgia and Turkey).
7 The “our” meant the Soviet Union. The Nazi army in the Second World War reached into
the Caucasus and was thrown back only after heavy mountain fighting after it took Elbrus,
Europe’s highest peak. Some of its units briefly penetrated northern Abkhazia but did not
reach into Georgia.
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the gods. I wondered whether the lar was worth the same as the obol charged
by Charon when he ferried the souls of the dead over the river Styx into
Hades. The Abkhaz border guards had me listed in their book as having
obtained an entry visa by email from their Foreign Ministry in Sukhum.
Inside Abkhazia along roads which were in a truly awful state there
was plenty to see of the devastation of the war of nearly twenty years earlier
when the Georgian government sent tanks into Abkhazia in a failed attempt to
retake it from the breakaway nationalists. The minibus driver who took me
onwards pointed to a railroad embankment that ran parallel to us to seaward:
“Not long ago we travelled without lights after dark as bandits, Georgian
infiltrators, would fire on traffic from there. Now it is quieter as the border is
more secure. His account of the state of affairs tied in with O’Loughlin et al.:
“… since 1993 …Guerrilla and sabotage actions by Georgian-sponsored
partisans left it [i.e. the Gal(i) rayon] in a state of permanent low intensity
conflict for the following 15 years ” (2011: 15).
On arrival in the Abkhazian capital of Sukhum I was dropped off by a
two-storied house with the flat where I stayed with a “now local” family for
fieldwork over five years. I say “now local” but the family was in fact
“localised” in three places – in Sukhum and in the houses of the families of
the husband and wife, where they were born in far apart villages. Both had
fought in the war with Georgia and the wife had been an army nurse and took
part in the 2008 mopping up after the Georgian forces fled from the upper
River Kodor valley into Georgia8. The husband had lost a brother and the
mother several close relatives in that war. They had three children who
moved back and forth between the town and the villages, although when I
asked them where “home” was, they replied “here”, in the flat in Sukhum.
The first floor flat’s windows faced east across a park opposite the
now empty cinema and a once-splendid open-air restaurant, and west towards
8 When I travelled up the valley nearly a year after it was taken I saw no evidence of battles,
as the Georgian troops who had been armed and trained by the US had fled without a fight.
The valley was almost empty of its pre-war Svan population. This had left with the Georgian
forces in 1998 and had, in the main, taken the Georgian side in the war against the Abkhaz
(Yamskov Op.cit.: 2). They had also pillaged Georgian civilian refugees fleeing the Abkhaz
up the valley through Svan villages during the earlier defeat in 1993 according to my local
informants. 
21
the mountain foothills beyond “our” big courtyard. Balconies festooned with
drying clothes and overhangs against subtropical rains and the days of
intensive sun.
********************
On one of my departures from Abkhazia an Abkhaz friend who drove me said
about the border area: “No, I have never been in this district.” His manner
betrayed his discomfort at being among Georgians. He was reluctant to ask
locals for directions or to get out of his car at any time. His father had been
killed in the war, as had a female relative and her children when a Red Cross
helicopter was shot down by the Georgian military.
I was greeted as “the Englishman” on the Abkhazian side of the
border and the Georgian post also remembered me. These noted down the
places I had visited in Abkhazia. A senior guard volunteered: “I am not from
Abkhazia and have no interest in visiting it.”
I looked in at a tiny cobblers shop in Zugdidi, a small town in
Georgia/Mingrelia, to have a leather ring fixed on my watchstrap. Hearing
where I was coming from the Georgian (self-identification) cobbler
announced in Russian: “Abkhazia nasha!” – “Abkhazia is ours!” then took
me down the street to a sweet shop and treated me to a third-of-a-pint of
home brew chacha (brandy) taken with chocolate sweets. As we were in the
Georgian part of Mingrelia I proposed a toast to Mingrelians but he
remonstrated: “They are Georgians, as are the Svan”. I changed the toast to
“the local people” and that was accepted. He spent much more on me than I
had paid for the job he did on my strap and invited me to his family home in
eastern Georgia. It reminded me of the taxi driver in Abkhazia who insisted
on paying for an expensive restaurant meal which cost much more than the
fare he charged for a two-hour’s journey. In a restaurant in Zugdidi the owner,
taking me for a Russian, changed the piped music from Georgian to Russian
and Soviet songs.
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On arrival at the Tbilisi railway station platform, hearing I was from
Britain, a porter immediately and at the top of his voice ran all Georgian MPs
down as “greedy crooks” and, also loudly, begged me not to think that all
Georgians were like them: “Georgians are decent people”. In Tbilisi I had a
full day between arrival and my flight home and spent it with 49-year-old
Georgi, a Georgian taxi driver from Ajaria in the south west of the country.
He asked me whether it was true, “as is told in Georgia, that Abkhazia is
under Russian occupation and the Russians are filling the spaces left by the
Georgians who fled, and are buying up everything.” His Russian was fluent
but ungrammatical although he served two years in the Soviet army, “in the
revolutionary town of Bryansk” as he put it9. 
We had lunch in a small restaurant – I ordered fresh lemonade,
khachapuri (a sort of local pizza), a huge tomato - “not Turkish” – three
khinkali (big dumplings full of meat), fresh salad from ingredients from the
garden, and a coffee. He said he was not hungry and would not allow me to
stand him a meal nor tip him on top of the agreed sum for looking after me
and driving me around for seven hours. As we parted, he gave me a souvenir
of a small dagger he bought earlier in the market.
He was very impressed when I described some examples of Abkhaz
custom, especially the case of a father killing his son for murdering a
neighbour’s daughter, saying wistfully “I did not know things were still like
that there. If only we had those here! We used to have such customs but much
has now been lost.”
The following tells of my first encounter with an agent of the law in
Abkhazia.
1.1.2 The policeman
Near the central market in Sukhum in the spring of 2007 I saw several young
men step out of two cars to row, noisily and threateningly with much waving
of arms. Passers by gathered round them in a rough circle from pavement
onto carriage-way with no signs of concern but a little excitement. The men
9 Bryansk is in Russia and famous in the countries of the USSR for the strength of the local
partisan resistance to the Nazi army. 
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were arguing about the cars’ collision. A young uniformed policeman strolled
up and joined the bystanders for several minutes before he spoke to the
disputants, gently and allowing himself to be interrupted and short runs of the
shadow boxing. After the discussion among all present had lasted some
fifteen minutes and in which the policeman joined, when everyone appeared
to have had their say and calmed down, he then spoke to the youths. They
then returned to their slightly damaged cars and drove off with friendly waves
to each other and to the policeman.  He had taken down no record of the
incident. It was happily explained to me by a few bystanders that the
policeman’s job had been to stop the row by mediating a peace. An elderly
man explained in Russian that the importance of a policeman’s job was to
reconcile disputants, to let all have their say and to show respect:
“The young man’s [i.e. the policeman’s, MC] part was to sort out what could have 
become a serious argument, not to decide who had caused the incident. He did well, 
considering he is young, and made it clear that he was not blaming anyone, and nor
should anyone else. He was out to have all agree that no one was more responsible 
than anyone else for the incident, and that no one was insulted. The lookers-on 
were part of the process of sorting things out, like garanty –guarantors, poniatye - 
witnesses that things were done properly, not to take sides”. 
“But,” said I, “most of them were not present when the crash took place.” He 
replied: “Well, some might have been relatives and, in any case, some were older 
than the young drivers and, therefore, had to be respected and allowed their say; 
after all, everybody was there to help.”
It might be thought that the incident I witnessed is the same as the restorative
justice10 that one encounters in many state systems11 but that operates in
western capitalist society after the determination of guilt and, as Marty Price
pointed out: “punishment cannot mend the torn fabric of the community that
has been violated” (2001). Among the Abkhaz guilt is not the main thing to
10 I use the term (sometimes called reparative justice) as it is in countries with “western” law,
where, once the guilty and damaged parties to a dispute have been determined  an attempt is
made to bring them and the community together to have the offender admit guilt and then to
agree on compensation rather than punishment.
11One may compare this incident with how police in Britain often, and increasingly today, do
not take matters that have been referred to them to court but deal with infringements outside
the law:  “One in eight crimes was dealt with informally on the street by police last year”
following a dramatic rise in restorative justice (Daily Telegraph 18.9.2012: 2). Similarly,
Customs Officers in the UK are permitted to decide that a traveller importing more than the
legal limit of tobacco or alcohol will not be penalised if the officer judges that the traveller
did not intend to break any rules.
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be determined, but settlement terms are, where no one is offended and the
protection of human dignity is placed uppermost. This will be further
illustrated through data from case studies. The Abkhaz policeman was acting
as an accepted member of the community, where a minor conflict had arisen
between younger men than himself – his status of respect being accepted not
an issue that required lineage adjudication, and not fulfilling a state
requirement to seek guilt and punish a culprit. It is at the same time a
recognition that there are loose edges at the boundaries of custom and state.
Even in the court rooms the influence of custom shows itself, as I
found when I sat through a hearing in Sukhum.
1.1.3 Driven to court - no alternative
In a trial three young men were charged with burgling a woman’s flat, the
charge initiated by the victim, a single mother, a Russian who had no living
surviving close male kin. The two of three accused who responded to the
summons to appear were, one from a single mother family, the other
unemployed and poor and clearly with no name to stand by him. In private
the state prosecutor told me of his concern that “some way of keeping the
accused out of prison should be found”. He evidently wanted to ‘do the right
thing’, to mend matters and explained that there should be no residue of
rancour.
None the less, cases taken to court suggest that the court room is
impinging on areas of what were once wholly customary. For some, as in the
case of the burgled woman, it is the last resort to turn to. From other
examples recourse to the court may be used as recognition that customary
practice could not be fully enforced in today’s changing conditions. In yet
other cases the state’s public prosecutor’s office does initiate court action, as
in the current more-than-two-year long pursuit of the perpetrators of the 2012
attempt on the life of the president, Alexander Ankvab, but this is rare. The
views given by informants among judges, lawyers, police and people in
general showed there is widespread distaste for the idea of locking people up
because that does not bring reconciliation and a prison sentence is not
25
considered to “wash clean” an offence of any kind. There is a general
reservation about prosecutions being initiated by the state and, indeed, the
law gives priority to disputants to reach agreed conciliation without the
intervention of the officers of the law and literal formulations in the laws
(Zakon 27.4.2009: 15: clause 70).
There is, however, a small but growing number of court cases that
tackle new kinds of offences that have arisen with changing conditions. These
include road accidents, disputes over property in new areas which do not
come within the village or another community where ownership can be traced
to inheritance and lineal property rights, and these are predominantly in the
cities where property occupation that was abandoned as a result of Georgians
and others fleeing the fighting left non-fixed flat usages. In some cases flats
that have been taken over are defended by their occupants as trophies of war.
These are often flats and houses vacated by Georgians who fled or were
evicted after the war. Even in cases that do go to court there is what would be
considered in law-governed societies as open interference in proceedings by
kin and friends who are not the accused, the accuser or witnesses. The
tradition of customary practice which allows relatives and neighbours to
resolve disputes is reflected in this kind of participation in court proceedings.
What is more, police often do not initiate action on infringements of the law,
such as breaking speed limits, because it is not considered proper for a
younger person, including a policeman, to charge an older one or a fellow-
lineage member. 
When questioned about the police failing to tackle the widespread
speeding in town and country and violation of stipulations (such as
overtaking on corners and crossing continuous white lines while traffic police
stand by) one of the most senior state officials suggested not the enforcement
of penalties or punishment but only that: “People need to be educated in
manners in school” (Personal communication 2012).
The list of cases heard over two weeks in Sukhum’s courthouse was
almost entirely about ownership of small properties and rights to residence in
them, and burglaries by people unrelated to the victim. Tamaz Ketsba, a well-
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known local lawyer, told journalists that about 70 per cent of all cases heard
in courts are disputes about property, “the accommodation question”
(10.2.10). The use of the law is predominantly by people who do not have
behind them the power of customary institutions. What is more, the court is
asked to decide, in the main, on occurrences in towns. I give chapter and
verse on where lineages cannot keep control.
Police are sometimes brought in when the perpetrator is unknown and
has to be found and this virtually excludes action being taken against
someone from within the same lineage or against a member of a known
lineage. That is to say, the agents of the law are brought in as ancillaries.
What at first glance might be seen as a symptom of post-Soviet “chaos” is an
example of practices that were common in the societies of the Caucasus also
in Soviet times. 
1.1.4 Both custom and law
In Abkhaz customary dispute resolution it might appear that both custom and
law are conceived of and instrumentally drawn on as if each were on an equal
conceptual footing. This would chime with what has been argued by scholars
who subscribe to a theory of legal pluralism that includes the continuation of
traditional activities by a minority community and its punishment by state
agencies, and discuss this in my section on legal pluralism. An important
Abkhaz feature is that the choice of whether to pursue a criminal case through
custom or law remains with those who are involved in a dispute, the
immediately affected players and their kin and neighbours. The discussion of
the legal pluralist argument in chapter two shows the Abkhaz do not see law
and custom as either coexisting as separate structures  with a hierarchical
placing of law  above custom, but to the contrary, accord  custom a priority
over law. Laws are framed that allow this explicitly or by being silent on
custom: 
An offender who has committed a crime of small or medium gravity may be freed 
from criminal responsibility if it [he/she] has made it up with the victim and 
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made amends for the harm occasioned to the victim” (Zakon 27.4.2007: 15: clause 
70). 
Crimes of “medium” gravity include those for which courts may sentence an
offender to five years in prison. The mechanism by which graver crimes can
be made to fit into that category will be explained through case studies
(Zakon Respubliki Abkhazii, 2007, 2009).
Judges seek to minimize the use of the laws and often take the
initiative in seeing that even criminal charges do not reach the courts but are
tackled through customary mediation and reconciliation procedures which I
will describe in my ethnography of evidential cases. I bring them forth to
show their links with etiquette, the role of lineages, reputation honour and
shame (as considered by such as Ruth Benedict and A.L. Epstein) and male
lineage factors, according to what is highlighted in each case. 
Numerous informants in Abkhazia assert that the preserve of “real”
customs and the peoples’ culture “shaped by the centuries” is found in the
village. Others differed on that, seeing apswara as a set of values, with
practices that have to be applied and changed to meet contingencies and the
demands of changing times, including those raised by urbanisation.
 
1.2 Abkhazia, the Abkhaz and Abkhazians
Custom is taken to mean the values and procedures that govern everyday
practices and are enforced by the pressure of communal structures. They are
justified by appeal to ‘tradition’ and a belief system that appeals to the
imagined past for validation. I do not use the word “religion” in this context
and will explain the Abkhaz belief system extensively, as it relates to current
nationalist state-building in chapter six.
Contradictions between acting out customary practices and the
construction of a “modernised” law-based state do manifest themselves, as
Abkhaz concepts of fairness, dignity and equity strain to tackle new problems
that arise out of  developing elements of a capitalist economy and its
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concomitant increase in social stratification and hierarchy generated by
increasingly unequal and individualised ownership and control of resources. 
The delineation of the oppositions is constantly debated and
customary practices are modified to reflect experience, practical necessity.
Those who speak out for greater power for law and a strong state, do so in
general terms and feel obliged to insist that they still want apswara values to
imbue that state and dare not oppose current customary procedure, especially
in the field of dispute resolution. The idea of a society that is based on the
values of apswara is also subscribed to by those who wish to see a society
built “on the basis of law”. However, what this means is often qualified
differently, as exemplified by a past president Sergei Bagapsh telling me in
2010: “Today we must have the law, above all else, law which takes into
account traditions – something that is very complicated. The time has passed
for the president to be the head of a clan or an arbitrator”. 
Max Weber’s dictum that “The claim of the modern state to
monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory
jurisdiction ...” (Weber 1968: 156) is a reference to the state in a capitalist
society of his time, and is not implemented in current Abkhaz practice,
especially when it comes to killings. It remains to be seen whether that will
remain the case. I use the term 'state' here in its common usage in English, to
mean a 'country' with boundaries, and come to its particularities in Abkhazia
through fieldwork examples and my discussion in chapters nine and ten. For
the moment I signal that I shall be discussing the meaning of the state as it
relates to Abkhazia, to class-divided societies and to egalitarian ones in
chapter two.
The laws in Abkhazia embrace the right to take revenge for a
perceived insult, the settling of scores ‘among ourselves’, the threat of blood
revenge and decisions by elders and the assemblies of relatives and local
residents - the skhod - that are not to be challenged. The ultimate test of the
veracity of a person’s version of events is by oath at sacred places and before
the keepers of the major shrines which have “powers” that are linked to
antsva, the supreme creator and his/her/its ‘parts’. Curses, oaths, dreams,
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prophesy, scepticism about ‘natural’ death, killing and revenge are the
common currency. Collectively applied justice by lineages and community
assemblies continues. 
Outward appearances of tradition cloak new practices and
conceptions. The plausibility of embedding a state formation in custom
(Polanyi 1944) is posed, as the anthropology of globalisation (Abeles 1990,
Appadurai 1996, Eriksen 1993) suggests states might be embedded in
institutional global, supra- or extra-state structures (Granovetter 1985).
Abkhaz argue for a close interlinking of custom, with law assisting it.
Embeddedness appears not as tolerance of minority groups within an
overarching state, as has been argued by Gudeman (1986). Discussion among
the Abkhaz often focusing on property relations which embody strong ideas
about fairness, the absence of inequalities in property ownership in Soviet
times and in reference to a supposed ‘traditional’ equality among the Abkhaz.
In practice the Abkhaz often refuse to implement state agents’ allocation of
property as evidence of this is presented in the case where a court decision on
who owns a flat being disregarded and where the police take no action to
enforce court verdicts. This also acts against ethnic Abkhaz who have
recently come to Abkhazia from Turkey, where the state’s allocation of
property to them is ignored, as shown in a survey of the situation (Kavpolit
2014: 1). 
My evidence from fieldwork does raise the question of whether
practices that are characterised as customary can be infinitely adjusted and
tolerated through incorporation of law and be ‘modernised’ should the current
course that is set on building a modern capitalist state be maintained. There
could be a cut-off point at which the dominance of the direct democracy of
flexible custom gives way to rigidity through the appropriation of agency by
state powers – a change to delegated, indirect democracy to accompany
changes from publicly-owned to privately-owned land and capitalist property.
It is interesting that the Abkhaz have retained conceptions that justify many
supposed outmoded practices throughout a turbulent history of societal
changes and foreign conquests, revolutions and wars. This allows me to
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entertain the possibility of a successful outcome of this social experiment to
retain the dominance of custom. 
There is much in Karl Max’s conclusions on the relationship of the
base of production to its superstructure of ideas that is reflected in thinking in
Abkhazia (1971[1859]: 20-21) and see Stone (1985), as long as one does not
base this on the vulgarisation of Marx’s writings that parodies his view, as if
he saw a mechanical relationship between doing and conceiving. There is
relevance for anthropological research (O’Laughlin 1975) in his dialectics of
political economy that made no such direct cause and effect relationship.
Marx did not study in detail how ideas that developed during a particular
form of property relations may retain a hold on people’s conceptions when
such relations are changed. Nor did he research how the hegemony of a ruling
class might be ideologically undermined during its rule. Both of those were
developed in depth by Antonio Gramsci in his study of the processes of
change in people’s perceptions (1967). Marx’s interest specifically in
anthropology is presented by Lawrence Krader’s 452-page edition of Marx’s
writings on ethnology (1972) and has been discussed by numerous scholars
that include Anderson and (2002) and Smith, D. (2002). The latter wrote: “In
his ethnological studies, besides documenting the entirely classless and
stateless character of clan societies, Marx also offers sustained and many-
sided objections to what we can reasonably call authority fetishism” (Smith:
81).
The research questions whether F.J.Feldbrugge’s words about the
Soviet Union are borne out: 
The urban and industrial civilisation will not fail to spread in areas where more 
ancient and traditional ways of life used to prevail. This will result, even without too
much of a conscious effort, in the disappearance of modes of behaviour which are 
rooted in the old ways of life (1977: 38).
 The point at issue is what is meant by “modes of behaviour” and this
dissertation looks into that with fresh field work data that might encourage
fresh thinking. The Abkhaz have instituted a parallel-cum-interwoven
existence of customary practices and laws which questions the opposition of
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custom and state in a novel way. They might be found to be of interest
precisely because examination of their behavioural specificities and seeming
particularities might be found to have parallels in other societies which have
gone unnoticed; an application of Edmund Leach’s emphasising that the
anthropology of other societies allows one to identify the unnoticed that
might exist in one’s own.
A general underlying principle for conduct draws on the flexibility of
customary practices (and their relationship to unsettled or weak state
mechanisms) to meet changing circumstances in a way, as one informant put
it to me somewhat simply in June 2012: “we settle our problems within the
lineage or between lineages”. This has resonances with the research findings
for a Palestinian society that were presented by Glenn Bowman in 2005. In
both, the procedures for disputes resolution place the maintenance of peace
within a community above that of establishing individual guilt and
punishment, as would be the case under western Common and Criminal law.
There is no two-tier legal structure as, for instance in Papua New
Guinea, one lower, for ‘customary practices’ which can be overturned by state
law (Demian 2003), nor is there the ‘legal pluralism’ that observes the
existence of popularly-approved sheep stealing in Sardinia while the Italian
state employs the police to stop this defiance of Italian laws (Ruffini, J.
2005).
When evidence that “would stand up in court” in the western legal
sense is not available in a dispute among the Abkhaz, appeals are made to
sacred sites - oaks or smithies - anykha, or, at the highest levels, to the
keepers of the shrines, at hilltops and sometimes in what double up as little-
frequented Christian churches, which bring a stage of closure to disputes.
However, these beliefs include a fail-safe in that they are enforced by
communal social structures that can institute ostracism and banishment of
those ‘shown’ later, by subsequent events, to have lied – the veracity of a
sworn oath is also sought in subsequent events. Gulia suggested in 1912 that
closure might not be complete, as “There is no association between accuser
and accused after an oath of not being guilty of a charge has been sworn”
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(2003: 352). Later evidence of false testimony could be found by the shrine’s
visitation of otherwise unexplained sickness on a person’s family and lineage:
early deaths, cattle plague, madness and infertility over following
generations. I add that there is a preparatory filtering procedure of widespread
consultation by shrine keepers before they allow oath-swearing; and present
at the rituals are advocates for each side in a dispute. The keepers decide on
whether a particular appeal to the shrine is permitted.
People’s dreams are veshchiye, that is, they prophecy and are taken
into account in the adjudication process of apsua tsas.
In cases where there is the danger of a feud with bloodletting the
forces of the law might be brought in these days, and then only for a court to
be told what verdict and sentence is acceptable to the disputants as will be
demonstrated by cases in chapter four.
The customary system regulates not only disputes, but all family and
lineage matters, through the elders, shrines, popular assemblies - skhody, and
the family, lineage or village gatherings. On questions of national importance
the country’s government will visit a shrine, in what has been described by
one scholar as the state “promoting its authority by exploiting the more or
less widespread belief in the sacred places” (Solovieva, L. 2007: 5). She
references a fellow Russian scholar who cited two occasions of the then
president, Vladislav Ardzinba  - a Moslem, being present together with top
state administrators at ceremonies: one in 1993 for thanksgiving for the
victorious conclusion of the war with Georgia, where a bull was offered up as
a sacrifice; and in 1996 to seek help in the battle against crime (citation of A.
Krylov 1998a). 
But nothing is as simple as sometimes seems – when, through popular
mass assemblies, the recently ousted president was running for election in
2011 and a campaign against his integrity was mounted by an opponent, he
refused to swear an oath of probity at a shrine and stated that he did not
believe in God or the sacred places, yet the people did vote for him. I was
told that his election “despite his atheistic beliefs” (personal communication
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2012) was a demonstration of “Abkhaz tolerance of different beliefs”, a topic
that will be fully discussed under the heading of shrines in chapter seven.
1.2.1 Abkhazia
The peoples of Abkhazia, numbering about 241,00012, constitute an
independent state that is guaranteed, protected and subsidised by the Russian
Federation. Russia's recognition of Akhazia's independence only came in
2008, after Russia had joined Georgia and most other states in imposing a
blockade on Abkhazia from the end of the war with Georgia in 1992, and was
aimed at forcing Abkhazia to return to Georgia and accept the latter's
dominion.  Abkhazia's attempts, especially under President Bagapsh in the
1990s, to be accepted by and integrated into the association of countries of
the European Union came to nought as those countries have backed Georgia's
claim to Abkhazia.
   Abkhazia is in the Caucasus region, wedged-shaped between the north east
shores of the Black Sea and the central range of the High Caucasus
Mountains, bordering the Russian Federation to the north and Georgia to the
east and south. It is approximately 120 miles from northwest to southeast
along the coast and extends at its greatest some 60 miles inland to the high
mountain range. The capital Sukhum is on the coast approximately halfway
along its northwest to southeast axis. 
12 According to the census of February 2011, published at the end of 2011 by the Office of
Government Statistics the population of the republic is 240,705, of which 50.3% described
themselves as urban and 49.7% rural. The sex ratio is 46.4% male to 53.6% female. The
numbers of people who classified themselves as Abkhaz was 122,069 (50.7%); Georgian
43,166 (17.93%), Armenian 41,864 (17.39%), Russian 22,077 (9.1%). Smaller groups
classified themselves as Mingrelian (1.33%) and Greek (0.57%). 
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Figure 1. Abkhazia
The country is today going through great social changes brought about by the
destruction of the Soviet Union, wars and demographic shifts that are
depopulating the villages. Most urbanites still retain the village ancestral
house and land, and the link between town and village continues. This affects
their adaptation to living for long periods in towns, alongside the breakdown
and porosity of the boundaries of closed village communities and
geographical dispersal of lineages.
The ethnic Abkhaz make up a little more than half the population
which includes Armenians, Georgians, Mingrelians, Russians, and small
numbers of others, with their own languages, religions and variety of
customs, many of which overlap geographically and share Abkhaz beliefs and
practices (Solovieva. 2007), and their relationships will be discussed to the
extent that they are relevant to the topic of the dissertation in several chapters,
and in some detail in chapter 6.2 . The matter of the relations of the Abkhaz
with other ethnicities will crop up in relevant sections of the dissertation and
also dealt with more substantially in section 6.2.  
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Tourism is the major industry. Tobacco, citrus fruits and some tea are
grown in the semi-tropical climate (Hewitt 1998a).13  There is extensive wine-
making, some exported to Russia,  timber cutting, stone quarrying for the
construction and civil engineering industries, and some coal is being cut by a
Turkish company which has been granted  commercial concession.
The Abkhaz language is spoken by an estimated half of the
population. There is a diaspora within the boundaries of what was the
Ottoman Empire among which many speak Abkhaz. Beyond these it is almost
an isolate, mutually comprehensible only with some 20,000 Abazins, who
live just north of the High Caucasus Mountain range in the Russian
Federation. Russian, which is almost universally spoken fluently, is the
language of inter-ethnic communication, as it is throughout the Caucasus and
other parts of the former Soviet Union, and is commonly used within each of
the ethnic communities. It is less so in the villages and towns inhabited by
Mingrelians and Georgians, mainly in the south east of the country (see
footnote 7 above).
The Abkhaz language relationship with others is: 
13 George Hewitt’s The Abkhazians (1998a) offers the best available survey of many features
of Abkhazia and the Abkhaz, including language, history and beliefs.  Neal Ascherson’s
Black Sea (1995) is a fairly recent description in English of the peoples of the Caucasus,
showing that the Caucasus is more than the “borderlands” of neighbouring countries and that
the Abkhaz and their languages are, rather, bridges between the peoples of the north and
south Caucasus.
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Figure 2. Northwest Caucasian Languages  (NWC)
(Tsutsiev, A. 2008: 1)
Abkhazia is part of the Caucasian fretwork of states14, many of which are in
conflict with neighbours over land and boundaries and within which conflicts
along ethnic and religious demarcation lines shroud underlying economic and
nationalist tensions. These are sometimes seen as the pursuits of personal
aggrandisement by influential local interests and individuals, as alleged in
private conversations to lie behind a dispute between Abkhazia and Russia
around some well-forested land on Abkhazia’s northwest border.Throughout
their own history the Abkhaz have been distinguished by religious tolerance,
despite the state promotion of Christianity by Tsarist Russia, Islam more
benignly by the Ottomans and anti-religious persecution under the Soviets.
This tolerance is most striking in shared practices and beliefs that have arisen
with  the adsorbtion (sic) of the imported ‘non-indigenous’ religions of
Christianity and Islam onto the surface of the still thriving belief system
(sometimes called ‘paganism’) of the Abkhaz, with little penetration into the
body of Abkhaz traditional beliefs. This might be one factor in there having
been no conflicts along religious lines in Abkhazia whereas there have been
in all neighbouring states. Moslem-professing Kabardians, Adighe people
(often referred to as Circassians or Cherkess by their neighbours and more
widely), Abazins and Chechens, and a few Afghans (personal communication
2009, 2012), as well as Christian Russians and Ossetians, joined the ‘pagan’
(more on this later), Christian and Moslem Abkhaz and local Christian
Armenians against the Georgian invasion of the early 1990s (Solovieva (Op
cit.).
In the current assertion of ethnicity and statehood by the Abkhaz, and
the contest over recognition and territorial boundaries between the Abkhaz
and the Georgian state, the weapons most used are not religious but appeals to
custom and language, and to different readings of history. A current schism
within the Eastern Orthodox Church in Abkhazia reflects Abkhaz nationalist
pressure for separating a schismatic Abkhazian church from the Georgian one
whose jurisdiction over the population of Abkhazia is endorsed by the
Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople
14 These include Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North and South Ossetia, Georgia,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygheia, Karachai-Cherkessiya, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
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(the primus inter pares of the nine eastern Orthodox patriarchates).  The
schism is not theological or based on other religious difference but reflects
state contentions between Abkhazia and Georgia, an opposition to the
Georgian Orthodox Church hierarchy,  one of whose leaders, the hieromonk
(priestmonk of the Orthodox  Church) Father Giorgi (Basiladze) put the
Georgian Church’s view as: “We will certainly return to Abkhazia, whether or
not the Abkhaz, Russians or whoever else want this or not. We will return
independently of whether our Abkhaz brothers come to their senses or harden
their hearts even more against us” (Giorgi 2009).
Figure 3. Maps showing the geographical location of Abkhazia within the Black Sea,
Mediterranean and Eurasian areas.
1.2.2 Legacies of the past
According to Abkhaz historiography, ethnography and myths, the Abkhaz and
proto-Abkhaz have been settled where they are since well before the claimed
first appearance of Christians from the west in the first century (Bartsyts, R.
2010: 42).  Christianity did not expand from the early Greek and then Roman
costal trading enclaves. It is argued that a Christian Church existed there in
the 4th century (Ibid.: 44).  By the 7th century Abkhazia was within the
Byzantine Empire, which appointed its archon prince, and used Greek in
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church liturgy. During the 8th century the liturgy changed to Georgian. In the
9th and 10th centuries Abkhazia maintained an independent kingdom (Inal-ipa
1965: 131-133). From the late 10th century onwards church building expanded
along the narrow coastal plain. With the decline of Byzantium there emerged
over the following five centuries independent Abkhaz princedoms and
kingdoms, whose borders shifted repeatedly as a result of changing alliances,
intermarriage and dynastic struggles, and expanded and contracted in their
domains within the south Caucasus. With the break-up of the Georgian
kingdom in the 16th century the Abkhaz lands were conquered in the 1570s by
Ottoman Turks. These ruled for nearly four centuries, bringing Islam with
them as the state religion, when most churches fell into disuse. The Ottomans
ruled largely through Abkhaz chiefs and princes, many of whom switched
from Christianity to Islam, which penetrated deeper into the villages than had
the earlier Christianity. They ruled until the Russian conquest, which was
completed in the 1860s and that brought state-sponsored Christian missionary
work, but met with a cool reception across the country according to Gulia
(2003). The Moslem clergy had been accepted in the villages and, unlike the
Georgian clergy brought by the Russians, lived among the people and
intermarried with the Abkhaz. Islam later lost ground as a result of the mass
exodus of Abkhaz known by its Arabic-Russian name of Mahajirstvo
(Dzidzaria, G. 1975). Led by their Islamised nobility, half of the country’s
population left. Tsarist forces expelled many of the Abkhaz who had not
themselves left for Turkey and other parts of the Middle East. Their
settlements remain to this day in Turkey, Syria, Libya, Jordan and Palestine.
The Russian Revolutions of 1917 and Sovietisation from the 1920s put an
end to Christian and Moslem proselytising in Abkhazia. Neither state-linked
Islam nor Christianity had ever established dominion over, or excluded, the
local belief system, nor had they acquired an overarching hold on the minds
and customs of the Abkhaz. 
The conditions of life had earlier made for small, militarised
communities in which all men carried arms and knew how to use them, which
held fast to their land, language, weapons and customs well into modern
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times; rooted in a past and partially continuing egalitarian social outlook and
institutions with notions of an ideal society. The customary rules of the kin-
based lineages retained wide acceptance through different state configurations
well into the 20th century (Inal-ipa 1965). They retained a hold even as
nobility was created under a proto-feudal sovereign prince who remained
primus inter pares, and the last of whom was still shown public respect by the
Communist Nestor Lakoba, who headed the Soviet government in the 1920s
and until 1936, as witnessed by Paustovsky (1966).
Kin groups exploited the land and had common pasturage and hunting
territories which were contested among the groups and defended against the
encroachments of neighbours. Today the protagonists of a nationalist
programme for statehood legitimise themselves by drawing selectively on
events and practices that are seen as having survived from the real or
imagined past as discussed by Hobsbawm and Ranger (2003 [1983]. What
constitutes ‘tradition’ here will be examined by drawing on the literature and
on the voices of today’s Abkhaz. Ethnic self-identity itself dates, according to
Inal-ipa from the early 19th century (Inal-ipa: 360 et seq.) 
The Abkhaz were partially successful in resisting 19th century Russian
land reforms that took away many of the commons and introduced private
demesnes and tenancies in the coastal areas which they controlled. The
Abkhaz retained elements of kin-founded custom despite the Tsarist Empire’s
efforts to enforce its laws (Inal-ipa 1965: 32).
The relationship between the Abkhaz nobility and the commoners
relied on a reticulum of fostering known in Russian as atalychestvo (Inal-ipa
n.d). Under this the peasants chose patrons from among lords were never tied
to the land, of which there was no shortage, and could freely change their
patron. This was very different from the feudal system in neighbouring
Georgia and underpinned continuation of customary values. By the time of
the Russian revolutions of 1917 capitalist relations had put down only
shallow roots. The Abkhaz peasants worked homesteads individually as
members of patrilinies. They retained elements of custom that negated the
enforcement of laws by the conquering Tsarist Empire (Kraevich 1871,
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Machavariani 1913) and then Soviet laws during Abkhazia’s membership of
the state configurations of the USSR. The legal codes did not govern Abkhaz
life as the Abkhaz remained concentrated in their villages, which were to a
certain extent bypassed by the initial Soviet transformations. 
In Soviet times Abkhazia first obtained republican status within the
USSR, but the realities of this independence were gradually whittled away
through increasing concentration of powers at the centre of the USSR and
Soviet Georgian hegemony in Abkhazia.
Although ruled over for long periods by Byzantines, Ottomans and
Russians, with the collaboration of their own notables, the Abkhaz have
retained many of their own peculiarities. More so than the populations of
other states in the Caucasus they accepted religions that came from outside on
their own terms and that has for the most part been only skin deep. It has been
described as “pagan” (Chirikba 2012, among others) the word used not
pejoratively but, to extend The Concise English Dictionary (1960) definition
of it as the animism of things (the “attribution of living soul to inanimate
objects and natural phenomena”) also to include concepts that are objectified
and given agency. Thus, the story is widely told of how in the 19th century
smallpox was identified with a spirit which was then ritually married via a
lineage head to several Abkhaz women and thus brought into a lineage and
ceased to afflict the Abkhaz. Cattle are thought to fear to enter a holy grove
on a sacred hillock where I saw prayers and a sacrificial chicken offered up to
a local spirit/force to bring a good harvest in 2011. In 2008 I witnessed an
atsunykhva ceremonial procession through Sukhum led by women with dolls,
banners and calf heart-and-lung offerings impaled on a stick to plead with the
supernatural power that ruled over water and thunder for rain to end a drought
… the rains came. 
What constitutes ‘tradition’ here is an on-going debate which will be
examined in depth, drawing on its roots among the Abkhaz and the literature
and the voices of today. Abkhaz scholars tend to draw attention to the
peaceful aspects of past practices, such as the power of women to end conflict
by dropping a kerchief between men about to fight and the part played by
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elders in peacemaking to end a feud (Bartsyts 1999). The Abkhaz scholar
Arvelod Kuprava warns that were the Abkhaz    to lose apswara and the
component of alamys (conscience), “we will turn into a disconnected mass
without its own national face” and he writes of Abkhaz custom as sui generis
which must be kept pure and eternal to maintain the nation (2007).
Despite persecution of practitioners of what were deemed
anachronistic and harmful practices, “survivals” of the past, many of these
remain to this day. Although modified, the etiquette and inter-lineage
relations of custom did continue to govern much of property relations and
individual conduct in the Soviet period. Soviet modernisation changed the
country from being overwhelmingly dependent on small-scale farming and
brought coal mining, power generation, road and construction industries for
tourism, universal education, scientific research centres and social provision
that included hospitals - all the industrialisation that accompanied the
collectivisation of the peasants’ land holdings in the 1930s (Krylov 1999a: 44
and personal communications 2008-2012). 
The continuation of customary practices within Soviet Abkhazia was
often with the connivance of local Abkhaz Soviet authorities (personal
communications). Another factor in allowing Abkhaz beliefs and traditional
practices to survive was that the cutting edge of Soviet religious persecution
was directed, in the first instance, at the Russian Orthodox Church and Islam,
as the bulk of the clergy of both had allegedly opposed the Bolshevik
revolution. Nonetheless, there were a number of serious attempts by some
Communist authorities to put an end to the practices of the ‘pagan’ beliefs, as
by Komsomol members smashing the large clay pots of wine that were buried
underground at sacred shrines to mature in preparation for use in rituals
(personal communications 2010-2011). Six of the seven most respected
shrines ceased to function openly.
Another explanation of the grounds for the survival of customary
practices suggested to me in personal communication (B-n 2011) was that
the Soviet authorities did secure agreement from elders in the Abkhaz villages
to radical modernisation projects, including collectivisation of peasant
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holdings, by exempting Abkhaz villages from many of their effects, and
carrying through collectivisation mainly among immigrant settler
communities. Some Abkhaz elders were led to believe that they would be left
to manage their own affairs – something that resulted, as put by one
informant: “They [i.e. the immigrants] got the tractors and administrative
power while we were left with the horse and plough” (Spring 2012). What is
beyond doubt is that collectivisation of the land was applied to the Abkhaz
later than to other peoples of the Soviet Union after compromises were
initially arrived at.  These came notably in the early 1930s when peasants did
actively oppose some of the consequences of the start of collectivisation in
the Bzyb (now Gudauta) region of north-west Abkhazia. Resistance was both
to economic innovations and to the effects that the peasants perceived
collectivization was having on their traditions (Blauvelt 2012: 87-88).
Patrilineages to a large degree still hold together the networks of Abkhaz
society, not least through the strong links maintained with the villages by
those resettled permanently or temporarily in the towns. Demographic change
has been a feature of Abkhaz reality for a long time.
1.2.3 Demographic changes
Over the past 150 years the half the Abkhaz population that was evicted from
or fled Abkhazia were replaced by Armenian and Greek Christians from
Turkey and Mingrelians/Georgians from Georgia. They were not only settled
on rural land but it was they who came initially to inhabit the towns. Large
numbers also came from Russia with the result that non-Abkhaz came heavily
to outnumber the Abkhaz by the middle of the 20th century (Mueller 1998:
218-228). 
Yet the Soviet practice of positive discrimination in education and in
the allocation of administrative posts through quotas reserved for titular
national minorities (Martin 2001:139 et seq.) did, to some degree, favour
Abkhaz within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic which incorporated
Abkhazia as a nominally autonomous unit in 1931 (Lakoba, S. 1998a: 94).
The effects of the 1992/93 war with Georgia were dramatic: infrastructure
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was wrecked and there was enormous damage to agriculture, industries and
holiday and tourist centres (kurorty). Whole villages and towns were burned
down and total losses amounted to around $13-14 billion, according to the
then vice-President Alexander Ankvab (ApsnyPress 26.5.10).
 The Abkhaz have only moved to towns in large numbers since the
war and the exodus of Georgians. Twenty years ago the Abkhaz in the capital,
Sukhum, were a small proportion of its then population of 120,000.
According to Derluguian the Abkhaz made up only 7% of the urban
population of the country as a whole in 1989 (Op cit.: 236). Sukhum's present
estimated 47,000 inhabitants are 56 per cent Abkhaz (State Statistical Office
2008) and results from an influx from the villages and the exodus of the vast
majority of Georgians. By 2011 urbanisation tipped the town population for
the first time to just over half (50.3%) of the country’s population and makes
current anthropological studies of urbanisation and custom  interesting for
additional study, as has been suggested based on research in similar processes
elsewhere (Pardo 2004, Prato 2009). However, there is also the phenomenon
of people living in both a village and a town, what Yamskov called “semi-
urbanisation” (2009: 9).
The issue of property ownership or usage without ownership is
relevant here. Housing in towns and land throughout the USSR was
municipally or state-owned, and land usage was similarly commonly owned.
It is still officially largely so in Abkhazia. Even where flats may be privately
owned municipalities still are held largely responsible for providing services
and the upkeep of roofs. Many flats have simply been arbitrarily occupied in
the aftermath of population displacements and the massive destruction of the
war brought by Georgia's sending its troops and tanks into Abkhazia in 1992
and then pursuing a policy of burnt earth and demolitions. The Abkhaz have
stripped empty public and once vacated dwellings, using fittings as fuel or
cannibalised for use in what was left standing in the fight for survival during
the international blockade. The matter of ownership of these today is
unsettled and gives rise to conflicts for which customary practices and
institutions have proven to be weak in resolving.
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The movement in population can be illustrated by the example of the
large Lykhny village secondary school in north-west Abkhazia. Built in 1981
for 1,200 children it had some 800 on the rolls on the eve of the war and only
around 200 today (Respublika Abkhazia 23.1.13).
The Abkhaz diaspora has retained, in its own view and that of their
“co-ethnics” in Abkhazia, many conservative Abkhaz customs but few have
returned to independent Abkhazia – despite its open-door policy towards
them - economic conditions are not inviting, although some have come as
refugees from the current war in Syria.
Informants have noted that national service in all parts of the Soviet
Union had for decades opened up young Abkhaz to new ideas they learnt
from fellow recruits. The active service during the fight for independence in
1992-93 placed new responsibilities disproportionately on the young, who
have become more assertive.  Since the break-up of the USSR the shutting
down of most of the industries that provided full employment and the
discipline of the workplace, taken together with the collapse of the farming
system, Abkhaz youth have been forced in large numbers to seek work in the
towns which are beyond much of the village-based dictates of the upholders
of customary practices (1999a: 26), and has also forced tens of thousands of
young people to leave for work in neighbouring Russia where, again, the arm
of tradition is weaker. At home there has been a big increase in crime.
Thousands of immigrants from the even more desolated post-Soviet states of
Central Asia replace some of them to work the construction industry and the
most menial occupations in tourism, markets and street cleaning.
********************
“Ethnicity” is locally not defined by “blood” but by patriliny and wider
kinship affine links. In the nowadays few cases when a Georgian man marries
an Abkhaz woman and he adopts Abkhaz ways he is then counted as having
become ethnically Abkhaz. In 2010 and 2012 I first saw black-skinned people
whose ancestors arrived in Abkhazia from Africa possibly in the mid 18th
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century and are described as Abkhazskie negry - Afro-Abkhazians. They are
universally recognised by other Abkhaz as Abkhaz as they adopted local
custom and freely intermarried with other Abkhaz. 
Women from non-Abkhaz families who marry an Abkhaz thereby
marry into the Abkhaz lineage and ethnicity although they do retain
weakened kinship links with their original pre-marriage lineage.
The Soviet period brought together Abkhazians from all ethnic groups
in the factories, mines, service industries and, to a lesser extent, villages.
Where there were mixed communities on collective farms it was common for
the work teams, the brigady, just as in some town workplaces, to be made up
according to ethnic group. Intermarriages or, defined more correctly as
“marriages into”, “marriages changing ethnicity”, were not uncommon and, it
has been claimed by one author that “more than 40% of the population of
Abkhazia belonged to such (wrongly called) “mixed Abkhaz-Georgian
marriages”. The same writer placed emphasis on this creating “a large
network of […] kin contacts” (Marshania 2008).  
Although there are such networks, and influential they may be, the
large number of marriages between the Abkhaz and members of other
ethnicities, especially Mingrelians (often loosely referred to as Georgians)
does not turn the marriages into “mixed” ones, as the woman loses her
original ethnicity and custom to those of her husband, although reverse
gender dominance is not unknown. I encountered cases of pre-marriage
Mingrelians, Georgians, Armenians, Russians and Ossetians so becoming
Abkhaz and in conversation they spoke freely of themselves as “we Abkhaz”.
The same changing of ethnicity works the other way round, with Abkhaz
women acquiring a different ethnicity. This cultural understanding of
ethnicity is general across the Caucasus. A woman who by birth was Abkhaz
became Chechen in this manner in one of the families I met. 
The stress laid in nationalist ideology on the perceived importance of
preserving Abkhaz national identity has led to some disputes, including about
whether Abkhaz women should be marrying non-Abkhaz, especially from
among new immigrant workers, often in defiance of their families. The war
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and emigration have left a surplus of women in the population according to
Tsvizhba, Z. (2012), who wrote that women sometimes had to defy their
families to marry, to obtain “the status of being a wife.” Some immigrants
have acquired second wives in Abkhazia and this is often defended in the
press by Abkhazians, although not all agree. The opinion of a veteran of the
independence war was: “they should not be left husband-less” and he spoke
of the tragedy of the war killing so many young men (personal
communication 2012).
The Abkhaz control state structures, claimed as a right won by
repulsing the Georgian invasion of the early 1990s and based on their claim
to be the original inhabitants of the land, the autochthones; something that is
generally accepted by Russians, Ossetians and Armenians in Abkhazia but is
contested by their Georgian neighbours.  Obtaining Abkhazian passports and
citizenship involves going through a complicated procedure and is currently a
political hot potato that was a factor in a change of government forced by
street demonstrations outside government buildings in May 2014. The
Abkhazian government’s newspaper has reported that in the town of
Tkuarchal, in the east of the country “there is a much bigger number of
marriages entered into [than those officially registered over the past year] but
registration of marriages is only made for those who have Abkhazian
passports, which, many young people have not yet received, unfortunately”
(Shulgina. 2012). Newspapers not infrequently report that local authorities do
not efficiently register births and adoptions.
The country’s state system has been pivoted on power that is in the
hands of the president, despite the existence of an elected parliament, both of
which are under pressure from the changing conditions towards
commercialisation of life that undermine the collectivist ideas and
foundations of property ownership in the Soviet and, largely, pre-Soviet
periods, as noted by many informants (2007:500-511). No single party may
obtain a majority in parliament because no party may contest more than a
third of its seats. A new development is the establishment of groups of
associated parties, the possible consequences of which will be seen in my
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concluding chapters. At the time of writing an opposition movement is
seeking radical changes to lift the country out of cultural and economic
continuing crisis and it and pro-government forces are fighting it out through
the convening of mass meetings and traditional assemblies – the skhods – and
though an extraordinary election for a new president.
I now turn to discussion of the literature and then to an explanation of
my methodology.
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Chapter 2 Literature review
The academic trend […] is away from dichotomous models in which law and 
Westernisation are opposed to custom and tradition and towards integrative models 
which stress the dynamism of custom and prefer to see village courts as an 
alternative to both traditional dispute settlement and legal formalism.
Michael Goddard. 1996. Reference to Aleck 1992:114
We live in a law-ridden society; law has cannibalized the institutions which it 
presumably reinforces or with which it interacts. [...W]e are encouraged to 
assume that legal behaviour is the measure of moral behaviour....Efforts to legislate
conscience by an external political power are the antithesis of custom: customary 
behaviour comprises precisely those aspects of social behaviour which are 
traditional, moral and religious-- in short, conventional and non legal. Put another
way, custom is social morality. The relation between custom and law is basically 
one of contradiction, not continuity. 
Thus, law is symptomatic of the emergence of the state[...] Custom -- spontaneous, 
traditional, personal, commonly known, corporate, relatively unchanging--is the 
modality of primitive society; law is the instrument of civilization, of political 
society sanctioned by organized force, presumably above society at large and 
buttressing a new set of social interests. Law and custom both involve the regulation
of behaviour but their characters are entirely distinct....
            Stanley Diamond. 1971. In Search of the Primitive: 255-280
Anthropology has had a development strikingly parallel with that of the law, and its 
practitioners have always tended to seek the norms of a society as the basis for 
understanding such key concepts as kinship and ‘the family’
   Michael Herzfeld.  2001: 218.
The results of my fieldwork suggested the possibility of the Abkhaz achieving
a state founded on the direct democracy of customary practice rather than on
the delegation of power to agencies of the state.
A reading of the scholarship on law and custom raises a number of
unanswered questions that pertain to Abkhaz relationships in a society where
the strength of customary practices is impeding moves towards a capitalist
‘modernisation’ and a state governed by the  rule of law.
I researched the background scholarship under the six headings of
custom, law and state, definitions, a major debate, post-Sovietics and
‘transitology’ and the ethnography of the Abkhaz.
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In examining the literature before setting out for the field I came up
against two general linked matters which required clarification: one of
definitions and the second the quasi-dominance of “Western” concepts of law
in much of the anthropological writing about customary practices. This
revolves around the place allocated to the state in anthropology. The citations
that head this chapter illustrate how far apart some contentions are on both.
I provide extensive background to the still dominant Russian and
Soviet approaches to ethnicity among the Abkhaz and looked for evidence of
where this affects modernisation and nationalist state-building. Wider
scholarship and debates on state and custom revealed how state law has
contested customary practices, usually superseding them while often
incorporating elements of customary-derived practices but reserving appeal to
law as the final arbiter when conflicts arise in state-law-governed societies. In
Abkhazia there is no such primacy accorded to law over custom. 
2.1 Custom and law and state
Customary practices and how they relate to law have received considerable
attention in Western legal anthropological output, drawing on ethnography in
societies on all continents. For the most part it takes as its starting point
Western law, and interpretation of custom has been bounced off it. That
approach by and large pursues an evolutionist path that presents custom as
turning over time into law, accompanied by the retention of the customary
appearances of restorative justice; practices that are widely present even in
the most industrialised of states, as simulacra of customary practice. They are
ever open to legal curtailment at the will of state institutions, thus being
firmly embedded within the realm of state power and law and as secondary
features of state law. 
There is a general negation of a role for customary practices other
than as temporary holding where they contradict law, and are practiced only
as tolerated by agencies of the law. In his oft cited volume H.L.A Hart gave
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recognition to this when he wrote that where a legislature grants courts the
power to deprive customs of legal status they “are exercising a virtually
uncontrolled discretion” (1961: 44). Yet he did not expand on the implications
of that deduction: that law negates custom.
That is something that Maine had already noted a century earlier:
“When primitive law [read: custom] has once been embodied in a Code, there
is an end to what may be called its spontaneous development. Henceforward
the changes effected in it, if effected at all, are effected deliberately and from
outside” (Bennett and Vermeulen 1980: 216, citing Maine Ancient Law 1950
[1861]: 13).
However, a picture of the evolutionary customCommon LawLaw
transition is seen in Henry Maine’s other comment: “Law is derived from pre-
existing rules of conduct which are at the same time legal, moral and
religious in nature […and] the severance of morality and religion from law
belong only to the latter stages of mental progress” (cited by Diamond: 1971:
vii, words from Maine’s Ancient Law (1950) [1861]: 14, 16. London:
Murray). That quotation expresses an old idea that it was people’s ideas,
“mental progress” that gave rise to the change from what we would today call
custom to law. Such  an approach to social change has currency today as
found in the Introduction to a collection of works  in which a number of
scholars debate whether doctrine came before practices  of customary law
(sic)   or followed on them (Perreau-Saussine and Murphy eds 2007: 2). In
like vein Gerald Postema has recently written: “The hallmark of legally
binding customs […] is not the addition of belief or conviction to behaviour,
but rather the integration of meaningful conduct into a web of legally
recognised reasons and arguments” (2012: 707). I will discuss his conception
of “legally binding customs” when I address the question of whether custom
can be legally codified in a later chapter based on field research. 
In his survey of legal expert’s writings on legal pluralism in a global
context, Ralf Michaels cites Guterman (1990) for his view that the myriad of
laws (sic) before the rise of the state, had as their “most important connecting
factor … not the territory of the state but rather community affiliation of the
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individual” (Michaels 2009: 9) – a loose use of the word “state”, here to mean
a territory, while elsewhere it is the centralised mechanism of rule. This
confusion is not accidental, as the author perceives no conflict as such
between customary laws (the myriad of “laws”) and the rules of a state (viz
Diamond) and pluralism becomes a floating discursive phenomenon.
The varied use of the terms “law”, “Common Law”, “customary
practices” and “custom” that is found in scholars’ writings reflects a degree of
imprecision and confusion that conceptually places custom in a time capsule
that distinguishes its practices only by its having been around a long time…
Lawyers have generally viewed “custom law” through the prism of their
interpretation of the transformations that took place from Common Law in
England15. Their prototype has been developed by judges and other legal
specialists and then drawn on in anthropology. Tamanaha touches on that in a
reference to the generation of transnational commercial law, when he stated:
“that is almost entirely the product of private law making activities” (2000:
1). He warns against the “error […] to think that other legal and normative
systems are parallel to state law (as sociologists and anthropologists
sometimes assume)” (Ibid.: 62).
In his debate with Max Gluckman on custom and law, Paul Bohannan
hinted at the problem: “The anthropologist’s chief danger is that he will
change one of the folk systems of his own society into an analytical system,
and try to give it wider application than its merit and usefulness allow” (1957:
5), warning against lawyers transporting the values and principals of legal
systems from their own societies, what he terms “folk systems”, especially
from the Roman and English ones of colonial powers, as yardsticks by which
15 Confusion here arises with the use of Common Law to cover what it properly should – the
conclusion of the unification and fossilisation of local, customary practices, into the state’s
(King’s)  law in England under Henry II; and the use of the same word “common” to cover
prior existing local, customary regulations, those of local communities (Sommerville, J.
faculty.history.wisc.edu/.../123%20104%20Common%20Law.htm.). See also According to
Britannica Online Encyclopedia: local customs gave way to “the great transformations of the
13th and 14th centuries, when English law was given statutory authority under the crown, the
‘customs of the realm’ became England’s common law” (Viewed 16.4.2010
http:www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/147411/custom). 
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to judge or understand other societies’ legal or customary systems, their “folk
systems”.
 The reinforcing of the so-derived legalistic approach with only a
paucity of recent research to question it has turned it into a ‘paradigm’.
Stanley Diamond (1974) challenged that but he was not successful in
breaking the mould and the matter needs to be returned to. I do so later in this
chapter when I cover the debate between Paul Bohannan and Max Gluckman,
which missed the salient point that Diamond raised to differentiate custom
from law, which he spelled out as the difference between “the rule of law and
the order of custom” (1974: 25). Bennett drew attention to the same problem:
“Customary rules are generated by a community’s acceptance of certain
standards of behaviour whereas, in the case of Western law, the rules are
derived from legislative fiat and the authoritative decisions of the courts”
(1985: 17). He and his colleague N.S. Peart wrote: “Customary law is pre-
eminently embodied in a set of concrete principles, the detailed application of
which to particular cases is flexible and subject to change” (1995 [1991]: 5).
Bennett had already earlier concluded: “In many respects, the two systems
are irreconcilable” (1985: 15). I break down the study of the nature of law,
custom and the state to analytical topics, starting with definitions of terms.
2.2 Definitions
The matter of definitions has a history that goes back in anthropology,
sociology and law to the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, as found among
many of the works by, for example, Karl Marx, Henry Maine, Lewis Morgan,
Robert Lowie, Max Weber and Bronislaw Malinowski, and debate on which
intensified in the post-colonial period of anthropological self-examination.
In some of the earlier literature specifically related to law and custom
the latter is seen as the property of societies that are pre-literate or pre-state
(Shershenevich 1911: 369). 
Early in the 20th century Weber set out his thoughts on custom and
law, which he saw not as opposed to social phenomena but as different
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expressions of the ways humans organise their social rules for living, both
being dependent on people’s “attitudes” towards how to behave. Accordingly,
custom existed “merely as a result of unreflective habituation to a regularity
of life that has engraved itself…,” supposedly embodying no fundamental
opposition to social behaviour that is enforced by a “coercive apparatus”:
both being “law” (Weber, 1968:12). More precisely, he gives his definition as:
“’law’…is simply an ‘order system’ endowed with certain specific guarantees
of the probability of its empirical validity” (Ibid.: 13). 
This he developed by stating that it matters not whether enforcement
is guaranteed by a judge or “some other organ” or by a kinship structure
(Ibid.: 19); and: “legal coercion, where it transforms a usage into a legal
obligation…often adds practically nothing to its effectiveness” (Ibid.: 21).
Further, on the difference of custom and law: “It is only with regard to the
sociological structure of coercion that they differ: The conventional [i.e.
traditional or custom-based M.C.] order lacks specialised personnel for the
implementation of coercive power (enforcement machinery: priests, judges,
police, the military, etc.)” (Ibid: 27).  I suggest that Weber’s approach is the
one that underlies much of the approach in the dominant paradigm on law and
custom today: 
Whether a rule is enforced by general agreement or by enforcement agencies from 
outside/placed above an immediate community, then that is “law” and it can exist in 
its plurality with custom in any given society. There is no qualitative difference 
between such a phenomenon relying on a state coercive apparatus and one that does 
not; no basic distinction between Evans-Pritchard’s acephalous Nuer society and 
the German capitalist one of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, “the iron cage” in
which Weber saw people trapped in the society in his time (Weber, 1994: xvi). 
I will show that does not fit Abkhaz reality.
Malinowski wrote that “the rules of law form but one well-defined
category within the body of custom” (1949 [1926]]: 54), which was
“designate[d as] the sum total of rules, conventions and patterns of
behaviour” (Ibid: 51).  He, thus, reduced laws to the normative use for
54
ordering any kind of society, an opinion that differed radically from those of
Diamond (1974: 255-280) and Assier-Andrieu (1983: 86-94) for its
introducing the term “law” into the order of custom. Those two scholars saw
“law” as being a feature of class-divided society and associated with the state.
Karl Marx studied the dynamics of societies and their changes and in
his later years devoted much time to anthropology (Krader 1972). His view of
the state as a vehicle for domination by a ruling class is famous and takes a
very different position to that of Weber. At the same time, as put by John
Lewis, an English follower of Marx, they did share the view that “a sociology
based on a simple description of social data and deriving its generalisations
from such data […] was logically unsound and inadequate as a method for the
social sciences. It does no more than describe and analyse present society
without considering its fundamental structure and economic basis as
themselves problematic”. According to that author’s humanistic
interpretation, they shared the outlook that “went beyond the mindless
empiricism that eschewed theory in favour of practical concern with plain
facts (Lewis, 1975: 1)16. What they did not share was Weber’s view that
society changed only as a consequence of people’s rationalisation.
 Marx, together with Frederick Engels wrote down their arguments to
identify those forces within societies that could be harnessed to influence
societal processes in a famous pamphlet, The Communist Manifesto (1984),
first published in German in 1872 and in English in 1888.  To paraphrase it:
they considered that there were present in all societies that were divided into
social classes opposing interests that arose from the dynamics of production.
The classes’ principal distinguishing features were determined by where they
stood in relation to the means of production. Those relations varied in
different class societies and in capitalism people were either owners of the
means of production or workers who owned nothing but their ability to work,
which the owners bought with the wages they paid and which were worth less
than the goods the workers manufactured, the meaning of “exploitation” in
16 That philosopher’s interpretation of Marx was challenged and widely publicised by Louis
Althusser, a French follower of Marx who argued that Lewis based his views on the
Hegelianism of Marx as a young man, whereas, in his view, that was discarded in later life,
an “epistemological break” (1976: 61) - a discussion of ‘what Marx really meant’.
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Marx’s works. It was the different interests of the classes and the way the
owners, the “bourgeoisie” were forced to operate in order to continue as
owners that forced on the workers the requirement to resist them and
eventually to strive to remove them if they were not to be totally
impoverished. According to that, in the class-divided society of their day,
private capital was defended by the capitalist state: “The executive of the
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the
whole bourgeoisie” (1984: 82). He stressed the coercive powers of the state in
that class society. The authors of the Manifesto concentrated their analysis on
European capitalism and on how they saw it had arisen out of earlier class-
divided feudal societies which generated their own forms of class struggle.
Marx was interested in how capitalism could be ended and be
superseded by a society without contending classes - “communism.” It is
evident from some of Marx’s other works, including in his collected
anthropology (Krader  1972) that change from one class-divided society to
another was not seen only in the simple form summarised in the Manifesto.
He did entertain the possibility of what we would today call existing
customary institutions being preserved and that they could facilitate the
construction of communism without the horrors of going through excesses of
West European capitalism. In his correspondence with the Russian
revolutionary Vera Zasulich, Marx (1989 [1881]) expressed the view that
Russia’s rural communes, the m i r (based on kinship and common
geographical setting), could be “the fulcrum for social regeneration in
Russia.” In the preface to the Russian translation of the Manifesto of the same
year - his last writing - he stated: “If the Russian revolution becomes the
signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that the two complement
each other, then Russia’s peasant communal landownership may serve as the
point of departure for a communist development” (Lowy, 2011). Marx’s
speculation was later debated in the period of decolonisation of the mid 20th
century, the implications for the Abkhaz I discuss in my concluding chapter
ten.
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Marx and Engels made clear that they used the word “state” in the
Manifesto specifically to mean the mechanism for class rule in a class-divided
society.  Developing this in a broader historical context Engels uses the same
word “state” to cover classless ‘tribal’ society where it  “had at first [been
arrived] at only for safeguarding their common interests  and providing
protection against external enemies” (n.d. [1878]: 169). The different aspects
of the word “state” as he thought it are evident. It was this that led to Engels
describing  a “state” without classes, which he and Marx envisaged as
possible in the future as one in which “The government of persons is replaced
by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production”
(Ibid: 315).
Does that idea suggest the possibility of custom taking over from the
(capitalist) state? Marx presented no blueprint for what communism as a
social system would look like but analysed societies for the tendencies within
them that might be directed. He expressed the expectation that a classless
society will not have the coercive agencies of the state that characterise class
ones. In the Manifesto he drew attention to the egalitarian collectivism that
many others in his time argued was found in the communality of pre-
industrial ‘primitive’ communist societies, in pre-class social formations,
often called such in anthropological literature. Engels drew heavily on Marx
when in 1876 he wrote The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape
to Man (Engels 1952 [1896]) which is largely incorporated into one of his
major works, written between 1872 and 1882, The Origin of the Family,
Private Property and the State (1940). Marx was strongly influenced by
Darwin’s thinking on evolution and very much by Lewis Henry Morgan’s
anthropology in Ancient Society (1877), based on field work on North
American native societies.17 
17 Marx’s interest in pre-capitalist social formations is cited with commentary by Michael
Lowy, reviewing Kevin Anderson’s Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity and
Non-Western Societies (2010). Anderson “documents not only [Marx’s] anti-colonialism, but
also his deep interest in the pre-capitalist and non-Western forms of communal property,
particularly in India, Algeria, and Latin America. In an interesting comment on the French
colonial policy in Algeria, Marx refers to official material of the French National Assembly
in 1875 — quoted by Kovalevsky — where the same “Rurals” that suppressed the Paris
Commune in 1871, denounce communal property in Algeria as a danger, since it is “a form
that supports communist tendencies in people’s minds”; those representatives of the French
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Without mentioning Marx, Malinowski strongly rejected his theories
on society on two principal grounds. The first was that he found what he
defined as private property present in the south Pacific society he had
extensively studied and where the term primitive communism - is “certainly
not correct in reference to Melanesian societies, which I know at first hand”
(1985; 11). Here, I would draw attention to Malinowski's failure to grasp that
Marx's use of the word “property” was denoting ownership of the means for
exploitation of labour power. Malinowski saw the collectivist and egalitarian
features that Marx imagined as a fantasy. Secondly, he deduced from his
research that changes in society were brought about not by individuals
constrained by social structures18 but by personal interest: “Human culture is
primarily founded on the biological needs of man. Following this cue, we can
add that in satisfying his primary biological needs through the
instrumentalities of culture, man imposes new determinants on his behaviour
that is, develops new needs”(1948 :202) such as for food and shelter. Social
institutions, he believed served those basic human needs; something that fell
within his highly individualistic interpretation of human motivation that was
very much in concord with liberal economic theory of the Adam Smith
school. Malinowski’s “functionalism” was not accepted by one of his
prominent students, Edmund Leach, who, in his First Malinowski  Memorial
Lecture in 1959 (1968), also rejected the idea of classifying societies as if
they were bounded wholes – “butterfly collection” - and called, instead, for
the study of general patterns in thought and behaviour across societies –
“generalisation” (1968: 2). He found fault with what he called the proponents
of “vulgar Marxism” for subscribing to a “dogma” that held that intrinsic
conflict within every society provided the motor for change. He argued that
the study of binary oppositions in society allowed one to see how the
“transformation of economics into ideology through the mediation of kinship
actually occurs” (1986: 223). This last point, I think, takes him close to Marx,
bourgeoisie, adds Marx, “are unanimous on the goal: destruction of collective property.”
18 That is to say not by Marx's conclusion that “Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition 
of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (1972 [1869]: 
10. 
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who rejected the vulgarisation of his own ideas, and into discussion on how
ideology might be formed, albeit Leach took a different starting point – that
of kinship relations.  The debate in recent times has made little progress
towards agreement on getting the terms clear for what we are discussing, as
the content of approaches that follows illustrates.
It is accepted among legal scholars that custom and law have in
common that they both regulate order in society and that custom originated in
non- or pre-class-divided society. Karl Marx wrote that the dominance of one
class over another was not only through the threat of the use of force: it used
promotion of ideology to hold matters together, all that "men say, imagine,
conceive," which include such things as "politics, laws, morality, religion,
metaphysics, etc." as he and Engels wrote (1970). I interpret this approach by
Marx as being recognition of a secondary arm of the state, something that
later followers, notably the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci, developed in
his writings (1957) when he considered ideology and its hold on people’s
minds, what he called “hegemony.” One of Gramsci’s contributions to
scholarship lay in his use of the plural of that word – hegemonies, and
considered that there could be a contest of different hegemonies in class-
divided society. Thus, he argued that the contribution of its hegemony to a
class’ rule over society denied that it was only control by the force of its state
agents. His pluralisation of hegemony was a discussion of both that of the
ruling class and another, of organisations in society that opposed a class’
dominance. Marx expected “the return of modern [i.e. capitalist M.C.] society
to a higher form of the most archaic type – collective production and
appropriation” where the ideology would be to sustain that. He added: “The
vitality of primitive communities was incomparably greater than that of
Semitic, Greek, Roman, etc. societies and, a fortiori, that of modern capitalist
societies” (Marx 1989 [1881]: 346). There is an implication for Abkhaz
custom in this: if the state’s role of defending the interests of a dominant class
or number of classes is removed, then one is left without its coercive
agencies, leaving a regulatory role, a purely organisational one, as in societies
that are/were ordered by the principles of co-operative-based societies. That
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implication is relevant to what is being contested by the social elements of
custom and law in Abkhazia and the hold of the conceptions of custom, what
might be called its counter-hegemony to a capitalist-minded state.
The concentration on customary practices in the anthropological
literature on law and custom, sometimes called “customary law” or just
“custom”, and sometimes using the term “tradition”, with all its baggage of
invention, reinvention and post factum revision, has been confusing. It has at
times blurred the differences between law and custom. 
Thus state agencies enforce laws and, more to the point today, meet
capitalist state requirements according to a number of scholars in this debate
(Bohannan 1965, Babadzan 1998, Keesing (1989), and also discussed by
Babadzan 2004 and Aikin 2004, 2005). Jeremy Bentham19 is approvingly
cited by Diamond for writing: “Property and law are born together and die
together” as Diamond believed “law is symptomatic of the emergence of the
state; the legal sanction is not simply the cutting edge of institutions at all
times and in all places” (1965:259). 
He saw law and custom as different institutions to fit different social
and economic systems, which they in turn bolster. This was something that
was described from the field by British colonial administrators such as Brett
Shadle (1999), who described the manipulative approach to “African courts”
by British colonial administrators in 1930-60 Kenya. However, even that
scholar glossed the rule of ‘the order of custom’, to use Diamond’s phrase
(1974: 256), with relics of its practices the British rulers of Kenya were
grappling with in order to modify them to meet their own interest. 
Tamanaha (2000) summed up  what he saw on this: “Virtually all
attempts to define law fall into one of two categories: law is either seen in
terms of concrete patterns of behaviour within social groups (Eugen Ehrlich,
Bronislaw Malinowski), or in terms of institutionalised norm enforcement
(Adamson Hoebel, Max Weber, H.L.A. Hart)”20. Hart’s positivist approach
provides some interest but he settles for a mechanistic understanding of the
19 Bentham, J. cited  by Diamond (1974: 259) n.d.
20 Reference to one of his previous works: Tamanaha, B. 1995. An Analytical Map of Social
Scientific Approaches to the Concept of Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Vol 15: 601.
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relationship of technology to social change - a reification of technology that
confers agency on it so as to make of it the driving force for initiating social
transformations and thinking. Bennett and Peart (1995) identify the failure of
the scholars listed by Tamanaha to free themselves from looking at law from
the standpoint of Western jurisprudence, and for generating conceptions from
within the circle of their profession.
 Making choices between available definitions of law and custom,
“the agonized return to problems of definition” as it was called by Simon
Roberts (1998: 97), and possibly adding to them proved to be essential to my
study. I found great value in T.W. Bennett’s raising questions that remain
unresolved or passed over in anthropology. He sited his study in the history of
developments in custom and law in the British colonies of Africa and related
them to changes in social formations, with “Customary law” (sic and
throughout) pre-eminently embodied in a set of concrete principles. The
application of these to particular cases is flexible and subject to change and
does question the supposed virtue of law having fixed responses to any
particular case. Bennett also argues that custom is not ruled by the precedent
contained in Common Law and develops that feature when instancing
“African courts” and law and arguing that while custom was the product of
community-based interaction that cannot be abstracted from its social setting
and applied in Western-derived legal courts: “Once a body of norms
[i.e.custom, M.C.] is treated as a code of law, it is assimilated to other legal
codes [e.g.] Western law  including “certainty, uniformity and precision”
(1985: 63).
Bennett (1985 and Bennett assisted by Peart 1985) have provided a
detailed survey of the different schools of thought on legal, state and
philosophical approaches to this topic, focusing on the legal approaches that
have been the main sources of the study of custom and law. He rejected
reification of cultures and examined how custom (what he called customary
“law”) relates to the social, political and economic changes occurring in a
particular society (Ibid.: 1 et seq.) Despite his efforts to introduce precision in
the use of terms there remains some imprecision in his own usage. Thus, he
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has the word “law” cover customary rules and practices as well as state laws,
instead of the word “order” that might best describe the absence in customary
practices of state-enforced law. He perhaps does sense this element of
confusion and explicitly rejects stigmatising customary law [sic] “as a lesser
normative order” and asks “whether customary institutions (notably
patriarchy) are tolerable in modern states” (Ibid.: 3). Leaving aside his
placing stress on patriarchy, he unfortunately does not answer that tantalising
question, which is topical for the Abkhaz and one that I address in this
dissertation. 
The other imprecision is his, again quite common, use of the word
“evolution” without specifying how this works as a function of transition or
change (better terms) from customary-based to law-based society. He glosses
the various ways of change that take place:  some by qualitative changes
within a society, ruptures or movement to wholly new forms, as with change
in which class is to rule, and the possible smooth development from one form
to another without disjuncture of the kind suggested by Maine in the earlier
citation and that one might associate with Malinowski. The importance of the
distinctions has proved relevant to examination of custom to law in Abkhazia
today.
Bennett did not, unfortunately, subject law (taking that word to mean
the legal system one finds in class- stratified countries with their states) to a
detailed examination of what can be taken as implied, viz that he took it that
custom did not have a continuity with the rule of law, as argued by Diamond
in 1974. Diamond will be retuned to below as I look specifically at his
arguments and contrast those with both Gluckman’s and Bohannan’s. 
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2.3 Bohannan – Gluckman – Diamond - the nature of custom and law
Substantivism/formalism/embeddedness 
You see, sweet maid, we marry
A gentler scion to the wildest stock,
And make conceive a bark of baser kind
By bud of nobler race: this I an art
Which does mend nature, change it rather, but
The Art itself is nature. 
William Shakespeare … The Winter’s Tale. IV (4) 81
The debates in anthropology between substantivists, formalists and dialectical
materialists on whether cultural practices determine and can survive profound
social and political transformations in a society is of great topicality for
Abkhazia.
An influential work by Karl Polanyi in 1944 led to a debate that
crystallised scholars into two principal camps – one that viewed the
individual as such as responsible for economic decisions based on calculated
self interest - the “formalists”; the other – “substantivists,” elevated cultural
beliefs to have them governing people’s decisions. Paul Bohannan was cast in
the first image and Max Gluckman into the second. However, it is fair to say
that those are over-simplifications that derive from the debate between the
two, and from a selective reading of Polanyi’s work. He changed his thinking
over time from his initial inspiration from Marx, and came to centre his
attention on how he saw the way that markets worked in societies, and came
to the view that in a commercial market system, using and giving currency to
the term “embeddedness”: 
[T]he control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming 
consequence to the whole organisation of society: it means no less than the running 
of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of the economy being embedded in 
social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system (1957: 57).
The key feature of his approach is, it seems to me, the glossing of the words
“the running of society” (human social agency) and “social relations are
embedded in the economic system” (making the economics dominant with “a
motive of its own” (Ibid.: 57)).  It was to these formulations that we owe both
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the substantivist and formalist interpretations, offered as choices - the
influence of social relations or those of economics.
For culture, called apswara by the Abkhaz, to be primary, I believe
from looking into the Abkhaz views on fairness, this could only be in a
society which was economically “fair”; a society based on reciprocal
exchange rather than the capitalist principle of unequal exchange of labour
for wages driven by the pursuit of personal profit. Embeddedness of the
economy in social practices would be in a society without the class
differentiation that is based on the ‘freedom’ of the market and inimical to
apswara. This rejects ideas of a no-choice economic, demographic or climatic
determinism for how people organise themselves in society. There is another
important strand of thinking that needs looking into, one that runs through
much of the scholarship on custom and law and which treats the relationship
between human, i.e. societal-derived institutions, as static at a given time, to
change simply because of the passage of time. Bridget O’Laughlin writes
(1975) of the dynamics of inter-relationships of the kind that Marx’s
dialectical materialism opens up to anthropology. To accept ‘production’ as a
mechanical motor for societal change was described by O’Laughlin as
“technological reductionism”, and she  has argued against it being accepted as
a determinant in the dynamics of historical change (1975: 355-356). That
might be interpreted to mean that the experience of retention of customary
practices by the Abkhaz in the Soviet period suggests that that period
furnished support for customary collectivism. The importance of this will also
be looked at in chapter seven. 
I looked at the relevant approaches of Bohannan and Gluckman and
bring in those who were not to be followers of either. 
Although Bohannan, following Boas, deduced from his fieldwork
among the Tiv that changes in any one society should not be fitted into an
overall, universally applicable theory of how change takes place, the example
he used of the influence of the introduction of money as a means of exchange
(as he saw it in a reification of money) would appear to have demonstrated a
counter to embeddedness. Sharon Hutchinson’s studies of transformation over
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time in Nuer society in the Sudan would also suggest that under the influence
of the introduction of money the Nuer followed the same course of societal
development (1996). Both sides in the substantivist versus formalist debate
left unacknowledged that processes might take place differently in class-
based and non-class customary regulated societies. Marx’s dialectical
materialist theory of the connections of economic development and human
activity and outlooks was presented in his commentary on Feuerbach (1973
[1888]). He argued that people adopt new ways of thinking and conceiving
through changing their circumstances that are then reflected in different ways
in their thinking. This offered a theory that would bridge the seeming
irreconcilables in the formalist and substantivist positions by advancing a role
for human agency, much as does the citation from Shakespeare that heads this
sub-chapter. The substantivist-formalist polarities have been debated from
many angles, including those that feature the tenacity of ideas of “moral
economy”, discussed in Scott’s examination of rural workers (1976). In his
discussion of the implications of embeddedness Granovetter (1985) has
argued for more attention to be devoted to what might be considered to be
marginal, such as the embeddedness of “small firms operating through the
market” (p. 507) and “the extent to which economic action is embedded in
structures of social relations” (Ibid.: 482), to show its continuation in
economies dominated by the market. One does not have to agree with all his
interpretations, but he does go deeply into what I found at issue in Abkhazia.
I interpret these discussions as concerning processes for human agency to be
exercised in the “political” part of political economy, and thus providing
choices for the Abkhaz who are not locked into Weber’s iron cage of
capitalism.
********************
I now visit the scholarship to look into the radically divergent approaches on
law and custom of a number of anthropologists – represented in the main by
Stanley Diamond, Paul Bohannan (1968), and Max Gluckman (1968), to
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make very clear what we are talking about before drawing on other
scholarship on the topics that concern us. 
The writings of Laura Nader (1965a and b), Goddard (1996), Demian
2003, 2008, 2014) and Aleck (1992) on other societies provide data for a
comparative study of Abkhaz society, especially when examining the
anthropology of the state. There are many variants and much blending at the
margins of the contrasting viewpoints. My approach comes up against certain
paradigms that reflect current thinking in the schools of anthropology in the
“West” and that are gaining ground among academics in Abkhazia and other
parts of what was the Soviet Union under the influence of the current
tendency to “turn daddy’s (i.e. Marx’s) picture to the wall” or to throw the
baby out with the bathwater.
This will set something of a backdrop to analysis of what is actually
taking place in Abkhazia. I consider some contrasting approaches that I was
drawn to by reading Diamond’s essay The Role of Law and the Order of
Custom (1974: 255-280). He argued that custom and law are mutually
exclusive, crossing swords with the contrasting view held by Bohannan
(1968:73-78) and Gluckman and singled out the presence or absence of the
state as a critical influence on societal development and social practices. It
touches also on how custom supposedly ‘became’ law.
 Paul Bohannan believed that law and its institutions incorporated
custom as it changed. He advanced his thesis of “double institutionalism”,
according to which “legal rights have their material origins (either overtly or
covertly) in the customs of non-legal institutions that must b e o v e r t l y
restated [emphasis in the text M.C.] for the specific purpose of enabling the
legal institutions to perform their task” (1965:36-37). Custom, for him, is “a
body of norms” which “expresses ‘ought’ aspects of relationships between
human beings” (Ibid: 35). Through “justifiability” […] rules must be […]
reinterpreted by one of the legal institutions of society [… to] be adjusted by
an ‘authority’ outside themselves” (Ibid.:34-35). The clear implication is that
it is only law, presumably of the state, that rightly can sanction (some)
customary practices according to its inclinations: “custom that has been
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restated in order to make it amenable to the activities of the legal institutions”
(1965:36). He argued that it is during periods when such endorsement
(“double institutionalisation”) has not “fitted” custom into law “that social
growth or decay take place” (Ibid.: 73). 
Elsewhere he precisely asserted that double institutionalisation meant
that laws simply were  “[the…] lending of a specific force, a cutting edge, to
the functioning of customary institutions […] and then assume a character
and dynamic of their own [… and] interact with given institutions”. Laws are,
he added, typically “out of phase with society” and it is when this is marked
that laws change (Bohannan: 1968: 73-78).
Diamond takes issue with Bohannan to stress what he saw as the
different features of law and custom – that, by its very nature law is a set of
regulations that are opposed to the direct democracy of custom and is
enforced by agencies of the state. Custom, he wrote is “traditional, moral and
religious […] The relation between custom and law is basically one of
contradiction, not continuity” (Op. cit.: 257). In his support he cited (1974:
257-8) William Seagle:
The dispute whether primitive societies have law or custom, is not merely a 
dispute over words. Only confusion can result from treating them as interchangeable
phenomena. If custom is spontaneous and automatic, law is the product of organised
force. Reciprocity is in force in civilised communities too but at least nobody 
confuses social with formal legal relationships” (1946. The History of Law. New 
York: Tudor: 35)
Diamond added: “Parenthetically, one should note that students of primitive
society who use the term ‘customary law’ blur the issue semantically, but
nonetheless recognise the distinction” (Op cit.: 258). He explained that
“direct democracy” pertained in custom: “Customary rules must be clearly
known; they are not sanctioned by organised political force” (Ibid.: 258). For
my own discussion I will question the accuracy of his tying custom to
‘primitive society’ and I will discuss whether this is acceptable in the case of
the Abkhaz, where data from my fieldwork provides grounds for envisaging a
customary regulation of industrially developed society.
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Diamond approvingly cited Maine (1889: 230): “Civilization is
nothing more than the name for the...order [...which has] substituted several
property for collective ownership” (1965:259).
Clifford Geertz’s characterisation of religious ritual as being “the
model for and the model o f aspects of religious belief” (1966:34) might be
applied to describing the beliefs and practices of societies which conduct
themselves according to custom. There the rules are universally known,
understood and enacted by all their members to regulate their own affairs,
there being no division, as Geertz perceived between the knowing and the
doing in religious ritual, thus making of custom the for and by of society.
Nader has interpreted Bohannan as having charged Gluckman with
“having forced the Barotse folk concepts into a Western model [of law, M.C.]
(Nader 1965: 11). Gluckman disagreed, but in words that leave the matter
open: “The whole of my analysis is concerned to show that even if the
principles of law be similar [i.e. to English law, M.C.] they are permeated by
quite different economic social conditions, this being so, it is nevertheless
important to state that there are similar principles” (Gluckman 1955: 378). It
is a fine line that distinguishes the charge and Gluckman’s response; the point
of me bringing this forward is that Gluckman does not regard the “quite
different economic and social conditions” of the Barotse and English of great
importance. Diamond does.
Gluckman (1972) generalised from the results of his study of the
south central African kingdom of Barotse – a class structured society, while
Bohannan had studied a society that until shortly before his field work was a
custom-ordered non-state one, the Tiv21 of northwest Africa (1957) and
likewise generalised his findings. This led to a debate between them which
had no common data to make for a comparative argument on the nature of
law. What was missing was an appreciation that it was the class and non-class
features of the two societies that underlay their difference. Their respective
data could have been better employed to  anthropology as a whole if the
21 According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica the British only established a paramount chief
in 1948, and with it the first class stratification of a state.
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scholars had attached more attention to that factor than Gluckman’s
perfunctory reference to “quite different economic and social conditions”.
This drew my attention to making a focus on the class element among the
Abkhaz.
It seems to me that the concentration on the differences between
Gluckman and Bohannan on formalism and substantivism is not the most
relevant point for my topic. Of greater import is what they hold in common:
the common theoretical ground that shows in neither of them detecting any
fundamental difference in societies that relate to their class structures. They
debated “Western judicial processes” and (to be compared with) “non-
Western juridical processes”. It also showed Bohannan’s “folk system”
concept, for analytical purposes - his conviction that every society in the
world had its own valid, way of looking at society (1957: 6).
Moreover, both Bohannan and Gluckman would reduce the difference
between custom and law and their practices to that of “concepts”, something
also subscribed to by Postema (2012), as mentioned earlier. In this is found
another important difference with Diamond, who argued that custom and law
were incompatible because they served different political economies and not
only focused on concepts of these. Roger Keesing’s contribution seems
relevant where he argues that attempts to codify custom in law in Melanesia
(using the Pacific Pidgin rendering of custom as Kastom) destroyed custom’s
essential contingency and flexibility in its application and were illustrations
of “the hegemonic force of colonialism” (1989: 27-28), for which one must
read that codification meant to make certain customary practices of a
particular moment became listed in the form of laws derived from a capitalist
society, and loss of its direct democracy, responsiveness to contingency and
mediation in disputes. 
Judith Beyer, wrote on the invention of tradition by colonial officials,
and of some locals getting their interests codified as “tradition” (2006: 154).
Her data from fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, show that courts run by the elders,
the aksakals, are under construction today, although in the days before the
Russian Empire ruled the region, there were “no official courts of the
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aksakals, but rather gatherings and councils during the life-cycle rituals […]
and in acute cases of conflict”, where the elders settled conflicts (Ibid.: 159),
adding that “courts” were a later invention as, in the pre-colonial period,
custom was applied according to local traditions and it was the Russian tsarist
administration that codified and downgraded customary procedures, replacing
them by Russian law (Ibid.: 160-161). Beyer’s view is that “describing a local
institution or a local practice as being a ‘revitalisation’ [as in Kyrgyzstan] or a
local practice, ‘invention’ or having ‘continuously existed’ is most often
nothing more than  a labelling of only one of possibly more discourses on the
historical development of the object under consideration.” (Ibid.: 169).
For comparison Stephane Voell has examined the relationship that
exists between law and custom among the Svan in Georgia’s Kvemo Kartli
province, just over the border with Abkhazia. There the processes of
reconciliation and symbolic compensation payments follow on the sentences
handed down to those found guilty in state courts and are to restore harmony
through reconciliation, to meet “local moral sensibilities”. This is more like
restorative justice where non-state or state-tolerated practices are permitted
after the agencies of the state have decided on the substance of a dispute,
rather than representing a prevailing order of custom. It is the accompaniment
of state law. Voell recognises this: “the state administration and police are
from a legal point of view in full control of the situation” and “even among
policemen or lawyers [informants] mentioned only a small number of
conflicts are [by the Svan] addressed with traditional procedures” (2012: 3
and 4).
I think that whether one sympathises more with the views of Diamond
or with Bohannan-Gluckman on that last matter is relevant for the study of
today’s Abkhaz society and whether the Abkhaz will continue to give
customary practice priority over law. Whether the forces for a law-based
society can replace custom in the process of modernisation, understood by the
Abkhaz to mean the building of a high standard of industry, agriculture and
services,   will be considered in chapters six, seven and eight. What will be
suggested is that there could be modernisation without capitalism and indirect
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democracy. The topic is relevant to other societies that have attempted or are
attempting to retain custom.
There is a factor which none of Diamond, Bohannan and Gluckman
examines and that is the possibility of a complex industrial society being
ordered by custom. The state is not interested in conflicts getting out of hand,
either between classes or among the sometimes differing immediate interests
of different sections of the ruling classes. The latter can be differences
between manufacturing, agricultural, rentier and financial interests, as evident
in modern Britain. This allows conceptually to separate two state functions
and consider a ‘communistic’ society in which classes that have conflicting
interests are not present, and with that the presence of instruments to maintain
one class in power over the other. All human societies require administration;
the question is whether this can be directly by the members of a society
without the delegation to agencies of the state. This would consider a role for
‘an ordering state’ that is largely neglected in anthropological literature, a
state without agencies to enforce laws that are antagonistic to the direct
democracy of custom. Informants in Abkhazia tend to envision the theoretical
possibility of a customary state being regulatory, like a co-operative, in which
all members decide and implement regulations – direct democracy. This will
be covered in chapters eight and nine where the possible courses for the
future in Abkhazia will be examined. I now turn to the literature on a major
debate in anthropology that is relevant.
********************
The dissertation presents features of Abkhazianness but is not a listing or
catalogue of Abkhaz customary practices. The dynamic interaction of
historicity in the sense of culturally filtered treatment of the perceived past
(Hodges 2011), as well as the future is looked at. Writings by Judith Beyer on
the practices of supposedly re-established ‘customary’ courts in part of
Central Asia (2006), Matijs Peleikis on the influence on practices among a
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single ethnicity which is divided by state borders – post-Soviet Georgia and
capitalist Turkey (2006), and Stephane Voell on the Svan in Georgia are
among those which were found relevant for comparison. 
Whether customs are today defined as a collection of relics of the
past, as “survivals” (Inal-ipa 1965) or as “traditions” (Inal-ipa 1978) when
writing about the Abkhaz, or as evolved social instrumentalities that justify
the laws of contemporary society by conferring on these the status of being
modernised aspects of “custom” (the popular imprimatur of “tradition”) it is
generally accepted that custom existed before state law, an acknowledged of
their existence as separate entities in a historical context. This understanding
of difference is illustrated by the interpretation of case studies in a Papua
New Guinea village court and “an urban national court” by Melissa Demian
(2003) and may be compared and contrasted with Brett Shadle’s survey of the
manipulative approach to “African courts” by British colonial administrators
in 1930-60 (1999), to which reference has been made.
 Sally Falk’s work on “an anthropological approach rejects the view
held by Diamond (1974), inter alii, that the sway of custom was a set of rules
of pre- class-based state formations, and laws for state regulation. That
scholar does not look into the possibility of any contradiction as such
between custom and law but, while criticising Diamond for his alleged
“adherence to the rigidities of an early evolutionism” does say that he raised
questions that “have not been thoroughly investigated by other
anthropologists (Moore, 2000 [1978]: 216). Yet Diamond merits no mention
in her later edition of contributors to a widely-used Reader on law and
anthropology (Moore Ed. 2005). Like most writers in that collection she
subscribed to the paradigm that has reigned since the 1920s to describe
custom and law as coexisting in the once colonial and now post- or neo-
colonial periods, through variants of a continuation of law and its
mechanisms for indirect rule. She attaches no importance to the fact that the
laws of colonial powers and of their state-builder successors of today had and
still have the final say on ‘custom’; and held and still hold the power to
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enforce their will, whatever their tolerance of what appears as relics of
localised customary practices.
The viewpoints of both Bohannan and Gluckman also gloss terms and
would have custom and law as variants over time of the same thing. That
explains how Bohannan22 (1957) could write about “law” among the Tiv
when he described the relics of custom, without placing them in the context
of the overarching power of British colonial rule – a legacy of the structural-
functionalist writings that have been with us since the early 20th century.
Elision has been applied to law and custom in societies where pre-state
custom dominates, where there are attempts to produce syncretic hybrids with
state-regulated law, and where there is straightforward enforcement of law at
the expense of custom.
Interestingly, the Russian words for Common Law, obychnoye pravo,
derive from the words for what preceded the Common Law in England that
was introduced by King Henry II in the 12th century to do away with local
practices (see note 17). The word “common” became glossed to mean ‘to
apply to all equally’ rather than ‘deriving from the commons’, i.e. in localised
different practices outside of centralised state control. The meaning found in
the roots of the Russian term is the one that Diamond (1974) championed
when he rejected Bohannan’s double institutionalization, and dismissed
Bohannan’s ideas as “abstract” for giving law “an eternal essence” rather than
having a “definable historical nature” (1974: 256).
I found that the unresolved controversy among scholars severally
mentioned above has a relevance to today’s discussion among the Abkhaz
around state-building, and thus impinges on their thinking on nationalism and
post-Soviet experience.
Even where it is suggested that customary practices are present in a
society they are placed in a temporal framework in which they are expected
to be superseded by law, making of them relics of a pre-industrialised or ‘pre-
22 One among many that included Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard, who described native
(i.e. colonially-dominated) societies, their regulation and mechanisms for settling disputes
without discussing the law that was in the hands of the colonial rulers; and which still today
justifies central “Western”-style government interference in customary practices whenever
they wish.
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modernised’ period, yet that temporality has not been discussed in
contemporary scholarship on law and custom. I will address this lacuna when
we come to conclusions arising from discussion of the situation in Abkhazia
and the choices available for attempting to ‘marry’ custom with laws of the
state in my conclusions. But, first a look at the literature on legal pluralism to
see whether there are answers and ideas found there that are relevant to
Abkhaz custom.
2.4 Legal pluralism
In an expansive review of thirty years of debate on legal pluralism Franz von
Benda-Beckmann interestingly singled out for prime attention “whether or
not one is prepared to admit the theoretical possibility of more than one legal
order or mechanism within one socio-economic space, based on different
sources of ultimate validity and maintained by forms of organisation other
than the state” (2002: 47). He regretted “that authors whose theoretical
understanding does not allow for legal pluralism, end up with widely
divergent concepts of law” (Ibid.: 72), and concluded that article with a plea:
“much more attention therefore should be given to empirical research and to
the theoretical understandings of the many variations we find in the empirical
constellations of legal pluralism and of the ways in which these different
constellations influence the actual social, political and economic conditions in
the areas and the lives of the people concerned” (Ibid.: 74).
The scholar of law, Ralf Michaels (2009), drew on legal experts in his
wide-ranging tabulation of theoretical understandings of pluralism, but used
the word “law” to cover actual laws as well as custom. He took state law as
his fulcrum around which to discuss pluralism and, thereby, was not able to
elucidate relationships such as are found in Abkhazia, where the state’s laws
are not conceived of as offering such a single fulcrum. While drawing
attention to the multiplicity of laws (sic) before the rise of the state, he saw
multiplicity simply as reflecting a “conflict of laws [in which] …the most
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important connecting factor was not the territoriality of the state but rather the
community affiliation of the individual” (Ibid.:218).  
Tamanaha (2000) has sought to arrive at understandings that would
overcome what he perceived as theoretical wooliness on law and custom by
addressing theories of legal pluralism - the idea that there can be a socially
accepted variety of legal systems coexisting within a single society. He wrote:
“…the notion of legal pluralism […] has been plagued by a fundamental
conceptual problem – the difficulty of defining ‘law’ (Ibid.: 3). He described
conflicts between state legal and customary norms but, however, after a
highly legalistic approach with which he revealed he himself was not too
happy, he ended with a call for more research to be carried out.
Does one witness pluralism in Abkhazia? I would say “yes”, but not in
the sense that it has been discussed in the literature which elides the terms
law and custom. Theories of legal pluralism vary according to how their
authors interpret the influence of law and that of its circumscription of the
vestiges of custom. The pre-eminence of customary practices in resolving
disputes in Abkhazia demonstrates the reality of a very complex relationship
of custom and law. Melissa Demian has written: “the ‘problem’ of legal
pluralism is an especially vexing one for lawyers and anthropologists alike”
and she cites other authors who have drawn attention to this (Demian
2003:97). According to Tamanaha: “What makes […] pluralism noteworthy is
not merely the fact that there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or
overlapping bodies of law, but that there is diversity amongst them” (op. cit.:
1).
Attempts have been made to suggest the possibility of incorporation
that of customary practices into state law, but it is the opposite incorporation
that is discussed among the Abkhaz. I show below when drawing attention to
colonial and post-colonial experience, for example, in the laws that outlaw
customs in Papua New Guinea on the grounds that that they are ‘repugnant’
(Ibid.: 509) have failed as they do not tackle the matter of whether or not they
are things of a different kind that cannot be reconciled, and the literature on
colonialism, post-colonialism and disputes about “multiculturalism” in
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unitary states bear witness to this. Disputes rage over what ‘customary’
practices are to be permitted by the state, ranging from dress codes, practices
to defend family honour, ‘permissiveness’ and much else. The American Civil
War was fought over that issue and it was not resolved by the victory that
established a unitary state and put a virtual end to the federalism that
challenged it.  At best, some customary practices are permitted, as long as
they do not negate the state’s legal agencies having the final say on something
that they might deem unsuitable.  The legal pluralist school of thought has not
been able to come to conclusions that square that circle of accommodating
both custom and law.
The dominance of law is well set out in a state document that sets out
the law on custom for today in Tanzania (note: it is a law and not “custom”
document). In part: Tanzania  Human Rights Jurisprudence (2013) lays
down : “Customary law applies only when there is no written law, does not
conflict with statutory law and as of today’s conception, to circumstances
which are not repugnant to principles of human rights. To date customary
laws include: codified customary laws, Islamic laws and other religious
laws.” The essence of this in post-colonial Tanzania is identical to what
pertained in all earlier British colonies as one reads in An Act to remove
Doubts as to the Validity of Colonial Laws, passed by the British Parliament
i n 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 63). That stated that laws passed in the local
legislatures of the colonies were not to contradict and not to be "repugnant”
to any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom adopted in London. The
same content was described for colonial Kenya (Shadle 1999). 
Denham has discussed the attempt in modern Papua New Guinea to
reconcile custom with law through legislation (1960). He was appointed to
review the administration of justice in PNG and conceded that “custom was
not a systematic equivalent of European law and would be difficult to
rationalise for judicial purposes” (Derham 1960: 35-36 [only released in
1973], cited by Goddard (1996)). Goddard  noted: “no progress was made
towards judicial rationalisation of custom (Ibid.: 54) and that the colonial
Native Customs (Recognition) Act of 1963 “provided a vague and
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“tautologous stipulation that ‘custom’ meant ‘the custom or usage of the
aboriginal inhabitants of the territory …regardless of whether or not that
custom or usage has obtained from time immemorial”. On independence that
formulation was then enshrined in Papua New Guinea’s Constitution with the
word “territory” replaced by “country.” 
These are codes of behaviour, legal and derived from once-customary
practices that are limited and formally spelt out within laws of the state. This
is something like the shoots of multiculturalism that are identified, for
instance in contemporary Australia (Joppke 2004) and under equivocating
discussion by successive governments in Britain but rejected in France. The
debates on multiculturalism and how particularities of government-identified
practices, again, of the government for a sanctioned and identified group,
ethnic, ‘cultural’ or religious, are partially to be exempt from the law of the
land, continue without resolution. In all cases considered they are not
expected to challenge the state and its law.  In Britain the delays to reaching
any practical results from discussion are, in part due to questions of
irreconcilability, but also today to a political game played out by the major
political parties. They exploit real and imagined elements of xenophobia in
British society for short-term political gain. Consideration of any forms of
indirect rule being introduced in the UK is hors de débat – that is strictly only
for the colonies and former colonies. Federalist noises are raised by
devolution of powers to Wales and Scotland, ideas that are not discussed in
Abkhazia, but might have to be faced if the large Georgian minority decides
that it wants an end to its being discriminated against.
In the writings on legal pluralism the vestiges of the order of custom
survive as the bastard progeny, the leftover of social mechanisms that were
set up early in the 20th century by colonial rulers and christened ‘indirect
rule,’ and are to facilitate state constructions in ex-colonial states. This started
out as a practice for colonial domination which allotted secondary roles to
local representatives who had sometimes previously been rulers who
supported the British conquest or locals who were appointed as “chiefs”
under British rule. It was first formulated by 1st Baron Frederick Lugard, the
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British ruler of Nigeria. (1922).  It was intrinsic to British rule and then was
adopted by other colonial rulers across their empires. This system retains a
precarious existence in various ex-colonial Third World countries and within
some multi-ethnic states such as the USA and Australia and has reappeared in
a number of states that have been formed from bits of what was the Soviet
Union, especially in Central Asia and the northern Caucasus. They are known
by various names, including  ‘traditional’ (renamed from ‘native’) in Africa,
‘tribal’ in India, and ‘village’ courts in Papua New Guinea, and are defined, in
the USA, for instance as supposedly functioning under “customary law,
indigenous law, native law and tribal or native ways” (Melton 2005). All are
part of the overall legal systems of the states of the different countries,
operating to cover issues that have been delegated to them by the states. In
Abkhazia there are no such courts.
Interestingly, there is what I would call a boomerang effect of
colonialism on perceptions of law in Western and North American areas, as
identified by Roberts: “So much of our sense of what law ‘is’, is bound up
with early on, the emergence of secular government in Europe; later, the
management of colonial expansion” (1998: 98). 
Bennett (1985) introduced into the discussion on legal pluralism the
implication of irreconcilability of custom and Common Law (see note 17 on
Common Law).  In his rich survey of cases of adjudications on state law and
customary rules mainly from southern Africa he concluded that there has
been a general failure of attempts to make the two dovetail into one another
where it has been left to the state’s courts to handle matters: “It is difficult, if
not impossible for them to sustain a coherent programme of law reform over
a period of time [….]. Implicit in the conflict of laws [i.e. of custom and state
law] is recognition of cultural or socio-economic differences whether by the
medium of the territorial state […] or via membership of a group of people
[i.e. a social group within a state, MC] (Ibid.: 1985: 16); and again he referred
to the overarching context of the colonial and post-colonial state, viewing
change as accommodation to “the demands of socio-economic change to suit
the needs of a western state” (Ibid.: 15) he identified as capitalist.
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The difficulty of trying to reconcile two opposites is illustrated by
Julio Ruffini’s discussion of how the indigenous Sards of Sardinia settle
disputes over sheep stealing through an “indigenous system”, which he
describes as “an informal legal system”. This is practised despite the Italian
legal system not recognising it and, indeed, opposing it, as it insists on its
own exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving animals and livestock theft
(2005 [1976]: 151). Ruffini writes of this as “a plural legal system” (Ibid.:
136). It might seem to be as much “a plural legal system” as are the
coexistence in Britain of laws and the illegal practices of the underworld. In
Abkhazia research into dispute resolution shows that the laws do not outlaw
customary practices.
Because of his, however, not identifying the fundamental differences
between custom and law, Bennett appears to accept the cultural pluralist view
that dissolves the matter by turning the problematics of the custom and law
relationship into one about “norms”, and exaggerates the degree of
acceptance of a supposed coexistence of different normative orders
(customary and state law), while not giving sufficient weight to the state’s
understanding of pluralism in only one of two ways: as intolerable (as in the
cited example of sheep stealing in Sardinia) or as a number of tolerated
practices which it has agreed to but whose existence remains subject to state
tolerance, as has was treated in the discussion of indirect rule.  
Interestingly, Bennett uses the word ‘family’ to describe the area
covered by customary practices when, in the case of the Abkhaz, the rules of
custom apply much wider to lineage and inter-lineage matters and beyond, as
examples from research in the field given in the next chapter illustrate. Yet
there is a cognitive continuity between the family and the broader conception,
as the Abkhaz base their understandings and thence practices, on kinship
structures when it comes to the resolution of disputes, however great might be
the use made of outside mediators and sacred shrines to reach solutions.
There is an integration of family, wider kinship and outside mediation. 
None the less, there is in Bennett’s work a major difference between
the data he accumulated from southern Africa – which considered “custom”
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applied subject to state restrictions (Ibid.: 65-216) - and the results of my
anthropological fieldwork, which also includes courts, but ones that are
adjuncts to customs that operate outside the law. 
According to Tamanaha, it is on the analytical failure to agree on
definitions that debate founders and leads to weaknesses in studying legal
pluralism itself. He finds great difficulty with definitions that “suffer from a
persistent inability to distinguish law sharply from social life, or legal norms
from social norms […and others whose] versions of law adopted share the
inability to keep law from swallowing up social life” (2000: 299). This is also
discussed by Simon Roberts who identifies the adoption of “pluralist
positions” in the legal domain that led to the invention of legal pluralism
(1998: 96) as an attempt to pin a notion of the legal to a broad canvas  “with
the boundary between the legal and the social dissolving in our hands” (Ibid.:
100). He saw “Shifting attention from the institutions of state law to those of
a wide range of normative orders” (1998: 96). His view resonates with that of
Sally Merry: “I find that once legal centralism has been vanquished, calling
all forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law confounds…”
(1988: 878).
Tamanaha (Op. cit) saw legal pluralism as a term that directs those
who are combating what they call the ideology of “legal centralism”. He cites
Griffiths23  for his description of the latter as holding to “the false ideology
that ‘law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons,
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state
institutions’” (Ibid.: 299). One will note, I hope, the vagueness in Griffiths
statement – his unqualified use of the word “law” in at least two senses, as
exclusively “of the state” and also as “other law”, which I take to mean
customary order and practices. Such laxness in the use of the word “law” is
widespread in the literature, to cover “indigenous law”, “customary law” and
simply “law”, rendering the term quite useless when it means so many
different things. It is for attempting to straighten things out by seeking to
23 Griffiths, J. 1995. Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation – With Special Reference
to the Regulation of Euthanasia. In Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in law.
(Eds) H. Petersen and H. Zahle: n.7: 4.
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counter what he sees as attempts to define law in generic fashion that I found
Tamanaha’ article so interesting. 
Current ethnography is rich in showing the persistence of customs (in
the plural) rather than of custom itself being a system that may be applied in a
modern or modernising society. Anthropology is extraordinarily weak when it
comes to considering the possibility of a country/state ordered by custom; a
weakness that is strange to encounter even among discussants who do not
find a fundamental difference between custom and law but share a normative
conception of a continuity between the two.
 Simulacra of non-state customary-type practices survive in
industrialised “western” and former colonial countries, especially practised
within the family but can be more widely so. It is argued that illegitimate,
informal or “non-formal” practices continue to exist or have recently
developed in the former Soviet Union, as put recently by Alena Ledeneva at a
conference on “Economies of Favour after Socialism” in Oxford in 2012 and
further developed in her volume which discusses whether Russia can be
modernised (2013). The existence of by-laws  might at first glance seem to
challenge assertions about the state having the final word on conduct but in
fact does not as they must not contradict the law, which applies to all of
society.
********************
In Abkhazia, legal pluralism is not under discussion, nor is the conflict of
custom versus law per se. The striving to retain or to restore perceived
traditional social and cultural practices and values comes up against a statist
programme for the transformation of society, to construct a ‘modernised’,
capitalist society in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A
group of Abkhaz scholars have called for “the cultural nucleus of apswara to
be joined to the pragmatic values of modern civilisations” (Arshba, V.,
Kamkiia, B., Kamkiia, F. 2003). The late President Sergei Bagapsh once
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stated: “We want a state based on a constitution and founded on the norms of
international law. That requires new laws and a new way of thinking”
(SpiegelOnline 16.7.09).
An example of the complexity of outlooks was given to me in late
2011 by a prominent and highly-respected Abkhaz, expert on tradition, an
elder who has to his name the amicable out-of-court resolution of many
disputes, including over murders. He saw the way forward as expressed in
“Apswara plus Soviet power”, knowing that the origin of his phrase was
Lenin’s: “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole
country" (1920). His view is not untypical of those who want to see an
enforcement of apswara by a new kind of Abkhaz state to be founded on it. It
reflected his regard for the collectivist features of the Soviet system, in which
powerful elements of customary practices retained a base. I shall come to a
more detailed discussion of this in chapter seven, when I address continuing
Soviet influences and the meaning of ‘nostalgia’, a term that has gained
widespread use among Western scholars but which I encountered over eight
years of extensive stays in Abkhazia only when I raised it.
Sergei Arutiunov, a Russian anthropologist and member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences, has added another point to this brief
examination of the literature on legal pluralism, his noting no perceived
movement to put  numerically small peoples or social groups, who might
want to live according to their own surviving customs, into “closed societies”
within “open societies”, like in “Indian reservations in the USA, […] taken
out from under state jurisdiction”  and granted a measure of internal self-rule
(2003: 13-14).
 2.4.1 Restorative justice
The definition of restorative justice in Oxford Dictionaries is: “a system of
criminal justice which focuses on the rehabilitation of offenders through
reconciliation with victims and the community at large (Web. Viewed
15.1.2014). There are no references to the phrase in the indexes or glossaries
of the Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology (Eds Alan Barnard
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and Jonathan Spencer 2004), of the Companion Encyclopedia of
Anthropology (Ed Tim Ingold 2005) and The Dictionary of Anthropology
(Ed. Thomas Barfield 2001). 
A mediator with the ‘international’ (USA-based) Victim-Offender
Reconciliation Programme (VOM) has written: 
Instead of viewing crime as a violation of law, restorative justice emphasizes one 
fundamental fact: crime damages people, communities and relationships. 
Retributive justice asks three questions: who did it, what laws were broken, and 
what should be done to punish or treat the offender? Contrast a restorative justice 
inquiry, in which three very different questions receive primary emphasis. First, 
what is the nature of the harm resulting from the crime? Second, what needs to be 
done to "make it right" or repair the harm? Third, who is responsible for the 
repair?  (Price. 2001: 2). 
That author emphasised the importance of restitution being agreed in most
cases. Restorative justice and reparative justice, which are similar for our
purposes, are sometimes seen as practices outside the realm of the state.
However, as Price makes clear the state is involved: 
After a guilty plea or a conviction, a court may refer an offender to VOM as a part 
of the sentence or as a term of probation. In cases of severely violent crime, VOM
has not been a substitute for a prison sentence, and prison terms have seldom been 
reduced following mediation. (Ibid.: 5). 
The role of the state is also obvious in its application as has been described by
Stephane Voell for the Svan in Georgia. 
This is very different from customary practice and its enactment by
the Abkhaz, where the victim, lineage and local society may decide matters
with no court involvement at any stage as they are not beholden to the state.
Declan Roche’s broad canvas of the many forms of reconciliatory
practices in state and non-state societies mentions that reconciliation and
mediation processes within societies that were/are without states use
pressures such as “Public ridicule, physical retaliation, ostracism, appeals to
witchcraft and divine beings, threats to withdraw co-operation, and third
party intervention directed at destroying or at least ‘paying back’ also feature
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prominently in traditional responses to unwelcome behaviour”, forms of
which are exercised among the Abkhaz today. He then adds an interesting
passing acceptance that things can be different in state and non-state
societies: “… historical and anthropological work cautions against making
[ … ] sweeping statements about the social control practices used by
communities before the emergence of the modern state” (2006: 222),
something that is pertinent to Abkhazia, where the state-custom relationship
has its own peculiarities.
2.5 The ethnography of Abkhazia
 
The fact that there is very little ethnography on present-day Abkhazia and
even less locally-emanating anthropological theory has forced an almost
exclusive reliance on my own fieldwork findings. That does have the silver
lining of presenting the researcher in Abkhazia with a virtual carte blanche to
delve into currently expressed Abkhaz perceptions and observed practices and
to consider enriching theory.
Modern ethnography on the Caucasus dates from the early 19th
century and included both Russians and, as distinct from the situation in other
colonial empires of the time, many were indigenes who served in the Russian
army and colonial administration (Kosven 1956). By the end of the century
Maxim Kovalevsky published his study of the Ossetians of the Caucasus
(1893). The Caucasus is on what the Ottoman and Russian empires saw as
their borderlands, when interest in the area was also shown by England,
France and Germany, who were busily building their own empires in the
neighbourhood, as a glance at the location of the Caucasus will show (See
Fig.3) … the Middle East, India, Central Asia. Abkhazia is on the trade routes
that were then, and still are contested (Freshfield 1902:10, Baddeley 1908:
176-18). Baddeley is interesting for writing up his experiences in the
Caucasus, for drawing on Kovalevsky’s ethnography and for citing Chursin’s
1925 ethnography of the region (Baddeley 1940, vol 1: 271) which are treated
in chapter three.
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Russian romantic writers saw the Caucasus as another exotic “East”
and Susan Layton has traced the evolution of their writings, from Lermontov
to Leo Tolstoy (1995). They included the liberal-minded Decembrists of the
early 19th century who were exiled to serve in the Russian Army for
campaigning for constitutional government in Russia, and regarded the
mountaineer as a fellow-fighter for freedom (Layton 1994: 97). Alexander
Dumas (1962 [1859]) wrote popular tales of Caucasian derring-do escapades,
of princesses, generals, soldiers, holy men and brigands – all wonderful riders
and swordsmen…the noble savage.24  But writings specifically on Abkhazia
came later to the Russian reader. Anton Chekhov fictionalised it with
characters speaking of “the magnificent Caucasus” or the “lazy Abkhazians”
who appear as shady background (1984: 46). By the 1920s Konstantin
Paustovsky’s rich descriptive journalism of life in the Abkhazian capital of
Sukhum was to tell in more realist genre of the blood feud, the brutality of
daily life, especially for women, and the  gerontocracy which had survived a
century of Russian domination and were going strong in the first decade of
Soviet power (Paustovsky 1966). 
In the first volume of Peoples of the Caucasus of 1960 Kosven gave a
comprehensive picture of the Caucasus and many of its individual peoples
and the second volume included a substantial article on the Abkhaz by Shalva
Inal-ipa (Gardanov et al. eds 1962). Emphasis was placed on linguistics and
history, with hints at the hold of ‘traditional’ practices. This was something
that Inal-ipa subtly sought to present in his major ethnography of the Abkhaz
(1965), and in a manner to minimise clashes with Soviet policies on
nationalities and, in particular, the Georgian Establishment.25 This
predicament which Inal-ipa had to tackle will be looked at where I discuss the
Soviet state-enforced intellectual climate in chapter six.
24 Similar manifestations of the Romantic movement in other parts of Europe are exemplified
by Hugh Trevor Roper’s tale of the transformation of the Scottish highlanders from “despised
[…] idle predatory barbarians” until defeated by the English. Then Anglicised Scots adopted
the fanciful dress of the conquered rebels (2003: 24 et seq.). It was the same for Russians
who adopted Caucasian mountaineers’ dress. In similar vein the Balkan bandit sheep thieves,
the kleftes of history became the epitome of the fighter for independence in Greek modern
nationalist mythology (Herzfeld 1986: 58-72).
25  For a listing of works by Russian, indigenous and Soviet anthropologists on the peoples of
the Caucasus see Kosven’s annotated bibliography (1956).
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There is a wealth of local ethnography that takes us up to and into the
1920s.  After that the study of extant customary practices was virtually
stopped in the discipline, or alleged that they were largely defunct or dying
out. By Soviet administrative fiat social regulation through customary
practices that continued to exist could not be written about from the 1930s
until the 1980s. Scholars sometimes used the device of touching on them but
had to present them as reminisces and reconstructs of the past that allegedly
had left only dying “vestiges”.
Lavrenti Janiashvili, a senior research fellow at the Institute of History
and Ethnology at Tbilisi State University recently briefly surveyed the state
of affairs in the relationship of law to custom in Soviet Georgia (including
Abkhazia). He described a short early Soviet period of tolerance of some
customary practices although the law provided for severe penalties for
practicing “traditional law” if it fell under the clause that made it a crime to
“threaten Soviet order or the rule of law”. But the application of the law was
permissive as customary regulation was allowed if it “could have been
considered a private affair even if theoretically speaking it fell under penal
law.” He drew on works by authors of 192826  to describe the practice
whereby “the state transferred the right to negotiate the problem to the
offended party […] without any interference from the state, because the
offended party did not appeal to court” (2012: 6). 
In a earlier paper, Janiashvili wrote: “The 1950s to the 1980s were
characterised by a ‘double’ system of conflict resolution, when the local court
institutions solved the cases considering traditional norms,” adding, that
according to Irina Babich27: “the weakening of the state apparatus in the
1990s was followed by the restoration of the mediatory legislation in the
North Caucasus” (2010: 3). He did point out that Vladimir Bobrovnikov28
26Erkomaishvili, 1928, Surguladze 1928
27 Babich, I. 2000. Formirovanie pravogo pluralizma v sovetskoe i postsovetskoe vremya na
Severo-Zapadnom Kavkaze. In Natal’a Novikova and Valery Tishkov (ed.) Yuridicheskaia
antropologia: Zakon i zhizn’  [Juridical Anthropology: Regulation and Life]. Moscow:
Strategy: 116-128.  
28 Bobrovnikov, V. 2000. Teoria I praktika pravovoga pluralizma dlia Severnogo Kavkaza
XIX-XX [Practices of Legislative Pluralism for the North Caucasus in the 119th and 20th
Centuries] In: Natal’a Novikova and Valery Tishkov (ed.) Yuridicheskaia antropologia:
Zakon i zhizn’  [Juridical Anthropology: Regulation and Life]. Moscow: Strategy: 128-141.
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held another opinion - that the reanimated mediatory resolution of disputes
did not represent “the reviving of local traditions” but are “formations of
post-Soviet traditions” (Ibid.: 3). Christophe (2003) found that the Soviet
state did not manage to penetrate rural society, stating that a “multitude of
informal traditional practices” prevailed. Both these last two points are
relevant to modern Abkhazia: offences can be ‘shifted’ from coming under
one legal clause to another (covering less serious crimes) and, secondly, a
matter can be blocked from interference by the state if the supposed offended
party is against it going to court, as found by Janiashvili for the 1920s and I
found in Abkhazia nearly a century later. This was and is custom holding
priority over the law courts.
The contradictions between customary order and the rule of law have
not only not been resolved but have been increased by the breakdown of
Soviet law. It is also true that an attempt to ‘return to traditional customary
practices’ proves unable to tackle new problems that arise in the programme
of building a capitalist state apparatus. In this arena there is a contest between
advocates of custom and protagonists of more law to supplant custom. The
contestation has existed at least since the conquest of Abkhazia by the
Russian Empire from early in the 19th century up to 1864 and is reflected in
open debates that took place in the early decades of Abkhazian independence
and then autonomy within the USSR that followed on the 1917 Russian
October Revolution. 
I will present the current stage of unfolding of the contradictions and
what indicators there are for trends and choices in the future for Abkhazia in
my chapter four on evidential cases from the field, and in my conclusions.
The historical background given in local ethnography exerts a strong
influence on current processes. 
2.5.1 Writing in “  the ethnographic past tense  ”
I extensively used findings described in the ethnographic works of Inal-ipa to
show what he identified as customary behaviour in the Soviet and some pre-
Soviet times. The Soviet state viewed contemporary customary practices as a
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restraint on its own forms of collectivity that rejected the kinship foundation
of custom and its anti-materialist belief system, characterised as ‘superstition’
that bolstered it.
The predicament that Inal-ipa decided to resolve can be summed up as
follows: how to demonstrate a distinctive ethnicity of the Abkhaz (and to
have this published) without being charged with the crime of bourgeois
nationalism and even of attempting to break up the Soviet Union. The
rehabilitation in the 1960s of Nestor Lakoba, the Communist leader and still
national hero who had headed Soviet Abkhazia from the Revolution until the
mid 1930s, was grist to the mill of Inal-ipa’s project. To show Abkhaz
cultural and historical distinction he carried out the most rigorous
ethnological research and wove it into acceptable strands in official Soviet
anthropological thought. In showing the past peculiarities of Abkhaz culture
he could intimate inevitable answers about their present-day existence to
distinguish the Abkhaz from Georgians and other Caucasian republics
without needing to spell these answers out himself. To overcome his
predicaments Inal-ipa thus chose an inverted historicist solution, to write in
the ethnographic past tense,29 a reversal of the “ethnographic present tense”
characteristic of European anthropological accounts of fieldwork in this era
(Sanjek, 1991). For example, he described the rites at a sacred shrine and the
holy smithies for local veneration of supernatural ‘powers’, but pretending
they no longer existed (1965). He artfully described still existing tradition but
as moribund “survivals” and fitted crucially constituent features into an
equally orthodox Soviet ethnos theory, knowing that his readership would
understand. Professor Kevin Tuite has also noted this: “many indigenous
religious practices described in the past tense in Soviet ethnographic accounts
continue to be observed to the present day in the Caucasus” (2006: 5).
In the conditions of the Soviet authorities’ sensitivity to the subject of
national minorities and their rights, Inal-ipa’s ethnography had to be
thorough, but with a good sense of what was politically judicious to render
explicit or implicit in his account of Abkhaz cultural distinction. The
29 I am grateful to Dr. Peter Parkes for suggesting that term. 
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changing political atmosphere in the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s – and
more so after the facts of infringement of Abkhazian national rights by
Georgia were publicly admitted by the authorities in 1961 - made his task a
little easier.
I shall be returning to some details of Inal-ipa’s work under sub-
headings in chapter six on Abkhaz nationalism.
2.6 Post-Soviet ethnography and “transitology”
The Abkhaz present a case of particular interest as the issue of whether
custom or law is to determine the course of future developments  has not been
decided over twenty years since the Abkhaz emerged from the Soviet era. 
The anthropology of societies that were within the geographical and
political area of the Soviet Union has since thrown up only a few
ethnographies and new approaches to theory. Among these have been works,
some already referred to, on the chaos of the  period; major ones among them
including Rigi's work on Kazakhstan (2001, writing under the pseudonym  of
Nazpary), Ledneva (2013) on Russia and Humphrey on Buriatia (2002), all
writing of the breakdown of the Soviet state and arising clientelism, disorder,
state officers violating laws, and the falling back onto inter-personal
networks' (on top of or using elders, marriage and lineage links from
customary practices). Beyer  (2007) has written interestingly on how new
state institutions have been 'populated' or taken over to some degree, by
customary practices. While some scholars see a chaos that can only be
resolved through totally new alignments and property institutions, others
accept what might be called a re-invention of  indirect-rule-type native courts
within state laws. Abkhazia is  ploughing a different furrow in offering the
possibility of custom running the state.
At the same time there are yet others who still use the terminology
and theories that were developed in the heartlands of “Western” schools in
social science and frequently reflecting Cold War stereotypical thinking on
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the Soviet period being applied to the so-called “post-Soviet” space, as are
found in works by Khazanov (1995) and Eickelman (2002) for instance.
Francine Hirsch writes of “new nation states” as emerging only post
1991, as if in the Soviet Union they were not states, writing also that they
“looked somewhat like national states” (220: 4) - because they were not
capitalist ones? She deals interestingly on the internal dynamics of Soviet
nationality policy, seeing it as a continuum over time that was applied at
different times in different ways according to changing circumstances and
progress made towards its 'modernisation' objective – that of  consolidating
its socialist economic and cultural stage on the way. That scholar also tackles
the reactions to pressures from beyond the frontiers of the USSR, such as to
face the growth of  Nazi Germany and its allies and its essentialist race-based
theory that expressed itself in claiming to represent Germans everywhere, and
Japan's  incursions in the Soviet Far East. There was the pull that was
exercised on ethnicities within the USSR by states outside its frontiers that
were founded on the same ethnicity and those  ethnic groups within the USSR
came to be regarded with suspicion and many of them were moved away
from the Soviet frontiers – including Koreans, Poles, Finns and Swedes, and
Germans during the Second World War. There was the special case of Soviet
Jews after the formation of Israel as a Zionist state that claimed to represent
Jews everywhere, and there was a period of discrimination against Jews
within the USSR in the early 1950s and in the 1960s. In the territory of
Abkhazia these movements/deportations of peoples affected the Kurdish and
Greek minorities. Hirsch distances herself from the views on Soviet
nationalities policies from another scholar, Terry Martin, for his perceiving in
the late 1930s “a dramatic turn away from the former Soviet view of nations
as fundamentally modern constructs and toward an emphasis on the deep
primordial roots of modern nations” (Hirsch 2005: 8 citing Martin 2001:
443). I will discuss this issue as it has surfaced in more recent time but under
a very different heading and in a different context in the 1960s when I come
to a discussion of nationalism and what I see as Soviet ethnological
adaptations, in chapter six onwards. 
90
The sociologist Georgi Derluguian's 2005 detailed account of conflict
in the Caucasus, the break-up of the USSR and the aftermath applies the
World System approach of Immanuel Wallerstein, with  a study of inter-
institutional contentions and battles among corrupt post-Communist factions,
oligarchs, gangsters and various nationalists and old-time Soviet factory
directors who draw in what he calls the “sub-proletariat”, a concept for which
he acknowledges Bourdieu as his source (Ibid.:308). He frames much of his
findings around original research into the Soviet Kabardian30 academic and
political activist Musa Shanib, who, when they first met told Derluguian that
Bourdieu's Choses Dites (In English: In Other Words: Essays toward a
Reflective Sociology), read in Russian, was his favourite book after the Quran.
Shanib  played an active part in the conflicts in Chechnya and was a moving
force in the creation of the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the
Caucasus, which was conceived as the framework for a Caucasus mountain
state and did organise great assistance for the Abkhazian side in its military
confrontation with Georgia of the early 1990s. Derluguian's approach
identified institutional agents in a conflict of structures with little socio-
economic factors. 
In his view: 
“classes […] can be distinguished from each other by the composition of household 
incomes.  [Bourdieu's] concept of social capital […] offers an important 
corrective to the economic criteria of stratification and helps to clarify the 
dynamics of positioning and strategy pursued by the members of different classes 
and class fractions – which prevents us from  making automatic assumptions about
class interests in any historical situation (Op. cit :131). 
That placed responsibility for the changes in society largely on individual
actors in anti-Soviet structures who failed to restore order in the post-Soviet
chaos (his word) - the failures of “intellectuals”, reminiscent of Julian
Benda's La trahison des clercs (1927) which holds intellectuals responsible
30The Kabardians jointly with the Balkars populate a republic in north Caucasus within the 
Russian Federation, bordering Georgia to the  south. Their language is part of the Circassian 
family and they are huighly regarded by the Abkhaz as contributors to the volunteer forces 
that took their side in the war against the Georgian invasion of 1992. 
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for making changes in society. The intellectuals who failed to bring positive
change in the areas of the USSR, according to Derluguian, allegedly  had
their ideological roots in the ideas of those who led the 1968 upheavals,
notably in Paris, who mistakenly espoused the cause of neo-liberalism to
destroy the bureaucratic rule of the Soviet Communist Party: “the conflicts
around the symbolic date of 1968 [...] served as a prelude to what happened
during Gorbachev's perestroika and its chaotic aftermath” (Ibid.: 6).
According to him one of the barriers to genuine democratic change was also
to be seen  “among the captains of obsolete industries who commanded the
allegiances of paternalistically dependent proletarians” (Ibid: 214).
In August 2009 Shanib took the view that in independent Abkhazia
the strongest asset of the Abkhaz was to retain “preference” for their ethnic
group within the Abkhazian state, where “others, [i.e. local Armenians and
Georgians, in the main] would not ask for land and state representation”,
warning that, otherwise, Abkhazia would face “the problems of division
encountered in the post-Soviet Baltic states” (August 17 2009, unpublished
interview in Sukhum). In his view the Abkhaz had not become Russified, as
had some peoples of the north Caucasus, and a possible future outcome for
the latter might be “a Russian Caucasus made up of different peoples, like in
the Soviet Union, a Commonwealth” (Ibid.). Incidentally, I found it
interesting that in that interview Shanib revealed himself also to be a follower
of the conspiracy theorist Dr. John Coleman31, whose work he recommended.
Among works that write about conflict in the Caucasus but that also
sites it in an anthropological context is Jacob Rigi's article on the post-Soviet
wars in Chechnya (2004), where the reader will find more than placing of
blame but the context of “The neoliberal reforms that succeeded in
'Africanizing Russia'” (Op. Cit.: 146). I find the term very apposite with its
parallel of what happened in Africa in the s-called post-colonial period, to
which I make refernce below. 
31An independent researcher and ex-intelligence officer who wrote  The Conspirators' 
Hierarchy: The Committee of 300 which researched secret societies and, as stated in his 
introduction “sets out to uncover what power it is that controls and manages the British and 
United States governments. 2007. Available on Amazion Kindle.
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Cold War stereotypes did not dominate throughout western
anthropology of the Soviet Union, as witness contributions made by a number
of prominent western anthropologists at a conference on Soviet and Western
anthropology in 1976, on ethnos theory. It was convened by Ernest Gellner
(1980) and stereotypes were banished by scholarly face-to-face debate and
mutual respect. Those present included Maurice Godelier, Jack Goody,
Lawrence Krader, Tamara Dragadze, Meyer Fortes and Caroline Humphrey
as well as a gallery of Soviet colleagues with big reputations. I shall be
returning to that conference when discussing Soviet ethnos theory in greater
detail.
However, there has been an overwhelming preoccupation of late with
conflicts between and across ethnic groups and state frontiers rather than with
the ethnography of those groups themselves (Trier, Lohm and Szakonyi
2010). This reflects the modern day replay of the Big Game of the 19th
century and also, curiously, resonates with a tradition that was already
exemplified at a different period of historiography by Kudryavtsev’s book on
Abkhazian history (2009 [1922]). That was criticised at the time of its first
publication within the Soviet Union for treating the Abkhaz too much as
pawns of outside powers, as their products, and giving insufficient attention
to their own internal social evolution and institutions and, therefore, agency.
It had about it a whiff of the diffusionism that today accompanies both
“globalisation” theory and world systems theory. The Abkhaz holding to
custom will be seen to counter such approaches.
There is a small growing number of welcome correctives today and
among them is an article on modern Abkhazia in which Rachel Clogg gives a
valuable analysis of inter-ethnic relations within that country (2008). Clogg
also provides a counter to the stress on nationalist invention of tradition that
is common in writings that neglect anthropological study of the culture, the
‘active customs’ and the actual functioning of the institutions of today’s
Abkhaz society.
Other exceptions include Plotkin and Howe (1985) and Muehlfried’s
and Sokolovsky’s 2012 edited volume of essays. That covers much of the
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Caucasus, and contributors tell us how anthropology lived and functioned and
how divisions of opinion were engaged and, through the great variety of
experiences and standpoints brought forward in the writings, go a long way
towards explaining how the Soviet period influences today’s scholars within
the Caucasus and Central Asia. They show that fieldwork for ethnography in
the Soviet Union, including in the Caucasus, was predominantly carried out
‘at home’, and anthropology was perceived as linked to a historicity for much
of the Soviet era that accepted as axiomatic that all societies went through,
roughly, the same stages of social transformations. The contributors provide
an anthropology of ‘doing anthropology’ in the regions focused on. They
challenge the continuing image in Western anthropology of that part of the
world that all too often still shows  “a striking disinterest in, and occasionally
even distaste for, knowledge generated locally” (Ibid: Frontispiece). That
volume is currently being added to by a project based in the Caucasus
Department of Jena’s Frederick Schiller University that is studying sacred
places across the Caucasus, including those of the Abkhaz. There is a
welcome increase in students of anthropology from a number of countries of
Europe and from the USA who have chosen the Abkhaz as their area of
interest.
Theories of “transitology” and “transformations” about the former
Soviet Union abound; witness a recent resume of these presented by the
Belarussian sociological team headed by Yevgenii Preygerman (2013) which
stresses that post-Soviet scholarship should be positioned into an on-going
debate – something I discuss in chapter eight. 
But there is still little published new ethnography, and few scholars in
the West have yet to take note of the literature of Soviet, Russian and other
researchers from former Soviet republics and of outsiders who did make
efforts to bring Soviet scholarship to the notice of a wider audience, as did
Gellner (ed 1980) and nowadays Paula Garb, Caroline Humphrey and the
SOAS Professor of Caucasian languages George Hewitt.  Inal-ipa wrote first
class ethnography of the Abkhaz (1965 to 1995). Alexander Krylov of the
Russian Academy of Sciences has done some since on Abkhazia (1999a).
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Terry Martin is among a small group of scholars who examined relevant
Soviet nationalities policies (2001). Vera Tolz has presented thorough
histories of Russian ethnography (2010 2011, 2011a). Mathijs Pelkmans did
fieldwork in post-Soviet Georgia (2006). Among others who treated Soviet
scholarship seriously is Slezkine (1994, 1996). A distinguished Abkhazian
scholar, Fatima Kamkiia, has published works on Abkhaz custom from a
lawyer’s standpoint in English (2008) and another recent work in Russian,
jointly with Michael Costello (2013). There is a smattering of strictly
ethnographic articles that discuss what is “traditional” and what not. Study of
disputes resolution will supplement that. Below, I cite some such writings and
place them within the context of anthropological and legal theories on
custom, law, the state and the related state-building by nationalists. 
The opportunity for fresh ethnography of the multitude of peoples in
the Caucasus an area that has now been open to researchers for over a quarter
of a century remains in large measure still open and unfilled. The exceptions
include the works I have mentioned and writings on the well-trodden land of
Daghestan. There is a concentration in western social sciences on what was
Soviet Central Asia, an area now of political contest between the “great
powers” and into which generous funding is being directed from the
authorities and companies in the USA and western Europe. Scholars’ writings
on the peoples in those areas have for the most part been fitted into the ageing
post-colonial paradigm, neatly placing their internal turbulence into the theme
of a “globalised/ing” world. Writing specifically on the Caucasus is virtually
solely on conflicts and turmoil in which the daily life and practices of the
locals are almost absent. That leaves out many of the realities of what Kwame
Nkrumah was among the first to identify as neo-colonialism (1965:
Introduction), and is now to be found in the continuing contests for
dominance of the old imperialist powers through economic control with the
co-operation of local proxies. That literature does not pay attention to the
reflection of this on internal societal dynamics. Today those powers are joined
by Russia, as the imperialist inheritor of the annulled Soviet Union. The
scholarship on the effects of all this on internal societal dynamics is truly thin
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and more of it would analyse the dire economic conditions of today’s ruling
inheritors of the Soviet Union and their harking back to legacies, real or
imagined, of Soviet times. I discuss this nostalgia, with its component of
hope in chapter eight.
Remarkably, the indigenous anthropology of societies that were part
of the USSR has had little new to say that would enrich anthropology by
examining the Soviet system itself and the imprint it has left on Abkhaz
perceptions. I will touch on that as contributory to discussion of today’s
Abkhaz identity and institutions and values. This gap is so despite the
existence of some scholars from outside the USSR (for examples, Tatjana
Thelen 2011, Hann 2003, Kaneff 2004) who have challenged the still
respectable “neo-institutionalist” analysis theory that was applied to the
USSR by the Weberian economist Ronald Coase as long ago as 1937 and the
influential political economic study of socialism by Janos Kornai (1992).
What is relevant here is that neither of those theorists has provided
methodological or theoretical paths of entry into understanding the forms of
social organisation that were present in their times or the new ones in that
region, certainly not among the Abkhaz. Hann (2003 etc.) has argued that the
“one size fits all” approach to the study of the socialist countries never was
useful: “There was [...] great variation in the details of implementation” of
state policies, he wrote and illustrated that when discussing the moral
economy among other telling factors. That is evident from the examination of
dispute resolution today and from the ethnographic works on Georgia and
Abkhazia that were written by Tamara Dragadze (1980, 1987), Sula Benet
(1974) and Paula Garb, (1984, 2000), the latter being one of the very few who
have touched on dispute resolution among the Abkhaz. The picture that has
emerged and that requires deeper analysis more than suggests that much that
was imagined in much of Western scholarship about the Soviet period does
not stand up to anthropological examination. This will be discussed in my
chapter eight.
Reading works across academic disciplines did at times prove
rewarding and among such is a remarkable collection of essays on national
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historiography in the Soviet and post-Soviet states (Aymermacher, K. and
Bordiukova, G., Eds 1999), funded by the Friedrich Naumann Fund.
********************
My reading of the literature prompted the identification of a number of topics
that I researched in Abkhazia and addressed in my field work. These included
data on current attempts to retain both custom and law in modernisation and
state-building, the effects on nationalist conceptions and the Soviet period,
conflicts of Abkhaz outlooks on customary versus a bourgeois social system,
and what might be the prospects for the future. The approach I took and the
methods employed are now presented.
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Chapter 3 Methodology and methods
What is a Caucus-race?” said Alice; not that she wanted much to know, but the 
Dodo had paused as if it thought that somebody ought to speak, and no one else 
seemed inclined to say anything.
Why,” said the Dodo, “the best way to explain it is to do it.” (And, as you might like
to try the thing yourself, some winter day, I will tell you how the Dodo managed it.) 
Lewis Carroll 1961 [1896] Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 
      London. The Folio Society: 20-21
.
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – 
is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or
of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. 
Hence, it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was 
developed by idealism – but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not 
know real, sensuous activity as such.
Karl Marx 1973[1888] Theses on Feuerbach. In Karl  Marx 
and Frederick Engels, Feuerbach: Opposition of the 
Materialist and Idealist Outlooks. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart: 92
  
These two quotations point up the importance of participation32 – to mean
immersion - alongside observation; to humans being agents in the creation of
their social environment, not just observers reacting to events; and to the
dynamic, dialectical relationship between people and objects and social
structures.
The aim has been to study the cultural and symbolic conceptions of
tradition and law as voiced by the Abkhaz themselves, their ideation; to see
how the Abkhaz instantiate the ideals and stipulations with what they actually
do, their conduct. I found the above two fields were related through peoples’
knowledge of how to do this – the link through symbols and actions (Fischer,
M. 2006), and how the contradictions that arise are lived with. This
demanded inquiry into what constituted 'a result' for the Abkhaz.
32 The meaning of Marx’s words “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
various ways; the point is to change it” Karl Marx 1969[1888] Karl Marx 1973[1888] Theses
on Feuerbach. In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist
and Idealist Outlooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart: p.95.  
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While the project required attention to the minutiae of conduct in
daily life, it was with a constant eye on how the overall social relations
panned out to reveal those ideas that are held and which modify conduct, the
culture of Abkhaz society, whatever the multitude of idiosyncrasies.
The project was, thus, not idiosyncratically phenomenological in the
sense of delving into individual psyches to elucidate the ‘self’, ‘identity’ and
agency but as conceived to be limited by social construction. Custom is
conceived of not primarily as an expression of individuality but of collectivist
concepts within which individual agency was enacted. 
This approach bore in mind Marcel Mauss’ concept of “total social
phenomena” (1990: 3) – a holistic understanding of cultural features as they
are perceived by the Abkhaz, shown in observable rituals, acceptance of
myths, the telling of history, the belief system and economic conduct. Here
“network” theories such as described in studies of loan systems (Hamalian
1974) and the incorporation of ideas that have greatly affected what were
once rigid understandings of kinship, for example Carston (2000), and
Hildred Geertz (1979) on the linkages maintained by women through 'visiting
networks' have proven useful. I drew on insights from Chris (2009a) on the
relevance of history, as well as Jack Goody’s approach to evolutionism
(David R., ed. 2006). Karl Marx’s thoughts on the relation of individuals to
social relations and changes in these with historical change proved to be most
useful in the examination of influences of the changing political economy of
Abkhazia33. Drawing on these guidelines for my investigation decided for me
the questions which I took to the field.
Abkhaz history and ethnography, and wider literature were combed
and gaps that I perceived in the writings suggested directions for exploration
in fieldwork, as seen in the previous chapter’s literature review.  Among these
are writings on supposed state accommodations with traditional practices
(Timmer 2010). Comparative studies of state building in different parts of the
33 Some relevant citations here might be “...the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in
each single individual. In reality it is the ensemble of the social relations” from Theses on
Feuerbach, 1885, and “The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each
other ...are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them...” from
Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol 5: 82.
99
world34 were taken in, including Brookfield stressing a role for  multi-
discilinary approaches (1972), and Akin (1993).  Among the wider
discussions on custom and law I examined and discuss the relationship of
these to statehood among today’s Abkhaz.
I scrutinised and present dominant elements of Abkhaz custom,
known to them as apswara and apsua tsas and include conscience (alamys),
shame, honour, etiquette, lineage and gender.
A thread running through the research was how the Abkhaz conceive
their attempt to accommodate to new circumstances, and to examine these
and the institutions that are seen as permitting their novel experiment with
custom and statehood that is with the connivance of law makers and state
agents. Reading the literature prompted me to seek out whether there was the
possibility of embedding a state formation in custom (Polanyi 1944) and
Granovetter's discussion of the embeddedness of economics in social
networks (1985). Writers on the anthropology of globalisation such as Abeles
(1990) Appadurai (1996) and Eriksen, (1993), as well as those who have
studied examples of what is perceived to be co-existence of customary
institutions and law, such as Melissa Demian (2003), writers on the courts
under the Ottoman Empire’s Millet system, indirect rule in colonial empires
34 Aikin, D. 2004. ‘Ancestral vigilance and the corrective conscience’, Anthropological
Theory 4 (3), 299-324 and  2005 ‘Kastom as hegemony? A response to Babadzan’
Anthropological Theory 5 (3), 75-83; Antoun, R. 2000. ‘Civil Society, Tribal Process, and
Change in Jordan: an Anthropological View’, International Journal of Middle East Studies
32(4): 441-463; Assier-Andrieu, L. 1983. ‘Custom and Law in the Social Order: Some
Reflections upon French Catalan Peasant Communities’, Law and History Review 1 (1), 86-
94; Balzer, M. 2008. ‘Editor’s Introduction. Legal Anthropology’, Anthropology &
Archeology of Eurasia 4 7 (2), 3-11; Bohannan, P. 1965 ‘The Differing Realms of Law’,
American Anthropologist: 33-42; 1968 ‘Law: Law and Legal Institutions’. In International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences D. Sills (ed) Vol 8 New York: Macmillan and Free Press,
73- 78; Diamond, S. 1974. In Search of the Primitive. New Brunswick. Transaction Books;
Gluckman, M. 1968. ‘Judicial Process: Comparative Aspects’, In International Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences D. Sills (ed.) Vol 8 New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 293-294;
Keesing, R. 1989. ‘Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific’, The
Contemporary Pacific 1 (1 and 2), 19-41; Keesing, R., Strathern, A. 1998 [1981] Cultural
Anthropology. A Contemporary Perspective. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College;
Kovalewsky, M. 1970 [1893]. Coutume contemporaine et loi ancienne. Droit coutumier
ossetien. Amsterdam: RODOPI; Shadle, B. 1999. ‘Changing Traditions to Meet Altering
Condition: Customary Law, African Courts and the Rejection of Codification in Kenya,
1930-60’, Journal of African History 40 (3), 411-431; Trevor-Roper, H. 2003. The Invention
of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland. In eds. E. Hobsbawm.and T. Ranger. The
Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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and the application of written codes of conduct, as seen in Judith Scheele’s
discussion of this for Algeria (2008). 
The choice of the Abkhaz as the object of study was been made not
only because their society offers rich pickings for examination of a topic that
is of interest within our discipline but also because the future course of
development is not settled, so the choices the Abkhaz face are highlighted at
many points of social rupture. 
3.1 Setting out
I was initially drawn to the Abkhaz through a reading of literature on milk
kinship (Parkes 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006), and the big
part it played in the Abkhaz kinship system at a time of class differentiation
into the 20th century (Parkes 2003, Inal-ipa 1965); its place within structures
of relations between individuals and social strata, and in dispute resolution
(Inal-ipa 1965).
During an exploratory trip to Abkhazia in 2007 I was impressed in
chance discussions (cafes, hotel and research institute staff) by the evidence
of the ubiquitous consciousness of two things: kinship ties and apswara
(customary practices and values) as influences on daily conduct and
conceptions, markedly illustrated in tales of dispute resolution. These
prompted investigation of the relationship of custom and law as such and led
on to ideas about modernisation and problems to be resolved in the nationalist
project for constructing a state. There were interesting contradictions in the
telling.
3.2 Theory
I adopted Malinowski’s approach to the conduct of fieldwork as set down in
1922 (1950: 6-25) - theoretical preparation before going out to the field (ibid.:
6), his view that: “The field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from
theory” (Op cit.:9) and immersion in the society “to grasp the native’s point
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of view, his (sic)  relation to life, to realise his vision of his world” (ibid: 25)
to derive understanding of both how people expressed their outlook and what
they actually did (ibid.: 83); then “…manipulating and fixing …evidence”
(ibid: 6), to analyse the data for a picture of the sociological functions of the
whole, the social constructions (ibid: 83), and I attended to his  valuable call
for attention to “the imponderabilia of everyday life" (ibid.: 18). 
Study of the Abkhaz today as they face radical change in the political
economy that is influencing old outlooks and practices, where nothing is
fixed in time and the picture is one of contradictions and conflicts brought
about by radical changes in people’s ways of gaining a living, themselves
stemming from a revolution in their relationships to the ownership and
control of the means of production, the meanings to people of custom and law
within those changes had to be studied. There is evident a constant process of
accommodating the new into customary outlooks, seeking to embed new
societal realities into custom and law that, it is thought, must allow for
custom.  
Sally Falk Moore’s discussion of what she called “processual
ethnography” to explain the present offered a sympathetic methodological
supplement to investigating societal dynamics: 
… the field-worker must also ask, ‘What is the present producing? What part of the 
activity being observed will be durable, and what will disappear?’… [T]he 
identification of change-in-the-making is one of the […] objects of analysis […] 
Conjectures about the future thus become an implicit part of the understanding of 
the present” (1987: 727). 
Her approach added to Malinowski’s methodology by examining societal
dynamics beyond his synchronic snapshot of an imagined static moment in
the society he researched, something I took into account in my discussion of
nostalgia and hope in chapter eight. 
I examined the theories of structuralists such as Claude Levy Strauss
and the ‘Marxist structuralism’ of Louis Althusser and found that I could not
identify them in communications from informants and participant observation
in Abkhazia. A structuralist approach appears to me to be to swing the
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direction of research away from giving the necessary prime weight to
ethnographic data on informants’ conceptions. To import concepts and pre-
determined patterns of subconsciousness did not fit with the research, unlike
attention to my own reflexivity. A citation from a work by Valerii Biguaa, an
Abkhaz scholar who applied a structuralist approach to examining apswara
(2009) will explain my meaning. He noted the lack of research on certain
aspects of Abkhaz “traditional culture” and set out from a standpoint that “the
roots of apswara are to be found in [the Abkhaz] inner world [that is founded
on] the Abkhaz language … the main ethno-differentiating principle on the
basis of which apswara was formed as a system” (Ibid.:3-4). His starting off
with ‘the inner world’ was a different approach to my own. Neither did I find
the ways of institutionalism and “neo-institutionalism”35 appropriate – a study
of the structures of institutions from outside looking in. In like vein Michel
Foucault’s innovative studies of what he saw as the ways in which rulers
exercise power, including through their control of knowledge, did not seem of
primary relevance to researching my specific topic.
I decided to draw on Karl Marx’s dialectical materialist theory,
including his particular understanding of the role of people in political
economy, to provide the methodological basis for shedding light on the
transformative processes in Abkhaz society. Marx’s own research methods,
demonstrated in his extensive ethnological notebooks (Krader, ed. 1972),
proposed the most thorough study of evidential data for the elucidation of
internal social dynamics and to identify within them factors that represented
trends that might indicate which of a choice of different directions the Abkhaz
actors might select.
Given the turbulence in Abkhaz society, the evident contentions
within the tangle of relationships shown in the practices of custom and the
stipulations of laws, the widespread uncertainty about the future and the
evident conflicting outlooks on what the future should be like, Marx’s
methods fitted a study of practices that are “on the move”, as it were. I am
35 Using the term in Stephen Krasner’s definition: 'the tendency of behaviour, norms, or
formal structures to persist through time', 1988: 74. Sovereignty: An Institutional
Perspective.  Comparative Political Studies. 21(1): 66-94 
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writing at a stage of an on-going process for a diachronic picture of the
relationship of custom to law and state-building. The study of dispute
management revealed the effects of changes in the economic infrastructure on
the customary practices; and at points where they directly affect individuals
within society. This became particularly clear in the cases of perceived
distortion of customary values, incorporating new events into customary
symbolism for tackling new effects of changing times. These are discussed in
chapter five, which follows descriptions of cases where the values of
apswara are accommodated.
I probed Abkhaz perceptions of their individuality as they, each
person differently, activate the socially made available mechanisms of social
construction, accepting Tomas Patterson’s interpretation of Marx as insisting
that “history is experienced phenomenologically in the lives of living
individuals” (2009: 8). My methodology, therefore, included Marx’s
understanding of the individual linked to and able to change its surroundings
in the material world. The agency of individuals is recognised in apswara, in
the variety of ‘shaping’ that they apply to resolve disputes, within the
interaction of socially constructed institutions.
My background includes following the anthropology of and
experiencing current drastic ‘modernisation’ processes in a number of
countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Solomon Islands and Western
Europe. I know Russian, the most widely spoken language of Abkhazia.
3.3 Methods
The research methods were:
3.3.1 Observation
Through residence in a family, town and village
Participation in daily life
Attending the proceedings of courts
Presence at non-state and ‘semi-state’ mediation and dispute 
resolution
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Attendance at lineage (“name”) and village rituals




Of elders, judges, state officials, academics
Collection of oral histories and biographies
3.3.3 Analysis of texts
Texts of laws, newspapers, ethnography (Abkhaz, Russian and 
‘western’)
Discussions while examining family photo albums and kinship charts.
3.4 Objectives
1 to document customary and legal concepts and practices and their 
relationship;
2 to document the effect of transformation of social institutions on the 
boundaries between custom and law;
3 to document perceptions of embeddedness of laws of a state into 
custom;
4 to investigate perceptions of ‘legal pluralism’ in state construction 
and perspectives – whether the state will eliminate custom;
5 the context of ‘post-Soviet’ studies in anthropology and  their 
relevance to outlooks.
3.5 Some general points on methods
I refused a kind offer by a family to be adopted formally into its kinship
structure - for fear that I would be restricted by a commitment to the rules of
that family and limited in research and dissemination of knowledge gained.
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Instead, I relied on accepted ethical standards in the discipline and,
principally, on building relations of trust and not betraying them. However,
my staying with a family and eating with it was understood by it and others as
my being virtually adopted. Under Abkhaz obligations of hospitality my
being a guest also conferred on me such adoption and protection by the local
community.
The ethnographic data from observation and participation was culled
from forming close associations with the families I stayed with and with their
friends. I extended my network extensively over the stays in the country that
totalled nine months over five years. I was invited to people’s homes,
attended family celebrations, visited relatives in hospital, helped to bring in
the hazel nut harvests and did other village chores, promenading together,
watching television and such like. 
The families gave me access to mothers, fathers, children aged seven
to seventeen and were also focal points for contacts with the extended
families of  aunts, cousins and grandmothers and their friends and facilitated
lengthy excursions to three villages, from two of which the families are now
town-based for most of the year. Many conversations and unstructured
interviews took place in the kitchens. All members of the families speak
Abkhaz and Russian freely.
I became widely known to village and town communities and was
introduced to a wife’s female associates who shared in networks of small
loans-and-borrowing groups among relatives, neighbours and friends that
many Abkhaz are tuned into and which help to meet irregular demands on the
finances of its members (Wooster 2005: 13). These may be compared to the
Shirkets one finds among Armenian women in the eastern Mediterranean
countries (Hamalian, 1974).  I regularly tutored children in English,
mathematics and history and read a lecture at the University and another to
academics at the Institute for Research into the Humanities, chatted with
people involved in NGO, and gave interviews for television and a newspaper.
I wandered everywhere at will, sat, supped and gossiped with the regular
clientele of a number of cafes, preferably on the pavements and squares.
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In time I entered into people’s confidence, something that was
demonstrated by being made privy to beliefs, values and conduct that the
Abkhaz know are considered to be strange if not barbaric by peoples in other
countries. Several had travelled to the “west”, especially to Cyprus, Turkey
and the UK. Most adults had experience of life in the different republics of
the Soviet Union and men over 40 years old had done national service in the
Soviet armed forces. They saw how others saw them – and they had their
views on others. Much data was garnered in the informal encounters of daily
life. I was with a fully literate population with whom my knowledge of
Russian allowed me to converse freely and obtain explanations for Abkhaz
terms.
An important source of contacts came from my readiness to submit
myself to long sessions of answering questions about conduct and values in
England, many touching on perceived problems over immigration, gender
attitudes, the settling of disputes and family property relations. The questions
raised by my interlocutors afforded me invaluable insights into their own
views on such questions. Politics, the rearing of children and standards of
living were covered extensively.
All that was against the background of a  study of the literature;
discussions with ‘experts’ and with Abkhazians from different walks of life,
including village, town and state officials, elected representatives, a publisher,
academics (anthropologists, historians, folklorists, linguists), booksellers,
business people, geographers, librarians, women’s rights activists, members
of NGOs, hairdressers, workers from different industries, taxi drivers,
cowherds, Russian tourists, leaders and members of the Armenian
community, immigrants and returning emigrants, political activists, university
students, farmers, lawyers and war veterans and journalists. Being old was a
great help as it allowed me to speak to people of all ages, including children,
who were the best informants on the outward appearances of ceremonies and,
as a foreigner initially ignorant of finer points of gender etiquette (and
therefore to be forgiven violations) I could talk to women. I could discuss
some questions separately with men and their wives even when they could
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not discuss the matter together in my presence. I triangulated and compared
informants’ data and raised seeming contradictions. Quite important was that
I had spent years in the USSR and successor states and could tell anekdoty,
jokes that can be just that but often have serious undertones – in the Russian
saying: “In every joke there is some joking”.
I travelled almost the full length and some of the breadth f the
country, much of it on foot through villages, chatting to all and sundry. I let
all whom I met know that I was an anthropologist. I also used buses and
marshrutkas, route taxis – both crowded with people willing to talk,
especially the drivers. I used snowballing and went with the flow of
conversation. In all interviews I allowed my informants to digress and paid
attention to the fact that answers to questions put to the same informants
could vary according to the context in which I put them, and to the
circumstances, according to who else might be sitting in.
I often took rough notes during encounters, rarely recorded, and
always secreted myself as soon as possible afterwards to fill in my notes from
memory. I avoided interrupting the flow of conversation even in the most
formal interviews.
I made my previous writing available in Abkhazia. Permission to
record in any form was obtained and individuals, families and groups are
protected by being anonymously presented when this is sought by informants.
Given the high level of mutual trust, irritation was sometimes expressed by
informants that I should think it necessary to ask for permission to use a
recorder or to play it back. This increased my sense of responsibility to all
informants.
I had constantly to judge how my presence possibly affected what
informants said or enacted - reflexivity; the matter of ‘intrusion’ - to be or not
to be present at rituals and how to inquire about and judge practices from
which I accepted being excluded. Watching for the combination in
conceptions and practices of science and magic, bearing in mind that locals
thought functionally and not symbolically (Trevor Marchand 17.10.13 talk at
the British Museum).
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The work in the field itself revealed additional gaps and
contradictions in current scholarly approaches that provided more pointers to
research and that will appear in the discussion of evidential cases. I found that
some questions were raised that made for extensive further reading as on-
going practice throughout the periods in Abkhazia.
3.6 Questions
Among local academics my topic was welcomed, as it was “new research
territory”, as one put it (August 2009) –very little research has been carried
on by local scholars into current Abkhaz practices and beliefs. However much
I prepared questions for interviews these were always extended by two- and
multiple-way discussions, during which those I was interviewing almost
invariably raised questions with me that showed their own concerns and, not
least, their worries about some features of custom. They thus added
substantially to the direction of my interviews.
While I formulated questions before each visit to the field these were
added to and modified in the light of what I learnt there. I started off with the
following and followed up the answers:
1 What are your personal biography and ambitions and family 
background going back in time and lineage? Where is “home”? Who 
owns what in the family?
2 What does living in or contact with the village mean? What is your 
relationship with neighbours and have these changed?
3 What is your employment, and what constitutes your family? Who 
decides what in your family, lineage(s), with neighbours, the local 
and national authorities? What are the mechanisms and the purposes 
of assemblies and shrine-visiting? Who attends what gatherings? 
What are the details of gatherings and what happens when anything is 
‘decided on’ in the different structures?
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4 What is new, has changed in your circumstances in recent years and is
changing today? Why?
5 What are the meanings and importance of apswara, apsua tsas, 
alamys, the Narts and your language? What does it mean to be an 
Abkhaz (man and woman and children); if it matters, why and how?
6 What is happening in Abkhazia? What problems, physical and moral 
do you come up against? What sustains you? What will happen, how 
and why? What do you do if expectations are not met?
7 What are the problems and who is responsible (individuals and 
institutions)?
8 How are disputes settled? What factors/outlooks/approaches 
determine whether the course of custom or of appeal to law is taken?
9 Can you explain Abkhaz beliefs, religions, and relations with ‘nature, 
dreams, prophetic signs, ritual, and shrines with powers?
10 What was it like in Soviet times (on specific issues and in general) 
and what remains; what was worse or better? What does freedom 
mean to you? Do you have more freedom, less freedom, are things 
changing? 
11 What do ‘civilised’, ‘modern’, ‘democracy’ and ‘capitalism’ mean to 
you?
12 What have I missed that you think is relevant?
3.7 Advocacy and participant observation
In her discussion of public and engaged anthropology Catherine Besteman
wrote of “the transformative orientation of the former and the messaging
concerns of the latter” (2013: 3). I found it necessary to adopt a stand of
engagement by taking a sympathetic attitude to the expressions of concerns
by the Abkhaz. That allowed me to come closer to being a participant – to
overcome the sometimes weaker part of anthropological ‘participant
observation’ and not being seen as looking in as an outsider. Besteman cited
Ernst Bloch for having debated the point of with whom one identified in a
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given society. Sympathetic engagement with the practices and the variety of
different expressed outlooks opened chinks through which I could glance at
what the locals live for and why they do what they do – to study what they
said, to exercise what Besteman called the obligation that “insists that the
public or engaged anthropologist situate him or herself in a moral landscape”.
Resonating with Ernst Bloch, she found that “Anthropology can capture both
the emergent – that has not yet become fully articulated”, adding:
“anthropology […] is also about the imaginable – the what could be – a
perspective anthropologists gain from the discipline’s comparative and
historical approach” (Ibid.: 6) something I found evident in my discussion of
nostalgia in chapter eight.
I found acting out the part of “participant” within the researcher’s
participant observation the most difficult. I had constantly to tack between
associating myself with some views expressed (especially on current politics)
and to make informants aware that I would present all opinions I heard. In
those ways I was possibly accommodating advocacy. The society I was
researching offered no illusion of non-contested practices, reflecting the
conflicts within it. I decided to maintain as much of a methodologically
neutral position as was acceptable but informants pressed me for my take on
some matters to a degree that to refuse to answer would have brought a
breakdown of trust.
In any research field the anthropologist has to position him or herself,
and that raises the matter of whether the researcher is to be seen as an
outsider or really as a participant in the society, something that required
engagement. The days of structural functionalism’s descriptions of societies
as unified wholes, of members who are dominated by homeostasis, are gone.
So, whose society, given the variety of outlooks on their own society by the
Abkhaz, does the anthropologist ‘participate’ with or be an advocate of? I
skated around that when I could but it was not always possible if I was to
retain trust with those who informed me; those who volunteered their time
and opened up to me.
I attempted self-reflection to minimise the extent to which my own
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grounding coloured what I was engaged in. To moderate the influences of my
own culturally mediated intellectual approach I took to Bob Scholte’s words: 
… almost every living anthropologist is an interested party to his or her own 
favourite movement, scientific tradition, intellectual style, etc. including their 
attendant textbooks, readers, classics and journals. Hence the specific choices made 
are likely to reveal current preoccupations and personal prejudgements …” (1987: 
33).
 I bore in mind Antonio Gramsci’s view  that every person is “a conformist to
some conformity,” and must strive towards “a ‘know thyself’ as a product of
the historical process” in order properly to understand one’s own convictions
(1967: 58-59).
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Chapter 4 Evidential cases
This chapter will present data from fieldwork on the resolution of disputes
according to apsua tsas. It describes Abkhaz avoidance of the law, or its use
instrumentally as an adjunct to custom and gives evidence of the fretwork of
customary institutions and law and the multitude of courses and procedures
that are open to their use. These include clearly understood recourse to
custom or to law, to mixtures of customary and legal practices, and ones that
are outside of both custom and law and might be understood as contradicting
both. I use the word “mixtures” to convey the wide variety of social
institutions (understood to mean practices that are, to one degree or another,
socially acceptable) which disputants draw on in order to reach satisfactory
closure. 
Precedent, let alone the Statute Book, is not central to practice and the
procedures for resolving each case in dispute is very much up to those
involved. There are widespread and varied general procedures for drawing in
the intervention of mediators but whose activities are only advisory and carry
no authority should disputants not all agree on any course of action they
might propose. This allows for individual and group agency.
There is a loose gradation in the stages that disputes may be taken
through, although this is not as formal as it may seem at first glance, as any of
the stages may simultaneously be a combination of any others, including
custom and law agents, any of which may be invoked at any time by those
involved or interested in settling a dispute. The proceedings are not law
courts or purely legal ones, as all interested parties, in the popular sense, may
take part as witnesses, complainants or simply to add authority to a party to a
dispute. At all stages elders might participate. According to the recognised
options for the resolution of disputes which are not settled within the small
family there is allowance for involvement of the patriliny36, the wider village
36The word ‘patriliny’ should not be equated to ‘patriarchy’, whatever the extent of the power
of men over women. There is a qualification of that power that is accorded by a continuation
of traditional Abkhaz age grading, which bestows increasing status according to age
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community (the akyta), the local government (rayon), the elders or assembly
of elders, cursing and shrines. and the elders’ council of the republic. A
dispute can simultaneously be on the agenda of any or all those mentioned. I
illustrate cases of overlapping of customary and ‘custom-incorporated’ or
state-recognised facets in the evidential cases.
There is little research by Abkhaz and outside scholars on the part
played by customary institutions and their command over the law in the
resolution of disputes. The closest one finds only take us up to the very early
years of Soviet rule and end in the 1920s. In no forums for discussion of law
in Abkhazia is there scholarly examination of the widespread customary
extra-legal practices that go beyond folkloristic or perfunctory and anecdotal
acknowledgement of their existence. Miserabile dictu, in publications and at
a recent all-Russian academic conference on pre-court legal procedures,
which included Abkhaz scholars, mine was the only contribution that was
based on fieldwork on customary influence on law (2013a). 
As distinct from societies in which native or village courts operate as
inheritors of colonial indirect rule the Abkhaz gradations are not subject to
state sanction for their decision-making. There is no ban that rules out
customary penalties of the kind that were considered unacceptable by
colonial rulers and their progeny in the ‘native’ and ‘village’ courts - that
were/are supposedly “repugnant to the general principles of humanity”.
Melissa Demian discussed the repugnancy clause’s application in Papua New
Guinea (2014: 509 et seq.) and shows its derivation in colonialism, “used as a
legal instrument for the management of hierarchy between European, colonial
and indigenous moral regimes” (Ibid.: 510). She illustrated this by citing an
1857 Crown lawyers’ interpretation of ‘repugnance’ as not permitting, among
other things, banning Christianity, allowing polygamy and punishment
without trial. It became general in its application “solely or consistently to the
irrespective of sex.  Thus, married women over fifty years old, apkhusbyrg, acquire the right
fully to participate with a voice in the male-dominated councils in village and other popular
assemblies. They can then be members of the councils of elders and participate in dispute
resolution (Maan, O. 2003: 49).  Furthermore, when a woman reached seventy, she became
known as an atakuazh, and “could give [her] opinion and, in many ways, influence men’s
decisions, for instance on questions of blood feud, settling family and marriage problems”
(Ibid: 51). 
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‘customary law’ of colonised peoples” (Ibid.: 510). In Abkhazia customary
practices are not defined by the state and certainly not constricted by being
limited to what was not “abhorrent” to the laws that derive from or mimic
European colonial law.  Customary practices in Abkhazia are not steps in a
system in which decisions are appealed against in higher state courts. There
remains a shifting inter-relationship between the two today. 
The dispute cases that I present demonstrate adaptation to ongoing
change. A complainant may go direct to a state court but that does not mean
that a court decision is what will be accepted. Furthermore, their proceedings
and the sentences they arrive at are subject to strong customary influences
that can amount to outright pressure and, in practice, negation. As a fail safe
for custom are the obshchina assemblies or other popular mass gatherings
which can and do on occasion negate or modify state decisions. 
The data on customary practices and law and state institutions will be
presented under a number of headings.
4.1 What law? Adoption outside the law
Rearing and fostering - and in conditions of hostile relations between whole 
societies a form of fictive kinship with the aid of the ritual of mass mutual 
adoption, were also recognised means for pacifying relations of enmity keeping 
peace in society. Fostering a child through atalychestvo and adoption barred the 
way to pursuing revenge, as […] blood revenge was not permitted within a 
kinship group.
Inal-ipa.1965. p.441
The law on the family (Zakon 29.1.2009) lays down a detailed procedure that
potential adoptive parents must go through in order to adopt a child, including
registration of intent with the authorities, presenting a list of completed
applications and documents, and their formal acceptance by various state
agencies. 
However, I was assured that in practice none of that paperwork was
gone through and it was sufficient to reach agreement with the child’s mother,
sometimes  in the maternity ward, before or after the birth and then to take
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the child home. A couple who had so adopted a child assured me that their
case was no different from any others and that neighbours and friends knew
all about it. At an extended family gathering round a well-stocked table they
described how they adopted a child.  All present were surprised to hear from
me, for the first time, that the law laid down procedures for what the adopted
father said “are natural behaviours”. They had adopted a son under accepted
customary procedures; i.e. by arrangement with the mother. The whole idea
that laws should determine adoption procedures were a subject of merriment
in the circle and initially was treated as a joke. 
Simplicity in adoption is very much in line with Abkhaz custom,
which has traditions that include adoption through milk kinship, atalychestvo,
(Inal-ipa n.d.)37 and which are shared by other Caucasian peoples. This is so
widely known that children who had been orphaned in other parts of the
Soviet Union during the Second World War were sent in large numbers to
Abkhazia for adoption. One informant in a village in south east Abkhazia,
told me (September 2009) that she was the daughter of a Soviet Greek who as
a child was orphaned when the Nazis murdered all her relatives in the
Ukraine. She heard of Abkhaz customs and went on her own to Abkhazia,
where she was taken in by a family and later married an old Abkhaz, my
informant’s father. 
Looking after children is seen as the responsibility of parents and
grandparents, and the law acknowledges this as a legal responsibility. On
parents divorcing, access to children is guaranteed by law to both parents and
all grandparents until the child comes of age.
A functionalist interpretation might relate it to the milk kinship
fostering that was mostly the practice of a commoner’s family (the atalyk)
adopting a child of the nobility, to bring it up into adolescence, and was
37 Milk kinship in Abkhazia  has been described in some detail by travellers and
ethnographers of the Abkhaz-Adyghe as well as other west Caucasian peoples since the 19th
century, notably by Luzbetak (1951:57), Kaloev (1971: 198-199), Baddeley (1940 vol 1: 155,
162, 207, 262, 263), Kovalevsky (1970: 212-214) and Kosven (1935 no page ref.), Parkes
(2003) authors who did detect links with blood-wite, milk brotherhoods, suckling and settling
feuds. Milk kinship and the system of adoptions that cemented it, atalychestvo were binding
strands to form a cultural matrix. The kinship bond in atalychestvo was sealed by suckling at
the breast of a member of the receiving, atalyk’s, family. It was woven into the total fabric of
custom that, Inal-ipa argued, conferred cohesion and unity on Abkhazian society.
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accompanied by extensive gift exchanges between the foster-family and the
biological parents. It has been regarded as engendering clientelism, under
which the milk kinship was considered as strong as blood relationship and the
commoner derived protection from the lord. As it is the youngest, junior, boy
who inherits the parental house and property the elevation of the adoptee to
seniority among the children of the adopter would protect the youngest son
from losing these to an adopted child, and to possible challenge from the
adopted child’s original lineage.
In Abkhaz ideation of milk kinship fostering had its roots in the
culture of a once egalitarian society (personal communications 2010 et seq.).
The Abkhaz historian Stanislav Lakoba, in a rather cosy depiction of it wrote
that it reduced 
conflict between the estates [in an Abkhazia that occupied an] intermediate position 
between the democratic, liberal societies of the mountaineers of the North West 
Caucasus and the feudal system of Georgia [and] the peasants vigilantly defended 
popular custom from any encroachments on the part of the highest estates and 
constituted the fundamental moral pivot of the Abkhazian community (Lakoba, S.
1988b: 76, 77). 
Other students of northern Caucasian societies have recorded fostering
practices38 that are similar to those of the Abkhaz, as Inal-ipa occasionally
notes.39 He decided that milk kinship and other practices that were associated
with it evidenced how through practices and rites the Abkhaz held onto ideas
for their old significance, and expressed and retained their kinship-derived
terminology to cloaked new realities. The British expert Peter Parkes has
extensively discussed the practices as seen in many societies (2003a) and
drew on Inal-ipa’s research to single out for mention its tie-in with elements
of differential status among the Abkhaz. What had been reciprocal mutuality
38
 Notable are the comparative tabulations of Louis Luzbetak (1951) and the broad
sketch drawn by Tuite (1996). The latter lists areas of major overlap in beliefs and rites
across the mountain societies of Caucasus, which included polytheism with a chief god, the
personification as quasi-human or divine of harmful phenomena, sacrifice accompanying
rituals, men playing the leading part in society, the use of Christian churches for non-
Christian rites, the systems of fictive kinship.
39 E.g. among the Circassians, who are closely related historically and culturally to the
Abkhaz. Their atalychestvo “corresponds in all main features with that of the Abkhazians.”
(Inal-ipa n.d.: 50).
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within Abkhaz society became the unequal relations between the nobles and
the peasants, who themselves were subdivided into freemen, serfs and slaves.
Gift exchange became feudal tribute but it continued to be expressed in the
language of reciprocal exchange and as evidence of brotherhood and
atalychestvo relationships. The state’s laws came later and are silent on such
kinship. (2003b). 
The non-registration of adoption today is part and parcel of the
common failure to meet legal stipulations. Thus births, marriages and deaths
are also often not registered until required to secure state benefits such as a
passport or old age pension. To this day the Abkhaz regard only a customary
celebration of marriage, complete with feast and the sacrifice of an animal to
the Most High as a real marriage and couples might have numerous children
before registration of a marriage with the state without carrying public
opprobrium. None the less, the fact that registration with the state is required
in order to receive state benefits does represent an encroachment by the state
on customary practice. 
Kinship is such a binding component of the distinctive Abkhaz
ethnicity that it was once widely extended to deities, animals and trees, and
discussions with informants strongly suggest there is still widespread belief in
the efficacy of such practices. Spiritual practices and attendant beliefs that
knit the strands of Abkhaz ethnicity together – honour, shame and relational
obligation sometimes described as attributes of past society, the listener is
made to infer, continue to this day – as is borne out by Benet’s ethnography
(1974) and my personal observations40.
Today adoption is widespread but does not carry with it the linking of
clans or lineages to avoid disputes of the kind described for the past. While an
adopted child is still senior to its new siblings, irrespective of age or gender,
the purpose of this appears to have changed to that of an infertile couple
obtaining children, to help relatives to cope with a large number of children
40Field observations, August 2007. The persistence of such values is well attested by a
common insistence that the results of the 1992-93 war between Abkhazia and Georgia cannot
be resolved by the creation of a federal state that would encompass both; for this would be
blocked by the Abkhaz requirements for blood revenge to be exacted from those who had
killed others during the war (Paula Garb 2000,  personal communications 2007 et seq.). 
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and to care for orphans. Thus, the element of prevention of disputes and for
peace-making appears to have receded into the past. At the same time, there
are disputes over to whom children of a broken marriage are to belong, given
the social importance of lineage and descent and examples of this will be
encountered in the next sub-section (4.2).  
4.2 The law as instrument of custom -a village idyll, harmony and feud? 
A wife is the family’s weak link (personal communication 
   (M-d, an ex-elder and ex- head of an Abkhazian village administration 
26.8.11).
Here I describe a case in which imprisonment of a man who killed his wife
does not close a dispute but bringing in the law’s judge and court can be an
adjunct to custom.
My first arrival in the village started with a visit to the graves of
relatives buried close to my host’s house, with particular mention of father
and grandfather in the male line. Then I was treated to a display of
welcoming hospitality (Inal-ipa 1965, Dasania 2006 etc.) at the family house.
The master of the household, khozyain, stood next to his wife, the
khozyaika, and another woman, and his children stood in the background as
he explained that his [sic] village house was “home” because his father had
lived there and he was close to the graves and houses of the lineage he
belonged to, even though he and his family lived for most of the year in a flat
in a town across the border in Russia. He gave a flattering description of me
as he introduced the men by name and with handshakes and then
perfunctorily pointed out his wife who stood with children, smiling in the
background. She was an academic, a highly qualified legal and political
scholar who worked in the same university as her husband, where she was
senior to him. Here she “knew her place” as a woman in the village, as she
put it to me privately.
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The table at which only the host and his male friends sat with me was
richly laid. The women, including the host’s wife, and the children kept to the
kitchen other than when called out to fetch or clear. The host commented:
“We let them alone in the kitchen, where they can meet each other and
discuss whatever it is that interests them, you understand, whatever women
talk about.” The only woman who was shown respect in the way it might be
recognised in Britain and who was introduced to me by her kin term and
ethnicity (Mingrelian) was an elderly widow. 
Gender segregation is widely practiced even inside private cars and on
public transport. There are still limitations on Abkhaz women exposing
themselves to activities which place them in largely-male environments or
areas which might be so.
 Toasts were pronounced by the master of the house, in what I later
learnt were in laid-down order under the conduct of the senior (usually by
age) member present, starting with the toast that comes first at any table: “To
the Most High; may his bright gaze shine light down upon us”. At table
everyone praised the values of apswara etiquette, touching on, as one of
those present put it “high respect for women”, deference paid to elders and
the “peace, friendship and orderly life that observance of the rules of
apswara provide for the village”. This had some 300 inhabitants in big
houses with extensive gardens with fruit trees, plots for growing maize and
vegetables and the many grape vines that climb high into the trees, beehives,
chickens, ducks and turkeys, pigs and cattle (usually singular or with a calf)
and the big neat front lawns. The initial picture of a rural idyll turned out to
be somewhat more complex as was similarly described by Roger Just on his
initiation into the society of a Greek island (2000).
4.2.1 Feud, reconciliation
After a number of stays in the village, a year later, I got up before my hosts
one day and walked down one of the two streets, hallo-ing those I had met on
the way. They were, for the most part women driving their family and
neighbours’ cattle to pasture in the nearby brush by a stream. Older women
120
collected dung for use as fertilizer. When I told my host where I had been he
told me to be careful who I dealt with. It was then that I learnt that a
simmering feud between the two lineages had been going on for two years. 
The husband of a young woman had shot his wife with an automatic
rifle after lying in wait in the bushes in front of her uncle’s house, the one
“where she had first been introduced to her future in-laws and where the
marriage took place...so she was killed virtually inside that house, a terrible
insult” my host’s wife explained41.  The husband had been angry for some
time at her “loose conduct learnt while she had lived and studied for too long
in Russia,” and that had led to a separation - “The breaking point came when
the wife came home late one night in a car in the company of two men.” The
couple, after negotiations that involved “respected members of both families”
agreed that their child should alternatively live for two months at his father’s
house in the village, and then at hers in Russia, where she went to live with
her mother. Her uncle was the senior surviving head of the lineage. As the
husband’s family did not always return the child on time and eventually said
it would keep it she gave notice that she wanted a divorce through the courts.
It was on the eve of the court hearing that her husband shot her outside of her
uncle’s house. An important difference between separation and divorce (a rare
thing), it was explained to me, is that the mother on divorce returns to her
original lineage and usually keeps the children. In our case all concerned
agreed that, in the circumstances, the child was to remain with her mother and
her original lineage, although there had been no formal divorce. 
Disputes are usually resolved with mediation by the elders of the
lineages through a process that demands full contrition by the offending
lineage, and terms for compensation to reconcile them are agreed. A dispute
is not treated primarily as one between the individuals, who triggered it off.
The terms for reconciliation in our case were to include compensation for the
loss of the woman-mother’s labour, her bringing up the children, and the
costs of their education and health requirements. Where a husband, “the
41 My dealings with the wife were not those normally between a strange man and a wife, but I
had been allowed a degree of freedom because I am old, a foreigner and trust had been built
up with the family.
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breadwinner”, has been killed compensation to the women’s lineage would
include supporting her. The great degree of emphasis that is nowadays placed
on reconciliation to replace revenge killing represents a change that was
enforced by Soviet laws in place since the 1920s and which severely
punished revenge killings, the ‘traditional’ way of resolving a serious dispute
(Krylov 1999a: 42). While reducing the number of killings this did not
eradicate them. In the past such an event would automatically lead to blood
revenge by an appointed close male relative of the deceased killing someone
from the offending lineage. Until that was carried out the relative given the
task was himself cast out from society (Inal-Ipa 1965: 436) as an abrek, being
in a state of “pollution” (Dasania 2006: 31) and denied all social contact and
clan and lineage protection.
The laws of today’s Abkhazia are totally silent on the customary
reconciliation which keeps disputes out of the courts. I compared texts of
legal documents of “the state [...] founded on the norms of international law”
as put by Sergei Bagapsh, a past president. The Abkhazian "Criminal Code"
states [my translation MC]:
 An offender who has committed a crime of small or medium gravity may be 
freed from criminal responsibility if it [he/she] has made it up with the victim and 
made amends for the harm occasioned to the victim” (Zakon 27.4.2009: 15: clause 
70). The two mentioned categories of crimes (small and medium) are, in the first 
group "Crimes of small gravity [that] are not premeditated, and accidental acts for 
which the maximum penalty ...is not above three years confinement", and, in the 
second group, "Crimes of medium gravity [that] are premeditated crimes for which 
the maximum penalty is not more than five years of confinement, and accidental 
acts for which the maximum penalty is not more than three years of confinement  
(Zakon:3: Clause 15).
While these two categories do not at first glance provide for out of court
settlement of graver crimes such as premeditated murder, for which the
perpetrator is liable to five years and more of imprisonment, the very many
exemptions and the list of mitigating circumstances in other parts of the
Criminal Code make it possible in virtually any case to ‘shift’ the assessment
of the gravity of the crime into one of the categories for which the matter can
be settled between the parties concerned. This resonates with the practice of
straightening in village courts in PNG, “which connotes both the means of
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finding a route through the complexity of a dispute and its desired outcome”
(Demian 2003: 102). And, indeed, in Abkhazia this is practised; without the
PNG’s separate courts, but in the state’s deference to customary procedures.
The circumstances of the killing in our case were considered heinous
and the uncle flatly refused to allow any of the members of the offending
lineage (Cf Black-Michaud 1975, Inal-ipa 1965) to attend his lineage’s
funeral for the woman, as that would have been to indicate willingness to
pursue conciliation and is usually the first public step towards it. The “act”
had been committed without the preliminaries of seeking guidance from the
village elders, which might have prevented it or allowed for elements of
justification or mitigation to be taken into account. The village was put on a
state of alert, realising the danger of revenge killings. In an effort to soften the
uncle’s heart the elders insisted the culprit, who was being hidden by
relatives, be given up to the police (which he was), thus involving agency of
the law. However, this did not mean permitting a court to decide anything.
The elders instructed the legal ‘authorities’ that when the matter came to court
the sentence was to be the maximum under the law – ten years hard labour
with no early release, come what may - and so it was ‘decided’ by the judge.
But imprisonment without reconciliation does not end a dispute and the
village waits to see what will happen when the convicted man is released in
ten years’ time...
The elders of both lineage parties to the dispute expressed their hope
to me that their unreserved condemnation of the “the man who carried out the
shooting” and their insistence on a most severe term of imprisonment and the
child going to the dead woman’s lineage might lessen the hurt felt by the
offended lineage members and allow, with time, for reconciliation. In the
meantime any “unfortunate” behaviour by the offenders was to be avoided, an
elder explained to me. By the time the condemned man came out of prison his
lineage would have had to have demonstrated unqualified contrition.
Otherwise the whole lineage or the family within it could be sent into exile,
losing their houses and land in an act of collective punishment. Their
behaviour might prevent a revenge killing before or when the main culprit is
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freed. The initiative is entirely in the hands of the leaders of the offended
lineage and the uncle as the senior immediate relative of the deceased. 
Everyone was aware that any display of light heartedness by any
member of the offending lineage could provoke an immediate and bloody
response. The offending lineage members dare not (in the present tense, as
the dispute has not been resolved) mark any festive occasion with the usual
pomp. A member of the guilty lineage who was a distant cousin of the man
who killed his wife did take a wife from outside the village but the marriage
was without music or noise, in semi-darkness and with only five people
present – this in a country where the guests at a marriage normally number
from 300 (a small wedding) to over 1,000. In order to avoid accidental
infringement of the rules of conduct placed on the offending party everything
is done to prevent encounters between the opposing lineagemembers other
than by their elders. 
This was confirmed when I noted the absence of members of the
offending lineage when I was present at the village Feast of the Assumption
of the Virgin Mary (the Dormition of the Theotokos – the Mother of God - in
the Eastern Orthodox calendar) on 15th August. The Abkhaz mark this feast in
their own way by men leaping through the flames of bonfires with salt on
their heads to ward of the evil eye, and the drinking of wine that accompanies
most Abkhaz ceremonies. My hullo-ing everyone on my earlier morning
walk, I thought, could have led to dangerous misunderstandings, especially as
my host was godfather to a child in the offending lineage. However, he
reassured me: my high status as a guest of a lineage in the village made me
one, also, of the whole village and would protect me from misadventure.
It had been impressed on me on first acquaintance that customary
practices brought harmony, which turns out to mean accepted customary
procedures to deal with any problems that arise, not that they do not arise.
The talk after my morning stroll and the sketch of a village dispute furnished
pointers to the relationship between custom and law – keeping law out or
directing its agency as an instrument of or adjunct to custom.
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The case involved punishment through semi-ostracism - no
admittance to lineage funeral, avoidance, the surrender of the offender to the
police and sentence according to customary insistence, and the loss of a child
by the father’s lineage.
The story raised numerous questions about how Abkhaz custom
operates in changing circumstances. They include how the ‘ownership’ of
children is seen and how it can be amended, broader matters of honour,
shame and gender, the part played by the lineage head and the elders. The
principle point is that the problems that arose in the village are being tackled
according to customary understandings, not depending on but turning state
agencies into their own through imprisoning the offender. This will be further
discussed in chapters nine and ten as it raises the matter of whether the state
or its agencies, or some of them can be embedded in custom, rather than the
reverse that is described throughout the anthropology of law, indirect rule,
native/village and other secondary courts that continue in ex-colonies. 
Note might be taken that the dispute that has been dissected is so far
not resolved; that is an imprisonment is a departure from custom as it is often
described by the Abkhaz, but not the individual transgressor alone, but his
lineage as a whole pays the price for the killing. There was not the automatic
and once universal application of collective responsibility through revenge
killing or banishment of the offending clan (Inal-ipa 1965), but a modification
of it, as the Abkhaz are pressurised by the increasing penetration of
individualistic values. At least, that is what is happening so far and only time
will tell or, more precisely, what happens when the malefactor is released
from prison. Strong features of the practices of yore do continue, as
evidenced by the threat of exile, the practice of exclusion from social events
and avoidance that affect all members of the offending lineage, the ban on
celebrations of marriage in ‘proper fashion’ and forcing the offending lineage
to hand the murderer over for punishment despite the generally-judged
improper, “loose”, conduct that the victim learnt in the environment of
Russia.
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Some villagers expressed regret to me that while there was exclusion
from festive events and enforced constraint for some time to come, there had
been no immediate exiling. Informants in the village and from elsewhere
have admitted that “times they are a-changing.”  The killed woman’s lineage
gained a child. The blame placed on the victim having been being brought up
in Russia, was seen by some as a general effect of what they called
globalizatsia, literally ‘globalisation', but the term is used to cover all
influences on customary, i.e. lineage-controlled behaviour from outside
Abkhazia. The effect of changing times is evident in all walks of life as
reflected in the further examples from my fieldwork and in the following
note:
Two informants said that the rules of exogamy should be more
precisely demarcated geographically, to keep members of different lineages
more apart, in separate villages, “as it was in the past” (A-r and B-n Ref n.
145. 2011). There is widespread use of the phrase: “A neighbour is closer
than a relation” and, in the opinion of several informants this is a confusion of
the differences between the two and sometimes leads to marriages between
distant members of the same lineage. Some excused this as being equivalent
to a marriage between close neighbours and was not viewed as the serious
violation of exogamy rules as they would traditionally have been seen. One
informant put it: “If kin is seen as virtually the same as a neighbour then that
can spread familiarity, which leads to behaviour among lineage members that
breaks all sorts of rules of conduct” (Anz 2010). He also said that it was
wrong for what he called “the wife’s loose behaviour” to be seen just as
something imported from Russia: “It comes from different lineages living too
close together and familiarity undermines the clear lines that have to be kept
so as to be clear on who one should associate with according to our traditions
on women’s roles and incest.”  Another said that “mixed” marriages were
difficult ones (Milord, 2012). But not everyone in Abkhazia takes this so
seriously; thus an Armenian woman said only partially as a joke about a
current increase in Abkhaz taking Armenian wives: “Yes, they are taking
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Armenian wives – they have to improve their blood somehow.” She lives in
the increasingly ethnically mixed city of Sukhum.
4.3 Filicide – breaking the law?
This case is one of individual agency to protect social cohesion despite the
law’s stipulation that “Justice in criminal cases in the Republic of Abkhazia is
implemented only by the court” (Criminal-Legal Procedure Code: 4). The
Public Prosecutor’s duty includes “to institute legal proceedings” and again,
according to the Code “in the name of the state, to carry through the
prosecution in legal proceedings, and also to supervise the legal procedures of
the  organs of preliminary investigation” (Ibid: 10). 
The following personal experience was recounted to me in an office
of the state-funded Abkhazian Institute for the Study of the Humanities
(AbIGI) in Sukhum by a professor of botany. He intervened when I was
discussing customary practices and dispute resolution with members of the
Institute’s Ethnography Department: “You might be interested in something I
was involved in.” He had shot dead his son who had confessed to raping and
killing a neighbour’s daughter in their village, under the influence of drink
(see also Garb 2000). A member of the large Kvitsinia lineage, the professor
told me he borrowed a gun from a neighbour and instructed his son to show
him the body, which was done. Then the father shot him. He explained: 
If I had let the police intervene then however many years of prison my son might 
have got, the neighbours would have crushed us [i.e. Kvitsinia’s family]. By killing 
my son I crossed over to them [in family kinship sense], and now relations with the 
girl’s family are good – we greet one another and I attended [was allowed to] her 
funeral.
Here there is more than a hint of the real relationship of customary practices
to law in Abkhazia. Custom centres its attention on restoring harmony; where
punishments are decided by the immediate community or names that are
concerned they prevail over the laws that would limit custom. Law is turned
to when a person’s family is too weak to settle scores and is unable to obtain
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a satisfactory settlement through acts of revenge, gift exchange or ritual
commensality. There was no doubt among all by informants that the father
had acted properly and he added as a further explanation that the lineages had
been “joined” by his action and “if the law intervenes then there is war”; that
is, war between the families which would have been left without the
reconciliation which cannot be brought about by law, court and punishment
of a guilty person. The case required no communal mobilisation of customary
procedure, just the action taken by the father; no calling in the elders or
seeking guidance from shrines. There were no intermediaries drawn in and no
compensation negotiated – the father had taken care of that and achieved
closure. He had also demonstrated that apswara includes individual agency.
While the law does spell out punishments for killings the call by the
Abkhazian state Prosecutor (prokurator)  for action to be taken by the legal
apparatus fell on deaf ears in this case, as there were no witnesses and the
police would not violate custom by an investigation.  
The settling of the case to popular satisfaction kept the law and its
courts out of it. The much approved saying that “A father answers for a son’s
conduct” was satisfactorily enacted, to the approval of judges and police,
ethnographers and others.
As with that case, in all similar ones of individual action to deal with a
problem by what in Britain would be called ‘taking the law into ones own
hands’ has no meaning among the Abkhaz when the action is endorsed by
custom. “There was no need to take matters further as an inter-family dispute
had been avoided,” in the words of one informant. And the proof of the
pudding is in the eating – no one did – such is the strength of custom in
practice. The father himself was critical of those Abkhaz who today argue
that laws and intervention by the agencies of the state, by the police and
courts should be allowed in such cases. We shall return to this when we
consider the advocates of law replacing custom.
Central to thinking as it was expressed to me was to keep disputes
either within the family or if that proves impossible then to as narrow a circle
as possible, “so that feud is closed off” as it was put. This also lessens the
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shaming of any offender. The matter of shaming arose in another dispute a
respected elder from a northern Abkhazian village described to me in June
2012.
Disputes, specially in rural areas between members of different ethnic
groups is resolved in similar ways to among the Abkhaz as other groups have
adopted similar systems involving elders to that of the Abkhaz. In towns this
is more complicated as custom is weaker in them. I should add that the whole
topic of inter-ethnic relations is one that requires much more research –
something I am planning for the future.
4.4 Mediation - extra-legal settlement - legal agencies connive
4.4.1 Judge turns to custom after knifing
A young man challenged another to wrestle. When he was thrown to the
ground for the third time before his friends he decided he had been publicly
insulted and killed the other with a knife. It would have been an open and
shut case had it gone to a court in a state where law had primacy and the
question of guilt was uppermost. That is not the case in Abkhazia, as my
informant, an elder known for successes in reconciling parties in dispute,
explained:
 A court sentence would have done nothing to return the dead man, nor left his 
family less aggrieved, so I was telephoned by a judge and asked to try and bring 
about reconciliation. Nor would it have mitigated the effects of a family losing its 
breadwinner. So I was brought in as an elder and the result of much to-ing and fro-
ing was that the matter was smoothed out. The family of the young man who had 
unfortunately killed the other agreed to help finance the widow to bring up her two 
orphans. Good relations were restored in the village [in central Abkhazia] where the 
incident took place. It is true that there is now a danger that the dispute will flare up 
again because the perpetrator of the killing was soon afterwards careless enough to 
go to a wedding in the village, a celebration of a joyous occasion, without first 
clearing this with the dead boy’s father, and so soon after the death. There is more 
conciliatory work to be done there and it will not be easy as l o o s e - t o n g u e d 
women are stirring things up, as women usually do” (Personal communication 
September 2009).
The last two sentences in the quotation were not throw-away remarks, as any
light heartedness shown in conduct by members of the family that killed the
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boy could produce an angry reaction and lead to the shedding of blood, as it
could in the earlier description of the on-going village dispute that followed
the shooting of a young woman.
The elder conducted his substantial negotiations with the widow’s
father-in-law; the recognised head of the family the woman had entered by
marriage, and brought him together with the father of the boy who “used the
knife”. Here, again the primacy of reconciliation and compensating for losses
took precedence over what the Criminal Code states in the text cited  three
pages above. It also shows not the incorporation of custom into law but the
precedence of customary practices over the words of the law – very much
counter to those arguments in anthropological literature that would describe
law as an incorporation of custom, that custom historically becomes
transmuted into law (Bohannan 1965: 33-42) and was discussed in chapter
two.
Law is regarded as a fall-back. There is a state-recognised council of
elders, as there is a state-registered association of shrine keepers – important
actors in dispute resolution. The role of neither is described in the laws. The
part played by the elders will be seen in other cases to be presented. The
judges have recourse to their services as they themselves are also part of the
custom-dominated society, notwithstanding their appointments as agents of
the state. Terms of compensation are agreed between the families and the law
stands aside with the acquiescence or active part played by its agents to
facilitate custom, such as the judge calling in the mediator in this case.
As will be described in chapter six, disputants, judges and the police
have recourse to the multitude of shared sacred shrines to settle disputes and
identify those at fault. Roughly speaking, the relevant activity at the shrine is
oath swearing of innocence. The formulations in the Criminal Code allow for
avoidance of the automatic intervention of the courts, especially when a
matter of “honour” has arisen. Thus one reads: “a murder committed when in
a sudden state of strong emotional upset (temporary insanity) brought about
by force, mockery or gross insult on the part of the victim or by other illegal
or amoral actions, inaction, by the victim...” (Zakon 27.04.2009:22: clause
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101) are accepted as mitigations and can make an offender liable to
imprisonment from one to three years or, as has been demonstrated, leaves
settlement to customary institutions. This goes well outside the scope allowed
for crimes of passion that one finds in many countries, as being “in a sudden
state of emotional upset” - what in other societies amounts to little more than
“being very angry” is sufficient to excuse “what might be thought to be
breaking the law” (Judge informant 2011).
The Constitution states, in its section on Human Rights and Freedoms
of a Citizen: Everyone has […] the freedom to protect one’s honour and
dignity” (Constitution, Ch 2, Article 14: 29).
4.4.2 Honour
Obliquely, the honour of the individual, the recognition of his or her status
and the right to react as one thinks fit to a perceived slight is endorsed in the
law. Custom demands a man reacts. One should bear in mind that the
individual’s honour is that of the male, however much the Abkhaz might
speak of a woman’s honour being infringed. An infringement of “woman’s
honour” is perceived of as hurting that of her male relatives and it is they who
are expected to defend the lineage’s honour (Informant 2012). Such an
interpretation has parallels in other societies and the literature abounds with
examples of this.
Almost without exception, Abkhaz informants told me that the job of
settling disputes and protecting honour was the business of the people in the
lineage affected. Society tolerates vengeance and, indeed, expects individuals
to exact it for insults.  Those who settle scores are held in high esteem. What
is more, nowadays when a member of a family, on the instruction of uncles or
its elders, carries out an act of retribution on a fellow family member for
besmirching the family name by offending a member of another family, then
a dispute with the offended family is halted without other redress being
sought. Individuals might cut matters short by individual action, as in the case
of the professor who killed his son. 
But all is not as simple as in the case of the wrestlers. There is a
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tendency for members of a lineage to defend their members, as will be seen in
several of the following cases. Kinship influences can be manifested in
different ways according to circumstances and the balance of forces as the
following case illustrates. It is of another killing in which the intervention of
the law was confined to a judge’s telephone call to an elder. Reconciliation
included ensuring that the family of a thief was not publicly humiliated;
something that the elder told me was upmost in the judge’s mind, as it was in
his own (personal communications).
4.4.3 Honour and dignity - the watchman and the thief
Even in a seemingly open and shut case where a state employee in the course
of his duty shot a man whom he saw seriously damaging state property the
dignity and honour of the family of the deceased had to be protected: 
A night watchman shot and killed a young man who was caught in the very act of 
stealing power cable metal. The young man’s family demanded redress, upon 
hearing which a respected judge contacted me [my informant. MC] by telephone 
and asked me to help stop the case being disputed in court. I went to see the father 
of the boy who was shot and acted as mediator between the families of the 
watchman and the killed man [thief] and the matter was settled after long 
deliberation. The family of the victim was spared the shame of losing a court   case 
against a state employee who had acted in the course of carrying out his 
duty honestly. Compensation was paid by the watchman’s family to help the widow 
and children – an unnecessary court action was avoided (personal 
communication 2009)
The elder, explained that when the case was brought to the notice of a judge
his uppermost concern was not with how to apprehend the watchman and
determine the punishment to be meted out and to have a wrangle about
whether excessive force was used, in the certain knowledge that a court
would find in favour of the watchman. 
“He was a state employee,” the judge later told me and taking the dispute to a court 
would itself serve “no useful purpose” as relations between the two families 
involved would not thereby be restored to “normal and the family that suffered a
terrible loss would gain nothing.  [… T]he family that had suffered the loss was 
grieving and concerned about its honour and wanted, initially, to defend that in 
court and to argue that even if their son had committed an offence, it was not a 
capital one. He thought that because of the death a court would clear his son’s name.
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It took some doing to dissuade him from that course of action and, in the end we 
settled matters without any public humiliation and provided for the widow. The 
family of the shot person was saved the indignity of public shaming.
 
Protection against shame is not only to protect individuals, but also the
lineage, as shown by  a judge telling me that a group of respected lineage
elders once came to his office to plead for leniency for a relative who had
been arrested: 
He had committed brutal acts of torture on an old man, forcing him to reveal where 
he had his money […]. I refused to be lenient and then the chief elder blushed with 
embarrassment and he and the others fell on their knees before me and agreed that 
the torturer was a poslednyi negodiay, (a scoundrel of the first water), who 
deserved to be hanged, but they begged me to let people know that they had done 
their customary duty in coming to plead for their scoundrel of a relative (personal 
communication 2011). 
Their concern was with how to deal with a difficult problem and having to
decide which was the greater shame to be guarded against – that of not
defending a relative or that of allowing the law in the person of the judge to
proceed, to use the law as leverage to get a resolution which customary
practices proved unable to secure in today’s circumstances. It was an
admission that customary institutions were losing some of their old weapons
for applying punishment, such as revenge killing and exiling. In answer to my
question, the judge did say that whatever the court decided, the relatives must
pay compensation to the old man who had been tortured.
He added a comment to me: “Had it just been a theft then, alright, we
could have settled the matter by having the money returned, for instance”.
When I asked about people interfering with the course of justice, he said: “If
we imprisoned everyone who interfered to influence a judge, then we would
be imprisoning everyone.” He was in favour of introducing arbitration courts
into Abkhazia and said that the “comrades’ courts” of Soviet times42 worked
well for “shaming people who had committed small thefts or, say, had spat at
someone. That worked well in Soviet times, but they are no more,
unfortunately” (personal communication May 2012 Fld 274). In his view the
“criminal situation” had not improved over the previous five years, because
42 See Appendix I for details.
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“economics moves everything, including politics – the economy decides
politics.”
Whether the judge’s very much extra-judicial approach is the last
word on dispute resolution will require further research with the extended-
case method (Gluckman 1961, Van Velson 1967, Buravoy 1998). But here I
want to expand a little on shaming and bring forward a case of dispute
management with the threat of applying customary punishment. In it one also
sees adjustment in customary flexibility on a role for women.
4.5 Custom evolving
4.5.1 Shaming - Woman takes son to local assembly -   skhod  
I was told by a woman: “There are no cases of a woman committing an
unprovoked killing as women are brought up in an atmosphere which rules
this out. Even when a son behaves badly, the action his mother might take in
extremis is to say to him: “I renounce you, usymyskhaait!’ which is a terrible
curse.”  If she cannot even then control him, she can call a family gathering
… if there is no man around to do it, she added after a pause. The following
tells of a woman initiating a dispute procedure over her son’s behaviour. In it
shaming was the principal lever to solve the problem.
At the gathering, the young man stood apart from his seniors, head
hung low and with all the outward signs of humbleness and contrition. The
people sat inside the family house because it was too cool outside although
the preferred sites for an obshchina assembly is the front lawn or at an
acknowledged place that is agreed in widely-spread villages43. The young
man’s relatives were discussing him, the “bad boy”. His wife spoke of his
neglect and described herself as a widow44. My local helper and friend, a
43 In most of Abkhazia the houses in “villages” are as scattered as farms might be in Britain
and might be ten miles across. There has never been the concentration of houses along streets
that were introduced by authorities and missionaries in the colonies, or the concentrations
that were a feature of the collectivisation of agriculture in many areas of the Soviet Union.
The villages retain from Soviet times a small centre of collective farm buildings, stores,
points where the farmers would sell surplus produce, a school, palace of culture club and post
office.
44 The word is normally applied only to the wife of a dead man and its use in the present
context was to stress the sense of abandonment the woman felt.
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neighbour of the lineage that was sorting things out, was Abkhaz by marriage
and translated finer points for me as speakers moved easily between Russian
and Abkhaz languages. She clarified the use of the term “widowed”: “She
means that is what the bad boy’s behaviour had made of her, a bride who
came from another village and whose lineage does not come into the
dispute”. This was a stage in an ongoing case of a young man who was being
called to account for not carrying out his filial duties to look after his mother
and his wife by going out to work, providing fuel, keeping the house in a
proper state of repair and working the land. The case was formally   brought
by the younger brother of the young man’s deceased father (his nephew). This
met the stipulations of patrilineity: the complainant was in fact a woman but,
abiding by convention, it was officially the senior male.
This was in the same village where I had been told on my first arrival
that all was fine, orderly and peaceful and where a man had shot his wife.
In the name of his uncle the young man’s mother and her neighbours
called fifteen people of their subdivision of the village to the assembly, – one
person from each smaller family. It was noticeable that some neighbours were
included, an indication of the breakdown of exclusivity for lineages that,
according to informants, would have been there not so long ago. The tone of
all contributions was to shame the young man; shaming being clearly chosen
to have the greatest effect on him. Everyone understood that and the
explanations I was given by participants after the end of the formal
proceedings bore that out. The Abkhaz word for shame, abkherchero, was not
used until towards the end by the most respected elder, and then only as
something that might hang over them all should matters not improve. Until
then the Russian word styd was used, a word that is close to the English
shame and in quite wide use, with the Russian not sounding so condemnatory.
In Abkhaz, however there is another word –Akhymz’kha which has much
greater strength, that of ineffaceable shame and approximates to total
disgrace, and that was not used.  
The widowed mother of the “boy” had her say; telling of how she was
left to do both a man’s and a woman’s work and called on the assembly for
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assistance. The senior elder made a brief speech to introduce all who were
present and conducted the proceedings. He interrogated the ‘widow’ (son’s
wife) so that everyone present should hear the details of what was at issue.
The assembly was then opened for all to have their say and ask
questions. My helper from the village drew my attention to how merit can
influence relative seniority in social relationships: “Even the uncle [i.e.
surviving brother of the boy’s deceased father, MC]) speaks, although he is
only twenty-five years old, and it is because he is an exemplary person who
has been to university and is married”. When everyone had spoken the senior
elder pronounced his verdict, his decision, speaking clearly and following a
ritually structured traditional presentation.
He started from afar, with a history of the bad boy’s grandfather, who
had been “a most honest man and to the utmost a loving peasant”. As an aside
my informant explained that “At such gatherings he would say that, even if it
was not true”. The elder continued: “He always helped his neighbours and
helped a widowed woman who lived some way away and had two children to
bring up - he brought her wood for her fire before he collected any for
himself. ‘Verochka,’ he would say to her, using the diminutive form, ‘don’t
worry, while I am alive you will have fuel and maize.’ He helped people”.
Then he spoke about the boy’s father: “He was a peredovik [Soviet
term for an exemplary worker, MC] in the kolkhoz and had been awarded
government medals. He was highly respected in the village and used to be
chosen as tamada [master of ceremonies at table, MC], was well known in
the rayon” [to the local authorities, MC]. “Everyone knew and respected your
father” he told the bad boy directly. Next, he moved to the boy’s
grandmother’s lineage, through mothers, father and, again, praising them all.
He drew on as many positive character traits as he could, implicitly to
contrast these with the young man’s behaviour. My informant-helper
whispered to me: “This is always the form – to contrast the good and
appreciated conduct of closely related members of the accused’s family with
that of the accused’s own behaviour.”  The boy’s mother was then lauded as a
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conscientious worker, good at her job and he pointing out that no one at the
assembly had had a bad word for her: 
“She never misses lineage events, be they funerals or marriages and
she has never brought shame (here the Russian styd was used) to the lineage
(which he named) she married into. Just take a look at the kitchen garden and
lawn that are so well tended. She sets an example of how things should be
according to our standards”. The point will not be lost that he kept to the
traditionalist ascription of gender roles, by which a woman’s prime
responsibility was for the house even though the Soviet period and post-
Soviet disruption had taken women to work out of the house into some of
what were traditionally male realms.
The elder went on to criticise the general situation in society, its
negative features: “What is happening to our youth today?” he asked, “lazy,
don’t work and always wanting money from their parents”.
Having set the scene and social context, only then did he come
directly to the matter in hand, addressing everyone and the young man, and
describing what he had done - that he has broken the norms of conduct, and
that when his father was dead. He contrasted what he should have done and
what he had been doing. As distinct from a court of law, the social context as
it affected the injured and injurer came uppermost.
Then came the resolution, “the decision”, as it was called, reshenie,
voiced by the elder, who, my female informant told me afterwards, knew it
would be accepted not only because “he is wise” but because he had sounded
out people’s views, and checked what had actually occurred, “so as to
eliminate the possibility that there was a settling of scores underlying the case
in hand”. He started with a warning that what had happened must not be
repeated, that the boy must not bring shame, abkherchero (the strong Abkhaz
word), on his lineage, his deceased father and grandfather. If he did not
improve himself then “measures” would be taken against him: “We will keep
the situation under review”. It was explained to me that while it was not
mentioned all present understood that “measures” would mean expulsion
from the lineage and his being forced to leave the village. Only then did he
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call on the young man to speak, and the man came closer to the others. He
briefly confessed he had been in the wrong, expressed agreement with all that
had been said and promised to amend his conduct.
One will note the similarities between this description of the
'resolution' with that found in Mikhail Sholokhov's novel Virgin Soil
Upturned (1935), in which he describes a similar resolution of a dispute
among the Don Cossacks of the very South of Russia – another illustration of
similar customary practice of direct democracy, but also of one accepted in
Soviet times during the collectivisation years of the early 1930s. 
His mother then joyously called everyone to table, to the feast she had
prepared “as sitting down to eat together shows the commitment of everyone
to the decision taken and to reconciliation”, I was told. There were toasts,
starting with a prayer to Anykhyrer, the supreme being of the Abkhaz:
“Antswa ulpkha khta,” or “khakh’ ukou” – literally, “who is above.” They are
the words that open all festive occasions: “To the Most High; may his bright
gaze shine light down upon us,” and the Abkhaz know that all solemn
occasions are sealed with those words – a hope and seeking the supreme
being’s and its representatives’ endorsement. It is Anigbo’s “’cultural
performance’, eating together for a purpose […] not a casual affair. It is a
social scheme or design, through which some specific aspect of a relationship
can be communicated” (1996 citing Richards 1932:187), “[…] the mutual
interest or values which can be invoked through the activity and the
relationships thereby defined” (Middleton 1960: 119-120). 
The Abkhaz form of severe punishment through social condemnation
might be interpreted as placing a person in limbo, a stage of adjustment that
might be followed by reincorporation into society after a period of social
isolation and disorientation, to be compared with liminality (Turner 1967).
Turner, (after Van Gennep 1960) described that as the transitional state
between two phases, during which individuals were "betwixt and between" -
they did not belong in their initial form to the society that they previously
were a part of and they were not yet been reincorporated into society and, I
add, among the Abkhaz they could be kept in that state for a set period or in
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perpetuity, by ostracism, expulsion, exile and deprivation of property.
Liminality for Turner was an ambiguous period which included
demonstrations of humility, seclusion and of being tested. These features
were evident in the conduct enforced by the skhod which dealt with the “bad
boy.” It is also seen in the case of the young man who shot his wife being put
in prison at the instigation of his community; itself a state of isolation from
his lineage, being placed outside the protective rules of customary practice
and solidarity, denying him (sic) not only lineage protection but the right to
participate in any form of socially recognised practice, debarred from
attendance at local ceremonies45. The Abkhaz describe this as being in a
condition of “living dead.” Herein lies the dreadful power that the elders and
the assembled community possess to enforce their decisions on recalcitrant
members of society. That is what is meant by the threat of ‘measures’ that
could be taken in the case of the “bad boy,” and is more impressive
punishment than that offered by the laws.
The detail of practices in implementing customary perceptions, of
apswara, are circumstantially modified and pressures are great today to meet
new demands, as the next incident will demonstrate. Whatever the
perceptions, they are there to solve problems and that requires that they are
‘bent’ to do so. Thus, precedence does not exercise dominion, however much
it is selectively invoked to justify changes in the present and the absence of
the setting down of codified ‘rules’ of custom allows for practices to be
applied in a contingent fashion. Whether customary institutions are
everywhere able to enforce the strongest sanctions is questionable – for
instance when it comes to tackling the increased incidence of stealing in the
villages where new inequalities are establishing themselves and are looked at
in chapter five. 
In the account of the “bad boy” there is no critical examination at the
assembly of the failure of the collective responsibility of the lineage that
allowed the boy’s behaviour; no appeal to the lineage’s responsibility for
what is widely spoken of as customary influence to prevent such behaviour as
45 The strictures do not necessarily follow an exiled person who finds refuge in another part
of the country, away from his home lineage area.
139
was exhibited by the culprit.46 The elder only expressed a general criticism of
the young people of today - something that suggests a degree of
powerlessness and frustration, and is blamed on outside forces. That fact
turned my thoughts onto the degree to which custom, Braithwaite’s moving
target, can cope through modification to meet new challenges, to whether it
has the foundations strong enough for that, but more of that later. My next
case considers a modification of traditional seniority within a family,
something that could be of wider significance.
  
4.5.2 Son tames father
In a family in another village my informant’s mother was a junior civil
servant and his father a farmer. Difficulties not of their own making put stress
on relations in the family and the father took to drinking and bringing
companions to party in the house. The mother did not know which way to
turn in this society where men, especially the khozyain, determine matters, at
least according to the most formal descriptions of custom. Driven to despair,
she took to crying on her own. 
One evening when her husband’s party was in full swing the older son
entered the room, dismissed the company and upbraided his father. The
conflict between paternal status and the proper rules of a father’s conduct was
obvious, but so was that between the statuses of father and son. What is
interesting is that this conflict of supposedly irreconcilables met with the
father’s morose acceptance of his admonition, which brought some relief to
the mother. It occurred to me that this might be instantiation of how people
modify custom, in this case that of status, to accommodate the external
pressures which they encounter, the way in which the idealised symbolic
constructions of reality and actual behavioural relations accommodated
(Fischer, M. 2006). That possibility was examined in other disputes I studied,
and found to shed some light on overcoming contradictions found in ideation
and practice in the rapidly changing conditions affecting Abkhaz society. The
Abkhaz cannot fit the requirements of all circumstances into their customary
46 I am grateful to Caroline Bennet a doctoral student at SAC University of Kent, for drawing
this important point to my attention.
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outlook unless ideation itself accommodates change, a form of embedding of
the new into Abkhaz culture. 
The son’s conduct restored a degree of harmony in the family and it
could be argued that in the very violation of details of the customary
hierarchical stipulations that require recognition of seniority by age, it was
successful in attaining another objective that is also central to customary
obligations - to maintain harmony. A violation of seniority was justified by
the last element. It was not, however, seen by others I discussed the case with,
and that included a younger son in the same family, as primarily a violation of
a father’s seniority as such, but as a special exception. Another informant,
indeed, argued that the son’s taking his father to book was a help to the father
better to remain senior. Paradoxically that also was the view of the elder son’s
telling of the story. He did not question that seniority remained in force. It
was seen as an accommodation that in no way challenged the validity of
customary relationships and practices in a family. 
Further research on modifications of practices and values indicate the
extent to which customary practices are changing and people are capable of
asserting themselves within its conceptions, on occasion in defence of what
they think is right, be it ‘traditional’ customary or not. In this process there
might be an effect of law that gives greater support to an individual’s conduct,
measures not against custom as conceived, but attempts to embed shifts to
individualism from collectivity. 
4.5.3 Changing customs.
My observation of a ceremony for the mourning of the dead in a village in
southeast Abkhazia showed how much more simplified it is compared to the
way in which it was described as recently as the 1950s, when women tore
their faces and men, including those only distantly related and even casual
visitors, would forcefully beat the top of their heads to show their respect and
sadness for the departed (Lakerbay 1965: 176-187). Nowadays even close
relatives may only put in a brief appearance and contribute little more than
money to defray costs, a bow and a few words to console the widow and
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children. But it is still regarded as obligatory for all relatives to put in an
appearance. The traditional way was for runners shwadzhhwajwy
(a.shwadzh.hwa.jw) - the gorevestniki of Russia, to call people together. As
lineages dispersed it was supplemented by notices published in a national
newspaper that was delivered by the postal service to virtually every
household in Abkhazia. Nowadays the distribution of newspapers has become
erratic, so announcements are made on television and their great importance
is shown by them leading the day’s news programmes; but even that is under
pressure as some Abkhaz now think that such sad notices should not be given
such prominence. While mourning rituals might be undergoing simplification
I could perceive among the Abkhaz no downgrading of the significance of the
dead, and deaths and funerals retain great ritual attention.
The law stipulates that the dead are to be buried in municipal sites.
There is a let out “for those with customary practices” (Zakon 2007: 43) but
the application of the general stipulation in the law is only implemented by a
minority of urban dwellers who have lost links with the villages or, according
to one informant “are out to make a show of themselves with an ostentatious
and entirely superfluous and immodest display of wealth” (2009). The same
informant drew my attention to the absence of grave markers going back
more than a few decades and said that veneration of the “departed” does not
have to be marked by precisely locating their presence as “they are
everywhere where they are remembered”. He, now 50 years old, remembers
coming across occasional decaying wooden grave-markers that could still be
found in the countryside in his youth, and which did not make for eternalising
the dead as individuals by personalised structures and current practices of
visiting their graves. His view suggests a continuation in a very different form
of the Abkhaz once practising the removal of an individualised physical
presence of the dead, through destruction of their corpses.  
Informants referred to the frequent visitation to them of the dead
through dreams. At both village and town grave sites today and where people
have been killed in road accidents food and drink are placed on tables under
temporary awnings. Is that itself a “new custom”? One does not find
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references to it in the literature and how would one have carried them out
without lasting tomb stones? The dead as a body, as of old, are
commemorated in houses on special days and places are then set for them at
table and they are generalised in rituals to honour them. The 14-year-old boy
of my host family in Sukhum once expressed amazement: “Is it really true
that you do not feed the dead in England!?” Respect for the ever-present but
not personalised dead, a link with the spiritual world, is an obligatory
requirement of apswara but the rituals change, as much else is undergoing
change today. Custom is indeed “a deviously moving target” in the words of
Braithwaite et alii when looking at the difficulties of laying down what
constitutes a practice within custom (2012: 183). 
The institutions for the regulation of individuals’ and lineage’s
disputes are often described by the Abkhaz as essentially not having changed
in the manner in which they are understood and practiced, and that they
embody unchanged principles for fairness and justice that exist from times
immemorial. Where pressed, informants acknowledged ‘deformations’ of
custom, adding that in an independent Abkhazia these can be rectified, in the
absence of external pressures, such as those of Tsarist, Soviet and, now,
today’s lawmakers. While many people acknowledged that changing times
have brought changes in customary practices to cope, these are seen as
secondary, in the main, to apswara’s and apsua tsas’ eternal principles,
demonstrating historicist selection of real or imagined events from the past to
justify current actions and contradictory perceptions. The changing times
have forced on the Abkhaz an outlook that while ideationally accepting the
past as the source of what is correct, in practice they align it with present
needs. This would support Marcus Banks’ insistence, made in reference to
kinship, that such structures have to do with how society is currently
organised and constructed, and not the real or imagined past, whatever
appeals are made to it for legitimacy (1996).
Changes in custom can be evidenced even in seemingly minor matters
of ritual. I was witness to one such happening when at table the host stood to
raise his glass and make a toast. When he was pulled up for standing by one
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of the senior guests he said: “According to apswara the host must stand when
there is a guest who has come from afar,” and that was accepted. Afterwards
he, a friend of some years standing, laughed and told me: “You see, they do
not know custom – I made up what I said as I don’t know whether I should
have stood […] but what I said was accepted because they don’t know either,
but defer to me because of my standing in the community” (2010 n. 270).
How custom is made to accommodate change is also seen in the
section that follows and includes several cases, including a consideration of
what happened around an attack on the life of ex-president Ankvab.
4.6 Resort to the law and to custom?
Here we have another Abkhaz use of legal agencies and contacts in
government as adjuncts to enforce shame, kinship cohesion and lineage
influence to resolve a problem.
4.6.1 Child run over – qualified use of law as an adjunct.
In a conversation about laws and people’s responsibilities a mother of three
told me  that the law should be brought in, in extremis, for example to stop
TV companies violating authors’ copyright by putting pirated music on discs
and selling them. She moved on to other forms of theft and then said: “The
law should be used only when people cannot sort things out themselves, such
as to bring dangerous drivers to book as drivers simply do not observe speed
limits” (2011. Fld 019). She had little confidence in the police but insisted
that they should be held to account and “made to do their job”. She
complained about a neighbour: “A mother allows her 14-year-old daughter to
drive and she might have an accident.” As she put it, the problem was not that
the girl did not have a driving license, a fact known to all, including the girl’s
policeman father, but because she was “too young”. 
The same woman had to decide whether to push for involvement of
legal agencies in a case of a child being run down on a main road by a
drunken driver, as now described. She was unofficially taking the initiative
because she feared that the mother and father of the child would not pursue
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the case with full rigour and her position of respect with them and as the
child’s mother’s father’s sister (MPZ) permitted her to do so. The dead child
was referred to as their “sister” by the children of the MFZ (Fld 145). The
mother of the child had married and the influence of the ‘normal’ male
lineage (her husband’s) was effectively negated by her being acknowledged
as a powerful individua. As in other cases I have described, here an assertive
woman did what customary practice formally insists is a male responsibility. 
The accident was in the previous September. (Fld 145). As a first step
the MFZ had persuaded the parents of the child not to allow the family of the
perpetrator to attend the mourning ritual at the burial of the child, the
oplakivanie. As with the case of the husband who killed his wife, to allow
them to attend would have opened the door to reconciliation and to have
taken it away from legal process. She wanted the driver to be severely
punished by the law as she could not be certain that a customary sanction of
exile would be applied. She also feared that the dead child’s mother would be
“bought out” when pressure was put on her to settle amicably outside the law.
The MFZ then had to keep an eye on things to ensure that the
offending lineage did not bribe the police to falsify the circumstances of the
accident, and that no other monkey business would be tolerated, such as the
police “losing” documentation or claiming that the driver had a tire blow-out.
To have everything on the record, she impressed on a government minister
she knew (“everyone knows government ministers” she said as an aside) that
the driver had been breathalysed and was shown to have alcohol in his blood.
She added: “It is up to the dead child’s father’s lineage to decide how to
pursue the case but I do not want things to ‘slip’ because the mother is too
upset to think properly, and I am insisting that the driver be sentenced to the
full six-to-eight years’ prison prescribed by the law: “Killing while driving
when drunk is murder, not just careless driving”. Demonstrating the widely
accepted belief that how the law was implemented depended on individuals at
the top of socierty, she muttered: “We’ll see whether the election of the new
president means the law will be properly applied” i.e. as she would want it
[MC comment] - elections were in the offing later in 2012.
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The MFZ agreed I could attend the oplakivanie. I had met her mother
and other members of the family, including the mother of the dead child. In a
comment on variety in local customs she said she was happy that the funeral
was to take place just two days after the killing: “Like in Gudauta region
[northwest Abkhazia] and not hanging around for days in the hot weather as it
can be in southern Abkhazia” [where she comes from]. There was a crowd of
hundreds, mostly men, in the courtyard surrounded by high rise blocks in
northern Sukhum.  Women predominated under a canopy that kept the sun off
their seats beside the coffin and visitors could walk by and express their
condolences and give a handshake. There was no hospitality provided on that
occasion and after an hour the closest relatives adjourned to the burial site.
There was a wider than usual attendance because the death was that of a
child. I saw no tears and no emotional outbursts at the solemn occasion.
I followed this case for more than two years and which, at the time of
writing, was ongoing. An appeal has been lodged (May 2012) (Fld 228)
against the lower court sentencing the driver to “only” two-and-a-half months
prison. What was said and done around the child’s death highlighted how
both custom and law were brought to bear in opportunistic fashion to seek a
satisfactory result. That included, on the one hand, bringing customary
pressures to prevent an unsatisfactory result, barring the miscreant and his
lineage from the oplakivanie and drawing in kin to influence the process of
law. The courts were used in a situation where customary practice was ruled
out as powerless to tackle an accident on the open road well away from
kinship groups. 
For comparison and to bring out the complexities in the conditions of
contestation among people applying both customary and legal procedures or
only custom, and to show what happens in a dispute within the all-Abkhazia
community there is the following. The example involves a still (July 2014)
ongoing investigation into an attempt on the life of the president.
4.6.2 Attempts on president’s life - Shame, suicide – law versus 
kinship
The cases that have been instanced of the “bad boy” and of the son punishing
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his father provided opportunities to sense and examine the strength with
which the Abkhaz customarily regard shaming in dispute resolution. It came
up time and again, as in the attempt on the life of the president, as well as in
the subsections on marriage and abduction below. Apart from the principal
substance of tackling the attempted assassination that case involves relatives
publicly disassociating themselves from others in their lineage who commit
suicide rather than be publicly arraigned in court.
In May 2012 a newly filled hole and repaired roadside embankment
were pointed out to me as I was being driven along the road that runs the
length of the country. It was the spot where the latest attempt on the life of the
then President Alexander Ankvab’s life was made by would-be assassins
using a mine, rockets and automatic rifles. It was not far from a highway
police checkpoint and is normally quite busy.
I was curious as I had heard of the incident and, like others throughout
the country, had depended for news mainly on the extensive rumour machine.
The official news for over a year was, to put it mildly, frugal, telling little
about how the investigation was proceeding and largely confined to
announcements of arrests and brief court appearances where judges gave
permission for the arrested to be held in custody. The then public prosecutor
Safarbey Mikanba announced in late August of 2013, that the investigations
were nearing completion, and had taken in previous assassination attempts
and that seven people were being held and would be charged after the
Supreme Court received all documentation “in about two months time”
(Apsnypress 12.8.2013). Detailed charges against a group of accused were
made by the Prosecutor General in October 2013 (ApsnyPress 9.10.2013) and
the court hearings are still continuing nine months later.
Ominously an announcement was made that the prosecutor’s office
was investigating possible links with “the Wahhabi underground that has been
discovered in Abkhazia” (IA REGNUM). The term Wahhabi is reserved in
Abkhazia and wider in the Caucasus and Russia for militant fundamentalist
Moslems. The significance of the possible charge of belonging to such a
group, and announced before the opening of court proceedings, has been
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greeted with scepticism in some quarters as it is generally thought that in
Abkhazia ‘Wahhabism’ was nipped in the bud, literally, when the few
fundamentalists who appeared after the war with Georgia were physically
eliminated.
There is a wider significance to this charge, which will be evident
when I come, in chapter six (6.4.1) to what I will be calling the “unanimity
principle” among the Abkhaz, and its perceived importance within the belief
system that is generally tolerant of all religions, excepting those that attack
others and are deemed to be against Abkhazian state interests, as the law
states:  “…the propaganda of a religion’s superiority [over another] is
forbidden” (Zakon 14.11.2012, chapter 1:4:6).
The attempt on Ankvab’s life was the fifth or sixth to date. Unlike
previous attempts this one was followed up by numerous arrests within weeks
of the roadside explosion. Two of the suspects have allegedly committed
suicide; one while in police custody and the other as officers of the law were
about to arrest him in his town flat. The two were said to be part of the group
which attacked the president’s three-car cavalcade as, accompanied by
bodyguards, he was going to work in the capital. One of the bodyguards was
killed outright in a shoot out after the bomb half blocked the road and another
died in hospital shortly afterwards. Despite damage to his car the president
continued on his way to the office, where he insisted on doing a full day’s
work. The attackers made off into the surrounding countryside leaving
weapons behind and evidence that they had been in position for hours by the
side of the road and, supposedly, no one had noticed them let alone reported
them to the police.
What are of relevance to us here are the suicides and people’s
reactions to the events. On hearing through the grapevine that one of their
relatives had been arrested members of the Khashig lineage gathered outside
the police station where he was held, seeking information and interceding for
the arrested man as well as demanding access to him. They were asserting the
customary right to intervene. After some delay, during which the crowd grew
considerably - “We are a big family” one of its members proudly told me –
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the police allowed the most respected lineage elder unaccompanied entry to
the prisoner’s cell. He reported to the assembly:
I asked the young man one question: ‘Have you brought abkercherop (shame) on 
our name?’ In response he showed great sadness and dropped his eyes to the 
floor in silence, at which I left him.
 Next morning the authorities announced that the young man had hanged
himself during the night. The Khashig kinship lineage had already met as an
assembly, where the bearers of the ‘name’ publicly passed a resolution
dissociating the name from the shame of attempting to kill the president.
Another alleged would-be murderer who also allegedly took his life had been
a previous Minister of the Interior, Almasbei Kchach, a past candidate in the
elections for the vice-Presidency. According to the rumour machine and later
officially confirmed, as the armed men sent by the authorities to arrest him
were approaching the door of his flat a shot rang out and he was found dead
inside. There is argument about the content and even genuineness of a
supposed suicide note scribbled on a piece of rough paper, and over what it
actually said, but there is no argument but that he made no secret of being an
enemy of the president. At the request of his relatives, who want his name
cleared, the court will also examine the accusation against the dead man in
absentia. 
At least one other suspect is rumoured to have attempted suicide when
arrested. While the attack on the president is being handled by the courts it is
clear that custom also is playing its part. There is not only the access to a
suspected murderer by a relative but also the matter of shame and suicide
which will be looked at.
The government’s newspaper announced that several witnesses have
refused to appear at the court hearings on the assassination attempt and at
least two have gone abroad. (Respublika Abkhazia 9.12.2013). Some
informants have told me that the failure of witnesses to come forward is due
to the Abkhaz traditional distaste for informers.47 Others have suggested that
47 Throughout Abkhazia a story written by its most famous living writer, Fazil Iskander, is
quoted with approval. It is of a family in which the father insists on observing the Muslim
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fear of retribution by assassins or their relatives stops them appearing.
Almost everyone claims to know who was responsible for the
outrages committed against the president but there appear to be as many
versions of what it is they “know” as there are people who claim they know
what happened.
********************
According to a pamphlet published by the Abkhazian State University 
a person who commits suicide loses value in the eyes of society [among the 
Abkhaz and neighbouring peoples] and they were traditionally not buried 
alongside other people. An aspen stake was driven into the soil above them 
(Zukhba 2002: 5).
One aged male informant told me: “People believe that a person who kills
himself will not be allowed to see his son in the afterlife” (N298). Yet Zukhba
qualified his opening condemnation of suicide when he added: 
Sometimes society justifies and feels sorry for people who put an end to 
themselves if they have done it in the name of preservation of honour, self-respect 
or to remove shame. In such circumstances suicide is seen not as a defeat but as a 
victory over death as the Abkhaz prefer physical death to a social death while alive.
(op. cit.:10-11). 
He then justified the suicide of a young woman who has been forced by her
parents to marry a man not of her choice (Ibid: 40). Clearly, there is
ambiguity in the way the Abkhaz look on the matter and informants provided
much data to suggest that suicide in defence of honour or against shame is
socially approved.
The instances given to me of justified suicides included women forced
into marriages and of a young man and woman who hanged themselves when
ban on eating pork. His daughter is caught by her brother eating a slice of it and he
blackmails her. Then he blurts out the truth to their father who, enraged, brutally punishes not
the girl who has broken the taboo on pork but a more serious one committed by the boy,
shouting: “Now I have a traitor and informer in my own house!” 2000 [1966]. 
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their families would not allow them to marry (N0108). A veteran of the war
against Georgia who had taken to drugs killed himself and it was made clear
to me by his friend, to excuse this, that he killed himself to wash away the
stigma of shame for becoming a drug addict, and not because he had become
overcome by the difficulties he had to contend with in the tough post-war
years. Then there were suicides by people who had become totally socially
disoriented by those years of dislocation (0130). There was also the
momentary decision by a grief-stricken girl who recently jumped out of a
hospital window when her father died following a second operation (personal
communication).
Shame is a concept that has been discussed in anthropological
literature notably by J. Peristiany (1965) for his description of its genderised
context – the honour of men and the shame of women, and then taken up by
others, including Benedict, who argued that shame was only felt when there
was fear of public exposure (1989). Epstein suggested that different cultures
could be contrasted for being 'guilt cultures’ or ‘shame cultures'  - that shame
was felt if a person was found out; guilt, when one had a bad conscience
(1984: 27). M.P. di Bella, described it in Mediterranean societies as a
subjective response to the loss of honour that had to be restored by a social
group: “The loss of honour gives rise to ‘shame’ (‘honte’) (2002: 341).
Among the many linkages of concepts of shame to within processes of
socialisation and identities F. Poole’s many-dimensional presentation is
relevant to the Abkhaz for his writing:
 Although shame […] is a cultural construct that operates as a sanction in social 
control, it is manifested not only in public arenas of social interaction, but also in a 
more intimate way in experiences of one’s own personhood, self hood and 
individuality (2005: 851)
It is experience of it by individuals that it was identified to me by Abkhaz
informants, and as relevant to my topic. I have illustrated the gradations that
it has for the Abkhaz in discussion of the “bad boy” case and take it a little
further. People were socially shamed but experienced it as individuals,
virtually in isolation, in the sense of being made to feel isolated “from life”
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(personal communication 21012, Novy Afon); as a feeling, so it was often
told me, of having “podveli”, that is, let the side down, one might say. In a
way that fits Abkhaz society, Epstein showed the aspect of shame as a
phenomenon motivated by a sense of not fulfilling social obligations (1984:
19). It was felt when being placed outside of society and that had to be ended
through taking individual action to restore one’s position or, if not, in exiling
oneself or even committing suicide. It appears very differently from guilt, and
treated by restorative justice, especially as those appear in western capitalist
jurisprudence.
Shaming was promoted in Soviet state practice and is remembered by
Abkhaz as a positive factor that could do with being revived. It is widespread
among peoples of the Caucasus. Thus, as recently as early last year (2013) the
chairman of the Georgian parliament, Davit Usupashvili, appealed for it to be
sensed by a group of Georgian MPs who had, in his view, made
“unsubstantiated claims” against the then Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili.
He called their action “shameful” and said they should moderate their
criticism “in order not to feel ‘embarrassed’ for their actions (Civil Georgia.
Tbilisi 12th March 2013).
“There is no dispute that could not be resolved, as long as the law is
kept out of it”, were the words of one informant. This seems to be true where
a dispute is within the family or between families, that is, within closely knit
communities that want to resolve a difficulty without anyone, in our terms,
losing face or bringing shame on themselves. In such cases the Abkhaz
understandings of both pkhash’aroup and itsasym are in mind. The first of
these terms can roughly be translated as ‘shame’ when used to mean the sense
of shame that might be felt by an individual for violating etiquette (apswara)
but which is not punishable by society through its institutions by, for
example, the individual being denied social status (Kamkiia, Costello 2013:
13) or exiled. The second, itsasym, is shameful behaviour that is contrary to
the canons of apsua tsas, the rules of custom rules, and is punished (Ibid: 13-
14).
The element of shame will again be encountered in my discussion of
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marriage below, for the intertwining of law and customary institutions that
are kept to in defiance of the law.
4.7 Defying the law in marriage
At a marriage feast the bride told me:
 When a woman marries, she loses everything – rights to land, which are 
linked to [her family of birth] grave sites, the mogila ... and [she] is buried in his 
`family plot. However, if a woman loses her husband through his death and the 
death of all his [male] relatives she can be buried in her original family’s plot. My 
own aunt lost everyone and she is buried in my family’s plot.
 “Without a husband a woman has nothing” was the way another married
woman told me of gender relations in the presence of three others who
nodded their approval. I was the only man present but I and they had got used
to the normal gender barriers to communication being lifted for me as it is for
a Catholic priest among his parishioners and an elder in Abkhaz society -  I
was also an outsider with no axe to grind and, therefore, in a sense, was not
bound by strict gender prescriptions. They explained that “everything
belonged to the men”. One of the other married women had made trips to
Istanbul to buy goods to sell in the Sukhum market and said that women in
Turkey “have an easier life than we do, they don’t have to carry such loads.” I
do not doubt that women, for all the talk from men about “honouring women”
are politically, economically and socially secondary to men in most public
arenas, whatever the occasional exceptions I encountered, and these included
some elderly women who had the status of an elder and were widely
consulted for their acknowledge and wisdom, as well as some independent
women who included some who choose not to marry.
During a gossip session with two married women, one of whom had
just  angrily complained of the tough demands made on a wife, none the less
said how sorry she was for another: “she is still quite young and so
attractive”, because she was not married and showed no intention of
becoming so (2011). Despite the generally rigid genderisation of roles in
public, I found that the practice, away from the eyes of outsiders, it is not as
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rigid as might appear or the theory might suggest and this was exemplified in
the described cases of the “bad boy” and the child-killing drunk driver. This is
particularly so with older widows. Following the inculcation of gender roles
in the family in childhood marriage not only marks a stage in fixing gender
roles but does accord a socially recognised status that is superior to that of the
single girl.    None the less, property that can be inherited – land and the
house - belong, other than in exceptions, to the men, whatever the law states
about equality for women.
It is not uncommon to hear a man say that he married to “get
children.” It is also not uncommon for couples to love each other and that
sometimes decides the choice of marriage partners, although it is influenced
by the views of the couple’s fathers and uncles, and her brothers. This will be
seen in the cases of abductions I now come to. 
I have emphasised that customary practices operate outside of and in
ways that are contrary to the law and that they affect gender relations and
marriage, internal and inter-lineague relationships and will show so for
property. Marriage covers a very broad spectrum of practices that includes
abduction and forced marriage for a woman or a man and may include
abandonment, denial of rights that are listed in the laws (such as spouses
having equal shares in family property). Several cases, recounted by both
men and women will illustrate this.
4.7.1 Abductions and arranged marriage 
A visitor to the village house in which I was staying told me of the abduction
of a relative:
My 17-year old niece was enticed by a fellow schoolgirl to stay with her family for 
a couple of days some miles away. The girl took her from the house and 
then they were offered a lift by two young men. They took her off the route to 
another girl’s family house where one of the boys took her for the night and it 
turned out he was the prospective groom. My relatives, her parents, learnt she had 
not turned up at her girlfriend’s house and my nieces’ brothers were sent off 
ready to murder everyone there. On arrival late in the morning they broke into the 
house despite the protests of ignorance by the boy’s parents and asked the girl the 
required formal question: ‘Do you want to stay here?’ and the girl was silent and 
looked down – the formal way of answering ‘yes’, which meant she acquiesced in
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becoming abducted and married, so preparations were made for the marriage  feast 
and shame was avoided (personal communication 2010 ref n. 268).
My host (ref n. 269), a more distant relative of the girl and of the first
informant, answered my question as to whether the girl was not really forced
into the marriage:
No, the girl was not forced into marriage but a girl who has been abducted and 
spent two or three nights away is regarded as damaged and knows she will 
have problems being taken by anyone else, and certainly by anyone of s u i t a b l e 
family reputation.
Then ensued an argument between the two men as the second informant then
gave a completely different version of the account of the abduction48:
The girl, who was older than me at the time of the events, whispered a secret 
before she left for the abduction:  ‘I am going to be married’ before leaving, 
allegedly, to stay with her female schoolmate’s family.
They argued over the facts of the matter in my presence and when the closer
relative of the abducted girl left my host said:
Vasily [a pseudonym] was just covering up for having agreed to the abduction and
marriage. Now he tells a different story because the marriage has turned sour. She is 
very unhappy and does not fit in with the family she was married into. I don’t know 
whether it is her fault or her husband’s, but the truth is that the responsibility must 
lay with her parents and her brothers for agreeing to a bad match. It is their 
responsibility to find a proper husband for the girl.
The different versions of what had happened cautioned me against accepting
as Gospel truth what one cannot check and awareness that my presence at the
argument between relatives pointed to the effect my presence had - at least
one of them had been tailored to save face before me. Neither informants
questioned the view that the girl could become damaged goods and
subsequently have difficulty making a good match. What I do think is the
case is that both accounts, substantially conforming to similar tales from
other informants, are evidence of how practice can dismiss the rights a girl or
48 The term ‘abduction’ in Abkhazia is the normally-used term for the first stage of marriage-
making, whether it is enforced, voluntary or arranged but also contains the notion of moving
out of the parental house.
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woman supposedly has under the law that prohibits forced marriage,
abduction and rape. A girl or woman, in effect, should normally marry a man
chosen or approved of by her father and other male relatives.
In chapter five where I discuss “Distortions and modifications” I
recount in some details the story of Zuleika (a pseudonym), a woman who
finds no protection either from law or customary procedures, to illustrate the
isolation from kinship support that Zuleika found herself in and, similarly, the
kin abandonment of the girl who was drawn into an unhappy marriage.
Zuleika’s case also raised the question of how a woman can be left without a
claim on a house when she is abandoned.49
********************
Other evidence from the field shows that enforced or arranged marriage
applies not only to girls. Men are also expected to marry so as to achieve full
adulthood to carry on the line and ensure property inheritance. In one village
in the foothills three sisters “prizhali”, that is literally, “put the squeeze on” a
forty-year-old brother to get married (N.K. personal communication n. 193)
and he did, but only after his father threatened to cease talking to him. In the
same northern part of the country a respected elder is admired for telling his
thirty-five year old son that he would be thrown out of the house unless he
quickly married, which he did. His parents “found him a girl”. The “boy”
then looked in on the girl’s parents, who set out a table with food. He glanced
at her to see if she was chistaya, ‘clean’, a Russian word that literally means
‘clean’, but is the closest translation into Russian of the Abkhaz word
distk’uwp, that means clean not only physically but approximates to a
combination of the English adjectives proper, decent and  modest. In short,
the qualities expected of an Abkhaz woman who hoped to be taken by a man
were that she be “pure, upright and unsullied”, in my informant’s words. He
decided that he liked her and that was that, although he mentioned as an
49 I am  indebted to Laura Roys M.A. for drawing my attention to the element of isolation
when a woman is left to fend for herself (personal discussion 2013).
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afterthought: “she could object.” He himself had only married at thirty-seven
after his father had taken him to task.
The pressures on a man not to marry someone the family does not
approve of are great. There are villages where customary practices are at their
greatest in which it is made clear to young men that to marry other than an
Abkhaz woman will lead to ostracism. In one recent case a young man who
was about to break that ban by marrying a Russian woman was severely
beaten. In another, the male suitor abandoned the girl he was in love with
because of objection in his village.
According to an informant the pair to be married nowadays makes the
choice of partner but “parents and uncles might express a view and expect to
be given notice and to be consulted” (personal communication 2012). At the
same time, to be married to a man is seen as conditional on the potential bride
“show[ing] herself to the boy’s parents to be respectful and meet[ing] her
obligations” (personal communication 2010 n. 121). Other informants
explained that if those being “consulted” disagreed with a proposed marriage
it was usually cancelled.
However, violence or the threat of it is not the only way; there are
powerful moral pressures. Thus, an Abkhaz told me (2012) that while at
university  he fell in love with a young woman of a different ethnicity from
the north of the Caucasus. He gently courted her from a distance, only giving
the slightest hints of his love. After four years of not even acknowledging his
existence she consented to marry him. The man then consulted his father and
a smotr, an “inspection”, was arranged for the father outside Abkhazia and
many miles away from the man’s and girl's own villages. There the
prospective bride sat demurely in the corner of a room while the son and
father chatted, without the father showing any signs even of glancing at her.
After they left the potential bride the father and son travelled hundreds of
miles back home and only then did the son pluck up courage to ask his father
directly:  “Well, what do you think?” After a pause the answer was: “She has
a fine ankle.” The son was puzzled as to what that meant. When he asked
around he learnt that the phrase was used to express satisfaction with the
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quality of a horse. His joy was complete and he brought the bride to his
family house On the way he showed the young woman the family graves,
explaining: “That is where my grandparents lie; that is where my father will
be and that is where we will lie”.
The seriousness of the courtship and the consultation came home to
me when I asked: “And what if your father had not given approval?” and he
replied after a pause: “Then it would have been very difficult”.
In parenthesis, the position of widows in Abkhaz society is one that
deserves investigation. For instance, an informant remarked: “A widow in the
village is a danger” (A-r, summer 2010 in K-a) to explain the general
encouragement of marriage to a widow or her marrying again as, otherwise,
she was “floating loose”, outside of normal kinship structures and her simply
returning to her lineage of birth on the death of her husband “might not be to
her liking, or that of her unmarried sisters,” he added.
4.7.2 Inheriting a house
The practice of virilocal residence for a married couple enforces patrilinial
ownership of the house the wife goes to live in, but not without controversy.
A story was told to me in company (September 2009):
There was a funny man in Zugdidi who married a woman and decided to live in the 
home of his wife’s family, where his wife was the only child, hoping that it would 
give him a claim to the woman’s family’s house and that he would inherit it on the 
death of her father [laughter]. The man later divorced the wife and, funny fellow, 
asked for a share of the value of the house! What a laugh! Fancy him thinking he 
could inherit from the wife’s family – was it not enough that by going to live in her 
family’s house no one could understand who was the husband and who was the 
wife: he had become the ‘wife’, as it were, by living there, so how could he possibly
claim any rights to the property?! It all became public knowledge when the crank 
took the matter to court and the judge, of course, rejected his claim. What a laugh!
According to law property that has been accumulated by partners to a
marriage is owned equally and to be shared on separation or divorce, but in
practice, as the house is the man’s before marriage is exempted by being
property accumulated before marriage. The wife moves into the man’s house
and it remains his and is not even referred to in the relevant law on marriage
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and property (2009: Zakon 21.7.2009, chapter 15 clause 35). On separation
she can be homeless, as was the experience of Zuleika that I describe in
chapter five (section 5.2).
There are riders to this: the law describes marriage as a union between
one man and one woman, yet it is not too rare a practice for a man to take a
second woman should there be no children from the first. The first wife
becomes “like a grandmother and looks after any children that come from the
second one” (personal communication 2012). On the man’s death the house
goes to the youngest son or uncle and, if there are none, to the first “official”
wife.
Adjustments are continuously being made in the supposedly ideal, and
ideation is made to incorporate unusual practice. Thus, in another family I
was present during an argument between husband and wife over inheritance
(Ref n. 078). They acknowledged (most strongly by the husband, let it be
noted) that the “family house” was his parental lineage house in the village he
came from and would be inherited, according to custom, only by their
youngest son, so that he, in accordance with tradition50, “supposedly” would
look after his parents in their old age. Yet changing times have given his wife
a flat in the town of Sukhum and she insisted that all their children would
inherit shares in it equally, boys and girl. Furthermore, as the older of the two
sons proved to be more competent in the father’s opinion, and interested in
agriculture, the father privately told me that he hoped “his” house would go
that boy.
Gift exchange persists despite changing property ownership over the
past decades and changes in the stages of the bride moving out of the parental
house. Thus, Inal-ipa could write of a bride remaining in her parents’ house
for over a year after formal agreement to marry ‘properly’ with a traditional
feast, by which time sufficient mutual gift exchanges between the families
had been completed (1954: 64). Delays to observe mourning for relatives
who died in the meantime could lengthen the time gap. An informant told me
50 “Supposed”, because communications from several women showed that while the
customary responsibility for looking after the house and the elderly parents lay with the
youngest son, in fact that work devolved to the younger son’s wife; and women often
complained to me about that burden.
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in May 2012 that she was still at her parents’ house three years after the
formal registration of marriage and had meanwhile given birth to two
children. The customary marriage feast was due to be celebrated in October
of that year. Having children before the feast celebration (something that
would have been unthinkable before the state first took to registering
marriages in the last century) is not unusual these days in an accommodation
of custom and law, but state registration is seen as secondary to the customary
feast.
In yet another case a husband died in a village without male progeny,
only a daughter. His house and land according to custom should then have
been passed to another male relative, of whom there were several cousins and
an uncle. However, the men met and agreed that they did not want to move
the woman and her daughters and none of the men wanted to move into her
deceased husband’s house to look after the land. “But,” said my informant,
“we were not going to leave the house empty to rot and the land to go to
waste.” So the woman and her girls stayed on the farm and it was accepted in
the neighbourhood that the male lineage was broken; the woman inherited the
land even though, of course, she came into the family from another, unrelated
lineage.  It has been agreed that until the woman or one of her daughters
decide otherwise, a new lineage has been established for the time being with
her heading it; an adjustment of ideal customary practice. My informant, now
joined by a cousin, was not prepared to speculate as to what this might lead
to, being satisfied that a problem had been overcome, whatever the future
holds (personal communications K-ra 2011).
The Abkhaz scholar Arvelod Kuprava has written on the peasant
upheavals that met the first attempts by the Soviet authorities to enforce rapid
collectivisation of the land in the 1930s. He singled out the threat that
collectivisation was bringing to the established gender roles among the
Abkhaz for special mention from the list of the peasants’ grievances. In
particular they called for dropping the campaign for universal literacy as it
took women out of the home to classes and led them “to abandon their infants
in arms” and to have women and men mixing at the classes (2008: 91, 100,
160
103). Today I have heard men complaining about the Soviet period for
imposing on women work in the fields outside the grounds of the house as an
iniquity, as it forced women to take on further responsibilities away from that
of looking after their husbands and the children and the running of the
house… no questioning of gender roles here. 
4.8 Neither custom nor law
There are practices that are both extra-legal and extra-customary, and not just
something new embedded into customary conceptions - the recourse to
individual agency outside of customary rules to settle a dispute. They
demonstrate a certain lack of confidence either in the efficacy of customary
practices or of going to law or both. It is a feature of the current disjuncture
between the workings of custom and law, a disjuncture that has opened up to
individuals to set in motion new practices that are seen as neither. This use of
institutions that have arisen because of the lack of fit between the two will be
further discussed in chapter five and in my conclusions but, first, some
examples of this.
4.8.1 Kin outweighs the judge - the axe woman 
Any suggestion in the examples I have cited  that disputes are all settled
amicably would be to miss the reality that unequal family standings and sizes
play a part, to put it mildly, in distorting the idealised picture that was often
presented to me by informants before we had built up relations of trust. The
weight of kinship is not equally spread among the kinship units and that can
determine both a court’s verdict and even whether court judgements are
carried out.  When matters do reach a court hearing the judge is guided, in the
fist instance, by the aim of restoring harmony in a locality. Often that is not
on the basis of the word of the law but on local circumstances, which include
his estimate of the relative local importance of the lineages, their standing in
the community and among the Abkhaz as a whole. There is recognition by the
judge that despite ideational equality for all and support for egalitarian
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principles, the social standing or 'capital', as Bourdieu would have it, of
different lineages and how they vary over time is certainly taken into account
when striving for harmony. This is also reflected in the choice of individual
shrine-keepers and elders, where lineage and age are tempered by candidates’
standing. One informant told me that he had doubts about shrine keepers'
total probity. I did not hear of judges being seen as corrupt, although I heard
they could be 'leant on'.
Thus, the small family of a woman who, during a row with another,
was axed about the neck two years ago in south-eastern Abkhazia took the
matter to court to seek redress. Note that the family can take a case on behalf
of one of its members and, note also that hearsay is admissible and widely
used. According to one of my informant judges in the capital, the axe woman
was acquitted although no one contested the charge. It happened after her
family packed the court room and interrupted proceedings with shouting and
threatening to destroy the metal cage in which the accused was placed. The
woman who used the axe and her family and friends, almost none of whom
had been present at the incident, argued that she had been provoked into using
the axe. The judge’s comment to me was: “It is quite likely that what
happened in the courtroom influenced the local judge’s decision...” She was
acquitted on the grounds of having been provoked.
I draw attention to that section of the law already referred to that
leaves it open to persons who feel they have been insulted to take what they
consider to be appropriate action. In the courtroom, the judge assured me,
everyone present assumed the right to take action when there is provocation,
without that action being limited by law or, more importantly, by custom. The
alleged provocation was not proven, nor was any witness to it called.
In the view of my informant, part of the problem was that the courts
lacked “the air off solemnity that I have observed on a visit [abroad]” and
judges were unprotected by not having staff which could enforce order in the
court (“I have seen how there is such personnel with truncheons in
courtrooms in [another country]”) and depended on the local police to arrive
in time should a fracas break out “and they can take a long time.” 
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In my presence the chairman of the Supreme Court telephoned from
his office for police assistance to stop a fight that had broken out in town
between two families. A court order that had been issued some months earlier
for one of the families to vacate a flat had not been enforced and the family
on whom the eviction order had been served were physically resisting the
efforts of the other family to move in, “as in a state of siege, with barricades
against the attackers,” as he described it. It was not the first time he had
attempted to involve the police to enforce the court order and he made it clear
to me that he doubted he would succeed on this occasion: “in the end, the
families have to sort things out,” were his words to me (July 2011).
It might seem that what has just been described is a negation of direct
democracy because influence and force are illustrated. This, I think, would be
to  miss the central feature of direct democracy, as I have argued it, following
Stanley Diamond, the democracy that denies decision-making by agents,
agencies, representatives, officials, and so on, of institutions that are outside
of the community -(ies) that is/are in dispute. Direct democracy does not
exclude at all times the kinds of influences on decisions that I have instanced
- influences of pressure, status and such like, even force used by members of
the communities in dispute.  To do otherwise would be to imagine a totally
ideal society.
There are elements in some of the cases discussed of “cultural
defence” and I will illustrate this more clearly.
4.8.2 Cultural defence - grey area
A US lawyer defined a cultural defence as an offense that according to the
defendant is permitted by the accused’s cultural background. Consideration of
culture allows prosecutors, judges and juries to determine the appropriate
level of culpability (USlegal.com. Viewed  3.7.2014).  According to an
Australian expert the cultural defence allows for “an individual’s ‘culture’ [to
be) used as a basis to exculpate or mitigate criminal liability” (Osborne, S.
2008) and he cites Heller’s view that a cultural defence
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[R]efers to all of the ways in which a defendant can use evidence of h i s
cultural background - the shared organisation of ideas that includes the 
intellectual, moral, and aesthetic standards prevalent in his community of origin - 
to argue that his conduct was either not criminal, should be excused, or
should be punished less severely” (Heller 2006: 291).
For most scholars the matter of the cultural defence is a question related to
multi-culturalism and the rights of minorities. This interpretation clearly does
not apply to the Abkhaz, whose cultural defence is that of the majority of the
population and is counterpoised not to the cultures of others, but to their own
law.
Cultural defence was discussed by Melissa Demian in detail in an
article that surveyed the situation pertaining to it in the USA, UK and Papua
New Guinea (2008), in cases where the cultural defence has been handled in
different ways, including its acceptance and rejection in legal practices. She
states: “The concern of legal scholars lies primarily with whether or not the
cultural defence upholds or undermines the principle of equality under the
law…” (2008: 433).  When examining the literature for and against courts
taking into account the cultural background influence on what are perceived
to be criminal acts she writes: “What both pro- and anti-cultural defence
critics accept with little argument,  however, is that the cultural defence is an
adaptation of contemporary criminal law to multiculturalism” and she, as do I
in the case of the Abkhaz, disagrees with that: “For the lawyer, the cultural
defence is a question of how to make the intentions of defendants knowable
by something called ‘culture’” (2008: 433).  In her view: “… the law’s
capacity to quarantine the cultural  from the non-cultural is potentially every
bit as creative, synthesising and comparative as anthropology’s own debates
over what constitutes ‘culture’” (Ibid.: 440). As my research illustrates, the
situation in Abkhazia is not one of recognised or rejected cultural defence, but
of allowing, not without contestation and blurring at the borders, the choice
of customary (‘cultural’) or legal avenues for dispute resolution. 
There is customary intervention in the limited proportion of disputes
that do undergo a form of court proceedings, when matters are “taken to law”.
It is not only that courts are places where relatives of the prosecuted and
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defendants insist that their opinions are as valid as of those who would be
regarded as witnesses in a court of law in England, for instance, but judges
themselves are sceptical of the value of punishing offenders under the law
and express grave doubts about the value of any prison sentencing. The
power of swearing good character and the great value placed on a sworn
statement that is not backed by evidence, continues to be important in the
tackling of disputes. That is something that is underlined by the universal
respect for oath swearing at sacred shrines to this day – shrines to the power
of which public prosecutors and heads of state make appeal, as I illustrate
later in a separate section in chapter seven that centres on the role of these
shrines in disputes resolution and in national state-building.
So, what does law relating to disputes actually cover and to what
sections of it is there recourse? Firstly, as a general rule, courts are called
upon for assistance when charges relate to the implementation of state
policies such as tax collection, smuggling and the allocation of municipal
property and state allocation of land use. Otherwise it is when either the
aggrieved have no lineage, i.e. customary, institution to call on or cannot
him/herself put matter to rights. The strength of belief in custom is shown by
a query about cultural defence as follows.
When approached by an Abkhaz lawyer for an opinion on whether
one could build a defence in court on the authority of custom (“the cultural
defence” Demian 2008: 432) a specialist on Abkhaz custom and law referred
the lawyer to the Constitution and codes of laws (personal communication
August 2009). His refusal to give an opinion on the validity of a cultural
defence in a court, he explained to me, was not a denial of the importance of
custom but to insist that in Abkhazia law and custom are separate entities.
The cases I examined in which the laws’ tolerance of customary practices
guided judges and pre-trial investigators gave warning signals of possible
greater conflicts in the future between the use of law and custom, arising
should private property rights come to dominate. In these changing
circumstances not everyone thought it was proper to leave it up to individual
judges to decide on where the demarcation line should be drawn between
165
custom and law.
The case about which the lawyer sought guidance from an authority
on customary practices and law was the following. A woman was arrested on
a charge brought by another that she had committed a crime against her, and
she was held in pre-trial custody for more than a year. The court found in
favour of the accused, exonerating her and she was released. She then
demanded that the woman who had brought the charges should compensate
her for being insulted by her levelling the charge before the court. The view
of my informant was that the state and not the woman who had brought the
charge should pay compensation to the woman for keeping her in custody.
Here is an interesting take on the relation of custom and law, as the expert
had decided that any claim that might be made in this case was to be
addressed to the state which had held the woman and not to the woman who
had brought charges against her. That was the opinion of someone who leant
towards a statist appeal to law rather than to custom. When I taxed him on
this he replied: “She was arrested by the [state’s] prosecuting authority and
the state was, therefore, responsible for all that flowed from that” (personal
communication 2009). On my pressing him further, he agreed that she could
have taken the matter up in customary dispute procedure, outside the law,
“but my advice was sought from, and given to, a lawyer.” It is the case that
the law is silent on customary dispute procedure as a whole, while effectively
allowing for it in vaguely-worded statements. This does leave a lacuna
between law and custom in the definition of ‘correct’ procedures, for
instance, when communities exile members who have contravened customary
rules, and confiscate their house and land. In the case under discussion the
woman who was held in custody could have taken her case up through
customary procedures on the grounds that that she had been insulted, a very
serious offence under custom. In the event, as she had gone to law and in the
light of the  advice given the lawyer dissuaded the woman from seeking
compensation from the state and she left it at that.
One might consider whether giving primacy to custom over law does
not itself constitute an acceptance of cultural defence, of apswara as a whole.
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This raises related questions about where “multi-culturalism” has its place in
a unitary state, something on which the Constitution of Abkhazia is
supposedly founded on. When I raised this with informants I was told by one
that “the idea sounds good if you are not fighting for your existence – here
apswara must be adhered to as we don’t have room for dividing ourselves
up” (2009). From further discussion it seemed that the position taken was that
no-one in Abkhazia should violate apswara but that, as one put it to me “the
family traditions that local Armenians or Mingrelians have are their own
business, but they must not impose these on us – they are living in our
country” (2009). Another in a group I chatted to asked: “Would you in
England not expect outsiders to behave properly?” Here, again, there
appeared to be no conception that law and customs should impinge on one
another other than in the form of custom being put before law.
The judges seek to minimise the use of the laws and often take the
initiative in seeing that even criminal charges do not reach the courts but are
tackled through customary mediation and reconciliation procedures, and
examples of these have been given in the accounts of cases. I have put down
a marker for a look later at whether the use of customary procedures itself
does not amount to the recognition in practice of an Abkhaz cultural defence.
It also raises the question of whether it is possible to have a state embedded in
custom and that will be discussed in chapter six on nationalist modernisation
and capitalism.
The Abkhaz do not commonly see why a court should not practice
according to understandings of custom. Informants have repeatedly told me
that they have taken disputes through customary procedure because that
stands above laws. The woman who wanted compensation believed she had
been “cheated by the accuser taking a case to the judges and, thereby,
trapping me” (2009 personal communication).
There is evident some fraying at the edges between understanding of
custom and law. Even in the case where a woman insisted that the letter of the
law be kept to when a child was killed by a dangerous driver, she found she
mobilised her kin to make this happen. It does suggest that customary
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practice has to be set in motion to bring a satisfactory conclusion to a dispute
in any case; despite the lack of success by the wrongly accused woman. The
detailed application of law and custom may be different within a village
community and where disputes involve parties that are from different lineages
and communities and are geographically wide part, and in no ways linked. At
times nationally-recognised elder-mediators are brought in (as in the case of
the cable thief), but that is only where the parties agree to seek mediation and
reconciliation.
4.9 Resume of elements of customary practices
Abkhaz custom fulfils a need and desires that would retain concepts of
traditions and benefits of customary direct democracy, while using the state
and its laws as adjuncts to these, to be opportunistically employed facilitators
in some cases. I re-iterate that my use of the meaning of state is an
interpretation of Marx’s view of it - being, on the one hand, an institution for
implementing rule by a social class or alliance of classes and, on the other
hand and linked to that, to maintain orderly life in society as a whole. In
Abkhazia no class or oligarchs have achieved unchallenged domination and
so it is on the second aspect – to maintain orderly life that emphasis is placed
in this dissertation. So far they have prevented the chaotic breakdown of
order that scholars have described for other post-Soviet states. Abkhaz
customary structures and procedures contain outlooks of fairness and
egalitarianism, elements that are thought of as stronger in the past, to counter
the growth of hierarchy based on inequalities.
However much the word ‘tradition’ may be used, with its baggage of
‘age’ and selections from and invention of past moments and practices, we
are witnessing not the defence of institutions per se but their application to
today’s conditions and needs (Hobsbawm 2001 [1983], Hodges 2011). In
Abkhazia application of custom conflicts with the policies of those who
would strengthen state agencies for the promotions of modernisation, also to
be looked at in chapter six.  
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Most of the cases have illustrated how strong custom remains and
how often the law is ignored or ‘straightened’. Only after spending months in
Abkhazia over five years was I enlightened on the lengths to which the strict
application of custom is frequently violated or adjusted. Thus, I was told of a
husband taking a second wife without the lineage being consulted (K-ma and
A-r 16.9.11). 
The imperative of maintaining the lineage was spelled out in another
context by a judge in the presence of a lawyer outside the Supreme Court
building: “The lineage is what sustains the individual and in disputes its
interests must always take precedence. It is not the individual’s prerogative to
forgive.” They were explaining how they saw the role of lineages in the
resolution of disputes, despite the fact that the laws, framed along borrowed
western statutes, pretends that matters are settled by the courts dealing with
individuals and not lineages. The discrepancy did not worry them – they were
talking about reality and “what might be an ideal,” as one of them put it,
“Rights and laws are not the same thing” (G-a n. 2011).
Qualification of the once-total dominance of male seniority in
lineages was shown in the case of the woman who argued with her husband
about the inheritance of property. It pointed up that adjustment is made to
custom in actual relationships, something expressed by another informant as:
“It is the strongest character who decides, irrespective of gender or belonging
to whatever generation” (personal communication 2012). A further
illustration of this was that, although supposed to be silent or “modest” in her
in-laws’ house, another woman with whose family I resided, does speak out
against “wasting money” on rituals, does not hesitate to give her advice on
who should be invited and fed at nankhua and other celebrations, and rails
against long mourning periods. But she agreed that her close woman friend
could not go to the theatre “because she was in mourning” for her husband
who died nearly a year earlier. Her husband criticised the law for “overdoing
things” by its insistence that quite distant relatives have a voice in the funeral
arrangements for a man who dies intestate, and not only those in the
immediate line of male descent deciding.
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The great variety in the disputes and their resolution that have been
described shows the aim of customary practices is perceived to restore
harmony and does illustrate that it takes in individual agency within it.
Custom, according to Goodenough, recognises clans, names51 - as
corporations, as “emic units” of a society (1971: 1151). It is not the
individuals who trigger off a dispute who are seen as the main societal units
that are the parties to disputes and their resolution but the name is. The law
reflects a different standpoint when it seeks to concentrate on ferreting out the
guilt of an individual. The university professor who decided to act and shot
his son is spoken of with almost universal approval today: “He made things
right by restoring balance between the two names and practising fairness”
according to an informant (2012). In the eyes of the girl’s family the father’s
killing of his son compensated it for death of their girl, by demonstrating
contrition and equalling out the losses; thereby ruling out the need for blood
vengeance.
The family, the name, includes any person with the same surname or
the surname of anyone married into the family over several generations,
going back through both male and female lineages. It can be small or cover
hundreds of people, and marriage among any of its so-defined name members
is considered to be incest. It is within the name, or its sub-groups of nuclear
families that disputes are ideally settled or collective action is decided upon.
When the dispute involves members of two or more names matters are
nowadays usually pursued through customary arbitration procedures. I was
told: “It is within the names that values and duties are inculcated in the young
and everything must be subordinated to the defence of the honour of the
name” (personal communication September 2009). There are instances of
continued and universally-approved use of the customary sanctions of
ostracism and the threat to exile to deal with severe violations of the norms,
such as incest. These sanctions remove the protection that the name normally
confers on all its members against being offended by any outsider. The elders
51 I use the italicised words name and names to denote the Abkhazian variation of lineage, as
do the Abkhaz to cover all people with the same name.
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or the keepers of the sacred shrines often act as conciliators who make for
“reconciliation washing everything clean” (personal communication
September 2009). Alongside this is the evidence that there is room for
individual agency within apsua tsas, as dramatically shown in the case of
filicide. It is reflected in Abkhazian law, which expressly condones the
actions of individuals who take action when they feel insulted, when the
agencies of the law stand aside and disputes are settled between parties in
dispute, as we have seen (Zakon 27.04.2009:7: clause 36).
Most informants were quite clear about the family, in its most
extended sense, the name, being the basic institution of social life, settled on
the village family house, that of the eldest man in the lineage and the pivot of
kin relationships which privilege the male lineage despite the law.  
Further evidence of accommodation to overcome constraints that arise
from literal adherence to customary practices even justifies polygamy - the
taking of a second woman into the house to supplement a childless first one is
not badly regarded. In such cases “There is no need to go through the
formalities of another marriage ceremony, as a ceremony has already been
gone through with the first wife”, it was explained (personal communication).
This ‘mends’, despite normal acceptance in Abkhaz society that a childless
marriage is legitimate grounds for separation. Whether this is an example of
affect, emotion, requires further research but A.L. Epstein’s work on “the
expression of affect” – the intervention of human emotion and how one is
regarded by other people (1984: 10) would be relevant. The different
meanings given to separation and divorce and their lineage consequences will
also be bourn in mind, as will the general view that it is the woman of a pair
who is the infertile one: “well, she is the one who brings forth a baby,” it was
put to me.
There are cases of a married man siring a child for his family from
another woman which I was told was “rare but widely known”. I came across
one such case, of a spinster being impregnated by a man “so that she could
have the experience of motherhood” (personal communication 2012).  Due to
the delicacy with which such cases are discussed it was not possible to
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ascertain whether some such cases were not simply of unregistered civil
marriages, or of the woman keeping the child and the father helping to defray
her costs. Not unrelated to this are the practices used for child adoption, in
which customary practices that predominate take no account of what the laws
state on this.
Clearly, there is ambivalence in attitudes to the laws, woolly thinking,
and contingency a vague factor defying precision. This impression was
strengthened from a discussion I had with some 60 students at the Abkhazian
State University in Sukhum (Fld 0102). All asserted the virtues of apswara
but not one could tell me what was different about apswara and laws. There
is a compartmentalising of what is thought should be tackled by law and what
by custom, without being more precise than giving priority to customary
regulation.
********************
According to official statistics divorce in 2007 was on the increase, being
over twice as high a fraction of marriages in towns as in the more traditional
rural population (State Statistical Office, 2008: 24); a possible indication of
new, unmastered pressures on the high proportion of the population that has
become urbanised over the past two decades and for whom traditional
practices are not a powerful enough mechanism for keeping cohesion. 
There is a legal obligation placed on adult children to care for their
parents and grandparents, in an effort by the lawmakers to recognise
customary practices. What penalties might apply when the law on these
aspects of the family are broken is, interestingly, not included in the law,
which has not been tested and, I was told, was left to customary shaming. A
possible sign of changing times is the frequency with which I encountered
interest, especially among women, in the smaller nuclear family sub-units of
the kind that we find in Britain, in the social provision of care for the elderly
and women being freed from much of what some Abkhaz women saw as the
burden of being tied to ailing elders and to serving grown up children in the
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same house. On several occasions the same women who had spoken with
pride of traditional Abkhaz family values, extolling genderisation and the
view that the man was the breadwinner and woman the house maker, as if this
still applied throughout, then turned to cursing the burdens that were placed
on them. They spoke of the heavy manual work they did, including pulling
loaded handcarts across the border with Russia to sell agricultural produce. It
was striking to be told in September 2009 by the vast majority of the sixty
female students who attended a discussion in the history department of the
university in Sukhum that they did not see their future in taking up a
profession outside the household.
My own experience of the practice of the correct conduct sought
through apswara was to meet with much politeness, standing up in my
presence, receiving the first handshake when I was the oldest present, even
from a stranger who joined the company. On more than one occasion a
stranger paid for my coffee in a cafe, and without seeking recognition. On the
other hand the failure I sometimes observed of young people to give up their
seats in a bus to an older person I was told was something very new; as were
young people shouting in public and noisily racing cars around the streets in
town at night. However, perhaps that demonstration of exuberance is a
parallel to the exuberance expressed in the widely practised firing off guns in
public on festive occasions.  No informant denied that changes were taking
place, at the same time as stating as axiomatic that “Abkhazianness”
demanded conformity with the perceived old ways of behaviour. 
Some informants question whether the ethnic Georgian community in
the Gal district see themselves as an arm of the Georgian state. According to
and informant who travelled there widely he expressed it as finding the locals
happy for the Abkhaz to run the country, and only longed “to be left alone” to
getting on with  their agriculture, free from suspicions of being the Georgian
state's representatives (personal informant summer 2014).  It must be borne in
mind that most of those Georgians-Mingrelians took a neutral stance when
Georgia invaded Abkhazia.
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Most Abkhaz I encountered insisted that the laws should be based on
or accommodate Abkhaz custom. The traditional institutions of family,
lineage, dispute resolution and a national belief system, which I discuss in
chapter seven, exercise a strong hold on popular imaginings. Some, especially
among law-makers welcome changes in such institutions and practices. Their
hopes are placed in the pursuit of a modernisation whereby law would disrupt
“out of date” institutions and practices but rarely speak of these disruptions
altering self-conceptions of Abkhaz identity. They would have new laws on
property that, in my opinion, challenge the very basis on which custom sits.
Those arguing for a pre-eminence of law avoid explaining how this is to work
with apswara. This vagueness has been severally exemplified, including in
statements by President Bagapsh and his endorsement of actual customary
practice. Even when he said “the time has passed for the President to be the
head of a clan or an arbitrator” he made no criticism of clans having “heads”
and acting as “arbitrators.”
From the data there emerges a general picture of the Abkhaz seeking
resolution of the problems they face in the tradition of custom and its
institutions, while adapting to modern circumstances and this suggests that
however much actions are justified by appeals to apswara and apsua tsas the
realities of everyday life are imposing new ways of going about things.
How custom is perceived, as a valuable relic of the past as well as a
product of the present, and one that also looks to the future is looked at in
more detail in the discussion of “nostalgia” and “hope” in chapter eight. The
importance is not its age but its relevance to living today.
I now deal specifically with some observed distortions in the practice
of  Abkhaz ideals.
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Chapter 5 Distortions,   contradictions,
changing times
5.1 What custom cannot tackle today
[T]he basis of holding land is changing from one of community and custom to one 
of individualism and contract; wealthy native capitalists are appearing... 
(Meek, C.K. 1946: v)
There is a danger that Abkhazian ideology will become dissolved in the market 
economy; one notices an estrangement from our own culture, a contempt for 
traditions in society.
 (Bartsyts, M. 16.6.2009)
The state budget is made up in the main from contributions from private business. In
such conditions it is completely unjustified not only to increase the structure of the 
executive branch of government but even to maintain it in its present form. 
Furthermore, bearing in mind our declared attractiveness of Abkhazia for 
investment, foreign business encounters serious problems with such a structure.
(President A. Ankvab 2012)
The course set itself by governments since the destruction of the Soviet
Union to construct a capitalist society has brought with it problems for
customary dispute resolution and sharpened its contention with law. In an
interview the president, Sergei Bagapsh put the problem to me as follows:
“capitalism is predatory […] for a person occupied with business apswara is
the last thing he thinks of and his business comes before everything else”
(personal communication 2.07.2010).The reality of the causes of these are
disguised in the minds of many through the temporal coincidences of the
economic effects of Perestroika, the demise of the Soviet Union, the
wholesale devastation that was brought by the Georgian invasion and
occupation of 1992/93 and the  following six years of blockade of
independent Abkhazia, including by Russia.
The background to dissentions and debates on how to balance custom
and law, according to Abkhaz informants, lies in the continuing problems
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with rebuilding the economy, raising living standards and establishing
structures that, in the view of one informant, might supplant customary
controls by state ones. Thus, a meeting of officialdom in Gagra in north west
Abkhazia in 2013 was interpreted by an informant as an example of an
executive attempt to devolve some freedom for initiative and taking on
responsibilities from the state centre to the periphery. But, in his words: 
Giving more powers to local authorities is so that they can get more money and be 
tied in with the government – we need help for what we in our village obshchina 
know should be done. Decisions, decisions and decisions are taken but nothing is 
done. Where is the money going? (A-r personal communication by telephone 
27.4.2013).
 Another informant had earlier told me: 
Of course, more money going to the authorities would be a weakening of the say for
custom as the purse strings would be more in the hands of local officialdom, not 
those of the popular assemblies, the elders and so on (personal communication 
July 2011).
There was another view expressed in the same discussion: 
But the moves […] might be a change of policy at the centre that faces up to the 
criticism that is about that too much control of resources lies there, taking away 
local initiative other than to act as petitioners.
 Petitioning has a long tradition that is reflected in the weekly meeting
between the president and people to bring complaints and requests for aid and
other action that includes the release of funds for local social and industrial
projects.
5.1.1 Corruption
I use the term corruption suggested by Italo Pardo as: “the sale of the
functions of office [a feature of societies] where there are marked
asymmetries of power […] perhaps inseparable from the modern state”
(2004: 1), i.e. the extortion of money for personal gain, selling a service
which one has been employed to provide - double charging, as it were. I
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present what the Abkhaz understand by it and discuss that, guarding against
Eurocentric importations of meanings. It will be looked at contextually – its
principal and pejorative sense being individual self-enrichment as against the
promotion of societal interests. It means the abuse of office by those with
powers given by state agencies and includes bribes to access state funds for
private businesses, payments to the police, to a mayor, head teacher, hospital
surgeon, and so on.
The widespread use of the term by the Abkhaz is in those senses and
excludes favours to kin, friends and neighbours, the socially sanctioned
customary practices of helping fellow lineage members, friends and
neighbours and the widespread exchange of return favours. Mauss’ study of
gift exchange in societies that prioritise the interests of the common weal and
not of individual accumulation; the various ways in which gifts are
exchanged to constitute “total social phenomena”  that build social solidarity
(1990: 3) fits much of the Abkhaz outlook of apswara.
An Abkhaz economist who is based in Moscow recently wrote: 
The level of corruption in Abkhazia, is doubtless high but some citizens see it as 
boundless as, according to them, all state officials take bribes and otkat [a post-
Soviet word that means to take a cut, to cream off money from business deals, MC]. 
That is a myth which is to a large degree spread by opposition parties [….]  None 
the less the institution of bribes and otkat in Abkhazia cannot be denied.” 
(Ardzimba, I. 2012)
In a volume edited by Italo Pardo, a researcher in Latvia alleges that
exaggerated publicity to suggest that corruption is widespread or inevitable
helps promote it (Sedlenieks: 130-1). 
The growth of private business of late has expanded the opportunities
for bribe-taking and the embezzlement of public funds. In his study of the
many forms corruption takes in Kazakhstan, Jacob Rigi finds some
informants linked its huge increase in post-Soviet conditions to neo-liberal
reforms that have allowed public assets to be seized by a “predatory … elite”
(the same adjective used to describe businessmen in Abkhazia by president
Bagapsh), under what Rigi describes as “legal anarchy” (2004: 116).
The report of the public prosecutor of Abkhazia for 2013 revealed
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widespread cases of embezzlement that defrauded the state through
unsecured loans to businesses and swindling and bribes totalling 332 million
roubles (over six million pounds sterling). Cases involved ministers and the
heads of state utilities and banks (ApsnyPress 7.2.2014). The president
announced a turn away from state funding of private businesses, to financing
the agricultural sector (2012). President Ankvab’s own background was as a
top official in Soviet and Abkhazian state structures, interrupted for several
years while he built a private business in Russia.
No informants doubted that there is corruption.  On the day Mr
Ankvab was elected in 2012 an MP asked me: “Do you know that no loans
are given without ‘a phone call from above’”? The blame for that and for the
large unsecured ‘loans’ that were doled out was placed at the door of various
candidates for high office and those who had held ministerial posts (n.98,
29.8.11) but not Mr Ankvab.
Abkhaz politicians are popularly thought to use Russian aid money
for personal gain and self-enrichment. Then there is the alleged frequency
with which police will defer to the powerful and not prosecute offenders from
influential families for fear of retribution. I was told by one Sukhum ex-
policeman: “There are criminals in all business and state structures”
(something I could not verify) and that the police “beat pickpockets but do
not torture or beat professional criminals because they fear them” (personal
communication April 2012). The picture of crime and criminality is more
complicated than would be suggested by drawing a clear demarcation
between crimes committed for personal advantage and mutual protection
among fellow lineage members.
At the same time, favouring a relative for a job would not be
considered corrupt if that person was capable of doing the job.
5.1.2 Witchcraft
Accusations of corruption in Abkhazia are similar to the way anthropologists
have seen accusations of witchcraft in Africa52 as moral contestations of
52 I thank Romelia Calin, Cambridge University PhD candidate, for allowing me to draw on
her insights from her fieldwork and unpublished comments on corruption in Abkhazia. 
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social and economic inequality. Here it is apposite to consider its evidence in
Abkhaz concepts. There is a widespread belief that few events are the
operation of chance – there is human or supernatural agency in all maters.
This covers business ventures, where failures are attributed to the
machinations of ill-wishers and not to bad luck or changes in the business
environment of the market. With such an outlook bribes as a safeguard can be
seen as justified as there is a chance that they will produce the desired
outcome and might not be discovered by the enforcers of the law; much as
propitiation of witches is in some other societies.
I have mentioned the power of oath swearing at shrines, where false
evidence is punished ‘from on high’ and can be visited on the property and
descendants of the perjurer. The other side of the coin is that a false oath
satisfies those who have brought charges against the oath-taker and, whatever
a liar’s conviction that it might eventually visit punishment on him, he can
benefit from his foul deed at least in the short term. To stretch a parallel, the
false oath might be likened to a footballer fouling a player of the opposing
team who is about to score a goal, in the hope that the referee might not
notice, or that the penalty that is awarded against him will not lead to the
otherwise inevitable goal being scored.  
But the matter goes much wider than that. Deaths are rarely
considered ‘natural’, just as with Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer, someone is always
responsible for a death and the evil eye possessed by such persons in
Abkhazia can betray them. When President Bagapsh died unexpectedly in a
Moscow hospital in 2012 it was widely attributed to poisoning. Allegations of
poisoning are often made and believed precisely because it is difficult to
disprove a charge, in the same way that accusations of witchcraft are used, as
witches are ‘known’ to use poisons from their store of knowledge of herbs.
When Bagapsh’s predecessor as president, Vladislav Ardzimba, fell ill and
died, he was said to have been poisoned. The death in 1936 of the head of the
Abkhazian Soviet republic after dining in the house of Lavrenty Beria, one of
Stalin’s notorious executioners, is ascribed to poisoning. I was warned
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repeatedly against trusting doctors and if I should find myself in their hands,
then to make sure I paid them well – as they poisoned people. There would
appear to be an association of malice attributed to doctors with their access to
poison but also to the fact that their professional skills, more than those of
others, do frequently end in a patient’s death, and causality is imagined to
explain matters. When clergy of the Abkhaz church went to Russia two years
ago for difficult discussions about their pursuit of autocephaly from the
Georgian Church they were advised by well-wishers not to eat or drink
anything that was proffered to them, for fear of poisoning. On their return
they told people that they need not have worried…as they were not offered
anything. The arrest of people in one village in northwest Abkhazia during
the political purges of the 1930s is put down to the activities of three
unpopular men who “everyone knew” had the evil eye (personal
communication 2010). There is a quasi-universal belief in prophetic dreams,
fate and premonitions as well as dangers that are forecast by animals. The
common ascribing of misfortunes to the machinations of others, as with
unsubstantiated accusations of corruption fit well within these outlooks. It is
akin to the widely held views in the West that put down the problems of the
Third world to “corruption”. It is similar to the Nuer beliefs in witchcraft that
were researched by Evans-Pritchard… or the wide attribution of the current
crisis in the capitalist world to the actions of “greedy bankers” or greedy
ordinary people who borrow beyond their means.
With the qualification that he makes, one might accept Inal Ardzimba
seeing widespread corruption. The fact that the Abkhazian press has carried
few reports of officials being brought to book for a corrupt practice is widely
considered to “prove” that there are cover-ups. I was cited allegations of
corrupt practices in numerous spheres: letting big cars jump queues at the
border with Russia, of crooks travelling the length of Abkhazia from the
border with Georgia at one end, to the Psou border with Russia, at the other,
“clearly with the connivance of police” (personal communication 2011).
There are the large payments that are, in practice, compulsory to doctors in
state hospitals to secure a bed or to receive good treatment. This is contrasted
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negatively with the gift-giving that was endemic within the Soviet Union as
informants say that the size of payments for this are of a different dimension
than the gifts of the past, and are not only bigger but monetarised, something
noted in other post-Soviet states, as exemplified by Rigi for Kazakhstan (Op.
cit.:114). Bribes are exacted by examiners from learners to obtain driving
licenses and for documents to show high educational achievement.
Real, exaggerated or conjured up, corruption is reified and is
imagined to pervade society rather like witchcraft – and not seen as the
features of society that leads to whatever level of corruption there might be.
5.1.3 Powerless to tackle changes
Economic upheaval and concomitant social disruption accompany the
modernisation process. This was exemplified by discussion in lineage and
obshchina-based assemblies at which new kinds of disputes arise especially
from the increase in private as against communal property, the great
discrepancies that are growing between richer and poorer members of
communities and are threatening their cohesion. In both of the villages I lived
in and according to informants in others the pattern is the same. It was
summed up by one of my hosts as: “Things worth stealing are appearing in
the villages” (personal communication 2012). He and other informants agreed
that it was becoming more and more difficult to contain the actions of thieves.
They are distinguished from ‘traditional’ raiding and stealing from outside
Others, by stealing now within the same lineage or obshchina boundaries -
“the skhod members and the elders do agree that action must be taken against
such criminals but are powerless to stop it,” as it was put to me. In two
villages (described to me in 2011 and 2012) some newly-rich members of the
community raised the matter of stealing from houses but the skhod came to
no conclusion about what might be done. In one case the discussion revolved
around whether to apply customary exiling of the thieves, who were known to
all.  That faltered on whether it would be right to exile a thief “so that he
could steal from people in another part of the country.” The alternative was to
go to law or, as it was put, to “use the Constitution” but that would mean
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bringing in outsiders and so that was turned down. The result was a feeling of
helplessness in both cases. It was pointed out to me that the problem was a
new one, as it is only in “the new times” that people with personal wealth had
appeared.
The main topic at a skhod I witnessed was what to do to secure a
water pipe which had been promised by the local authorities but not provided
and the common topic of what to do about the appearance of stealing.
 Such experiences are not confined nowadays to the Abkhaz, as it has
been described in detail for people in another part of the Caucasus, the
Pankisi Kists in Georgia (Melikishvili 2003: 80-81). It was strongly hinted by
some in Abkhazia that as there is the threat of another attack by Georgia this
was not the time publicly to demonstrate any disunity in Abkhaz society.
Such constraints have not deterred politicians who are opposed to
government policies from arguing in public, but even they are constrained
from naming individual violators of custom.
These are signs of the changing times and informants were aware of
this. A two-way pull is evident between “traditionalists” for custom, and
“modernisers” who want to modify the hold of custom or (a smaller number)
to sweep it away, viewing it as a barrier to building a “modern” state in which
private enterprise would flourish. But to leave it at that and present only the
extreme polarities of opinion would be grossly to oversimplify the true
picture. In reality, within a number of contradictory approaches that might
appear at times to threaten national unity, there remain two unifying foci:
firstly, agreement that there is such a phenomenon as Abkhaz ethnicity that
should be preserved, based on apswara a n d secondly the continuing
perceived threat of a Georgian invasion.
5.1.4 Debts and insults
A young man described the course of action taken through the following
stages when he detected an insult (personal communication 2009 Fld 061/2): 
First you try to settle it [extracting an apology for an insult, which opens the accused
to a compensation claim] by giving him a beating.  If that doesn’t work t h e n y o u 
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involve male members of the family and if that is insufficient, then bring in 
neighbours as well. You settle the matter. If someone is robbed then you try a way 
that is like dealing with an insult […] For instance, I was owed money and he would
not pay up, so I insisted. Then I told him he would regret not paying. Then I brought
in by brothers but he still would not pay, so we carried him to  my brother’s car, put 
him in the boot with a mobile telephone and left him in the car parked up to its axels
in the river [River Gumista, MC]. After a day and night he rang my brother to say 
that he had raised the money and it could be collected from someone he gave a 
telephone number for. We went to see that person, who paid the debt in full for him 
and we let him go.
In another case, I was told by a worker in the docks:
I zavyol (involved) a vor v zakone53 who charges for his services or takes money 
from the person who stole from you. If the victim of the theft is a normalny paren’ 
(genuine bloke) or poor, then the service is free. No one would go to the police 
about it at any stage” (June 2011)
 
According to other informants this resource is widely employed. Most of the
small proportion of reports on crime that are made to the police is made by
foreign holiday makers, and are about burglaries and theft.54
These examples also help to show today’s fluid relationship of
customary practices to law.
5.1.5 Lineage pressures - drunken driver gets off Scot free 
A recently retired senior police officer told me (2010) of how the mobilisation
of a very large lineage with important connections “in many spheres of life”
secured the freedom of a relative, a drunken bus driver who had run down
and killed a pedestrian on the shoulder of a country road. Within hours agents
of the influential name of the driver re-asphalted the section of the highway
53 That is the term for a member of the hierarchically structured network of professional
gangsters who abide by a code which excludes ever collaborating with state agencies on pain
of exclusion, physical punishment and death, according to the gravity of the offence against
the code. Unlike the Italian mafia, the vor v zakone is not tied up with politicians and the
judiciary, Church, and so on.
54 An article in the government’s newspaper (Respublika Abkhazia of 28.3.2012) asked:
“Why do citizens refuse to make depositions when criminal matters are being investigated
and what is the quality of such investigations?” The author writes that criticism of the police
is commonplace and deserved, citing statistics on crime solving as running at 35% overall,
including, murders 20.6%,  robberies (разбоев - razboev) 16.7%,  robberies (грабежей)
26.1%, theft (краж - krazh) 26.1%; police officers are reputed either to do nothing or to
assist the criminals. The statistics are of reported crimes and the author suggests that these
are well below the number of crimes actually committed.
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where the death occurred and removed the skid marks left by the bus’ wheels,
“persuaded” the investigating commission to move the point of collision from
the side of the road onto the highway and secured a decision in which the
dead pedestrian was blamed for his own death.
Thus extra-legal and extra-customary pressures secured an
exoneration of the perpetrator. Commission members proved to be venal as
“money changed hands,” according to my informant. I could detect no
customary precedents for such an affair. Here we have a case of
straightforward violation of all the rules, customary or legal – a manifestation
of naked power used at a time when custom is becoming weakened and law
has not asserted itself. There were other cases I came across of the use of
power or non-customary and non-legal practice through the use of strong men
and influence, which will be discussed below. 
What I would call the unstable marriage between custom and law that
generally prevails opens up room for individuals and lineages agency to come
into the picture in a manner that is neither customary, nor a total reliance on
the mechanisms of the law, as also shown in the next case. The efficacy or
hoped for efficacy of agency depends on being able to maximise what each of
the two, custom and law, might offer, to manoeuvre between them. There is
the opportunity to play with the choices that are offered and to refute the
ideas that one often hears in Abkhazia that custom dominates without
modification.
5.1.6 Big men? Gangsters? ‘influence’ – a society of tensions
Statistics on reported crime are very suspect, showing a total for all kinds in
2007 of 692, when a police informant told me that over a thousand cases of
car theft took place around the same time. Debt collecting is generally carried
out by the use of threats and violence by the family members of the creditor
or by “people of standing in the community” who have social clout or
muscle, as told me by informant port worker, taxi driver, policeman and tour
guide among others.
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The freebooters who collect debts with threats are in total contrast to
any of the actors in Marshall Sahlins’ Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief
(1963), who are embedded in their societies. In Abkhazia we are encountering
simple gangsters who collect debts for payment made by the creditor who
hires them or is ‘extracted’ from the debtor. Threats or actual force are their
instruments. Certainly, I was assured by one informant, “if the person the
money is owed to is poor, then the freebooter might waive his fee, and that
increases his reputation in the community and helps to protect him from
being denounced” (2010).
The laws ignore customary practices in dispute resolution and have
nothing to say on where they might not and are not observed. In effect, the
Abkhaz state does not arrogate to itself the exclusive right to the use of force.
5.1.7 Practical challenges to values of   apswara
Customary practice is not always able to cope, as with care for children and
the elderly. Responsibility for this under custom belongs to extended families
that are defined by their patrilinial surnames. Yet some orphanages and
nursing homes for the aged, which were unheard of before the end of the
Soviet period, are now being set up. New practices demonstrate, in this case,
changes in the role of the family and wider kinship obligations and introduce
new grounds for contention within the extended families and the obshchinas,
the residential-based social organisation. Who takes (or does not take)
responsibility for those accommodated in the orphanages and homes for the
elderly is a matter of contention and resolved by negotiated sharing of
expenses, paid in money, to fund those state homes through conceptions of
parities in contributions that are new. Kinship relational distance is re-
negotiated outside of what is still expressed as ‘traditional’ conceptions of
worth and seniority among contributors, even though there is no ‘tradition’ to
go on. This raises questions about interpretations of obligation and their re-
interpretation. They remain, however, within the conceptual field of family
responsibilities. 
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There are virtually no orphanages and the fact that they have recently
made a limited appearance is rarely spoken off and seen as a national shame
and blamed on the breakdown of society and values following the war with
Georgia. There is a tendency to blame the war for many ills.
Those in orphanages and the nursing homes have been what the
Abkhaz feel are abandoned by their families, a blot on their character as an
ethnicity, and, indeed, a matter for national shame and its discussion is
consciously avoided.
5.2 Outside of custom and law   – Zuleika’s case
 
The spectrum of practices that includes women’s abduction and forced
marriage for a woman and also for a man, abandonment, and the denial of
rights that are listed in the laws (such as spouses having equal shares in
family property) are often told of in  narrations that reproduce the tangle of
interrelationships as understood by my  interlocutors.
There are people who fall outside any kind of social provision and the
kinship networks. Such cases fall outside of protection by effective laws but
also serve to demonstrate that idealised imaginations of custom and
community as the much exalted solidarity of the Abkhaz family, lineage and
village communities, has its gaps. They were instanced in the telling of
discovering hungry individuals and families that have been neglected in the
villages (personal communications 2012). It is true that they were present in
the hey day of custom – when the blood feud left abandoned individuals
immured in high mountain towers, depending for charity to sustain them over
years, a far cry from the, again idealised, writings of the feud only as a
mechanism to prevent conflict (Inal-ipa 1965).
The case now presented in some ethnographic detail is the story told
to me by a woman who not only could find no societal support but did not see
her situation as extraordinary. It reveals another side of customary order,
when what is nicely described as ‘patriliny’ and in another context as
apswara ‘male respect for women’ shows itself as male dominance over
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women. I heard the tale in bits over several years of encounters and it tells of
her abduction, marriages, neglect, poverty, rejection and misfortunes and
occasional good fortunes, throughout which she could only seek a male
protector and rely on her own initiative. I considered her to be ethnically
Abkhazianised, born in Abkhazia while being of Russian parentage, as she
had absorbed many of the ways of the Abkhaz although, like many Abkhaz,
she does not know the language. At the same time she is caught in something
of a no man’s land. 
I was looking for a cheap lighter and met her when I went into her
rented hole-in-the-wall shop on the high street of a small town. There was
little room to move among the knickknacks, small souvenirs and beach games
for tourists. I sat myself on a stool to smoke.
“You should give up smoking,” she said.
Me: “Have you ever smoked?”
 “What? Don’t I look like a woman any more?” she asked anxiously and without the
slightest coquetry. Her assumption was that I was a local and, therefore, 
that I knew that a woman was not supposed to smoke.
Me: “Of course you do, and very attractive, too”
“How do you know I am a widow?” 
Me: “Oh, don’t men talk to women here unless they are widows?”
She: “What do you mean here? Aren’t you local?”
Me: “No I’m from England.”
She: “England?! Really! It must be lovely there. They say that women aren’t made 
to  work like here and men are kind to them. Is it true that you bring your 
wives tea in bed and they all have servants to look after their parents? Do 
women own houses?”
So the chatter raced on as it did in other visits over three years. The woman
was of a certain age and I will call her Zuleika. 
When I asked why she had not learnt to speak Abkhaz her reply was:
“To speak it you have to know how to spit and hiss…” Russians in Abkhazia
do not necessarily observe the obligations that are customarily imposed by
the Abkhaz lineage - rod. She freely criticised those she sees as “Abkhaz by
blood” with stereotypical references to “their” arrogance, bad treatment of
women, brutality and more. Yet she accepts many local Abkhaz rules of
conduct without realising it. Her story went as follows:
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 I was abducted when I was 17 and my husband gave me three children but soon 
stopped bringing money home. He was a trained medical man but gave up on life 
around the time of the war55 and died. I planted onions, coriander and looked 
after bees. This was in a house that belonged to my husband, 'out in the wilds' and of
no use to anyone else, two kilometres from the foothills. I lost my fingernails from 
working in the damp earth and used to stick them back on my fingers and paint 
them. I fed the children nuts with honey and bought clothes and flour by trading 
with a tachka [a big barrow, MC] across the Psou River [into Russia, MC] during 
the Russian blockade, when no men from 16 to 50 were allowed to cross the Psou. 
One day with my small daughter I was carrying sacks of tangerines and 
hitchhiking to get a lift to the local train station for the journey to the b o r d e r – 
you could travel zaitsem56 – a big ‘lux’ car stopped and a man took us right up t o 
the Psou border and said he would wait for me to return when I crossed 
back. I thought no more of him but an hour later he was there waiting and took me 
and my cart to the gate to my garden and invited me to contact him. I had forgotten 
all about it when, a month later, he called on me and asked: ‘Why did you trick 
me?’ Then I went to live with him, an Abkhaz, and life was good for four and a half 
years. He was also medical and rich and lived in a good house…. I had myself put 
right [ Zuleika bared her teeth to show me her white fillings]. He had three children 
of his own. Then he died and his children threw me out. When I said I was their 
father’s wife they said ‘you only were when in bed.’ My own old house 
was overgrown as my children, girls from my first husband, were not interested and 
had moved away. It is still empty in the backwoods, two kilometres from the 
railway station.
She started work in her little high street shop where we met and one day told
me:
“I have been approached by many men but they are not nice, but recently a kind 
man started to look in and he has asked me to marry him. What do you think?” 
“Well…,” I delayed and Zuleika went on: “He seems very nice but has a problem 
that worries him a lot. He stutters when he worries. Do you think it will be all right 
to marry him? He says that his friends always tease him and sometimes strangers 
do.” She demonstrated how he stuttered with gestures and sounds and at some 
length.
I suspected that she thought remarrying was a good idea. She had told me she
w a s chistaya, “clean”, in the sense I have already explained.  She had
previously made it clear that I must know all about life “because you come
from England,” and that suspicion that I “knew things” more generally
became a firm conviction when Zuleika decided that I understood the
meaning of dreams and talking about dreams led to her imparting more to me,
as the coldly labelled “informal interview” often does; something of which
fortune tellers, psychiatrists and priests taking confession are well aware.
55 That is, the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992/93.
56 Russian, literally ‘as a hare’ ie. without paying .
188
“Do you know the meanings of dreams?” she asked one day. “Well…” w a s m y 
non-committal reply. Taking my not saying “No” to mean “Yes” (and I had 
knowingly led her to assume that), she continued: “Last night my first husband 
came to me [in a dream, MC] and looked sad but said nothing. Here we believe the
coming back of a person is a bad sign. Do you think that is right…and why did he 
come?”  
I knew that the Abkhaz take it as read that dreams are veshchiye, meaning that
they forecast events and give ‘signs’, as I had been present at many
discussions of dreams where it was always assumed that I, like the rest of the
company also understood that dreams told the future – “after all,” I was once
told, “you have the great knowledge that comes with seeing the whole world
and being old” – a compliment in Abkhazia.
So I set out to comfort her and said that in England a person appearing
in a dream was a sign that could be either good or bad. As it was mid-August
I asked whether she had married in August or whether that month was
associated in her memories only with unhappy events. “Oh, no”, she replied
after taking time to think about it, “I do remember he came home once in
August so happy that he brought me a length of good cloth, enough to sew a
dress.” “Well, there you are,” said I, “perhaps he was not sad in the dream but
weary – you did say he was not well when he left this world. Perhaps he came
to wish you well and was sorry that he would not be present at a happy event
that awaits you.” Zuleika had already asked me whether she should marry the
“nice” man who was looking in on her at the shop and I guessed that she
wanted encouragement.
********************
She told me did marry him when I saw her some months later on a return visit
to Abkhazia: “I have gone to live with him”. She continues to work in the
shop selling toys, pills and suchlike, including some cleaning fluid that she
knew youngsters only bought to activate something else that made it a
narcotic, putting up with the   passing rudeness and pomposity of her Abkhaz
landlord who looks in to collect his monthly rent in cash. When I asked her
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how she put up with him her answer combined a comment that “well, all men
are like that, well…nearly all”, with an evasiveness which hinted that she
benefited from his being an Abkhaz, and that meant he dogovarival, had “a
little arrangement” on money (that is, that the tax collector did not come into
things).   She said of her husband: “He helps me and gives me money. I was
surprised to find that he is still a man at 50 and he does not stutter when he
lies in my arms.” When I once asked her why she did not seek redress in the
courts for her past treatment by the children of the medical man she had lived
with she more or less repeated what she had said before about how the
Abkhaz lineage structures would be ranged against her.
For most Abkhaz, marriage means having gone through a traditional
feast. Signing up officially at the Registry Office (ZAGS) does not count,
except to obtain documents and state benefits. I never asked Zuleika how, in
what manner, she became married, because it did not matter and to have
asked would have suggested total ignorance of Abkhaz custom. At no time in
our many discussions when her marriages cropped up did she consider the
actual way in which marriages are ‘sanctified’ (perhaps the word should be
‘noted’ as valid) worthy of mention.
Zuleika never suggested that she might have some claims on property
or children from her marriages and was amazed to hear that this was not the
same in England. On the other hand she took as normal the practice of extra-
legal adoption of children and for children born to a family to be regarded as
belonging to the couple that produced them unless they gave them away. She
confirmed that there is no stigma attached to having children between the
announcement of intent to marry and going through the customary marriage
feast. There can be years of delays because of lack of the money to pay for
the feast or because periods of mourning of up to a year for each death in the
lineage require that no marriage feast is celebrated while that lasts. I spent
time in a family in which there had been a delay of ten years between starting
to live together and legally marrying and registering three children born in the
meantime. Zuleika used the term pokhitili, “abduction” to describe her first
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marriage, a term that has gone into the vernacular to mean any way of
initiating a marriage.
The spectrum of practices that includes abduction of women (and
pressure on men to marry), abandonment of women, and the denial of rights
that are listed in the laws (such as spouses having equal shares in family
property) are often narrated. I return to her case in a discussion of inter-ethic
relations in chapter six.
5.2.1 An internal ‘Other’?
Zuleika’s case raises the question of whether she should be considered,
anthropologically, as falling into a category of an “Internal Other”, someone
who is not perceived as being the Other as ‘not like us’, as someone who does
things differently, yet is not protected by  the orders of custom. Perhaps
Zuleika falls into the category that Simone de Beauvoir (1972 [1949]: 15)
identified as reserved for women who qua woman are “defined by limiting
criteria, without [the] reciprocity” that binds societies; and can, therefore, be
denied the protection of customary practice other than by a man’s choice.
Certainly, the moments in her life that Zuleika was protected, it was by a
man. In the male-dominated society she is ‘not like us’ from the male.
The ‘Other’ as normally defined in anthropology is certainly present
in Abkhaz conceptions and is identified, in the first instance, as the Georgian
both inside Abkhazia and across the Ingur frontier with the Georgian state. As
with all other social constructs, that of the Georgian ‘Other’ varies according
to societal and inter-societal conditions, and these are evolving today, as
Bowman has discussed in his observations of the contextuality of altering
outlooks and the actions that flow from them, in which “the force of
contingency still prevails” (2005: 45). He does this for the shifting relations
within a Moslem-Christian Palestinian community as it faces its ‘Other’ - the
Israeli occupying powers, and takes the reader through an account of conflict
and betrayal, as a member of a lineage is found to have collaborated with the
Israeli military and how that is disguised.
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5.2.2 Distance
Virtually all the cases of customary dispute resolution took place within a
closed community – family, lineage and village – and could make
opportunistic use of the law.  
The inability or refusal to tackle some matters through customary
procedures is leading to a greater involvement of the law, as in the example of
the child-killing on the high road. The assertion of individual agency by a
female relative of the child, to initiate a case in law is interesting for that.
There is rare pursuit of a blood feud, although informants told me it was more
common than is publicised, but I did not have the time to research this.
How this is managed, and the manoeuvring to gain a hold on events,
is evident as the Abkhaz adapt to face the shape-shifting of the Georgian
threat. The Abkhaz nationalist and modernisation contestations reflect this
and owe a lot to historical perceptions of their ethnicity and the drive to build
a capitalist society, on the one hand, and the resistance through defence of
custom, on the other. This will now be looked at in the light of my research.
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Chapter 6 Nationalist modernisation 
 
[I]t is often unclear who owns what in Abkhazia. Frequently, the ‘title’ (a special 
term usually used to refer to a person or persons’ property rights) to a property is  
based on a person’s word and the ‘law of the strong’; it is not based on a formalised 
and specified right to own, dispose of or use the property. In most cases, this creates 
legal uncertainty, since over time conflicts arise between ‘titleholders’ due to the 
absence of formal property rights. These conflicts are generally resolved extra-
judicially. 
Inal Ardzimba, President of World Economy 
Association, National Research University - Higher 
School of Economics, Moscow. Viewed in web 
1.2.2013. Socioeconomic System of Abkhazia and 
Problems of Development
[C]ompared with those of its neighbours (the Georgians, Armenians, Greeks and 
Russians living in the republic) many traditional institutions and customs strike one 
by the relative ‘archaism’ of their traditional everyday features, above all in the 
sphere of social and normative culture – the demonstrative respect for seniority, the 
extensive customary hospitality, holding to pre-Christian and pre-Islam belief cults, 
gender stereotypes and others. […] Over the past decades Abkhaz society has, 
doubtless, greatly modernised.” 
Lyubov Soloveva. 2007. The Caucasus and 
Globalisation 1(3).
Inal Ardzimba’s article (2012) cited above lacks data to substantiate the
assertion that “…a decade of economic growth in the 2000s [was] a period in
which Abkhazia was transformed. Some economic and social problems
inherited from the ‘lost’ decade of the 1990s were overcome – or at least the
preconditions for overcoming them put in place,” as he only referenced a
nominal growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)57 in 2009, from which he
concluded: “…Despite 20 years as a capitalist country, it has not managed to
develop modern market institutions.”
57 One has to be cautious about what GDP actually measures. Despite its being widely used
by economists as a measure of economic performance it is so only in a narrow
capitalist/bourgeois sense. It does not measure production or include the whole gamut of
exchanges in society - only the transfers/movement of money. Thus, it omits all forms of
direct gift exchange and includes price rises as if they increased “products” and when
converted into US dollars, further distorts the picture as exchange rates are no measure of
production but reflect the market rates of various currencies.
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Twenty years after winning independence nationalists are largely
disillusioned by its failure to open the way to prosperity and happiness, as
does the gaining of national independence in all post-Soviet states.
Dzidzaria, T., a veteran of the war of independence from Georgia and
prominent historian and social scientist expressed this feeling of
disillusionment and blamed it on people for having changed from what they
were during a war to what they are like “in ordinary life […] ”:
People ask with bitterness ‘What did we fight for?’ and I sometimes think that way 
but it passes…because I understand that if we had not fought then nothing would
have been left for us today, nothing […] In a word, there is again something to 
defend, to love and to value. It is difficult for me simply to list or count on my 
fingers all that I fought for. It would sound like bombast, as in an opera. How can 
one put in everyday terms and simply something that is so important and 
complicated? Put briefly, I and thousands of other comrades-in-arms fought for 
every centimetre of our land so that we could be free to make decisions and build 
our future independently and without having to look to anyone over our 
shoulders…That’s why it is important to defend [our land], to rebuild the 
independence of our Church and bring home our diaspora that is scattered across the
world (Dzidzaria, T., 2011).
This is the background to the serious divisions within society about the future
course to defend Abkhaz ethnicity. The large Georgian/Mingrelian minority is
excluded from citizenship and the rights that go with that, by those who today
are consolidating their dominance in state institutions following on  street
demonstration that overthrew the president and government in May 2014.
These regard the minority as a Fifth Column for the Georgian state. The
nature of the May events of 2014 that led to the resignation of the elected
president and his team is disputed. One informant told me: “There are
passionate events going on here and they are very interesting, for all involved
[all sides] are arguing that their claims are based on customary institutions,
t h e skhod, etc.” (personal communication 8.6.2014). I give the text of a
statement from those with another view in Appendix 2. The roots of the
problem are not new as will be discerned in the following sections.
The socio-political changes in Abkhazia are reminiscent of what Marx
studied in the second half of the 19th Century: the nascence of a new form of
state, nationalism and changes in class differentiation. What I find
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additionally relevant to the situation in Abkhazia is that the ‘kick-off point’
for the original transition from stateless to state society, to class
differentiation, is not satisfactorily explained by him or any other scholar. It is
not by chance that Marx devoted so much of his last years to ethnography. He
and Engels certainly identified the role of labour as a/the factor in what took
place (1940 [1884])  but there is no explanation of why innovations that
allowed the production of goods surplus to immediate needs should have
been appropriated by a particular group/class, and with it power (Marx and
Engels 1974 [1872]), Engels 1952 [1896])58. That is what marked a radical
change from the situation that anthropologists have found in acephalous
societies -   where surpluses were produced but ‘primitive’ gift exchange did
not necessarily bring with it class differentiation and hierarchy, as we have
seen in writings, for example, by Castres and Sahlins. Neither is it explained
by Thomas Patterson’s noting that there was a time of “the development of
property relations away from those of the original kinship-based
communities” (2009: 147), nor by the later imperialist spread of capitalist
dominance in the world59. Anthropological literature is replete with examples
of where ‘primitive societies’ have resisted accumulating goods beyond the
needs of the producers, in order to defend egalitarian property structures.
Thus Howe has described, for example, how the assemblies of the Cuna of
Central America kept their chiefs in line when these exceeded the boundaries
of speciality roles that had been granted them (1978). Other cases have been
described for other peoples by Woodburn, on preventing envy (1982) and
Renshaw, on the use of gambling to distribute wealth (1988). To those one
must add the Abkhaz experience of Soviet State's laws that strictly limited
individual aggrandisement. What I have found striking is that in
58 Ethnographers have grappled with this question of the incorporation of those surpluses into
society ever since; witness, for example studies by Boas (1938: 358-360), Mauss (1990
[1925], Sahlins (1963).
59 To be seen in Abkhazia not as it was during Marx’s life, that of direct political rule through
colonialism but as the dominance through ‘globalisation’ of the transnational companies
based in powerful capitalist state centres whose state machines, including their military arms
are today used to protect those companies in all countries, as witnessed through invasions of
Iran in 1953, Cuba 1961 and on many other occasions throughout Latin America, the
Caribbean, Africa, and Asia and Europe since, and continuing today, notably in the Middle
East.
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anthropological paradigms egalitarianism is treated only as a feature of pre-
industrial, ‘primitive’ societies, and that includes in James Flanagan’s
extensive entry on the subject in The Dictionary of Anthropology (2001: 145-
147).
The concepts the Abkhaz call apswara clearly suggest egalitarian
communalism, although this does not gender equality inn the family, as I
instanced in chapter 4. At the same time the complaints about their inability
to tackle many of the difficulties they face are not posed against a state as
such but to seek a state that would embody and personify the ideas of
apswara and to help regulate societal matters as the adjunct to apswara.
There is a strong legacy of the ideas of the Soviet state, which placed
stringent limitations on individual accumulation and excluded any individual
hold over the productive labour of others, something that is reflected in my
discussion of nostalgia in chapter eight. Brian Schwimmer wrote that in
numerous societies: “In a general sense, the kinship unit often constitutes a
corporate group which becomes a legal [not in the sense of state-law-
determined, MC) entity in itself and is assigned collective rights on behalf of
its members and their estates” (Web viewed 4.8.14). Today common property
in Abkhazia is being transferred into individual private hands, putting
pressure on traditional social institutions. A similar process was described
when it took place in colonial Kenya (Meek, C. 1946), when British capitalist
relations was ousting kinship ones throughout the colonies.
What is taking place in Abkhazia represents nation-state-creation’s
fourth wind that parallels/repeats of what happened in Europe around the
middle of the 19th century, then the de-colonising period immediately after the
First World War under the impact of the birth of the USSR and the
dismemberment of the defeated powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary, and
again in the aftermath of the Second World War. Abkhazia went through the
second of those and is shakily and multi-dimensionally stumbling through a
second go in the aftermath of the break-up of the USSR, but is doing so
without the course being determined by outside powers.
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The Abkhaz’ ‘customary’, i.e. perceived old ways of doing things is
challenged by those promoting a capitalist state and its law. Some Abkhaz
refer to the challenge to building a capitalist (“modern”) state as being a
‘revival’ and invention of customary practices (Informants included  a scholar
and Minister July 2008). The collectivist ideas of the Soviet period are being
undermined by the promotion of the individualist ones of capitalism. The
conflict of custom – apswara, and capitalist state law60 is the reaction to the
individuals being forced or asked to change, and is not primarily a battle of
institutions as such. The changes are bringing some class stratification and
inequality that would place commodity price tabs on all human requirements
(Diamond 1996 [1951]:27 and cited by Patterson 2009) of a kind that Marx
identified in his studies of the transition to, and development of, capitalism in
his time. That transition included the drawing in of a multitude of states into
what is now called globalisation (cite Abeles 2007, Renton 2001, and others). 
The defence of tradition finds its clearest expression among those who
would keep the often idealised old-style relations among the Abkhaz and the
expression of these in institutions that are selected from the real or imagined
past (see Hodges, 2011). Personal and collective objectives emerge in dispute
management.
6.1 Abkhaz nationalist thought, origins
[T]he creation of a nation requires a ‘core’ of a shared ethnos around which the 
process of nation-building will take place, since nations cannot ‘be created out of 
nothing’. The ethnic Abkhaz already constitute such a core. 
Natella Akaba Natella Akaba, Secretary of the Public 
Chamber of Abkhazia. Abkhazia as a multi-
ethnic community ( 2013).
Communities like individuals, draw borders not so much to assert presence but to 
exclude the influence of that which is perceived as threatening to the persistence of 
that pressure. 
Glenn Bowman. The Violence in Identity (2001: 46)
60 This is a rough shorthand for customs and laws that is not intended to attribute agency to
what are human-created social manifestations, as neither of which are things in themselves
but are vehicles that allow the articulation of different concepts and activities.
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To legitimise itself today’s nationalist advocates of a programme for state
consolidation draw selectively on events and practices of the past, real or
imagined. Nationalists stress the time when Abkhazia is referred to as having
had an independent state. The formation of a state in the early 8th Century by
Leon I and its consolidation by Leon II “the first king of the Abkhaz”
(Bgazhba, O. Kh. and Lakoba, S.Z 1998:120-122) is forcefully argued in
nationalist rhetoric as one of the justifications for an Abkhaz state today.
Little significance is attached to that having been a feudal state but it figures
as relevant today in the cloak of a discourse of continuous ‘ethnicity’61.
For some Abkhaz what they are after is any kind of independent state,
for others it must be founded on the apswara  system of ‘traditional’ custom,
pure and simple. What constitutes tradition here is an on-going debate in
which the nature of Abkhaz ethnicity is very much a contested area, coming
mainly in conflict with Georgia’s claim to Abkhazia based on its own selected
historical imaginations. Pavle Ingoroqva, in Giorgi Merchule – a Georgian
writer of the 10th century” (Shnirelman 2001: 242-244) argued the Abkhaz were
a tribe that had entered what were ‘Georgian’ lands in the 8th century AD. A
group of prominent Georgian scholars went into print to contend that the
Abkhaz had over time become just another sub-division of the Georgians
(Gaprindashvili, Giorgadze et al. 1991). What is not questioned is that
“having been there first” is a qualification for occupying a territory today –
the claim of ‘indigeneity’, to being the autochthones, possessors of an ethnos
throughout history, passed down male lineages and their absorption of
outsiders. The Abkhaz accept that any woman, from wherever and of
whatever ‘ethnicity’ who marries into an Abkhaz family thereby becomes
Abkhaz with all the rights that come with that. The current politics of
relations with Georgia, however, is making it problematic for a Georgian man
61 In a commendation of the writings of Solomon Zvanba, “the founder of ethnographic study
of Abkhazia”, Inal-ipa praises his mid-19th Century studies for presenting “the innate
Abkhaz” (1965: 13).
Similar constructions have been noted by anthropologists in other parts of the world,
for instance in studies of state creation of ‘traditions’ in modern Indonesia, first by the
colonialist Dutch (Keebet von Beckman 5.3.2007 in talk to Department of Social
Anthropology, University of Kent) and then the invention of Gotong Rayong ‘tradition’ by
the authorities in independent Indonesia (John Bowen:1986).
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becoming Abkhaz through residence and enculturation, although I did
encounter examples of that ‘working’.
Problems do arise - an Abkhaz child told me of a schoolmate who was
not popular. His father is an Estonian from Abkhazia who fought on the
Georgian side during the war and now is has to live abroad. The child
considered himself to be Abkhaz, through his Abkhaz mother and by
residence but the other children did not, even though my informant said: “He
is a nice boy.”
There is an idealised teaching of the past. For instance, Inal-ipa
described blood feud as a mechanism simply to enforce peace (1965: 409).
Hospitality and blood money helped to prevent feuds getting out of hand
(1965: 438), as did fictive kinship institutions of adoptive brotherhood and
fostering. In disputes between different kinship groups’ corporate property
rights, the inviolability of the person and social order would have descended
into anarchy, he wrote, had it not been for the twin operation of two related
institutions of self-help: the right of all to carry and use weapons, and the
collective obligation on all lineage members to answer to others for the
behaviour of their members. Lineage members were bound to avenge any
infringement of the rights of its own members (1965: 409). Thus: “From
ancient times weapons have been valued and respected almost above all else.
It was a constant appurtenance of every man. It was seen as impermissible to
disarm a person or to leave one’s arms in the hands of an enemy.” He
evidences the depth of this weapons-carrying culture by an example from the
Nart epics: “That is why the Nart hero Eldyz Sh’iaruan, having been
victorious in a battle with dreaded giants, immediately sets off to find their
sisters, who live in a far-off cave, to take back from them the arms which had
once been seized by the giants from his Nart ancestors” (Inal-ipa 1965: 415).
Other strands of the web that made for a distinctive structural system are
mutual aid and spiritual beliefs.
I have partially described the institution of atalychestvo, by which
peasants fostered the children of the nobility until maturity and that is
generally presented as one that cemented society across social boundaries.
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Thus Stanislav Lakoba, a prominent Abkhaz historian wrote that: “… even
conflict between the estates was reduced” by milk kinship (1998: 76). Inal-
ipa wrote of it as a custom that is also known among neighbouring Georgians
and other peoples. The adopted child of higher social orders stood higher than
their adopter, the atalyk (1965: 480). By the end of the 19th Century the
custom almost died out after peasants protested at its growing costs (Ibid.:
490). Peter Parkes has described the elements of clientelism in the custom,
the attachment of peasants and their families and villages to the upper social
orders (2003a: 741). It possibly lies at the root of today’s higher status for an
adopted child over a family’s biological children. 
Another custom of the Abkhaz that is harnessed to the nationalist
cause is the idealisation of the once widespread practice of milk kinship,
whereby any man who could symbolically be breast fed by a woman of
another lineage thereby secured the protection of becoming joined into that
lineage. Milk kinship was used to end a feud and also, as mentioned already,
to establish the equivalent of a blood relationship with afflictions such as
smallpox, so making of it a relative and, therefore, no longer a scourge.62 
Nationalism and the nationalist programme for building a new kind of
state for the country following the dissolution of the Soviet Union has its
roots in political, economic and social contexts, and it is with the last that this
research has mainly concerned itself. 
********************
Promotion of the Abkhaz language is currently elevated to play a big part in
the compendium of Abkhaz nationalist attributes. While the earliest extant
written record of the Abkhaz language was that by the Turkish traveller
Evliya Celebi in the 17th century (Chelebya 1846) I concentrate on its part in
nationalist thought in its various forms since the turn of the 19th century, the
Russian revolutions of 1917 and thereafter. Then I discuss the way in which
62Yet to be researched is the significance of the milk kinship practices of old for being a
structure for a woman to draw men into a lineage which she herself had only entered by
marriage – coming as she did from another Abkhaz male lineage or from another ethnic
group – a structure of joining a male lineage though a female affine. 
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one Soviet Abkhaz scholar overcame the predicaments he faced in presenting
Abkhaz history and customs so as to give them a voice in Soviet times.
Dmitry Gulia, a staunch advocate in modern times of the Abkhaz
language, provided an overview of the Abkhaz in the early years of the 20th
century (2003)63, his writing started before the Russian Revolution, when he
was an official of the Russian Orthodox Church and for which he translated
the Bible into Abkhaz. In 1910 he was one of the early critics of Georgian
influence in Abkhazia, providing a foretaste of an approach that is prominent
in the Abkhaz nationalist programme of today. His Church background is
relevant to the nationalist identification of belief systems in Abkhazia with
their project, as seen in the current call for autocephaly for an Abkhazian
Orthodox Church, for a Church “open to believers of all nationalities [with
services] in Abkhaz and other languages”, as out by one informant in 2012;
the relevant beliefs are looked at in detail later in this chapter.  Gulia wrote
that after the incorporation of Abkhazia in 1812, the Russian Empire
introduced Eastern Orthodox priests from Georgia who were semi-literate and
knew no Abkhaz. According to him “While calling themselves Christians the
Abkhaz were never genuine Christians but always were in part pagans and
remain so to this day, something that is seen in their pagan rituals and
traditional customs”, a view that has strong support in today’s Abkhaz
nationalist rhetoric (Chirikba, forthcoming). 
Gulia described a stronger influence of Islam among the Abkhaz of a
century ago than is admitted by most Abkhaz writers today (Bgazhba and
Lakoba, S. 1998, but see Smyr 1994, Kunacheva 2006). Indeed some Islamic
practices are still visible, including a taboo for some on the eating of pork, in
burial rites and the marking of events in the Islamic calendar. After the
Russian Revolution he became an official of the Abkhazian Soviet
Commissariat of Education and in his History of Abkhazia of 1926 he
expressed the hope that it was “the first stone thrown into the calm smooth
surface of scientific indifference and will stimulate a flow of efforts to work
63 Dmitry Gulia (1874-1960) was an Abkhaz  who, together with Konstantin Machavariani
(vide infra) composed the first alphabet that employed Cyrillic characters for the Abkhaz
language, in 1882.
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on the history and nations of the Caucasus”, a remark that had the approval of
Inal-ipa, who cited him (1965: 16).
Today’s poverty of scholarship on the influence of Islam in Abkhazia
would appear to be contingent on politics. While Gulia argued that neither
Islam nor Christianity engendered any theological appreciation among the
Abkhaz, he held in 1912 that Moslem emissaries from Turkey were more
integrated among them, married in and made converts, “a dangerous
phenomenon” in the words of that Christian missionary (2003: 351). There
are authors who do not deny widespread Islamic influence (Chakvetadze
2009), especially when discussing the 19th century mass exodus of Abkhaz
and other Caucasians when tribesmen followed their Moslem nobles to
Ottoman Turkey. Gulia was in a Christian family that experienced that
expulsion and later returned. Research into Islam among the Abkhaz is in a
suspended state for fear that any demonstration of an influence would come
up against a wariness in Abkhazia’s neighbouring northern ally, the Russian
Federation, because of an influence of anti-Russian Islam within its own
fractious north Caucasian republics and, now, the annexed Crimea, and the
use of it by Georgian nationalists to paint the Abkhaz in an unfavourable
light. 
An early history of Abkhazia that took in customs was the volume by
K.D. Kudryavtsev published in 1922 and republished in 2009. It treated
Abkhazian history as a series of periods that were governed by the influences
of major outsider states: “The ancient period”, followed by Hellenistic
influence, then Roman, Byzantine and then the “Heyday…, Abkhazia’s most
precious period” (2009 [1922]: 101) when Abkhazia, freed from Byzantium,
became an independent state in the late 8th century AD. For our purposes, the
value of the volume is three-fold. These lie in its detailed ethnography and
describing the Abkhaz throughout their history as a subject of influences with
little of a self-generating culture. That was soon to be regarded as
unsatisfactory for the process of Soviet nation-construction that insisted upon
each recognised nation ‘discovering’ a history that had its own pristine
lineage and without too many foreign adulterations. The third point that is
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interesting is that it carried no arguments about the Abkhaz as a special
people that was privileged by virtue of possession of its language and an
allegedly superior culture of the kind argued by Basaria (see below) and
argued by many in Abkhazia today. Its relevance to today’s nationalists lies in
its tracing the Abkhaz back through the centuries as autochthones.
Kudryavstev wrote that the Abkhaz, until taken over by the Tsarist Empire,
were ordered by unwritten custom (ibid.: 19).
The volume of selections from Gulia’s writing contrasts with a work
by Simon Basaria (2003) that was first published in 1923 in Sukhum, known
at that time by its Turkish rendering as Sukhum-Kale, another early Abkhaz
educationalist and the chairman of Abkhazia’s first republic of November
1917. Gulia’s writing shares nothing of the other’s diatribe against all things
Georgian, even though he, like Basaria, experienced the Georgian Menshevik
state’s occupation of Abkhazia. The defeat of the Georgian armed forces at
that time was a condition for the Bolshevik victory that secured Soviet
statehood for Abkhazia in 192164. Basaria was one of the first to place
emphasis on a political role for the Abkhaz language in justification of
independent statehood for Abkhazia. He argued that the Abkhaz had never
experienced language loss which, for him, was evidence that the Abkhaz had
been independent from Georgia, and it was the Georgians and not the Abkhaz
who periodically were losing their independence (Rouvinski 2007: 107, citing
Basaria 1923, 49-50). I mention Basaria’s volume because it was re-published
(2003) as a textbook for today’s upper secondary schools. Even though this
extreme nationalistic propaganda contains no original research it is important
for the discussion of Abkhaz nationalism today. He was one of the first to
promote an essentialist nationalist theory for the Abkhaz, something that
followed on nationalist ideas in the West and influenced Soviet policy for
creating nation-states within the boundaries of the USSR (Martin 2001).
64 In 2011 the Abkhazian parliament agreed that March 4th marking the anniversary of the
Sovietisation of Abkhazia in 1921, should be celebrated as “a significant day [...] a
memorable date in the history of Abkhazia”, following consultation and agreement on this
among representatives of the intelligentsia and the scientific community (Apsnypress
29.12.2011).
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In his folklore collections and fieldwork in Abkhazia in 1928 Chursin,
listed among the principal “survivals of the clan system” at that time: blood
feud, atalychestvo, mutual aid and hospitality (1957), but he did not present
the linkages of these in the practices and beliefs he described, thus contrasting
with the work of Inal-ipa. It is to be noted that in today’s contestation of
custom and state-building law Chursin’s work has not been republished, in
contrast to other early studies, especially the Basaria piece.
The dominant ‘orthodox’ theme today is Basaria’s approach. At the
same time it is coupled with enormous respect for the work of D. Gulia, after
whom the Abkhazian state Institute for Humanitarian Research is named, and
the 140th anniversary of his birth in 1874 was grandly celebrated earlier this
year. Yet there is an underlying tension in this coupling. It broke out into the
open towards the end of 2012 in a controversial pamphlet that allegedly
exaggerated differences among the Abkhaz, and suggested that Gulia was not
really a champion of Abkhazianness but was guilty of “direct co-operation
[with] Georgian nationalists” against the Abkhaz. It was issued under the
pseudonym “Kh. Gechba”, with a fictional publisher. Distributed
anonymously in the country it ruffled the hair of the Abkhaz Establishment,
which greeted it with furious denunciations. This included a presidential
statement from Alexander Ankvab:
 This book or booklet, is not a decent work, I do not know where this book was 
written - in Abkhazia or outside it. It depicts the history of Abkhazia of the thirties 
of the XX century in a distorted manner, also origin of Abkhaz names are given 
according to certain locations, which is cretinism. The book also raises issues that 
may cause conflict with peoples of the North Caucasus. This book is a pure 
provocation, so security services should be interested in the person of the 
author. Abkhazian people are reasonable and no one in Abkhazia would take this 
book seriously (20.9.2012 cited in Vitaly Sharia’s Patriotism on a local scale. 
http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/24713859.html). 
The pamphlet describes almost all the “enemies of Abkhazia” as Jews,
married to Jews or with Jewish relatives, and as Georgian agents of Georgia
to boot. In particular, it abuses the inhabitants of the south east of the country,
the Mingrelians who border on Georgia. Its openly tendentious commentary
is so crude that, one would have thought, it was undeserving of any attention.
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Yet the attention it did get suggests a high level of sensitivity in Abkhaz
society that does not tolerate ‘too much’ open debate that might be seen as
weakening the public image presented of a united front of the people when it
comes to interpretations of history and ethnicity. But, as I will show later, that
image is now being challenged. 
Gulia wrote that it was because Abkhaz “ethnography only began
towards the end of the 19th century, [... that] the labouring component of the
country is denied the possibility of associating in a common language”
suggests that he identified the salvation of ‘Abkhazianness’ with literacy
and/or a knowledge of its past. It can be seen as an earlier version of aspects
of Anderson’s “print-capitalism” theory (1991:40). This view might be set
alongside Inal-ipa’s that national self-awareness only came to the Abkhaz in
the 19th century (1965) and both represent a challenge to current nationalist
foundation mythology which puts stress on Abkhazness, with an essentialised
unchanging ethnicity continuing from its foundation into modern times,
through Russian and Soviet periods; legitimised by times when past states
had Abkhaz rulers (Bgazhba 1998: 62), and then becoming transmogrified
into the nation. Gulia, already between 1921 and 1924, was arguing for what
became the basic Soviet approach to nationalities and territories when he
wrote, in the academic vernacular of the time, that “enormous efforts” on the
part of state authorities were required for the Abkhaz to secure what would
today be called positive discrimination to allow them smoothly to reach a
level of development equal to other, “more enlightened nations.” Among the
latter he mentioned, the minorities of Georgians and Armenians inside
Abkhazia itself, who had their national republican territories within the Soviet
Union and on which they could draw for “cultural sustenance” (op cit.: 275).
He believed the Abkhaz could not do this on their own, unlike the task the
nationalists have set themselves in our days.
Throughout his arguments in the defence of structures to protect
Abkhaz ethnicity, as it would now be called, nowhere did Gulia support this
by arguing for the protection of Abkhaz custom, although he did study them
alongside his pioneering work to promote the language. In Gulia we see a
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contributor to our discussion who is clearly a nationalist but who did not see
an Abkhaz nation state dependent on the preservation of Abkhaz custom.
6.1.1 The Soviet ethnographic setting
From its earliest days the Soviet state promoted the expression of linguistic
and folkloristic expressions among its different nationalities (Stalin 1936
[1913]) and into the 1920s allowed variations in customary practices as a
component of strategies that were designed to hold together the multitude of
nationalities it had inherited from the Tsarist Empire. At the same time it
pursued elements of policies that were in common with many that had existed
among Russian anthropologists in late Tsarist times and the literature has
grown on that in recent decades, as reviewed by Tolz (op. cit). It shared the
outlook that non-Russian nationalities should retain many of their customs. It
was no accident that Russian anthropologists moved easily into assisting in
the implementation of Soviet nationalities policies, which radically extended
the degree of tolerance shown by the Tsarist Empire, to the creation of states
for different ethnicities. The history of Soviet nationalities policies is well
covered, especially in Terry Martin’s work (2001) and D. Tumarkin (2004)
and Francine Hirsch (2005). Martin wrote: “...the Soviet Union became the
first multi-ethnic state in world history to define itself as an anti-imperial
state” (2001: 19), using the word “state”, in this case, to cover what was, in
fact, self-designated as “a union of republics” in the opening words of the
Soviet National Anthem (1944).  Joseph Stalin defined it as
a period of the flowering of national cultures that are socialist in content and 
national in form; for, under the Soviet system, the nations themselves are not the 
ordinary 'modern' nations, but socialist nations, just as in content their national 
cultures are not the ordinary bourgeois cultures, but socialist cultures (1954:379).
The Soviet state required that anthropology should assist and promote its
policies. This, however, proved not to be as simple and benign as Stalin’s
words might suggest. Indeed, a scholar from the Institute of Language,
Literature and History in Abkhazia has asserted: “... the position of the
Autonomous Republics within the Union Republics [e.g. Abkhazia within
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Georgia] is that of third-class ethnically subordinate states” (1992). Because
of his studies on Abkhaz ethnicity Soviet Georgian academics backed by their
political Establishment challenged Inal-ipa’s ethnographic competence
(Gaprindashvili et al. 1991). His insistence in his 1976 monograph on an
Abkhaz autochthonous claim to their own territory instigated outrage within
Georgian academic circles (Lorkipanidze, M. 1990, Voronov 1992,
Gaprindashvili, Giorgadze et al. 1991). In 1988 prominent Abkhaz appealed
to the national conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to
allow Abkhazia to secede from the Georgian Republic and directly join the
Russian Federation within the USSR.
In the 1950s Gulia, even if in different language, pursued the same
course as he had taken in the 1920s, when he complained that the Soviet state
powers and particularly its Georgian republican component (which
incorporated Abkhazia within its borders in 1931) was denying the Abkhaz
their Constitutional rights to education, language and high office in Abkhazia.
Both before and after he joined the Communist Party in 1955 he voiced this
strongly in letters to ministers in Moscow and to the First Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita
Khrushchev.  In the aftermath of Stalin’s and Beria’s deaths (both of whom
were ethnically Georgian – something that is made much of by Abkhaz
nationalists today) Abkhaz protests were becoming widespread and did lead
to concessions to the demands for measures to safeguard Abkhaz culture, in
the face of opposition of the Georgian political and academic Establishments’
assimilation policies.
In her works Vera Tolz demonstrated that in both Tsarist and Soviet
periods there was a strong motivation among the authorities to consolidate
lands that had been conquered by Russia in the 19th century. Both under the
Russian Empire and then in the Soviet Union anthropologists tended to
promote cultural autonomy in line with state strategies to secure loyalty on
the part of non-Russian peoples. A big difference was that under the Soviet
system the nominally independent autonomies were to be linked to and based
on distinct territories and with their own recognised languages, but with
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restricted room for traditional social practices after the first years of Soviet
power. Borders were set around the identified nationalities, with the
acceptance of some customary practices among them. Anthropologists
demarcated the boundaries of peoples on the basis of their autochthonicity,
languages and cultures, creating indigenous schools and books for the
smallest such units. With time, the Soviet authorities settled on a number of
major “Union” republics, many having within them states and semi-states
which enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy. There is an interesting account
of how this was done in the tribal and Moslem conditions of the area of
Central Asia that became the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 1925 and
is now independent Turkmenistan (Edgar 2004).
 The Abkhaz were among the first to attain statehood as a result of the
Russian socialist Revolution, for the first time in modern times. Nestor
Lakoba (1893-1936), leader of local Bolsheviks (Communists) at the time, is
perceived to have been the architect of Abkhazia’s winning effective
independence from Georgia at that time and the main streets in many towns
are today named after him. A close associate of Stalin, as his local nominee,
he successfully slowed the pace of the initial collectivisation of Abkhaz
agriculture.
6.1.2 Abkhaz nationalism and ethnos theory
Ethnos (in the narrow sense of the term) can be defined as a firm aggregate of 
people, historically established on a given territory, possessing in common relative 
stable particularities of language and culture, and also recognising their unity and 
difference from other similar formations (self awareness) and expressing this in a 
self-appointed name (ethnonym)
(Yu. Bromley et al. (1975:11)
I introduce the scholarship of the current nationalist trends among the
Abkhaz, as they contest for the future of Abkhaz statehood. 
Myth-making contributes to today’s nationalist self-conceptions and
to making of tradition an on-going area of contestation. One question that is
considered is whether there is a gentle evolutionary flow from a sense of
208
ethnicity into that of nationalism, as argued by Inal-ipa among others, or a
disjuncture or even a contradiction between the two, with nationalism and the
construction of a state being instrumentally employed in a fashion that
eventually destroys the self-imaginings of ethnicity on which it is putatively
based or initially was conceived and expressed.
It was in the second half of the 20th century that Shalva Inal-ipa
emerged as the most thorough Abkhaz ethnologist. In the editor’s
introduction to Inal-ipa’s monograph on the ethnicity and culture of the
Abkhaz, Soviet Academician Mikhail Korostovtsev included the following:
Anyone who has engaged in research into the complex and tangled problems of 
ethnogenesis, of any people on any continent, knows from experience that it one of 
the most difficult questions and, at the same time, one that gives rise inevitable to 
polemics and collisions that are not infrequently  motivated by far from the 
authority and impartiality of genuine science.
(Korostovtsev 1965: 3)
A theme in the writings of Inal-ipa (1965) and identified with the Soviet
ethnos theoretician Yulian Bromley (1977, 1983, 1989) was introduced to a
wide audience by Ernst Gellner at an international conference in Austria that
gathered prominent anthropologists from the Soviet Union, Britain, France
and Berlin in 1976 (Gellner, ed.1980). Gellner delicately suggested that
Soviet ethnography was moving towards a Weberian outlook on social
structures for self-identification by elevating ethnos into one that had a
continuity through different class-based social formations (1980, notably
pages 75 and 80).  In the same volume Tamara Dragadze drew attention to the
citation above from Bromley for its suggesting that ethnos lies outside of the
particular class formations of a society: “not bound to any particular historical
stage of history” (1980a:163). She goes on to say: “… the theory of ethnos is
seen as means by which Soviet anthropology can successfully claim a unique
stake in the study of contemporary study” (Ibid: 169). Inal-ipa held that view,
and Abkhaz nationalists and the Abkhaz academic Establishment do to this
day.
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The Soviet participants differed among themselves on the sociological
derivation of distinct ethnicity, an ethnos, and what might sustain it (Gellner,
ed 1980)65. Tamara Dragadze66argued that while there was “a convergence
between academic theory and state ideology” in the Soviet Union, “historical
materialism was the only acceptable theoretical framework in which to
pursue ethnographic studies. Ethnos theory [thus] does not purposefully serve
‘state-condoned’ or especially ‘state-encouraged ends.” Soviet fieldworkers,
she added, had long “witnessed the tenacity of significant variations among
each Soviet people in their whole ways of life, ways of thinking and ways of
adapting to modern conditions [and] yearned for theoretical guidelines which
would provide the possibility of formulating and acknowledging this very
diversity.” The matter had been raised in Soviet anthropological journals as
early as 1950 and Dragadze could point to a 1948 article that drew on the
views of earlier Soviet anthropologists, and the Russian émigré social
scientist Shirokogoroff, which would allow a distinct classification of peoples
on the basis of culture and not on class alone (Dragadze 1980: 2-4).
Sergei Shirokogoroff was among the first Russian scholars of the 20th
century who studied individual peoples and his pioneering work (1924, 1929)
on ethnos followed from his fieldwork among the Tungus (now called Evenk)
of the Far East of Russia and northern China. See, also  (Kuznetsov 2001). He
presented a bell curve over time for the development and decline of
civilisations and made a plea for ‘protecting’ small cultural groups from
destructive association with other, more powerful, ethnic groups and their
cultures; an idea that was adopted (without attribution) by the later Soviet
anthropologist Lev Gumilev (1966). Chinese scholars of the Evenk today
reject Shirokogoroff’s view that small nations should be isolated against
modern technologies and literacy.67 Gumilev wrote a theory of ethnogenesis
65 For a discussion of the course of its genesis since the 1960s see Bromley, J. and Kozlov, V.
(1989).
66 Tamara Dragadze (1987) has provided a valuable resume of Soviet fieldwork at home, and
Plotkin and Howe conveyed the extent of debate that did take place among Soviet
anthropologists which included the subject of “stages” in human social development (1985). 
67 Personal communication at a discussion that was very kindly organised for me by the
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking, 2010,
and at which an Evenk scholar praised his mobile telephone for enabling him to maintain
relations with co-ethnics, however widespread they might have become today.
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in the latter years of the Soviet Union, that argued that the centuries-long
Mongol rule over Russia had allowed the Russian ethnos to develop free from
the cultures of Western Europe; a revival of ideas that were around in the
1920s as “neo-Eurasianism” and which is popular among Russian students
who are now brought up in the fashionable rejection of previously dominant
Marxism, something promoted by the new Russian state and its official
anthropological Establishment.
The somewhat benign picture of Soviet ethnographical innovation that
emerged at the 1976 conference did not consider the barriers to be
surmounted by an indigenous anthropologist who wanted to illustrate this
contemporary validity of continuing “traditional” practices within the Soviet
Union: especially if one came from a small people that was defending its
culture within a larger republic, as was the case with Inal-ipa in Abkhazia. 
Nonetheless, a theory was being elaborated and in Abkhazia Inal-ipa
by 1976 could approvingly paraphrase Yulian Bromley as:
Ethnicity is a complex dynamic system that exists on many planes. Its main 
attributes are those ethnic traits which, as they are passed from generation to 
generation, possess peculiar qualities of longevity: a stability that characterises the 
core of an ethnic community – the specific peculiarities of its traditional way of 
life68  (language, religion, traditions, customs and ethnic aspects of psychology) and
its ethnic self-awareness (1976: 8).
The ethnos theory that was discussed at the 1976 conference organised by
Gellner is no longer supported by the leader of Russia’s official
anthropological Establishment today. An expression of this can be found in a
volume by V.A. Tishkov (2003), the current head of the Russian Academy of
Sciences’ N.N. Miloukho-Maclay Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology69
which argues for the rejection of Soviet ethnos theory. Tishkov bemoans the
continuing dominance in Russian anthropology of adherence to ethnos theory
and which, he wrote, draws its ideas of from “L.K. Morgan, K. Marx, C.
Darwin, C. Spencer [sic!], E. Taylor, M. Weber” and not those he describes as
68 One might note that the Russian for way of life, byt, has the same root as the word for
genesis, bytie, as in the biblical Book of Genesis and is suggestive of ethnicity.
69 Nikolai Mikloukho-Maclay (1846-188) was a Russian multifaceted scholar who was the
first European to carry out extensive field in what is now Papua New Guinea, in the 1870s.
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Russia’s home-grown originators of post-modernism  like M. Bakhtin and V.
Propp (2003: 9-10). He similarly sharply criticises Ernest Gellner for his
“caustic pronouncements on the eminent French anthropologists and
sociologists who began the great changes in the humanist sciences of the
second half of the 20th Century” (Ibid.: 11). Yulian Bromley is dismissed as
“uneducated” (Ibid.:12). What concerns us most here is not to debate whether
Tishkov’s post-modernism and rejection of the concept of ethnos, or Inal-
ipa’s different view is ‘correct’ but that the Abkhaz subscribe to Inal-ipa’s
Soviet ethnos theory – making Tishkov's rejection of it irrelevant when
studying the conceptions of the Abkhaz.
Throughout Inal-ipa’s academic life the Soviet state held the reins of
power over all branches of knowledge. Once determined, state orthodoxies
were enforced and public debate was cut off by bans, proscriptions and
declarations of political anathema. Individuals and the members of whole
schools of thought in the 1930s and 1940s were exiled and imprisoned, and
some were sentenced to death (Tumarkin 2002). These circumstances made
for dominant theory, in anthropology as in other disciplines, to carry more
weight than simply that of one theory amongst several. This rigid framework,
however, did not exclude its evolution, as described in part in a volume of
essays issued recently by the Max Planck Institute (Muhlfried, Sokolovsky
Eds. 2011), and see Tumarkin’s collection of articles on Russian
anthropologists of the 20th century (2004).
A small number of Western anthropologists have added interesting
fieldwork data that contributes to our topic on custom and the state. Thus, an
intriguing twist to the question of defining ethnicity in relation to the state is
given by a study of the Laz in villages on both sides of the Georgian-Turkish
frontier. They had been separated for a half century and only resumed contact
with each other after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Mathijs Pelkmans
(2006) grappled with the question of their ethnicity in relation to Georgia,
Christianity and Islam and discussed how the frontier division affected it.
What is striking is that the years of separation was not felt by the Laz as a
loss of each retaining a concept of Laz ethnic self-identification although the
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effect of different statehoods was found to make them strangers to each other.
This influence of the two states allows me to question any supposition that
statehood as an institution per se destroys self-awareness even if that image
of self is altered by circumstances, in this case the effect of the state and
different citizenships.
6.2 Ethnicity or citizenship – Abkhaz or Abkhazian or others?
In what appears to be a serious omission in such a multi-ethnic and multi-
denominational country as Abkhazia, there are no institutions dealing with the 
problems of minorities […] The political and intellectual elite, as well as civil 
society in Abkhazia, have so far clearly failed to start any debate over the optimum 
model for building an Abkhazian nation state”
         Natela Akaba International ALERT 31.1.2013
What is needed is a national, all peoples’ policy. We must move away from 
national deviations; begin with issuing new Abkhazian passports. I propose the 
removal of the column denoting ‘nationality’.
     Alexander Mkrtchyan, In Anton Krivenyuk, Kavpolit 12.3.2014
I would not question the accuracy of Natela Akaba’s conclusions from her
study of the formal state of affairs regarding ethnic standings in Abkhazia
today, although it must be added to. That scholar does note that state
appointments to positions of responsibility in its structures disproportionately
favour the Abkhaz ethnicity that makes up just over half of the population.
The parliament has been embroiled in long and at time acrimonious debate on
what rights should be given to members of the other ethnicities, particularly
to the largest of them, the at least 40,000 Georgians/Mingrelians who are
concentrated in the country’s south eastern districts. That public debate
revolves around the granting of Abkhazian citizenship, not so much around
the rights of that cultural minority to hold to traditions and language. 
The qualification for Abkhazian citizenship heavily favours the
Abkhaz and without citizenship one cannot take part in state activities,
including elections. Some half of the tens of thousands of the Georgian-
Mingrelian population that to this day makes up the majority of the
population of Abkhazia’s Gal and parts of neighbouring Tkuarchal and
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Ochamchira provinces that lie up against the border with Georgia do not have
Abkhazian citizenship (O’Loughlin, Kolossov et al. 2011:19) and 20,000 and
20,000 had their citizenship taken away from them just before the elections
for president in 2014. Their local administration is predominantly composed
of ethnic Abkhaz (Yamskov 2009)70.
My informants from among Armenians and Russians who make up
the bulk of the other non-Abkhaz citizens of Abkhazia expressed general
satisfaction with their status, accepting the privileging of Abkhaz based on
indigeneity, although I encountered some, especially in the leadership of the
Armenian community who did want to be granted a bigger voice, as an ethnic
community, in the political life of the country. This issue of ethnic balances in
representation is not a dead issue. 
There are tensions at many points within the relationship of ethnicity
and citizenship that have been thrown up by discrimination and war. They are
raised by changes in demography, including the immigration of large
numbers of Central Asians to fill the gaps in demand for labour that has
opened up by emigration of Russians, Abkhaz and the departed Greeks and
Georgians, and the estimated 10,000 workers who have arrived from
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. A new phenomenon is that they are taking Abkhaz
women as wives; sometimes as second wives to those they have ‘back home.’
The Abkhaz rulers have instituted strict qualifications for Abkhazian
citizenship: surrendering Georgian citizenship, uninterrupted residence in
Abkhazia through the period when many Georgians fled the country after the
Abkhaz won the war, name changes and all procedures for obtaining
70 Yamskov, 2009, who carried out fieldwork in Abkhazia 2003-2006 and subjected official
Abkhazian calculations of the ethnic composition of Abkhazia to careful scrutiny, providing
interesting original work on the country’s demography. What is most valuable is that Russian
scholar’s tracing the dispersal movements, geographic dislocations and redistribution of the
Abkhaz, Armenians, Mingrelians-Georgians and Russians, Greeks and Svan that resulted
from the destruction of the USSR in 1991 and the 1992-93 and subsequent Abkhaz wars with
Georgia. He delves into the value of the statistics and warns of distortions introduced by the
political agendas of some of those who did the counting. Yamskov explains the difficulties in
determining who lives and where in the country, as a large proportion of Abkhaz live both in
their villages and the towns, dividing their time between them in what he calls “semi-
urbanisation” (page 9) and states: “all urban Abkhazians are very closely tied to their native
villages and the relatives who still live there” (p. 10), while there is also a lot of migration for
long periods backwards and forwards across Abkhazia’s boundaries with its Georgian and
Russian neighbours. He adds fieldwork data from other scholars, taking the reader up to the
situation in 2008 and speculating about what the future might hold.
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citizenship are blanketed in red tape. Applicants are hit by an essentialist
concept of ethnicity that is intrinsic to Abkhaz nationalist state builders -
something that  contradicts the expressed apswara concepts of cultural
absorption – and is a feature that is fed by suspicion of Georgians in their
midst. There are meetings of the Commission for Citizenship Issues that is
chaired by a Vice President to vet applications for citizenship. According to
the procedure, applications are considered in two categories – 1992-93 war
veterans and their close relatives reinstating their citizenship and persons
married to Abkhazian citizens (Abkhaz World  2013).
Concepts of ethnicity linked to language play a big part in the
thinking. Difficulties faced by applicants for citizenship mostly affect those
resident in the south eastern part of Abkhazia that is heavily populated by
Mingrelian and Georgian speakers who consider they are ethnically
Georgians (Census responses 2011)71. The Abkhazian state position (personal
communication 2.5.2013) is that those defined as Mingrelians who bear
Abkhaz surnames in Mingrelianised form should restore the alleged original
Abkhaz name (without the Mingrelian suffix -ia) and to record their ethnicity
in their internal passports as Abkhaz72. There is a procedure to obtain a
zakliuchenie, i.e. resolution of cases that come up, from specialists at the
71I use the descriptions ‘Georgian’ and ‘Mingrelian’ as used in the self-descriptions given by
people counted in the Abkhazian 2011 census. However, these descriptions are not
universally agreed, as ethnicity/nationality definitions are used in the nationalist dispute
between the state administrations of Abkhazia and of Georgia, and relate to their conflicting
claims to territory; to arguments about borders between the Abkhazian and Georgian states;
to how each, differently, defines the ‘Georgian’, Abkhaz and ‘Mingrelian’ ethnic groups.
Thus, the Georgian state claims the Mingrelian-speakers as “Georgians”, while the
Abkhazian state claims them either as a separate ethnicity or as Abkhaz who were forcefully
assimilated by immigrants from Georgia (Achugba, 2006). The Georgians and Mingrelians
speak very different languages but share the same south Caucasus, Kartvelian roots. A
discussion of the languages of the Caucasus is provided by Professor George Hewitt (1998b).
72 One might note that similar process of ‘name adjustment’, but to Georgian names, was
applied by the Georgian authorities to Moslems who returned in 1974 from Soviet expulsion
several decades earlier (Dzhaniashvili: 84). 
Around the same time the Communist authorities in Bulgaria were putting pressure
on Moslem Bulgarians, Pamaks, to change their names back to the “Bulgarian” ones (that is,
Christian) they had before conversion to Islam under Ottoman rule. 
A new addition to the name-changing and nationalist programmes is the case of
Lativia.  The administrative court in the Latvian town of Lipaja has received a declaration
form a local resident who complains that the Lipaja Registry Office is insisting that his
child’s name “must correspond to Latvian grammar, that is that an ‘-s’ should be added to the
name. The result would be to change the name Miron to one that sounds like the word
‘mironis’, which means ‘the deceased’ in Latvian” (IA Regnum 2013).
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Institute for Research into the Humanities (AbIGI). Those deemed to be
ethnic Mingrelians who have resided in Abkhazia obtain Abkhazian passports
without having to prove their Abkhaz ancestry – citizenship is given to those
among them who lived in Abkhazia in the years from 1994 to 1999. For all
people of any ethnicity, including Mingrelians and Georgians with such a
residential qualification, the internal Abkhaz passport is issued without the
procedures for surname alteration to qualify them. The specialists at the
AbIGI have a state-informed task to decide about the changes in a person’s
belonging. 
The contention over citizenship for Mingrelians/Georgians is kept
alive by intransigence on the part of the hard core Abkhaz ethnic-nationalists’
stand for firmly retaining power in the hands of the Abkhaz. Here the water is
muddied by the ongoing confrontation between the Abkhazian and Georgian
states that stems from the latter’s refusal to recognise the former and conclude
a peace treaty. As a consequence Mingrelian/Georgian inhabitants of
Abkhazia cannot gain Abkhazian citizenship while holding a Georgian state
passport. The way in which Abkhaz holders of Russian passports are
accommodated is presented in George Hewitt’s latest work (2014), the details
of which need not concern us here.
The issue of citizenship is not one that customary practices would
appear to be able to tackle directly at present, leaving it much to the state to
deal with. However, earlier in this dissertation I have identified customary
practices that do, in fact, encroach on the matter, through adoption, marriage
outside of the state agencies – not studied so far in the anthropology of the
Abkhaz. It does come within the realm of customary practices and could be
extended to encompass all cases that arise by communities overseeing the
whole question, taking it out of the realms of the state. It could be
encompassed more broadly within apswara, which does embody practices
that regulate ethnicity by kin and affine conceptions, based on cultural
absorption of newcomers and not on “blood” lineages. 
Once again I must point out that generally-expressed views of 'how
things are' are not always borne out by individual accounts. Thus,  Zuleika
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(whom we met in section 5.2) blamed the Abkhaz customary influence of
lineages for inter-ethnic friction in her own case. At different times and only
when no one else was present we gossiped. She thinks of herself as ethnically
Russian, “because of my blood”, adding in 2012:
“Georgia is restoring order on the streets and putting a stop to burglaries and that 
would suit Abkhazia well, but there is no chance of that here because of the kin 
ties that make all relatives protect each other. If I am burgled the neighbour 
will deny knowing anything if the thief is the son of her father’s grandfather’s 
other son’s daughter who was married to the man who is the father of the burglar 
[FFFSSS, second cousin, MC].
“That is how there can be attacks even on the president without witnesses coming 
forward. The Abkhaz are savages and not subject to law because of family ties.” She
said the attempts on the then president’s life are because he is seeking repayment 
of misspent ‘loans’ that were dolled out by his predecessor. “The Soviet 
times were good because there was order and the town was lively and you didn’t 
hear Abkhaz spoken but now when I asked two women who were shouting in 
Abkhaz outside my little shop to cut the volume and move away one rudely replied: 
‘I do as I please - I am in my own country’”.
Outside of the capital, most of the members of the different ethnic groups live
in their separate own clusters of villages, though, their proximity to those of
other ethnicities allows for some mixing with them at schools and work,
which is more characteristic in towns such as Sukhum, Tkuarchal and Gagra.
There are some villages with an assortment of ethnicities. One informant
bewailed the increased numbers of rods (plural of rod, the Russian rendering
of lineage and kin) that now exist in the same village as a result of population
movements: “Matters were simpler before, when each village was inhabited
predominantly by members of a single rod and everyone knew the rules and
behaved according to rod custom” (2012).
Debates at the highest level on the citizenship issue do not diminish as
the current problems are repeatedly referred to the state agencies of
commissions which cannot agree. Thus, in May 13 2013 it again came before
Parliament73. 
73 See Appendix II for details on the passport issue as it was presented to Parliament.
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Sometimes the appointments to government posts are allocated
according to what part of the country candidates come from, what some
regard as the more traditionalist north west, or the south east. The two were
separated by the empty spaces left by the massive exodus in the 19th century
and then filled by immigrants. There is acknowledgement of some variations
in custom in the two, as shown through parliament deciding that customary
popular assemblies – skhods - may take place without first agreeing this with
local authorities, at Lykhny, the site of a shrine in the north west, and at Myku
[Mokva], in the south east. The two are sites at which assemblies pass
resolutions and expect them to be implemented by the state’s agencies.
The state procedure that links ethnicity to citizenship would appear to
run contrary to the customary outlook that has recognised (and still does for
some) as deriving from lineage descent, marriage and adoption that is to say a
definition of Abkhazianness as culturally constituted. There are also practices
to meet contingencies, as we have seen in the case brought forward of a
descent line being shifted from the male lineage to a female one as in chapter
four, section 4.7.2.
There is no discussion of adopting any reconstitution of ethnic
autonomies such as existed in the Soviet Union and in today’s Russian
Federation and in Moldova. Abkhaz informants have insisted that the
experience of the past led to Abkhaz culture losing out, the fears of a
repetition of which is represented by independent Georgia’s dissolution of its
autonomic components (successful with Ajaria but leading to breakaways in
South Ossetia abnd Abkhazia) and its refusal to recognise Abkhazian and
Soouth Ossetian independence. In a study of multiculturalism, Bill Watson
described its great variety of forms in a number of states, rather than
proposing a blueprint of how harmony among different cultural groups might
be brought about (2000). His review of the very different ways states have
tried to accommodate or assimilate members of different ethnic or cultural
groups, often through the rejection of rights to minorities, is confined to states
within which there is a shared citizenship. This is not the case in Abkhazia
and the accommodation of  multiculturalism is not debated. All citizens are
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expected to support an independent state and to conform to the laws in the
construction of that unified state, although the reality is that law comes
second to Abkhaz custom. Georgians in the areas of their major concentration
do enjoy spaces to use and teach their language in Georgian language
schools.
However, customary processes exist that do not conform to idealised
versions of ancient and immutable customary practices and do provide
possible openings from ‘down below’ for ‘homogenizing’ the population
around Abkhaz values, open to and drawing in non-Abkhaz into apswara.
These aspects of Abkhaz culture have not so far been discussed in the
anthropological or political literature on Abkhazia. They derive from the
centrality accorded to apswara including the principle of what I shall call the
embodiment of unanimity. I now discuss this under several headings that
follow, starting with the role played in drawing in the Abkhaz and others into
a common belief system.
I will treat another facet of acceptance or not of non-Abkhaz to show
that ethnic identification is not a fixed concept.  There are customary ways in
which children of non-Abkhaz parentage ‘become Abkhaz’ and I show that
this not only applies to children.
 
6.2.1 Ethnic transition and slippage
I want to draw attention to an article by Igor and Rita Kuznetsov (2012: 16),
who carried out fieldwork in a village in north-western Abkhazia, Ldza
(called Lidzava in Georgian).74 They depicted the multitude of traditional and
74 “In July 1988 [the] Ldzaa-nyxa annual ceremony and feast took place in the
village. Those who donated money for it became the member of the community through the
reciprocity gift system. In the villagers’ imagination they were “ours.” Amongst the
participants, mostly of Abkhaz extraction, there were a few ones speaking Georgian and
marked as Georgians in their passports and village council documents. There were several
models of becoming Abkhaz. Firstly, someone may “recall” his “genuine” Abkhaz ancestors.
Secondly, others married to Abkhaz women. Later after the patron of such family had died,
his children entered their mother’s community, while keeping Georgian family name. They
remained the descendants of mixed families and they could not be a source of big ramified
Abkhaz lineages (abipara). Thirdly, there were Georgians who had become Abkhaz before
they moved to Lidzava. They chose to behave as a real Abkhaz big family (aindu). During
the feast [a] few guests were seated close to participants on the nearest hill: a Georgian
(“Karlo”), a Russian, as well as several visiting Abkhaz. Neither Racha Georgians nor
Armenians were invited as they were not accepted as […] members of [the] local Lidzava
219
not-so-traditional appearances of Abkhaz custom as it was adapted to reflect
the relations between members of different ethnicities at an Abkhaz holy
shrine before the war with Georgia. The Kuznetzovs demonstrated the
multiple ways in which non-Abkhaz were initiated into ‘becoming Abkhaz’,
an example of a lack of the rigidity in custom in Soviet Abkhazia. That, in
some ways happier time, has changed since, as a consequence of the war. The
Kuznetsovs describe how a child of a Georgian father and Abkhaz mother
make an ‘ethnic transition’ from Georgian to Abkhaz (2012: 16). They put it
down to the use of Soviet law, under which a child born to a Georgian father
and Abkhaz mother could make the transition by choosing to be Abkhaz on
the father’s death. It would then join its mother’s Abkhaz line. In my
discussion of ‘unanimity’ I question whether such a transition may be
confined to a formulation in Soviet law as I have spent time with a Chechen
man who married locally, resides in Abkhazia and has been described to me
as Abkhaz. 
Yet, at the time of the Kuznetsov’s study inter-ethnic relations were
beginning to change and they exemplified that in the lengthy extract I have
given in footnote n. 76. They further explained: 
The Abkhaz linguistic nationalism was arising. During the party devoted to the 
christening in a Russian family one elderly man spoke Georgian while a young 
Abkhaz woman protested: “you should not speak your language here as we have 
ours”. Another similar event happened during these years in the bookstore in 
Pitsunda (customer asked for the literature in Georgian and the Abkhaz shop 
assistant reacted negatively). Religion also became the object of nationalist conflict, 
although in smaller part. The founder of the village museum, amateur local 
ethnographer and rich man “uncle Grisha” Khetsuriani wanted to establish an 
orthodox chapel in Lidzava. While local Armenians, Georgians, and Russians 
accepted it positively, [the] Abkhaz part was displeased and saw pro-Georgian 
action in it.
community” (Kuznetsov’s observation, July 1988, Lidzava).
“In 1986-92 those who researched on Abkhazia issues discussed possibilities for
complete assimilation [by…the Abkhaz within the next decades. This process seemed to be
viewed in different way[s] in Lidzava. It is worth noting; here it never turned in [the]
opposite direction when some family who identified themselves as Abkhaz might be
assimilated by Georgians. At that time [i.e. before the Independence War with Georgia M/C.]
the official government was already divided between Georgians and Abkhaz. Tato Pagava
(Georgian) was the head of [the] village council and Fazlabey Tskuia (Abkhaz) was the head
of collective farm (kolkhoz). (Liudmila Shalvovna Mamasakhlisi and Galina Khakovna
Gochua (Dbar) (Interview, 08/07/01, Lidzava)
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President Ankvab’s statement that Abkhazia should not be “a melting pot”
(2012) is more one of intention and hope than of fact. Given that the history
of the Abkhaz has shown that as a result of mass exile, forced emigration and
being swamped by state-promoted immigrants under different state orders
since the mid-1860s the continued existence of Abkhaz culture, traditions and
language has been severely curtailed, such a standpoint is understandable.
However, there has also been and continues to this day a process of ‘drawing
in’ to absorb members of other ethnicities; founded as their culture is on
cultural and not racial concepts. That remains true despite angry utterances
one hears at times about Georgians, Armenians or others being such and such
‘by blood’.
The Abkhaz have drawn in the descendants of black African slaves in
recent years, Turks, Georgians, Ossetians, Roma, Chechens and others to
apswara and including into their belief system. They are peoples who might
still hold to what we call different religions. The strength of relatedness was
anecdotally shown when I heard two women, one ethnically Abkhaz and the
other Russian, chatting in the street about the time they fled the Georgian
occupation of 1992 and the delight of seeing a family of Roma – “nashi
tsygane” (“our Gypsies”), fellow refugees in a street in Russia’s town of
Sochi.
The following account of the belief system and shrines includes
discussion of the idea of ‘unanimity’ in state building.
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Chapter 7 Shrine-sharing - national 
belief system for different 
religions
As for religion ... first of all, we are Abkhaz" Maan, an immigrant from Syria. 
Abkhaz World web 27.4.2013. Viewed 28.4.2013
The period since the breakdown of the USSR “may be called a period of 
reassessment, renewal of and rebirth of those customs and the original pre-Christian 
religion the Abkhaz have preserved. At a difficult time the traditions of the 
ancestors became one of the principal means for the people’s national survival. 
Chakvetadze, S. 2009: 72-82
“On 17th November 2013, in Dydrypsh [site of the holiest sanctuary], with the 
participation of all the shrine-keepers of Abkhazia, there will be a ritual sacrifice 
and sacred prayers for the salvation of the youth of Abkhazia"- to protect them from
the increase in road accidents, recourse to drugs and suicides. Announcement by the 
Dydypsh Sanctuary, shrine keeper Zaur Chichba. 
Nasha Abkhazia 1.11.2013. Viewed15.11.2013
I discovered this interesting sub-topic during field work and it is examined
from an angle I did not encounter in the literature - its linking of a
‘traditional’ system of beliefs with its facility of drawing in members of
different institutionalised religions, Christian and Moslem, and at times
conflicting ethnic groups under one nationalist Abkhaz umbrella, and
conclude that shrines are a potential instrument for state-building along
customary lines.
In 2012 I chanced upon the initial stage of an oak cursing ceremony. I
was looking around the centre of a sprawling Abkhaz village – school, post
office, a one-time barracks for the KGB guards who had protected the nearby
holiday residence of Soviet leaders, the water tank, a shop and what was the
collective farm headquarters and is now empty. Sitting on a log, I greeted the
only other man around. He responded and interrupted something he was
doing around a tree. In conversation he said he was cleaning up to make a
curse:
222
He was cutting into the bark of an oak tree to place a candle in it. He was to curse an
adulterer: “I am sure the wife of my younger brother has been with a man and this 
will make it dangerous for him,” as he pierced the bark, adding: “he will either 
swear he is innocent or face retribution; he will not dare lie.” Notice of the coming 
cursing had been widely made known and on the appointed day later that May my 
informant would make it before the oak, the lit candle and people as witnesses. It 
declared that so-and-so should confess to being “guilty of committing a serious 
offence” (seduction of a married woman) on pain of bringing on himself and his 
descendants and animals and other property, death, sickness, disease and other 
misfortunes. There was no doubting the seriousness of invoking the “power of the 
oak.” We shared cigarettes and chatted and he told me that he was also the 
convenor of an annual lineage, rod, assembly. He told me he was 43 - “But you are 
young for that,” I said. “Well…I am still responsible because I was the one who 
proposed the convening of a village assembly on Azhyrnykhua, the Day of the 
Creation of the World, [14th January]” - a national holiday. His village celebration 
would be at the abandoned smithy I had noticed a mile or so away. “This is only the 
second time that we have revived it. I am a garage mechanic and that is like a 
modern blacksmith and I know how to forge and get a hot fire going. 75
In the introduction to a collection of papers by different authors on shared
sacred shrines, Glenn Bowman described their displaying interaction of
differences and how competition is understood and accommodated (or not!)
at the shrines; where “identities are local products rather than extensions of
the hegemonic orthodox discourses of state and sect” (2012: 5). They “can be
seen to reflect and amplify images of the consociality of the communes that
surround…them” (Ibid.:5). Common to the case studies in the volume was
the accommodation of difference. Bowman has described cases of nominal
religious possessors of shrines seeking to exclude sharing (2012) and on
contestation between sharers under pressures from changing political
environment (2012a). Manifestations of syncretism that leads to a coming
together and melding of different religious outlooks that are discussed in
Stewart and Shaw (1994) are not evident in Abkhazia, although a prominent
politician has described the rules of apswara and apsua tsas (see Kamkiia
2008) as: “the synthesis of traditional Christian and Moslem values that are
intrinsic to Abkhaz culture” (Butba 2012).
75 He was referring to the belief in the “power” of iron and fire, both of which belonged to
Shashva who had his site in smithies. It was not so long ago that the Komsomol (Young
Communist League)  had problems getting the blacksmith’s apprentices to attend its own
meetings when they were going through their training. The cult continued through Soviet
times and there was conflict with the authorities as people demanded that apprentice
blacksmiths be free from all civic duties, including National Service (personal
communications 2009-2012). 
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In Abkhazia the sacred shrines do not belong to any particular
religious orthodoxy which might invite, tolerate or accept others wishing to
worship there. While there are several shrines that are recognised for their
“powers” to a degree that labels them “main shrines” country-wide, there are
hundreds of local ones and anyone or, rather, any community, might set up its
own and thereby be recognised as legitimate by all. There is no hierarchy of
clerics within the Abkhaz belief system. 
The shrines are places for communal gatherings to commune with the
Creator or what we would call local deities that look after family lineages but
can be also for across-lineage social entities. They exist to maintain and
endorse the Abkhaz belief system of apswara; to petition, to swear oaths, sort
out problems, reconcile people in dispute, clear one’s reputation,  seek
fertility, discover liars and adulterers, thieves - in a word, to regulate and
bring harmony to society. The shrine keepers are chosen from people with
outstanding probity. Those who attend can be of any religion that does not
attack the members of another: Moslems, Christians, Krishnaites, Jews and
atheists and the rest. The law on freedom of religion stipulates: “…the
propaganda of a religion’s superiority [over another] is forbidden” (Zakon,
14.11.2012 Chapter 1:4:6). The adherents of no single institutional religion
have domain over the site or a greater say than others. 
While an overwhelming majority of the Abkhaz consider they belong
to an institutional religion, Moslem, Christian and others, religious
observance and knowledge of theology is minimal as, indeed, it is among the
other ethnic groups which make up the population of Abkhazia. The belief in
apswara and the power of the shrines extends across ethnicities and the
different religions are considered to be irrelevant at them. Therefore, the
discussion of the shrines here is not concerned with syncretism, hybridity or
borrowings, although scholars are able to discover practices in Abkhaz daily
life that can be identified, for instance, with Islam. I examine the shrines in
Abkhazia from the perspective of a traditional system of beliefs that draws in
all under one Abkhaz umbrella. There are shrines that are attended by
members of different institutional religions in other parts of the word, for
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instance at the Ibo Okija one in Nigeria (Okili A.2005, Onmoyo 2007). There
oath-swearing is accompanied by sacrifices with similar seeking of
supernatural guidance as in Abkhazia, and attended by Christian pastors but
at Okija the ceremonies are reserved for members of one specific ethnicity.
********************
Zaur Chichba, the Dydrypsh shine-keeper, has stressed that "as in the past so
today, the people of Abkhazia honours and preserves its shrines, believing in
them and placing trust in their miraculous power. The respect and honouring
of the ancient shrines is by no means to belittle other religions that are
represented in our country” (8.11.2013). 
Inal-ipa has given the case of the oath sworn in 1917 by Bolshevik
revolutionary fighting units to demonstrate how traditional practices and
beliefs carried on into modern times: the oath of allegiance that was sworn by
recruits to the revolutionary military formations took place in the smithy. The
first item of the oath of loyalty promised not to be influenced by
considerations of kinship when fighting for the cause (Inal-ipa 1965: 166).
The Abkhaz retain their holy sanctuaries dedicated to Antsva (Krylov
1999a), the creator of the world (Kunacheva 2006:35) and the smithies’
power, once always in an actual smithy, have often now come to be
symbolically represented as few smithies still exist but keepers are (as of old)
chosen from the blacksmith’s lineage or from among respected members of
the community. Again, it was the site that was revered76. People also hold
celebrations around the family holy hearths, hills, individual trees and at local
holy groves (Solovieva 2007: 7). There is universal mutual tolerance and
celebration of Christian, Moslem and traditional Abkhaz belief festivals.
Belonging to different religions is no barrier to marriage of Abkhaz with
others, which is universally celebrated through the Abkhaz belief system’s
76 I came across a similar reverence for a site on Santa Cruz Island Solomon Islands in the
south west Pacific. There the Anglican deacons cautioned me against walking across a grass
dancing circle that was used by the locals, as it “was having to rest” (2001). In areas of the
Solomon Islands what are known as Kastom houses with revered skulls and a ban on women
entering were maintained by people who saw no contradiction between the associated belief
system of the shrines and their own avowed Christianity.
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feasts. There are no officiating priests – only elders, and the same applies to
funerals and marriages. If a priest or mullah is present it is only as a lineage
member. Some Eastern Orthodox Christians, in the loose understanding of the
words, do go through a supplementary Christian marriage ceremony in
church, but do not bother with the required fasting before it, may not even
have been baptised and, according to informants, can even be inebriated.
Moslems drink alcohol and eat pork. Circumcision is unknown, as are the
Koran and Bible.
The examination of the practices at Abkhaz sacred places provides
insight into a way in which Abkhaz belief systems relate to law and custom
and how these fit into the Abkhaz nationalist state-building project in ways
that are not only not immediately obvious but also not expressed by site
devotees. Government ministers, MPs and state officials including the police,
judges and prosecutors consult the shrines on policy and to discover criminals
and clear the innocent. One will note from the description of the 1988 annual
Ldzaa-nykha shrine ceremony in footnote n. 76 that unitary aspects of shrine
ceremonies was evident. It, thus, invites questioning of the assertion that
customary practices as simply going back to the ancestral past, as suggested
in the quotation at the head of this chapter from Chavetadze’s survey of
religions and beliefs in Abkhazia (Op. cit.). Modifying any implication that
what is going on is only the conscious activity of resuscitating customary
practices, my findings indicate that the truth lies closer to it not being that
alone, as can be seen from the broad attendance at shrines. Practices at them
and their being open to all peoples of Abkhazia strengthen the nationalist
project by being there together under an Abkhaz umbrella.
Nowhere is this aspect of shrine attendance openly expressed or
highlighted and, indeed, it does not appear in local literature. Yet it is an all-
pervasive intrinsic feature in them today and makes visible what the shrines
do not openly express but what is a central effect of them. This setting of the
shrines within the pattern of Abkhaz beliefs and their coexistence with
religions will include unpicking what I call the Abkhaz “unanimity principle”
and the enforced mutual respect in Abkhaz concepts.
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The part played by customary shrines in tackling disputes outside the
law was summed up for me by an informant who had himself baptised into
the Eastern Orthodox faith in 2012. He said his understanding of the
relationship between the Abkhaz system of beliefs and religion, was that
“They are different but not conflicting - the Church forgives people their bad
actions but the shrines punish them”. He was in favour of both (A.Ch.
informant 2012). At no time in his discourse, nor in that of any other
informants, did matters of Hell fire in the afterlife surface – there is no
Heaven or Hell. Even in Soviet times the authorities turned something of a
blind eye to the shrines as “they helped to sort problems out and hold the
people together” (B.K. informant 2011).
Before going further into discussing the nationalist state-building
aspect of Abkhaz belief some more background is necessary. The shrines are
not promoted to syncretise but are the sharing by the Abkhaz with other
ethnicities and adherents to ‘institutionalised religions’77.  Rachel Clogg has
written: “… the notion of ‘religion’, which has always been approached
idiosyncratically by the Abkhaz, has merged to a great extent with the notion
of apswara (i.e. with what it is to be an Abkhazian). This is a code of ethics, a
secular description of the fundamental essence of Abkhaz identity, one not of
belief but of ‘mentality’” (1998: 205). I do not here pick up on her use of the
word ‘religion’ in preference to ‘belief system’, as used by the Abkhaz.
The Orthodox (Eastern) Christian Church’s premises are used for
apswara festivals and their sacred entities double up as Christian saints. In
the grounds of the Ilor cathedral there is a ritual sacrifice of a fatted golden
bull. This is distinctive from the   practices at the tomb of St. George in the
church of Mokus-Su and at the Christian shrine of Dzivar, both in Georgia,
where the tombs are honoured by Christian Georgians and Armenians, and by
Moslems, but where each denomination honours the tomb in ways that reflect
their own denominational groundings. Shrines that are shared are found
across the Caucasus among members of different ethnicities as for example in
77 I have gratefully borrowed this term from a Research Grant Proposal , in which
“institutionalised religion” is used to distinguish major world religions from the shrine-based
belief system under discussion (Tuite, K and Muehlfried, F.2012). 
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syncretic form according to a collection of authors, in the Pankisi valley,
shared by Ossetians, Georgians and Chechens; and by Kists with others.
There is mutual celebration of each others’ religious festivals by Christians
with Moslems and with ‘pagans’ according to Melikishvili (Op. cit.: 78).
However, those shrines belong to one or other institutional religion and
conflicts arise with the others on the terms for them to be allowed to use
them; often reflecting shifts in political balances within Georgia and with its
neighbours, as has also been described for Palestine by Bowman (1993).
There are, similarly, what is described as syncretic practices of Moslems and
“pagans” in Georgia’s south east, and with Shi’a Azeris in Georgia (Dmitriev,
V. 2003).
On President Ankvab’s visit to Lykhny’s Church of the Assumption of
the Virgin Mary he referred to it as “one of the seven main sanctuaries of
Abkhazia” (Respublika Abkhazii 23.1.2013). He thereby identified the church
that is in on the site of a sacred place in the Abkhaz belief system, as sacred
as the shrine itself. There is no distinction made in his words, nor have I
encountered such a distinction made by others in Abkhazia or from the
church itself. Churches and their rituals are also open to all, whether
christened or no.
The shrines and their keepers in Abkhazia play an important part in
representing a unified citizenship, neatly fitting into today’s nationalist state-
building agenda. All Abkhazians may appeal to the powers of the shrines.
A statement made to me (personal communication 2011) that “anyone
can use the shrines as long as they respect apswara and the shrine keeper –
zhrets – and the people whose shrine it is”. In answer to my pressing him on
this point, he added: “Ossetians and Armenians respect our shrines and use
them”. This aspect of Abkhaz shrines places them in a context that differs
substantially from those that are most found in the literature on shared shrines
but does make them comparable to some others’ systems as described by
Maria Couroucli at rituals on Princes Island off Istanbul  (ed Bowman 2012:
49-52) and Anna Bigelow in post-Partition Punjab (Ibid.: 25-6). In Glenn
Bowman’s opinion these “bring together members of different confessional
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communities in an echo of an intensive earlier inter-communality which may
have largely disappeared from quotidian life but which will resonate in
practices of sharing holy space […] and bring together members of different
confessional communities…” (Ibid.: 6). There are indeed more than echoes of
such inter-communality in Abkhazia, as communality – without the prefix
“inter-“ as, in Abkhazia the shared shrines do not reflect any acknowledged
syncretism of ‘communalities’, as the different religious communalities exist
only outside the shared shrines. The Abkhaz shrines are, incidentally, in
themselves a refutation of the allegedly inevitable “Clash of Civilisations”
prognostications (Huntington 1993) and of the emphasis that Hassner places
on shrines being  places of conflict of different religions for control over them
(cited in Bowman 2012:1).
The literature on Abkhazia has concentrated on the characteristics,
locations and history and powers of what are described as the Seven Sacred
shrines (Krylov, A. 1999a, Bartsyts, R. 2010, Chirikba V. 2013), but  there are
literally hundreds of shrines, anykha – the property of lineages, individual
households and residents of a locality. Before describing some activity at the
shrines an important observation must be made on the often-met-with
interpretation of the Seven as pyramidal, encompassing a hierarchy. Because
the Dydrypsh shrine is often described as the principal one the others are
sometimes spoken of as subsidiary to it; something made problematic by
informants stating that all the shrines carry within them “parts of the supreme
creator” (who/which) is variously interpreted.  Thus, R. Bartsyts, while
writing of the Seven as “the principal shrines” also speaks of them as being
“in a related relationship among themselves; they visit each other from time
to time. What is more, they actively socialise even today [and] they visit each
other as guests”. He instances informants who have told him of “the holy
spirit” (a borrowing of terminology from Christianity) in the shape of “a
flaming ball with a luminous tail” travelling from one site to another on
visits. Two separate informants told me of seeing such phenomena  with
slight variations – in one of them the “tail” was replaced by what he called a
“laser beam”; in the other it was just a “huge ball” that whistled by. Bartsyts
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wrote that “as guests some of them appear as male divinities, others as
female, sometimes as brother and sister” (Op. cit.: 36). An informant
described to me his own experience of seeing anykha power as a light beam
that pointed out enemy positions during the war with Georgia (personal
communication 2012).  The evidence makes apparent that there are different
and sometimes confusing notions of the sacred places, of hierarchy and
kinship, and of gender, acting out human social behaviour and being
protectors. There is no obvious justification for treating Abkhaz beliefs here
as mirroring monotheistic religions nor as a belief system that accepts
hierarchy unequivocally. 
 The law On Freedom of Worship and Religious Associations that
came into operation only on April 2 2013 (Zakon 14.11.2012) has nothing to
say about shrines. The significance of this should become apparent in a
moment.
Such is the recognised power of shrines that I came across no
informants who said they would risk giving false witness at them as they
‘know’ that the penalty for that can be severe.   The shrines that share
locations with Christian churches do so only as locations. It is illegal for the
practitioners and clerics of religions to denigrate other belief systems and this
is emphasised according to the recently adopted law “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations”, which states: 
Nothing in the legislation…may be interpreted to mean belittling or curtailing 
human rights  and the right of a citizen to freedom of conscience and the 
freedom to practice religion (Chapter 1:3:3).
 
Indeed the Jehovah Witnesses have been banned for infringing that last point
as well as for refusing on religious grounds to join in the defence of Abkhazia
from the Georgian military incursion in 1992, and I shall be returning to the
significance of the clause for Abkhaz customary strivings to reach unanimity.
Chakvetadze, states that while the majority of people in Abkhazia are
“believers” they are not organised in churches. That includes the quarter of
the population who are Armenians and after being present as a community for
well over a century had no churches of their own until they built one in 2013.
230
All appeal to the powers of the shrines of the Abkhaz, of antswa and to other
powers, especially of the smithies which by their construction and use,
acquire powers.78 Chakvetadze also wrote that the period since the breakdown
of the USSR “may be called a period of reassessment, renewal of and rebirth
of those customs and the original pre-Christian religion the Abkhaz have
preserved. At a difficult time the traditions of the ancestors became one of the
principal means for the people’s national survival” (2008: 72-82). But to
leave it at that would be to site Abkhaz custom in the past, as something that
can be ‘moved’ in its old form into the present. 
Abkhaz beliefs encompass a multitude of “powers”, a host of
prophetic dreams, premonitions, animal signs; the presence of the dead and
their communication with the living. The ancestors must be assuaged by
commemoration: 15 April the festival of Nankhua is celebrated in Abkhaz
houses by smouldering coals lit under the dining table for the smoke to please
the ancestors, while the celebration of the Day of the Dormition of the
Theotokos on August 28 is marked, as I found when I attended one in 2011 as
a native Abkhaz autumn festival for warding off the evil eye. Abkhaz leave
food and drink out for the no longer present 'departed':.
To give some data from the field: In the village of Bedia, in south eastern Abkhazia 
the ruined 10th Century church was described by a young woman as “the place of 
our shrine.” 52 members, “not counting women who have married in” who trace 
their origin seven generations back to a founding ancestor attended. Candles are lit 
at the family assembly, for each member of the lineage who has married out. Men 
and women and children are present. News was exchanged about all members of 
the lineage; the whole sanctioned by a prayer and sacrifice of a pure white goat to 
the Supreme Being, Azhyra, whose protection and assistance is sought. My 
informant explained that some problems were sorted out at special men only 
convocations. The biggest current (mid-2012) problem was of how to stop road 
deaths, usually occasioned by outsiders, and how to placate close relatives of the 
injured. This is outside of the constraints of law.
Village members who are found to have committed an offence are punished by not 
being invited to ritual celebrations (such as funerals and marriages) and they are cut 
78 I use the word “powers” and “a being”, “protectors”, ”supreme being” in an attempt to
avoid deities, god, souls and spirits so as not to convey confusion with those terms as used in
Christian, Sufi and other cults/religions. However, it sometimes makes for difficult reading to
include too frequent a proliferation of Abkhaz or Russian terms (pace Bohannan 1956,
American Anthropologist 58: 557). Therefore, the words “spirits” and “deities” are
sometimes used and the reader will bear in mind that this is the closest English rendering of a
local term even though that might not  strictly be in total conformity with a native term and
its meaning.
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at events that are not closed to them. The offenders who are punished include local 
officials as, in the words of the informant “everyone here is related,” officials who 
delay completing forms for needed documents. The village is mostly composed of 
those named Jinjolia. To them are added another ‘name’ whose bearers “used to be 
o u r prisluzhnye – servants. The solidarity of bearers of the same name was 
illustrated by my informant’s comment: “It is difficult for a policeman to make 
himself fine a ‘fellow name’. A matter recently the subject of men’s gatherings of 
two lineages concerned the discovery that an intended bride’s grandmother had the 
same surname as the prospective groom, and they insisted on going ahead with the 
marriage, even though it violated the definition of incest. The result was, it was 
decided, “grinding their teeth”, to allow it to proceed without exiling the defaulters, 
“but the default will always be remembered.” The case of second cousins 
once marrying – a crime of incest – even 60 years later, today, the disapproving 
finger is pointed at their descendants. Any misfortunes that might befall them or 
any examples of bad behaviour are attributed to the punishment for the incest, 
meted out to them by the power of the shrine.
All Abkhaz, according to the Abkhaz anthropologist David Dasania (personal
communication 2008) have their protectors akin to those in Zoroastrianism
and the Christian guardian angels, and all lineages “have their parts of the
supreme being who is celebrated on a particular day in the year at the lineage
shrine” – his own lineage day is on May 12 each year. At the annual gathering
the family skhod “sorts out who is doing anything wrong and who needs
guidance or a dressing down” for instance for not receiving a guest in suitable
manner and thus bringing the lineage name into disrepute.
Those who describe themselves as Christian (often with a volunteered
explanation that that means their lineage is so considered) may have Moslem
names and vice versa.
7.1 Unanimity principle - shrines
There are many demonstrations of the Abkhaz “unanimity principle” that is
applied to seek common ground on any matter, something that is shared with
the other peoples of Abkhazia.
Glenn Bowman has shown, in two of his articles, on Israeli-occupied
territories in Palestine (2003), and comparing Macedonia and Palestine
(2009) that shared shrines can be places for joint use by Moslems and
Christians tolerating each another, but the practitioners of each bring with
them different practices that demonstrate, at times, different aims. 
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My findings in Abkhazia suggests that the shrines are not places for a
coming together of subscribers to different identifiable religions that can be
called sharing in the common sense, but are locations for the expression of a
commonly held set of beliefs that are outside of the boundaries of
institutional religions. Thus, the shrines are ideologically held in common by
peoples who otherwise and separately might be practitioners of different
religions and see no incompatibility in adhering both to those and
simultaneously to the Abkhaz belief system.
This raises a question over whether the shrines of the Abkhaz can be
called ‘religious’. This is to question the directional or lineal approach that
underlies much discussion of syncretism – it questions the Augustinian ex
pluribus Unum, at least in any religious sense. The shrines shared are Abkhaz
institutions and are not compounds, mixtures, hybrids or amalgams for
otherwise Moslems, Orthodox and Armenian Christians and atheists.  The
theologies and particularities of religious structures are not touched on at the
shrines.
Thus, the approach to shrines is different from, for instance, the one
planned for a debate in a panel at the V Congress of the Association of
Portuguese Anthropologists in 2013 under the banner of “Multiple
Syncretisms”. In that the organisers state 
We would like to revive the debate [on syncretisms] by inviting speakers to think 
through syncretism into syncretisms. By pluralizing a common understanding of 
syncretism - defined broadly as a combination, fusion or overlap of discrete systems
of thought and practice - we aim to explore the multiple ways by which 
relations/associations are forged between different aspects of cultural  experience 
(João Leal, Dr. Diana Espirito Santo 2013). 
The motto “Ex Pluribus Unum!” adopted by the Constitution of the United
States of America, might apply to the Abkhaz shrines in the context of the
construction of national unity in Abkhazia. Their “sharing” aspect is really the
sharing of a host’s house with his (sic) guests. It is a nationalistic adoption of
outsiders on Abkhaz terms. To stretch the analogous characteristics of the
concepts or hypothesis I am proposing, it is an assertion of Abkhazianness
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that has its parallels in longstanding Abkhaz practices of adoption into family,
lineage and ethnicity.
It was difficult to see the attempt by Geertz to define religion, starting
with the ‘nature’ of religious belief, (1973 [1966]) of relevance for Abkhazia.
Indeed, Talal Assad’s criticism of Geertz for attempting to universalise the
retreat into other worldliness by branches of Christianity does appear apposite
(Asad 1983). Their belief in the powers of shrines, the anykha, do not
constitute a ‘religion’, that is to say, something autonomous with its theology,
a stand-alone socially structured institution, and their beliefs are conceived of
and, thus, ‘exist’ in an anthropological sense, only as integral to and a
reflection of apswara practices that have been found to ‘work’ in maintaining
social order. Belief in the power of the shrines shares with religions only that
they are a framework of conceptions, a rhetorical moral trope. This includes it
covering disputes resolution and that is their determining feature, an essential
of its ‘reality’. 
The nationalising aspect of Abkhaz shrines that is played by the shrine
habitués in today’s nationalist nation-building, is a phenomenon that is
similarly (but not in the same way) sought to be exploited by others among
the peoples of the trans-Caucasus. In Azerbaijan the state would have itself
identified with the widespread veneration of shrines - pirs, which were
described for Azerbaijan by the religious scholar Nariman Gasimoglu as the
celebration of “secular religiousness” (Vladic Ravich 2011). A difference,
however, is that attendance to the pirs excluded the minority of  self-
designated orthodox Moslems, and was not thus universal.
There is a field for research into shrines as shared gift exchanges
between the Abkhaz and others living on the territory claimed by the Abkhaz
“hosts” and the others, the “guests”. I was prompted to this thought by Bruce
Grant’s dissection of “the gift” factor in relations between the Russian Empire
and then the Soviet system with peoples in the Caucasus (2009). Grant has
intimated tangentially that shrines can play a nationalising role for the state
when writing about shrines as “melded with national ties” (2011: 657). In
Abkhazia the reciprocity committed to by non-Abkhaz through being given
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access to the shrines, commits them to the Abkhaz unifying nationalist
programme. It differs somewhat from Grant’s discussion of reciprocity which
shows the pirs in Azerbaijan as connected to Islam.79  The Abkhaz belief
system of apswara, coexists with respect for Christianity and Islam and any
other religion, as long as the practitioners of these do not place themselves
above others. Lacking a theology, Abkhaz beliefs are not a religion, whether
characterised as paganism (Chirikba forthcoming), animism, a syncretic
belief phenomenon or a local form of Christian or Islamic ideas. 
Sociologically-derived questionnaires that would show x per cent of
Abkhazians are Christians, Moslems, Pagans, adherents of other recognisable
religions, or atheists are characterisations and classifications from irrelevant
templates introduced from outside80. Thus that Russian scholar wrote of those
who put down a tick by “Christian” or “Moslem” in a survey: 
[T]he number of parishioners attending services is quite insignificant, even on 
important feast days. Judging by our conversations with members of the clergy and 
many of the newly-baptised, most of the latter attend church extremely rarely or not 
at all, do not participate in the Eucharist or observe fasts, are not interested even in 
basic doctrine, do not read the Bible and are Christians only nominally.   
The situation is the same as regards Islam: to this day there is not one mosque in 
Abkhazia. The majority of nominal Muslims do not have any knowledge 
whatsoever of the Quran and do not show any interest in studying it. The ritual of 
circumcision not only does not take place but is considered completely unnecessary, 
unnatural and even shameful. There are no dietary restrictions and those who 
identify themselves as Muslims eat pork and other foods forbidden to 'true orthodox'
believers along with other Abkhazians (1998b Keeston News Service).  
The Abkhaz and inhabitants belonging to other ethnic groups in Abkhazia do
not see conflicts between the traditional Abkhaz beliefs and the above
enumerated religions but share them.81 
79 His approach might be extended to a comparative examination of Buddhist beliefs in
‘spirits’, ‘gods’ and ‘ghosts’ (according to their naming and the baggage these names carry in
English), in the nats of Burma (Nash 1966), the phi of Thailand (Tambiah 1970) and Laos,
the deviyo ‘gods’ and yaka ‘spirits’ in Sri Lanka, which enter the system for people to gain
merits for a better re-birth to improve their lot through reincarnation  (Southwold 1978: 364).
Studies of the relationship of ‘spirit worship’ to the Buddha have placed the question of
whether Buddhism is a ‘religion’ in syllabuses for undergraduate studies in the anthropology
of religion.
80 Krylov cites Abkhaz the responses to a survey on their beliefs as Christian 60%, Moslem
16%, Pagan 8%, Atheists 8%.
81 I think that one should not define ‘religion’ too narrowly, confining it to ritual and
theology, as the practice of particular religions often accommodates tolerance/absorption of
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Divisions along religious lines that have historically been observed in
other societies have not affected the Abkhaz below the level of rulers who at
times aligned themselves with ruling empires.82 It is within that context that
the shared shrines of the Abkhaz must be seen. To interpret the situation
otherwise would be to fit Abkhazia’s cult of shrines into concepts of a social
framework that is imported from other societies, an artificial injection of
religious divides from the ‘West’, for instance. It should be noted that Abkhaz
scholars have also committed this sin, as witness the writings of the eminent
ethnographers and historians Shalva Inal-Ipa (1976) and Kuprava (2008).
This is also evident in a hypothesis that the cult of the anykha shrines and of
the Supreme Creator, Answa, is an Abkhaz monotheist religion (parallel with
Christianity) that contains much that is Christian and has miraculously (?)
survived since the appearance of early Christians on the northeast shores of
the Black Sea in the 1st Century AD. Another hypothesis holds that the
Abkhaz had “proto-monotheism” or “primitive monotheism” predating
Christianity and was only later adulterated by the “polytheism” of apswara.
Writers who have supported that idea include (Krylov 1999b). As pointed out
by one Abkhaz scholar, that idea was championed by the Roman Catholic
theologian V.Schmidt (sic), cited in Bartsyts R. 2010: 40, quoting S.A.
Tokarev’s Rannnie formy religii i ikh razvitie (Moscow: Politizdat: 1990:
322). His was an attempt to use biblical “evidence” as a source for arguing
that monotheism predates polytheism and is found in writing of a Roman
Catholic theologian, Schmidt, F (1987).
The new law defines the Abkhaz belief system, in a list of its “basic
understandings” as
practices that are primarily those of other belief systems, frequently in the interests of state-
building, as Florian Muehlfried notes for Georgia: “Orthodox priests held church services in
Tusheti during the period of the (supposedly pagan) summer religious festivals, reminding
the locals of their ‘true’ religious heritage. According to leading Church representatives,
being a Georgian citizen means being Eastern Orthodox. This equation is reflected in the
Georgian Constitution, which stresses the unique position of the Georgian Orthodox Church
for nation-building…” (2011: 355). In this case it is the Church which seeks a gift exchange
of citizenship for recognition of the Church. In Abkhazia there is controversy over the state
legislators’ refusal expressly to give primacy in law to the apsuara belief system, as they
maintain, at least officially, the separation of state and religion.
82 In all cases the driving force for religionising  (please excuse this awful  neologism) has
come from raison d’état, even if advanced by different  religious missionaries.
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The monotheistic belief system of the Abkhaz – a system of religious o u t l o o k s , 
canons and rituals which have been formed in the process of lengthy historical 
development of the people of Abkhazia (Zakon, 14.11. 2012: Chapter 1, 
clause 2).
That clause was adopted only after lengthy and acrimonious debate, in which
the council of shrine keepers sought for primacy for apswara to be expressed
in law, a ‘religion’ placed above others and, therefore, state-endorsed. The
elders’ spokesman, Zaur Chichba, publicly denounced the adopted
formulation and issued a “warning” to the members of parliament and the
state authorities of the “destructive pоwer of Abyzh’nykha […] to bring
universal discord and public disturbances”83 (Moskovskiya Vedomosti. 2012).
While to have enshrined the belief system in law might have appeared to
elevate apswara, in my view it would have denied it the current recognition
in the national status it possesses and so evidently demonstrated in the
practices around the shrines. I stress that I am talking about the shrines of all
kinds. To make the shared Abkhaz beliefs the state ‘religion’, would have
been placed it in the same category as religions and opened it up to
formalising and codification under state jurisdiction and regulation and taken
away its customary responsiveness to the direct democracy of universal
unmediated participation. The dispute resolution of the non-state customary
practices would go the way they have done in other countries that adopted
indirect rule by the state.
Within Abkhaz conceptions there co-exists the accommodation of
contradictions that, with changes in social circumstances are selectively
stressed to meet contingencies. Alongside the essentialist reification of
cultural practices, of primordial “thingism,” there is the general conviction,
and one that is  voiced by the country’s intellectuals, that their belief system
is at one and the same time both a unique attribute of the Abkhaz people and
is also available as an example that would fit the needs of all people. It was
expressed by a prominent politician who thought of apswara as a blend of
83 In parenthesis I speculate that the “discord” manifest in the forcing of President Ankvab
and his government and leading state officials to resign in early June 2014 could be
interpreted as a manifestation of those powers of the Supreme Being. 
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Christianity and Islam [!]: “How useful for humanity would be the wealth of
experience of […] values that are intrinsic to Abkhaz culture!” (Butba, 2012).
According to that conception, apswara is not only superior to religions but
can embrace them all, by expanding to others non-conflictual universalism,
something that I suggest merits further research.84
 For the moment I register two points that flow from this and that are
demonstrated in the practice of shrine sharing: apswara transcends ethnicity
while affirming that it is Abkhaz – a symbiosis. Thus, one can be Armenian,
Ossetian, Greek, etc. in Abkhazia and keep to one’s own ethnic traits and
religion yet recognise the shrines. Herein could lie a marriage between the
late 19th century-born nationalism and a 21st century pursuit of non-exclusive
ethnic territoriality. 
The underlying rationale for this is an attempt to justify what are
relatively recent features of Abkhaz society that are made in the nationalist
drive - to justify today’s claims to statehood by presenting a picture of a
historical continuity for today’s Abkhaz statehood project. 
A common consciousness of unitary beliefs among the Abkhaz is
exemplified by the reasoning of Lyutik Khagb, a Moslem from the town of
Achandara: “Allah is God for all people, but for us the main god is Dydrypsh
who inhabits Dydrypsh-nykha mountain nearby” (Krylov 1998a Op cit). The
Supreme Creator of Abkhaz beliefs, and ‘his/her/its’ divinities85, inhabit all
things, material and immaterial, and all places, and all ideas and practices and
all phenomena. The actual ancient names of many of these have been
forgotten by people in modern Abkhazia but they ‘know’ that the entities 'are
there' and must all be treated with respect.
The shrines have been fitted into today’s Abkhaz national state-
building project, as intrinsic to the “Abkhazianness” of the state. This is a
national cloak in the way that “Britishness” is sought by politicians in the
multicultural United Kingdom today despite it still retaining its ambiguity of
84 In op.cit. Chakvetadze see references to parliamentary practice, the rule that in the national
interest there must be no confrontations among religions, that that is prohibited.
85 I prefer this word to ‘spirits’ because the latter is usually associated with Christian ideas of
souls or with ancestor-worship cults, and I am trying to get away from the baggage of
Eurocentric concepts when discussing the Abkhaz.
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also meaning English more than, say Scottish or Welsh. It is ‘national’ in the
way that Roman Catholicism has recently come to be identified with Irish
nationalism. The shrines draw on the support of locally resident ethic
Russians, Ossetians, Armenians, Greeks and others. Among these there are
virtually no conflicts along religious lines. Indeed, when the slightest sign of
religious animosity has raised its head it has been condemned and the state
taken action against it, as seen, for instance, in the case of the ban on Jehovah
Witnesses for denigrating members of other religions. An utterance made by
Dbar, a Monastic priest of the Eastern Orthodox Church, was widely
condemned for suggesting that Christianity might be better than Islam, and he
was made to apologise for the ‘misunderstanding’ (Chaketadze 2009).
The detail given on the shrines the Abkhaz share with all others ties in
with what I have called the “unanimity principal” of Abkhaz custom and I
now present its breadth in state-building founded on custom.
7.2 More on unanimity…
There are splits in the Eastern Orthodox Church in Abkhazia – between those
who would like to see Abkhazia coming directly under the Moscow
Patriarchate and others who want autocephaly. Each controls a number of
Orthodox sites of worship. The Moscow Patriarchate and the Patriarch of
Constantinople recognise only the Georgian Church as the church for
Abkhazia. There have been discussions to mend the schism and this has
involved the Moscow Patriarchate and the Abkhazian head of state. For its
support of the Georgian state in its war on Abkhazia and continued refusal to
recognise Abkhazia's independence priests of the Georgian Church are not
allowed in Abkhazia. The dispute is, thus, one around statehood and not about
theology or ritual.
The assemblies that convene people in Abkhazia  to discuss what is to
be done about the schism are open to all and attended by Christians,
Moslems, people who are not christened and those who profess no belief
outside of apswara without discrimination, a practice similar to what we have
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seen for the shrines and at village skhod assemblies. To reject apswara is
unpatriotic. The churches, other than the Georgian, identify themselves with
nation-building and tie in with apswara; witness the wording of the call of the
Orthodox Abkhazian call for orderly conduct on the eve of presidential
elections: “to exclude violation of morality canons and the God granted code
of apswara in election speeches and activity” (Appeal 2009:1). The rejection
of religious barriers has been illustrated in the attendance at shrines for
political purposes by government officials. These have included people from
“Moslem” families (such as President Ardzimba) and Christians (such as
President Bagapsh). Then there is the acceptance of Russian Orthodox
Church awards by atheists, including President Ankvab. The broad attendance
reflects what I have called the “unanimity principle” within Abkhaz culture. 
On the very rare occasions when theology crops up in casual
conversation, it is seen as irrelevant to the unity represented by apswara and
the Abkhaz belief system, and to marriage between professed Christians and
Moslems.
The institution of elders plays its part in extra-judicial settlement of
disputes and is important for the nation-building programme. It, thus, speaks
in the name of all in Abkhazia and has called for apswara to be the basis of
education in all schools; and no opposition to that has been expressed to me
by non-Abkhaz.  
Calls are repeatedly made for political parties to agree on national
coalitions and the council of elders has demanded that there be no sharp
contests for the presidency. Zaur Zarandia, an elder who has won the most
distinguished award of Hero of Abkhazia, noted, in the run-up to the
presidential elections of 2012 that the candidates A. Ankvab, S. Shamba and
R. Khadzhimba were individuals who are well known in the country and said
that they should “without splitting and setting their supporters against one
another, come to agreement and unite. They all are our brothers and we ask
them not to divide the people’’ (Apsny Press 11.6.2012). In that election the
collapse of Shamba’s campaign is generally put down to him being
“divisive”. In one of the villages where I was carrying out fieldwork at the
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time the community had been divided, but with an expected majority for Mr
Shamba. In the event there was a last-minute shift away from him because his
campaign was judged to be “brash” (personal informants) and he had made
attacks on another candidate who, in the event, won the election. 
In the complexity of social change new ways are sought for popular
expressions to be reflected in state structures. An example of debate on this is
of interest. At public meetings there has been the voicing of dissatisfaction
with aspects of government policy, which were then carried into
Parliamentary debate in March 2013. There a prominent MP argued that the
“political process” cannot be confined to Parliament or to experts
(Khadzhimba 2012b). In an atmosphere of a debate about structures to
provide for popular expression there were calls for “a compromise
commission” in which Parliament would be only one constituent, and also for
a Chamber that would check on  how things were going  in  the “political
process”. The Speaker of Parliament urged “the state” to involve “society”
(an interesting formulation of a dichotomy) in its decision-making process in
addition to listening to the expressions of mass meetings – a mixture resonant
o f skhods, assemblies (ApsnyPress 20.3.2013). The issues at the meetings
drew attention to the contradictions between state-delegated democracy
(indirect democracy) and the direct democracy of customary institutions in an
attempt to marry the two in modern conditions. 
When, in May 2014, widespread dissatisfaction with lack of economic
and social progress erupted into protest meetings which called for the
resignation of the president and selection of a new government, the president
demanded that such a decision should only be taken by a vsenarodnoye
sobranie – an all-Abkhazian mass assembly, as rallies carried out by parties
are often frowned upon as being “divisive”. One informant told me:
“Abkhazians do not really like demonstrations in the streets” (personal
communication 2012).
Raul Khadzhimba, an MP (and now president) who has earlier called
for a “strong state” (Regnum News 20.12.2012) convened a skhod and stated:
“From the earliest times an attribute of our people has been the taking of
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decisions collectively, the creation of conditions for society fully to
participate in these processes. Parliament is the only structure which can
permit us to implement this today” (20.3.2013). While, on the one hand,
seeking to give pride of place to parliament, he went on in the same speech to
argue for a more modest role for it in an attempt to accommodate the duality
enshrined in the Constitution, where it speaks of the people ruling “directly or
through their representatives” (2001:7). This might sound like a case of
wanting one’s cake and eating it. However, he was not the only person who
wanted parliament to become an institution for compromise, appeasement,
agreement, for “co-ordination of all parties for unanimity,” as expressed by
another active politician, Daur Tarba (Kuraskua, Y. 2013), who stressed the
importance of the constitutional right of a citizen to initiate referendum
procedure (Ibid.). He also identified the executive arm of the state as the
perceived weak point in the democracy of Abkhazia. Thus we see Abkhaz
arguing for decision by popular gathering, assemblies, skhods, while, at the
same time wanting decision by a reformed parliament with a curtailed
executive arm.
The on-going conflict between custom practices and the current
structure of the state centres on differences over the concepts of direct and
indirect democracy. Khadzhimba summed up his own feeling when he said at
the conference of the FNEA party that what was happening in the political
process was “leading [him] to the thought that the country is gradually losing
the system of spiritual values that make up the foundation of [our] national
ideology” (Respublica Abkhazii 26.12.12).
The dialectics of seeking to resolve the presence of the state and the
negation of it in custom draws to mind Marx’s view on how he saw this could
be resolved, not just through disputation in the realm of ideas, à la Hegel but,
as he put it, by changing the conditions that underlay ideas:
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct 
opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of 
thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an 
independent subject, is the  demiurgos  of the real world, and the real world is only 
the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is 
nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated 
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into forms of thought. (Capital, Afterword, Second German Ed., Moscow, 1970, 
vol. 1, p. 29). 
The problem to be resolved is interestingly buried within concepts that are
seen in the Council of Elders’ appeal to apswara ideas on the eve of
presidential elections (n. 104), and which would draw people into the running
of the state:
It would be helpful for the presidential candidates to form a single electoral block 
in order to draw on the skilled personnel of all the electoral blocks, to overcome 
differences that are found in the electorate. Should the presidential candidates 
consider it impossible to accept that proposal the Council of Elders proposes that the
newly elected president should draw into the running of the state the skilled 
personnel of all electoral blocks. That, in the opinion of the elders would assist in 
overcoming the disagreements that exist in society, and also would provide for the 
broad popular participation in the management of the state [my emphasis, 
M.C.] …
Experience demonstrates that in a multi-party situation not the whole people have 
their representatives in the organs of state management. This violates the 
Constitutional right of some of the people … (Appeal of the Elders 2011). 
Another comment from Marx is relevant to the elders’ appeal: 
The materialist doctrine [i.e. of Feuerbach] that men are the products of conditions 
and education, different men therefore the products of other conditions and other 
education, forgets that circumstances may be altered by men and the educator has 
himself to be educated (Marx and Engels, 1973 [1888]: 93).
 While the elders did not directly draw on that the implication of their
expressed requirement that all Abkhazians enact their decision-making
directly in governing, to “provide for the broad popular participation in the
management of the state” might imply that link with the ideas derived from
different people’s experience.
In their statement the elders came out against a multi-party system and
blocks, and their omission of the word “opposition” is not accidental. It
reflects a general sense of discomfort among my informants with the idea that
differences should be built into organisational structures, as proposed by
some politicians, as that goes against reaching decisions by mass participation
in free decision-making. This was confirmed in a discussion I had with
several members of the Council of Elders (May 2012). The statement also
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reflected uncertainties about how best to proceed, given that parties do exist
and some label themselves as “opposition.”
Informants were clear that they vote on how they judge the probity of
candidates and not on programmes they might offer. In his time Ankvab won
the presidency precisely on that – his promise of uprightness and honesty and
without an economic plan. 
Those are the outward appearances and represent the most-often
encountered comments. It is, however, not the whole picture. There is talk of
electoral fraud (Anz informant 2012) and I overheard procedures for this
being discussed over his mobile telephone by the driver who gave me a lift
when I was hitch-hiking in 2012. An informant, also in 2012 explained
kuchkovanie to me - that meant what we call “the payroll vote” among
ministerial appointees in Britain - voting to keep their jobs for the party of
those who appointed them. In Abkhazia, it was claimed by my informant, it
accounted for an estimated 20 per cent of the total vote and included the
relatives of appointees. There is another repeatedly heard belief, that villages
or other communities that do not vote for the winning candidate might find
themselves at the end of the queue for receiving state allocations for roads,
and other infrastructure. I was not able to verify any of the allegations about
kuchkovanie and the other allegations; nor did I seek to do so as I was not
carrying out sociological surveys but was listening to what the Abkhaz had to
say, and judging ‘moods’.
In many discussions I heard only one view: that confidence in
“democracy” (a pejorative term to mean a system where a few people get
very rich and there is widespread corruption) had collapsed. An old Armenian
woman whose son is a hero of the war of independence complained to an MP
in my presence (2011) that she could get no money for hospital treatment for
her sick grandchild. People in the streets exchange information and discuss
how to find and then pay for their children’s school books and the payments
they have to make to teachers. A woman serving at a street café who had just
lost her childminder said she was giving up her job because the owner of the
café would not pay her enough to cover one and she could not work and take
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her children to school and collect them. In the villages I heard that “Nothing
is done to help peasants and ordinary people.” A failed presidential candidate
was strongly criticised for organising and paying for public entertainment
shows: “when people are still in mourning for the death of the previous
president” (n 94, 26.8.11). The problems are myriad and many are associated
in people’s telling with how it now was “not like in Soviet times”.
The degree of a feeling of uncertainty about current events and what
the future might hold, as well as reflecting the unpopularity of individuals
who might divide the country was the lack of open campaigning for
candidates in the press. In addition, I encountered ignorance, especially in the
press, among those supposedly “in the know”, of the real mood in the country
that became expressed in voting. For instance, right up to when the votes
were counted, none came anywhere near correctly estimating the results of
the presidential elections (in 2009 and 2011) and the second was won by the
candidate who spent the least money on his campaign. It is in these
circumstances that the Council of Elders has adopted a more public face and
openly intervenes in politics to campaign for apswara.
7.2.1 Contradictions
Religions in Abkhazia require registration by a state committee of experts to
be judged suitable to practice and have access to property.
The state has courts, police and a prison but what they do and who
goes to court and what sentence is given to offenders is governed by
customary practices. There is a duality in rule or order that has not been
resolved by either law or custom and people are thrown back onto their own
resources to tackle problems. Some, but not all, informants said that apswara
should be able to deal with all problems.
There is dissatisfaction and anger among sections of the population at
the fall in living standards and social provision over the decades since the
dissolution of the USSR and the war of independence. In a conflicting fashion
some ties of custom are becoming strained while there is a counter-tendency
for people to strengthen them as the means for maintaining some order. But
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the state is privatising property in its promotion of capitalism, and that closes
some avenues to customary regulation of new features and values. People are
demanding more fairness, and older people express regret at the passing of
the Soviet period; one that is generally associated with a sense of community
and greater ‘fairness’ as well as confidence in the future. A new generation
has grown up that did not experience the repressions of that time and, because
of poverty and the international isolation of Abkhazia by the countries of the
EC, the USA and states that follow them, Abkhazians have little freedom to
travel abroad.
It is against the general background that has been presented of
strongly held views on togetherness and unity, and the experience of much of
the opposite that I now discuss legacies, and perceptions of what the future
might hold – the alternatives.
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Chapter 8 What now – where to start?  
Here I examine the content of nostalgia in Abkhaz perceptions in the
comparative light of the phenomenon as found in post-Soviet scholarship.
The thread running through Abkhaz conceptions allowed an identification of
concern about the present and hint at hopes for the future; rather than to
express nostalgia as principally temporal retrospection. This has relevance to
agency and whether the Abkhaz are to continue with the evident current
uncertainties, the dynamic balancing of apswara, custom with the laws of the
state, or to incorporate one into the other. It is about how the Abkhaz might
realise aspirations to modernise that are generally expressed as how to
become a ‘civilised’ (i.e. orderly) society.
8.1 “Failure of Soviet  Union” and “Nostalgia  ”
When US President Richard Nixon asked China’s Premier Chou En-Lai over two 
centuries after the French Revolution of 1789 what he thought had been its impact 
on western civilization, Chou considered the question for a few moments and 
replied: "The French revolution’s impact on western civilisation? - too early to tell."
BBC news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/02/china_party 
Viewed  20.4.201486
The former republics of the USSR experienced economic decline, rising levels of 
inequality and poverty. Russia lost the USSR’s status as a major world power and 
its peoples suffered an identity crisis. A process of decay and industrial de-
development accompanied by disenchantment with free market mechanisms 
occurred […] degeneration of their societies into chaos. 
86 Chou en Lai’s comment to Nixon is often, in Orientalist fashion, considered to express
some sort of peculiarly Chinese way of looking at time. A similar view of African societies
and time used to be taken more widely, as exemplified by the words of John Mbiti, a
western-trained Kenyan scholar: “African ideas of time concern mainly the present and the
past” (1975: 34). Neither Nixon nor Chou en Lai were led to think that the events that have
followed the French Revolution (including counter-revolutions) should qualify that
Revolution as “a failure”. Few would put a similar construction on the English Revolution of
the 17th Century more than 350 years after it and the Restoration that followed. The same
applies to the impossibility of qualifying the American Civil War as “a failure” because the
1865-1877 period of Reconstruction brought back legalised racial “segregation” for another
century. If one takes a step further in this reasoning, then to speak of the “failure” of the
Soviet Union because of the problems that have arisen from its demise after its seventy years
of rule in Abkhazia, would seem more to be the expression of a short-term political
judgement rather than anthropology.
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New Regionalism?: 3-4.
Informants among the Abkhaz never used the word nostalgia unless I brought
it up but usually spoke of what they said was “better” in the past, often in the
context of what they hoped for in the future. Data from the field contributes
to discussion of an ongoing clash of theoretical approaches among scholars
around the future and nostalgia, the past being “a spectre [which] still haunts”
as put in the title of an article by Kristen Ghosee (2012) which I shall be
returning to. Hirokazu Miyazaki saw a political contextualising trend that he
identified as noticeable today when he wrote of 
… social theorists’ share[ing] [a] sense of the loss of hope in progressive politics 
and thought. Underlying their concern with a loss of hope is a general sense (in the 
academy and beyond) that the world, and more specifically, the character of 
capitalism, has radically changed and that social theory has lost its relevance and 
critical edge (2006: 147).
8.2 “Nostalgia” - phantom of the past or the present
. 
“When comrade Stalin was on the run from the Tsarist police after he had taken part 
with a group of Bolsheviks in collecting money for the Party [raided] from a ship 
off the coast he sought refuge in Abkhazia. You will probably have heard of our 
strong tradition of hospitality, and this was, of course, extended to Stalin, to such a 
renowned fighter for peoples’ freedom and liberty.”  
Tourist guide in Abkhazia (2009).
The tourist guide, a woman in her forties and born well after Stalin’s death
and was around twenty years old when the  Soviet Union was wound up, was
going through her patter to a busload of tourists, for the most part young
Russians. We were passing one of Stalin’s dachas in Abkhazia. She said that
Stalin “loved Abkhazia”, was a frequent visitor and had been a good friend of
Abkhazia’s first and still very popular Communist leader, Nestor Lakoba
“although he later had him killed.” When I asked her at a stop at a café how
one was to understand Stalin’s friendship alongside her assertion that he had
his friend killed she explained: “Stalin did not allow his friendship to
interfere with what he thought needed to be done.” It was a sign of Stalin’s
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correct conduct. As we chatted about the past and present she expressed a
longing (my word) for the Soviet period as one of “order” and “confidence in
the future”, something that was missing today.
8.2.1 Nostalgia abstracted.
 The notion of post-Soviet and post-socialist “nostalgia” is seen by scholars in
a variety of ways, to describe the recognised longing for much of the past of
the Soviet Union. Svetlana Boym has written that nostalgia has moved from
once being considered   a “hypochondria of the heart, a treatable sickness,
[that became] an incurable disease” (2001: 7). She also saw in it “a longing
for a home that no longer exists. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and
displacement, but it is also a romance with one’s own fantasy”, “the disease
of an afflicted imagination” (Ibid: xiii). Sean Scanlon’s introduction to a
collection of essays that trace the histories and applications of the term rejects
the idea that nostalgia is “the sorry cousin of various ways of retrieving
memories” and suggests that it may be an  important form of criticism of the
present (2004: 1). This theme is expanded by Marcos Natali in the same
volume, who argues that nostalgia does not require “the imperialism of
history’s categories”, in which determining the ‘accuracy’ of past events is a
requirement for the validity of nostalgia as a critique of the present (2004: 3-
4).
Another approach was taken by Sergei Oushakine, who found post-
Soviet nostalgia in aphasia, in “linguistic behaviour”, an approach derived
from the phenomenology of Roman Jakobson in the 1940s. For Oushakine
the aphasia represents “regression to symbolic forms of the previous
historical period that has been caused by the society’s disintegrated ability to
find proper verbal signifiers of the new socio-political regime” (2000: 994).
He imagined that 
the “regressive logic of aphasia… has become closely associated with a ‘longing for
the past’ […] that frames the post-Soviet symbolic landscape in the late 1990s. 
Inability to articulate a new language adequate to a new period, coupled with the 
loss of the ‘enframing’ meta-language, has been compensated by stylistic regression 
to the language of the preceding period” (Ibid.: 1005). 
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This somewhat structuralist take did not correspond with views expressed by
informants in Abkhazia who certainly did not see problems as those of
“symbolic styles” (Ibid.: 1005) or, “the absence of what, following Pierre
Bourdieu, can be defined as the field of post-Soviet cultural production”
(Ibid.: 1005). For my research, I did not find helpful the let-out in
Oushakine’s approach, which is the two-fold one of attributing factors to
people’s unconscious self and avoiding discussion of what is going on, on the
ground; that it, of what are identified as the problems-to-be-solved by the
Abkhaz.
There has been the presentation of nostalgia as something of a
sentimental or distorted vision of the Soviet past. Examples of this abound
well outside of academic scholarship and have captured a broad audience. It
does have its counter-images; thus one might contrast two films made in 2003
Wolfgang Becker’s “Goodbye, Lenin!” -  Germany, for looking both ways in
its treatment of people’s real concerns, with Hiner Saleem’s “Lemon-Vodka”
- Armenia, which does not. In the latter, there is a conversation at a bus stop
out in the hills, in which one character says:” It was better under the
Russians”. The other replies: “But we had no freedom,” to which the first
says: “Yes, but we had everything else”. When I recounted that episode to a
group of five Abkhaz in 2012 their reaction was loudly approving the “but we
had everything else” line.  To judge that reaction as reflecting a distorted
memory smacks of an outsider’s imposition or “I know better” attitude, and
to deny the Abkhaz (or Armenians) a balanced judgement.
The problems of looking backwards in time and at the present, to
define perceptions of nostalgia, are well illustrated in Daphne Berdahl’s essay
on the topic (Ostalgie) in East Germany, the former GDR: as seen in “the
different readings and receptions” (2012: 181) of “Goodbye, Lenin!”, a film
that revolves around a young man and his wife hiding the demise of the GDR
from his mother. The film has become popular throughout Germany and
beyond and Berdahl brings forward the differing moments that western and
eastern audiences outside of Germany latch onto. She draws attention to the
coexistence of the man’s sense of loss and his comment on the staged GDR
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that they create around his mother as “the GDR I created for my mother was
increasingly becoming the GDR that I might have wished for myself.” (Ibid.:
180). For him, as I found in Abkhazia, the nostalgia contains criticism of the
present, and hopes for the future.
Maria Todorova opens an introduction to a collection of essays on the
nostalgia that extends “from Central Europe to Central Asia” to state that
authors need “to put thoughts to memories”: 
 Although the end of the Cold War was greeted with great enthusiasm by people in 
the East and the West, […] the ensuing social and especially economic changes led 
to widespread disillusionment that can be observed today all across Eastern 
Europe. Not simply a longing for security, stability, and prosperity, this nostalgia 
is also a sense of loss regarding a specific form of sociability. ..  [The authors] 
argue persuasively that this nostalgia should not be seen as a wish to restore the 
past, as it has otherwise been understood, but instead it should be recognized as part 
of a more complex healing process and an attempt to come to terms both 
with the communist era as well as the new inequalities of the post-communist era 
(2012: 1). 
The authors primarily regard nostalgia as reflecting perceptions of the past.
This commonality in many approaches to post-Soviet “nostalgia” derives
from a construction/invention, or “reinvention” in the present, according to
Svetlana Boyd (2001: 73). In her comprehensive monograph on the subject
she identifies the possible future that is perceived in it: 
Creative nostalgia reveals the fantasies of the age and it is in those fantasies and 
potentialities that the future is born. One is nostalgic for the past, the way it was, but
for the past the way it could have been. It is this past perfect that one strives to 
realise in the future (Ibid.: 351)
Treating the phenomenon by more attention to the present and to what the
‘victims’ of nostalgia desire for the future offers a way out of only looking at
the past, something that Ernst Bloch has argued (1986: 1054-59). Zsuzsa
Gille captured something of that when she wrote: 
[T]he post-Socialist and the ‘European’ present needs [sic] no less questioning than 
did the Socialist past” (2012: 280). She concludes: “Perhaps we can now start 
looking for more signs of future-orientedness in the post-Communist region and 
thereby stop ceding that terrain to the West” (2012: 288). 
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In Abkhazia when I raised the word 'nostalgia', it was taken to mean mock
sentimentality, as their reminiscing about the past is almost invariably
tomention very specific practices or events of Soviet times to identify which
elements they would resuscitate for today and into the future.87 
Abkhaz are selective in their choice of what Soviet practices should
be introduced and high up the list are the restoration of a sense of purpose and
communality and “fairness”. In the words of middle aged informant: “What
we had then fitted us better, even though terrible things were done” (2011).
While Katherine Verdery does make an important point when writing that the
pulling down of statues and other symbols of the socialist period were
“foundational acts of new states” (199:21) this does not explain the evidence
that some restoration of these is also now taking place, that in Belorussia they
remain and that the Abkhaz honour and build statues to Nestor Lakoba, the
founder of the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic.
87 I have come across an exception to the general absence of the term, in Sukhum market, on
a packet of the cheapest “Prima” brand cigarettes made in Russia, (“fifth quality”). It is
labelled “Nostalgia” and displays a picture of Stalin and that of the Red flag being raised
over the Reichstag in May 1945. It also has a facsimile of Stalin’s famous Order No. 227 of
July 28, 1942 to the Red Army demanding “Not one step back!” on pain of death. At the time
the order featured on a Soviet postage stamp which was shown to me with pride by an
Abkhaz stamp collector: 
 
Still today, that Order is looked on as brutal but commendable. There is nothing
imagined or faulty about the memory of that event to fit into “aphasia” or “hypochondria of
the heart”. When I asked whether that was ‘nostalgia’ the collector angrily said “No”, making
clear he did not think he was being sentimental (sentimentalnichat’, in Russian).
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8.2.2 A political agenda or ideology. 
Karolina Slovenko, a Polish university student (2006) provides an interesting
discussion of nostalgia which grapples with what she finds are apparently
contradictory manifestations. While listing the many criticisms that Poles
express about the present, she does so unquestioningly within the current
dominant official neoliberal version of the past that is also part of her
thinking. Her characterisation of that assumes, without discussion, that the
reader subscribes to the assumptions that 
Poland has travelled from dictatorship to democracy, from monopoly to pluralism, 
from the status of a satellite country to a sovereign country […] from an economy of
scarcity and a planned economy to a market economy and economic growth, from 
censorship to freedom, from closed to open borders [in which] the market economy 
is a challenge to be responsible for one’s own fate (2006. Ibid.Blog). 
Yet she notes that “the proportion of people who report that they favour the
socialist system has grown”, and that many Poles long for the security of the
past. While mentioning that studies have identified what she terms “collective
amnesia”, people longing for the period of their youth (see also Veronika
Pehe’s study of the Czech Republic 2014), “a subjectivism [that] garbles
memory of communism past,” she does suggest that “Post-communist
nostalgia might have also substantive reasons.” (2006: 1-2).
An argument by Renato Rosaldo about how scholars might be
influenced in how they understand things might be instructive here. Writing
on the portrayal of “imperialism” (meaning colonial rule), she warns: “the
observer is neither innocent nor omniscient…Under imperialism metropolitan
observers are no more likely to avoid a certain complicity with domination”
(1989: 107). Although writing in the twilight of the Soviet Union, Rosaldo’s
words might apply to some writers on the peoples in those countries; writers
whose thinking accepts the “western” Cold War images of their past. Rosaldo
set out to “dismantle” the “imperialist” ideology. 
In his interviews with east Europeans a decade after the end of the
Cold War Kristen Ghodsee found that longing for the past was founded on the
belief that they had been fooled into giving up socialism. According to one
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indigenous previous fighter against socialism in Bulgaria, “a darling of liberal
reformers who came from the West,” found that “What we have now is worse
than we had before … the whole thing was rotten from the start; 1989 was not
about bringing liberty to the people of Eastern Europe; it was about
expanding markets for Western companies” (2012: 5). Given the
disappointment across the European socialist countries it comes as no
surprise that the Swedish political scientists Joakim Ekman and Jonas Linde,
found “a majority of postcommunist citizens evaluating the command
economic system in positive terms” (Ibid.: 6). That fits with definitions of
post-socialist nostalgia as voicing a condemnation of the present. However, I
cannot accept that unconditionally, as informants among the Abkhaz do not
voice blanket approval but also criticise the Soviet past. One informant, for
instance, blamed the run down of industry and the joblessness on “those who
were in the leadership of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union who now
live to make profits and all are thieves” (personal communication 23.8.1011). 
 Ulugbek Badalov, an Uzbek who recently obtained a doctorate in
Paris, has cited informants from three Central Asian republics, where
“Almost all the population […], as in other parts of the ex-USSR who knew
communism, would prefer a return of the ‘protector’ regime in all areas rather
than perpetuate the current system” (2012: 1-2). His field studies lead him to
conclude that the current state of “misery” people express “...is not an
imaginary construct but […] the result of the confrontation of a precarious
day and the idealised image of a previous better life of which the Soviet state
was the guarantor and protector” (Ibid: 3), adding: “In general, people…have
moved from a system of collective certainty to a system of individual
uncertainty” (Ibid.:5).88 Badalov finds the misery of today obliterates or
outweighs the memories of what his informants thought of as negative
88 To all the mentioned criticisms of the present should be added the widespread expressions
of the effects of a loss of pride and community with the fall of socialism. Despite the
deportation of whole nationalities and the belief that a threat of deportation hung over the
Abkhaz in the 1940s it is the longing for a sense of “interethnic harmony” in daily life that
informants speak most of as being characteristic of the last forty years of the USSR. Such
“harmony” is spoken of as also covering personal daily relationships with Georgians until the
breakup of the Soviet Union.
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features in the past; but that can hardly be called amnesia. Some of the
scholars I have cited discuss nostalgia only or primarily as relational to the
past. It is seen as contradictory, almost illogical, and there is an unspoken
sense in their writings that “it will pass”, very much as some writings do on
custom. The topic of this dissertation examines the present, however much
people might look to the past, in order to discern what the present might offer
for the future. 
Few scholars have taken this analytical approach but among
exceptions is Mitya Velikonja, from Slovenia (2009). His findings resonate
more with how matters are perceived by the Abkhaz, where longing for
aspects of Soviet life goes alongside the widespread view of their custom,
apswara, as a system that can rectify today’s ills. Velikonja sees nostalgia not
only for its relationship to the past but for a possible expression of hope for
the future, starting with it being a voice of protest against present conditions.
Certainly, that is to think outside the box. It does not fit the ideology of neo-
liberalism that would write of itself as the pinnacle and last point of societal
change, as found in Fukuyama’s The End of History?: the “end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,”
constituting the “end of history” (1989). That idea about capitalism was not
original but has reared its head on numerous previous occasions, an old one
that was held by Hegel, who saw the “end” arriving in Europe with the
triumph of the Spirit  (1998 [1837]: 197); and Herbert Spenser’s and Weber’s
different approaches but agreeing on capitalism representing the apogee of
human development. 
Velikonja posed the questions: “Why is there nostalgia for real
socialism?  Is it but a logical response to sudden, dramatic transformation?
Don’t people remember those days anymore – or do they remember them all
too well?” [My emphasis, MC]. He describes nostalgia as: 
a retrospective utopia, a wish and a hope for a safe world, a fair society, true 
friendships, mutual solidarity and well-being in general, in short, for a perfect 
world” and  identifies such feelings “in all ex-socialist Europe, from the Baltics to 
the Balkans, from eastern Germany to Russia (2009: 535).
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 It is clearly expressed in the title of a volume by Chris Hann: “Not the Horse
We wanted” (2006) which sharply draws attention to the widespread feelings
that in the demise of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries people
sense they were sold a pup. Velikonja adds: “In most of the dominant
discourses, socialist times are almost completely blacked out” and “new
ideologies […] are created and developed on the basis of a complete
condemnation of everything that came before” or the imposition  of silence
about everything before 1989-91 -  historical revisionism (Ibid.: 537). It is
generally forgotten that the people in a number of the Soviet republics
opposed the dissolution of the USSR from the outset and that included the
Abkhaz. In my fieldwork and broader travels in those countries it was
extremely rare to hear condemnation of the one-party systems as such, or
praise for a multi-party one.  
From Abkhaz fieldwork I share Velikonja’s discomfort with the prefix
“post-“ used to denote today’s societies that are characterised primarily by
today’s conditions (in which the “nostalgia” element is not central) and his
categorisation of it as “re-think[ing] the recent past” (Ibid.: 537). 
8.2.3 Post-Soviet nostalgia for the present
The widespread wish for a restoration of Soviet practices has its raison d’être
for the Abkhaz in the conditions of today’s Abkhazia and it would be a
mistake to believe that the desire for restoration of the losses which are felt is
only formulated in vague or general terms.
The following tale from a café in Sukhum two years ago conveys a
sense of longing that was shared by other chance listeners. I sat gossiping
with some Abkhaz men who accepted me at their table, set up by an Ossetian
woman. One reminisced about his Soviet youth of some 25 years earlier in
the fashion of telling a story with a moral the Abkhaz favour:
I was driving along the rutted country road, somewhat merry and with a friend, 
when he hit a neighbour’s piglet. ‘What’s to be done?”’ he puzzled, and feeling 
sorry for the wounded animal, reversed over it to put it out of its misery. Out came 
the neighbour, who was in mourning for a relative. She cursed us young men: ‘May 
you also be run over!’ was what she said – words not to be taken lightly. I quickly 
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slit the piglet’s throat but spilt blood onto the ground, something not to be done 
when a person is in mourning. 
Smartly picking the carcass up and throwing it into the boot of the car, I drove to 
the village shop and borrowed the going price for a piglet, 30 roubles, returned to 
the neighbour’s house and dropped the money on the kitchen table.
What now to do with the piglet? It was too much meat for two people, so we 
gathered friends from their houses, found a suitable place and singed and butchered 
the animal, then roasted it over a fire in nearby scrubland, well out of sight of where
it had lived. It was joyously eaten and washed  down with supplies of chacha, the 
home made grape brandy. There was wine and bread, cheese, tomatoes, water 
melon, pickled cucumbers, garlic and some cake – whatever we had foraged from 
our houses. I knew what I was about: The piglet’s skin was well rubbed with ajika, 
[a sour sauce] let it seep into the meat and fat. It was well basted. Toasts were 
pronounced, with the obligatory first one “to the Vsevyshny” [the supreme]. This 
went so well that some of the men had to be held back from bursting into song; that 
would have been very bad: a display of joy within earshot of a family in 
mourning. It went well.
Shortly after I got home the husband of the woman who had owned the piglet came 
in carrying two large water melons. The woman who ran the village shop had told 
him all about it, including his wife’s curse. He angrily plonked the money [that the 
story-teller had borrowed] on the table in front of our storyteller’s father and wished
his own wife ‘A pip [bird’s disease] on her tongue, the carrion, bitch’ another curse. 
No one was to think his family as cheap as to take money from a neighbour’s son. 
So my father heard about the accident and you can’t lie to an adult and a father, so 
the whole story came out. When my father summoned me [the narrator was then 
well into his twenties] I cautiously sidled up, ready to run out of the door – He 
could have given me a thrashing or killed me for violating custom but, in the 
event, he quickly let me off. 
He added to the account by stressing the “strength of custom under Soviet
power.” The telling took twenty-five minutes, with no interruptions. There
was wistfulness not only for times gone by but specifically for the 30 rouble
price of a piglet – he explained: “Today it costs tens of thousands because of
the inflation that we did not have under Soviet power.” To nods from the
others be bemoaned the poverty level of his pension, dolled out to him as an
invalid for wounds received in the war with Georgia  “and I can’t afford to
look after my flat, so I drink a little…” But his tale revealed also his and his
listeners’ thoughts on examples of apswara, ritual, Abkhaz belief system and
tolerance, of mourning, of curses, of paternal authority and power, of the
sense of personal pride, of family structure and communality, of feasting in
proper manner that are associated with the Soviet past. There was much in
Zuleika’s story in chapter five that chimed with these outlooks on the past but
from a very different experiential standpoint.
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8.2.4 Present and future
Velikonja moved from discussing nostalgia in a perspective that shifted
attention from the past to the future: 
What lay at the core of nostalgic feelings, narratives and practices, and what many 
nostalgics remain oblivious to, is precisely what remains at the very bottom of 
Pandora’s box: hope […] a retrospective utopia, a wish and a hope […a] wish to 
transcend the present […] it embodies a utopian hope that there must be a society 
that is better than the current one (Ibid.: 547-8).
   He drew on the thoughts of Ernst Bloch, who tackled this problem
theoretically in his writings of 1938-1947, a discussion of the nature of hope
and ways of striving to improve one’s lot, adding an element that rejects
reducing the validity of nostalgia to looking backwards and, instead, seeing in
it a tool for considering the direction in which a society might evolve.  Bloch
argued that only by looking to what concepts offer for the future can human
agency affect the aims it sets - to look backwards “would pitch the future into
the past,” and, therefore, not be able to activate hope (1986: 1-8), as a
reification of the past could not take it into the future because the conditions
of the present are no longer those that gave rise to the past. Yet he considered
that messianic programmes that often derived from imaginings of a past, can
take as its mental thrust an outlook for the future, instancing the Book of
Revelations that looks to the future by upsetting all current and past values.
For him “identifying the becoming” is important (Ibid.: 9).
I suggest Vincent Crapanzano missed this point in an essay on hope
when he wrote: “Although Bloch and most theologians who discuss it stress
the optimism of hope, hope can in fact lead to paralysis. One can be so caught
up in one’s hope that one does nothing to prepare for its fulfilment” (2003:
18). This lumping together of Bloch and theologians comes from attributing
to Bloch the outlook of theologians who place hope in the context of inactive
faith, and is curious, as Bloch rejected that and energetically identified the
aspect of hope that would generate human agency to attain its desired ends.
As Miyazaki has gently pointed out: “Crapanzano’s central concern
258
ultimately is the difficulty of differentiating the category of hope from the
category of desire” (Miyazaki op cit.: 148).
When Abkhaz informants have discussed what at first hearing seemed
their wish to return to something that was now gone, I soon found that it was
an amended past that was sought, thus pitching it forward. This was
exemplified when an informant reminded me that apswara (in which he
placed his hopes) had been radically ‘updated’ on occasion in the past and he
rejected the view of apswara as “fixed for all time – it has and will  evolve
with changing circumstances, but must keep its set of values for behaviour”.
He instanced as requiring change the “Abkhaz mentality,” for not allowing
open discussion of personal problems (personal communication 2011). 
The Abkhaz widely express a critique of their current state and call for
the wholesale activation of apswara and laws based on it, and, in that context,
itemise what they think was positive in the Soviet period. It, thus, centres on
what is not primarily in the past but in today’s experience, in whatever way
this may be conceived by today’s actors.
8.3 Transition or transformation?
Each Soviet republic had the same laws but applied them with variations. Abkhazia 
to fit local customs…For instance, in Abkhazia, collectivisation was different. 
Abkhazia was privileged [i.e. gifted by nature MC] and many here thought that with
independence, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, life would be heavenly 
(Personal communication 16.5.2012).
D. Saltmarshe perceptively observed as early as 2001 that it was high time to
treat the peoples who have gone through a socialist period as being in a
condition of ongoing “transformation”, and are not just positioned in a
transition “between a known starting point [and] a known end product”, and
“the social, economic and political processes occurring [in former socialist
countries] are better understood in terms of ‘transformation’ (Pardo 2004:
79). Referring specifically to the states of the south Caucasus, including
Abkhazia, Thomas De Waal picked up on that point when he said that it is
misleading to describe them as “in transition” to a known end; that twenty
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years after the end of the Soviet Union they are “not ‘newly independent’”,
that the term ‘post-Soviet’ is not “as useful as it was”. He also repudiated
generalising paradigms that described the countries of the south Caucasus as
“conflict regions” as unsatisfactory: “opinion polls suggest that most people
[in them] are more preoccupied with economic issues than the conflicts”
(2011). 
In the field I became convinced of a number of points: that there was
no general rejection of all things Soviet, nor a desire for wholesale
reconstruction of the Soviet, let alone the pre-Soviet past; that in Abkhazia
those are dead ends as hypotheses for research and informants did not voice
them. When pressed on this, they had nothing to impart. In the years
immediately following the dissolution of the USSR some scholars imagined
that the state progeny of the break-up were embarking on a journey into the
past or were in transition to an understood future capitalism (Hann 2006).
Chris Hann has suggested that the very existence of “post-socialist studies”
reflected the continued power of Western intellectuals to construct a field to
their own tendentious imaginings, analogous to their earlier construction of
“the Orient” (Ibid.: 1); reflecting “the inadequacies of macro-level
explanations lacking a firm basis in close-up understandings of the
quandaries of ordinary people as they coped with dislocation – policy
prescriptions based on unwarranted assumptions” (Ibid.: 2). At best such
research would have been to engage in something akin to writing in the
structural functionalist ethnographic past and at worst to imagine practices
and intent that were not evident, as Caroline Humphrey pointed out when
warning against keeping to stereotypical characterisations that were rooted in
the Cold War (2002:xx). Something that has fuelled weaknesses in the study
of the once Soviet countries is the neglect of the study of those countries
when they were Soviet, as forcefully argued by Hann, and by Petra Rethman
(1997: 720). Soviet ethnography was and still is not widely accorded much
status, as shown by the unavailability of Soviet ethnography to non-Russian
readers. For instance, of the vast output of work by Inal-ipa, to take an
example from Abkhazia, only one piece, on the social importance of Abkhaz
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milk kinship, atalychestvo (Inal-ipa n.d.), with a substantial introduction by
Peter Parkes,  has been translated and is available since 2003 in English; but
not printed.
The ignorance of or setting little store by Russian and Soviet
anthropology in mainstream ‘western’ anthropology was what led to the
ephemera of “transitology” (Rustow 1970) – an approach taken to study
change in the post-Soviet that had its roots in the thinking generated in the
‘West’ during the Cold War, and imagined, wrongly, that the end of the Soviet
Union presaged transition to the model of capitalist modernisation of its most
industrialised countries. This weakness reinforced and was reinforced by a
lack of anthropological fieldwork data, as Hann pointed out and Tatjana
Thelen found (2011). My discussion of Abkhaz nostalgia and hope questions
transitology and has illustrated the abiding strength of custom in Abkhazia.
Transitology was predicated on the groundless imagining that, because many
laws appeared similar across the Soviet republics, the “transition” to
(capitalist) democracy in them would be the same. To some extent that ghost
has been laid to rest, not least as a result of the substantial scholarship carried
out by Chris Hann (2003, 2006: 2, Caroline Humphrey, 2002 and Tatjana
Thelen 2011 inter alia), which demonstrated from fieldwork, in Thelen’s
words: “the presence of a variety of socialisms” (2011: 45); that the ‘socialist’
countries were dissimilar before Communist rule, during it and following it,
effectively debunking the myth that one suit could fit all. Hann appealed for
attention “to the context of contemporary institutional interplay both at the
level of formal institutions and by studying informal social relations, the
habitual continuities of everyday life” (2006: 2).
The lessons to be learnt from dominant Western anthropology’s very
belated recognition in post-colonial studies of its blindness to the reality of
undercurrents within societies in the imperial colonies that made for social
change remained in effect towards the countries of the Soviet Union.
Compounding the errors of the transitology approach is the academic hunt for
a “nostalgia” that only refers to the past. My research into Abkhaz society
suggests that new approaches are demanded and I will suggest possible
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alternatives that are conceived of by the Abkhaz and which could be acted
upon.
An illustration of the deleterious effect of prevalent attachment to
unfounded approaches was signalled (but not followed up at the time) by the
discussion I have described of ethnos theory in the Soviet Union – something
that took two decades to meet with other than episodic attention (Gellner,
1980).89 It was the discovery by the West at that conference of the important
change in nationalities policy that occurred in the 1960s to explain the
tenacity of traditional practices in the Soviet Union (Dragadze 1980) was not
pursued.
The content of wanting to restore features of the Soviet period in
Abkhazia lie within the existing and very much alive apswara order of
custom that, for most of my informants resonates with the principles of
egality and much of direct democracy that are perceived as having imbued
thinking within the USSR. The state or co-operative ownership of property
during he Soviet period is held up to demonstrate this, alongside its absence
of “oligarchs”. Yet, while much is said by the Abkhaz about the virtues of
apswara this is not without its problems. Thus an informant who insisted that
in Soviet times the Abkhaz “kept their set-up [i.e. customary practices] in the
villages, where most of us lived” would not even consider seriously that
apswara might be partially responsible for the deterioration in everything that
he decried in the present (personal communication 19.5.2012) and could,
possibly therefore, not satisfactorily determine the future course of Abkhaz
society. Whether my raising this will be seen to be idle speculation has to be
left to future research over time.
89The meeting of Soviet and Western anthropologists at the conference in 1976 that has been
referred to usefully illuminated different trends in Soviet ethnos theory over the two decades
that preceded it. This noted that common to all the contested trends was the theme that
however much ethnicity was modified over time by changing social and economic conditions
it maintained a continuing and independent existence. Debates at the conference centred on
how and what made this so and whether this was a move, as Ernest Gellner suggested,
towards seeing the ethnos as a distinctly cultural phenomenon: a form of incipient regional
identity that was not simply a reflection of “infrastructural” or differential political-economic
underlying forces, as classic Marxist materialism might have insisted. The Caucasian scholar,
Tamara Dragadze, argued that “…the theory of ethnos is seen as a means by which Soviet
anthropology can successfully claim a unique stake in the study of contemporary society,”
(Gellner 1980: 169). 
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8.4 Nationalist modernisation - capitalism?
Richard Peet cited Marx in his Introduction to a volume on development
theories (1999: p.x): “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” Unfortunately, he did not
analyse the significance of those words for states that have tried it, and he
dismissed the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in a reference, as “abjectly
failed” (Ibid.: 15). 
It would be unfair to hold against him that he did not foresee that
today’s neoliberal counter-revolution would put paid to what Wallerstein in
1974 saw in the Russian Socialist Revolution of 1917 that it “ended that
country’s further decline toward peripheral status” (Ibid.: 115). Nonetheless,
Peet’s description as “abjectly failed” might be considered something of an
error, considering that the Soviet Union’s social and economic development
brought advances in living conditions and a cultural revolution that were
historically unprecedented for scope and scale. Hann has called for not only
attention to “the trauma” of the socialist period but also to “the positive”
(2006: 4-5).
There are special circumstances in recent Abkhaz history that were
dictated by its being a long-rebellious autonomy within the Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic, its war with Georgia and a long international blockade.
The Abkhaz voted against the dissolution of the USSR and, when that
happened, applied unsuccessfully to join the Russian Federation.  To this day
it is Georgia and not the Soviet Union that is held responsible for what the
Abkhaz consider to be measures in the Soviet period to downgrade their
language and culture in general. A middle-aged Abkhaz stranger told me in
Sukhum’s central square: “Russia is our elder brother” (August 2008), a
phrase redolent of the Soviet period and which I interpret as an interesting
take on the views discussed on nostalgia – his expression of a hope that what
he perceived of as positive in the Soviet past could be transmogrified into
Abkhaz-Russian relations in the present. But it might have been simply the
expression of faith in “Russia” as a guardian against Georgia, something that
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shows all the complexities of perceptions, as further discussion showed he
was quite aware that Boris Yeltsin’s new Russia did not stand by Abkhazia
during the Georgian invasion and occupation. 
It is almost irrelevant to discuss the works of a number of
modernisation scholars, be they some that are close to anthropology, such as
Immanuel Wallerstein’s variant of diffusionism (2004 [1982]) or Richard Peet
on modernisation theory that omits the socialist countries, as does Ian
Roxborough’s Theories of Underdevelopment (1979).  The picture would
appear to be as described by Michael Herzfeld: “Development
anthropologists – often, perhaps, inadvertently – are engaged in extending to
Asia, Africa and Latin America, a project of cultural transformation shaped,
broadly speaking, by experience of capitalist modernity…” (2001: 162).
They generally by-pass the experience of socialist economies, something that
is most relevant to the Abkhaz perspective on the future of custom;  and
omitted are countries that have attempted to build states outside of capitalist
modernity, as I discuss in the next chapter when I look to the future. Looking
back to my literature review, the issues debated by Gluckman, Bohannan and
Diamond are still relevant to the Abkhaz today. To these must be added part
of Karl Polanyi’s views on embeddedness. 
As a result of the war with Georgia the nationalist element assumes a
political relevance that more than impinges on economic and social
development and opens up a possible course that at times had been envisaged
by Karl Marx – one of retaining customary practices when modernising, but
modernising along socialist lines (1989 [1881] 24: 346) and  Renton (2001:
77). It gained wider credence in the years after the Gold Coast (now Ghana)
won independence in 1957, even though such experiments in numerous other
countries in Africa have been killed off in the years that have followed the
murder of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, since when the neo-colonised continent
of Africa has been truly thrown into the darkness of neo-colonialism that
continues for the most part.
 While Abkhaz daily life is lived principally by custom, it is under
challenge from a growing field of state law. For many, apswara remains their
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only element of social stability. At the same time, despite the strength of ideas
that support a moral economy (Humphrey, 2002: xxii), virtually everything
that is connected with money and, increasingly with property ownership
outside the villages, comes under property law or outside of both law and
custom – criminality playing a big part. Then there is the area decided by
Constitutional delegation to the state: taxation, the armed forces, police and
prisons, health, education, power supply, roads, the state borders and crossing
them, foreign policy and the allocation of state revenue and the contentious
issue of the granting of citizenship to others than to the Abkhaz. There is a
form of passive resistance to taxation and state controls, through widespread
refusal to pay rent or for the utilities that were free in Soviet times.
So there is a tug of war going on between institutions of direct
democracy and the indirect democracy of the delegation of powers by those
wanting a state along western capitalist lines. Although the officially
propagated picture of pre-Soviet society is romanticised, yet elements of it
retain their hold, as was the case when resistance to the Georgian invasion of
1992 was decided by a traditional national assembly. There are practices
today around shrines, and at national assemblies that carry forward that way
of doing things into the 21st century. The possible power in use of the internet
to extend direct participation by people in their hundreds of thousands in
decision making deserves additional research for how it might apply to
strengthening customary ideas. 
Fatima Kamkiia (2013: 39 – 41) writes of what she calls Abkhaz
archaic tendencies to counter the failure of ‘democratisation’ in post-Soviet
countries and the [capitalist features] of “identification of power with
ownership, the dictate of the employer, incredible reverence for officialdom
and other negative phenomena” (Ibid.: 41). An Abkhaz scholar holding the
post of Head of Faculty at a Russian University, she argues: “There is no
universal formula for freedom” and cites Weber for the view that free hiring
of labour does not automatically bring individual freedom. The order of
priorities for institutional respect, as set by the Abkhaz elders, are firstly
apswara, then apsua tsas, then the law (Ibid.:42.) and they are considered as
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being against the concept of positive law, as distinct from natural law, which
comprises inherent rights conferred not by act of legislation but by "God,
nature or reason.”
She gives voice to what she sees as the contradictions of private and
collective property that are showing themselves in Abkhazia but,
interestingly, argues that private property is fine if laws insisting on apswara
are introduced (ibid: 43). What is also interesting is the dovetailing sought for
custom and law …as long as apswara is the foundation of law. I now come
further to discussing the seeming paradox.
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Chapter 9 State-building
9.1 What kind of state?
Laws did not, of course, dictate social reality  
Wade, P. 1995:26.
We are building a legal state90...We all have one task and the powers: the 
legislature, executive and judiciary must serve our people  
Ashugba, N. (2011), the Speaker of the Abkhazian 
Parliament.
[I]n the conditions of a market economy scientists must learn to earn money 
themselves
Zurab Japua, president of the Abkhazian Academy of 
Sciences. 2014. Respublika Abkhazia 4.4.14
Practices that I have instanced are knitted together within the structural
concepts of apswara and endorsed by the ‘deities’. Following the discussion
of ‘hope’ and ‘nostalgia’ here I examine what kind of state is under debate. In
the conditions that followed on the Soviet state there has been an active
revival of customary practices, conceived of as modifications of the past and
adding to the egalitarian principles of the Soviet period. This poses a serious
challenge to those, mainly represented by Soviet- and western-trained
intellectuals, who are striving to build a state on western capitalist lines, what
they call simply ‘modernisation’, as if there is no alternative to capitalism.
For the moment custom holds a strong position. The institutions of the
state are largely circumscribed by apswara, are secondary, used to a large
extent as adjuncts, as demonstrated in the cases of dispute resolution I
brought forward.
90 In Russian pravovoye gosudarstvo, which derives from German Rechtsstaat, embodying
concepts of social justice that go beyond the simple application of law, imposing social
concepts of fairness to limit state arbitrariness.
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Even those who want to change the situation dare not call for the
abolition of apsua tsas and apswara, preferring to remain silent on them or
calling for the accommodation of apswara in imprecise ways into state
institutions. Their view was interestingly expressed by the Abkhaz Dr Beslan
Butba, a supporter of state laws and author of a textbook on “Social Ecology”,
who publicly declared in 2012:
As a result of the thousand year development of a society of free people […] there 
has appeared a special system of values, of unwritten laws and rules that are set 
into the soul of every Abkhaz. It is the code of values […] we call apswara. That 
word reminds us that all spiritual values are bequeathed to us by our remote 
ancestors. Apswara […] in the broad sense covers the whole complex of Abkhaz 
culture and traditions. At the same time it is the moral code in accordance with 
which every Abkhaz constructs his/her life. (Butba: 2012)
The most important […] aspect of apswara is the notion of conscience [alamys]91 . 
To go against alamys is death for an Abkhaz. Other moral qualities that have gone
into apswara as imperatives are honour, dignity, nobility and love of freedom, a 
sense of duty, faithfulness and chastity. But this unwritten code includes not 
only positive reference points. It also includes a system of taboos – itsasym… [O]f 
late, however, […] under the cover of verbiage about ‘freedom of the individual’ 
and ‘free speech” we often witness outbursts of cynicism and permissiveness…How
useful for humanity would the wealthy experience of the synthesis of  traditional 
Christian and Moslem values that are intrinsic to Abkhaz culture be! (2012)92.
He then called for “the building of our own democratic state […] founded on
the traditional national idea of apswara” [My emphasis, MC]. Another
informant, an elder, spoke of the need for the state to have an official, “like
the third secretary in the Communist Party organisation who was responsible
for ideology, to be in charge of enforcing the ideology of apswara” (personal
communication 2012). Yet another Abkhaz nationalist state-builder
informant, argued:  “Only our own independent state with our own language
can represent the real traditions of the people, their values and their customs;
and those can only be protected by a state which codifies apswara and sees
how these can be incorporated into laws” (2012).
91 “Incorporates both a sense of individual conscience and also a more collective ‘conscience
of the people’”. Hewitt, G. 1998a. The Abkhazians Ed. George Hewitt. New York. St
Martin’s Press. p.284. 
92 I leave aside comment on that formulation of the “synthesis” as underlying apswara which,
I found, did not represent the last word on the indigenous belief system which would not tie
in with Butba’s view, as seen in chapter seven.
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An interesting proposal for formalising apswara in a parallel structure
to law, or to replace law, that was made in 2004 has recently been revived by
David Dasania (2014). It has similarities to the Millet system that pertained
within the Ottoman Empire and also, at different stages within the Tsarist one
and the early Soviet period. Under it considerable autonomy was accorded to
perceived ethnic or religious groups to determine their own rules of conduct
so long as they acknowledged the overall command of the state, paid their
taxes and fulfilled certain obligations such as military service. He has stated
that there is rising local interest in his proposal that there be a Union of
people with Abkhaz surnames together with those of the Abazin93. His draft
constitution provides for the Union of all lineages through each choosing one
person according to internal lineage procedures, irrespective of its size. Each
representative of a name would be at least thirty years old and a parent. Each
lineage would have collective responsibility for the conduct of its members,
especially for answering for any “personal insults and offending the dignity
of others”. It would be charged with activities in Abkhazia and among the
Abazin to tackle “cultural, demographic, social and humanitarian problems
facing the peoples”, by means of “ethnic diplomacy” – to settle conflicts. He
singles out from among the problems to be dealt with, the struggle against
“lawlessness, corruption, criminality and an unwholesome way of life”. The
Union would aim to restore among young people “the progressive traditions
[…] of respect for elders, women-as-mothers, people of different religious
convictions, the customs of the ancestors, the laws and rules of blood and
spiritual kinship, love for the homeland, charity/mercy, the values of serving
society and the state” (Dasania, 2014). In an addendum to the draft rules,
Dasania added: “Today the lineages carry no responsibilities before the
people and the state. It is for that reason that representatives of influential
lineages do as they please, commit crimes and their lineage status is not
affected by this; what is this but chaos?” 
93 Also known as Adyge and Circassians, an ethnic group of possibly 50,000 people whose 
language is very similar to Abkhaz, and who live in the Russian Federation’s north Caucasus 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, across the mountains from Abkhazia.
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One might consider whether this project does not include a number of
contradictions on the law-state-apswara relationship and leaves without
sufficient analysis the influences that are intrinsic to a state that embodies
inequalities and hierarchy, as I have presented these. Also, it carries a lot that
suggests the codification of custom, albeit not its incorporation in the state. In
Dasania’s project I found a lack of clarity on the relationship of custom to law
should conflict arise between competing demands. None the less, the setting
out of the project illustrates how some Abkhaz might see the way forward for
dealing with the problems that they face.
Whether the Abkhaz will continue to adhere to direct lineage-based
self-government through custom or move radically to incorporate and
fossilise some customary practices into laws is to be seen. My research and
discussion of Abkhaz conceptions and practices does lead to questioning
current anthropological theory on custom and law and about interpreting the
experience of statehood in other parts of the world. There law is relentlessly
supplanting custom, leaving only some of its practices as subject to legal
approval.
9.1.1 Heads of state’s perceptions
Several years ago the then president Sergei Bagapsh rebutted accusations
made by Inal Khashig, the editor of a local newspaper, that he exerted unfair
extra-legal pressure on a journalist who had suggested that his family had
profited from him being president. The president rejected the charges in the
following words:
 
In my years as president, I have never reacted to any written provocations. No one 
harassed Inal Khashig when he was criticising the state. It was only when he wrote 
about my family – and in a vulgar way – that my relatives and a few of my close 
friends got angry. They sat him in a car, and they said to him: ‘Now it’s not just 
about the president; now it’s personal.’ But that’s the Caucasus. Around 
here, you have to answer for insults like that” (SpiegelOnline,16.7.09).
In the event no action was taken against the newspaper editor, nor was the
president’s explanation of matters challenged. Those who disagreed with
Bagapsh’s conduct revealed in discussion with me that they were motivated
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more by their view that the journalist he criticised was telling the truth than
by the president’s relatives having  “a talk” with the journalist. There was
between them no difference in principle over custom (the “talking to”) and
law. They supported the journalist because they believed relatives of the
president had profited from his post, and spoke of a paucity of prosecutions
of known/believed-to-be corrupt officials.94
When I met President Bagapsh a year later he told me: “We want a
state based on a constitution and founded on the norms of international law.
That requires new laws and a new way of thinking”. When I asked how
apswara  could be reconciled with the individualism and inequality that were
increasing in society and were protected by the laws on private wealth
generation his response contained a recognition of a divergence between
custom and the laws, both of which he wanted: 
Of course, capitalism is predatory […]. For a person occupied with business 
apswara is the last thing he thinks of and his business comes before everything else 
[but] the foundation must be the law [...]. Today we must have the law, above all 
else, law which takes into account traditions – something that is very complicated. 
The time has passed for the President to be the head of a clan or an arbitrator. 
[apswara] is, in the first instance, respect, respect for elders, respect for the family, 
for the father, for the mother. There is no chinopoklonstvo [toadying to ranks, MC] 
here unlike in some countries (July 20, 2010).
His endorsement of his relatives and friends giving the journalist who
criticised his family a ‘talking-to’ shed light not only on contradictory
outlooks within society but also on the contradictions not having been
resolved. 
According to the offending newspaper report the relatives and friends
of the president who ‘talked to’ the journalist included David Bagapsh, the
president’s nephew and head of his security and his nephew, Kondrat
Samsoniya, Sukhumi Deputy and Director General of the "A-Mobile"
telephone company and head of an advertising department of Sukhum
Mayoralty. According to some allegations, they took the editor from the
centre of Sukhum outside the city and threatened his life (Anon, 2009).
94 Mr Bagapsh has expressed concern that “today many business strictures are run by
criminal elements” and recognised that there are cases of corruption among state officials
(ApsnyPress 26.5.2010).
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Informants in general did not see the problem as a contradiction in
principle between custom and law of the kind expressed by President
Bagapsh in his conversation with me. Customary practices are widely spoken
of as deriving from a higher authority than that of the state and enshrined in
law, taking precedence over law through moral imperatives of what is
understood by tradition, by apswara and apsua tsas. It fits with a concept of
‘natural law’, something of a variant on “Render unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (Gospel
according to Saint Mark 12:15). In discussions with Abkhaz informants I
commonly found they saw no necessary conflict between what Sophocles’
eponymous heroine Antigone raised in her appeals to the laws of the gods
[read custom in our context] above those of the state (Steiner 1984). Informants
were puzzled by my suggesting there might be a conflict of conceptions of
custom and law if the ‘laws of the gods’ are taken to mean apswara, the laws
of the mystical ancestors and the supernatural that is sited at the shrines.
“Can’t you see that everything must have principles as a foundation and for
us laws or anything else we have or do must be founded on apswara!” one
informant told me angrily, as if I was missing a simple point (2012). One
Abkhaz lawyer I discussed this with put it to mean they coexist. As my
fieldwork shows, the role of the state here has little relevance to how it is
perceived in capitalist countries.
While extolling the virtue of apswara for being “in the first instance,
respect, respect for elders, respect for the family, for the father, for the
mother,” Bagapsh did concede that there was “a conflict between the tradition
of reconciliation and that of punishment [but] the foundation must be the
law” (2010).
The first Soviet head of independent Abkhazia, Nestor Lakoba, is
known for his modest conduct, as exemplified by being available in the 1920s
to any complainant or petitioner, and this was repeatedly described by my
informants as apswara. It is still accepted practice that, despite murder
attempts, presidents are today frequently available in coffee shops. There is in
Abkhaz no equivalent of the Russian word gospodin, which is “sir” in
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English and in use in the higher and richer echelons of today’s Russia; and
the Abkhaz are proud of that.
Two years ago, marking Constitution Day, the government’s
newspaper had President Ankvab, President Bagapsh’s successor as president,
saying, in the third person about himself: 
As far as gaining reception by the head of state [the president], then the order for 
that is long established and is known to all: all citizens may avail themselves of the 
opportunity. What is more, one thing is absolutely certain: no intercessions, no 
gentlemanly status, and least of all being a relative or namesake of A.Z.Ankvab can 
positively influence the order of getting in to see him. In fact these would probably 
produce the opposite effect” (Respublika Abkhazia 23.11.2012).
The wording of the laws encourages customary procedures: that all matters
that can be resolved outside the courts should be kept out of them. Yet, the
increase in the number of car thefts and rape (a rare thing in the past), of
drunkenness and the use of drugs, of burglaries and “hooliganism” (rude and
intimidating behaviour in public places) and corruption,  have led informants
to seek stronger redress from the laws and protection by its enforcers,
especially the police.
A countervailing trend to that of strengthening custom is to demand
that legal agencies be used to curtail anti-social behaviour in the broadest
sense, and accepting that customary practices are not able to tackle the
historically new phenomena and consequences of private ownership of
property and business, of means of production, and widening class
differentials in wealth and power, that are felt to be narrowing the scope for
the resolution of disputes by customary practices that are grounded on
principles of egalitarianism. Today those principles are being undermined
more than they ever were in the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods. According to
Paula Garb “The Soviet state also objectified indigenous custom that it
sanctioned, which has left a powerful legacy in the thinking of post-Soviet
anthropology and of the intelligentsia of indigenous peoples” (2000: 8).
A new code of laws endorses the commercial relations of a market
economy, abolishing the previous Soviet state’s wholesale public ownership
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and control of the means of production and allocation, and selling some of
these off to private interests. 
Abkhaz insist that the laws the state enacts should be based on or
accommodate Abkhaz custom. There is evident a two-way pull between
“traditionalists” who hold aloft the banner of what they identify as ‘tradition’
-  customary practices, and some “modernisers” who want to sweep these
away, viewing them as barriers to building a modern state. More important
for examining theoretical approaches to custom and law is another
contradiction that is as follows. If customary practices and the very concept
of custom are founded on principles that are different from those of law, then
it might be illusory to hope for law to enshrine or be based in custom. 
That matters cannot be reduced to seeing all transformations in
Abkhazia as a move away from Soviet practices is ethnographically detailed
in my chapter four on custom, and chapter seven on beliefs and the unanimity
principle. It is not only that old practices are widespread, but the practices for
modernisation have elements that take the reverse direction from neo-liberal
privatisation as the state is expected to dovetail into apswara’s concepts,
including those for universal social provision. 
How the Abkhaz implement collectivist responsibilities through the
state has been reported in a number of recent newspaper reports that include
the bringing back into state ownership the once privatised kindergartens, on
the grounds that only public ownership could safeguard what the public
demanded.  In that tiny country plans are being implemented to build
kindergartens in 105 villages and another 100 in towns. The Church of Simon
the Zealot (Kanonit) is being repaired by the state both as a shrine and a
tourist excursion feature. Abkhazia claims to be the only state where the
Cabinet decides the volume of fish to be caught in the sea. It provides, gratis,
houses to men (sic) with upwards of ten children. The collective farm lands
have not been privatised. Public money is used to repair housing in towns. All
citizens can appeal directly to the head of state for financial assistance with
health, housing, education, foreign travel and much besides. MPs have funds
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for social provision and customary institutions exert their powers to control
the direction of its allocation.
It might be argued with justice that such measures of social provision
are also features of capitalist countries, especially in Europe. Jane Guyer has
pointed to the importance of fairness in a moral economy of allocation
exercised through rationing during the Second World War in Britain, in her
discussion of price formation (2009: 205). However, the trend in Abkhazia
today is an expansion of state funding at a time when there is curtailment of
social provision right across European states, including all the countries that
were socialist and where capitalism has now been espoused. Abkhazia has
resisted being included in the cutbacks of social provision that are a general
feature of European “austerity” programmes.
Today’s reality is a parallel existence of largely unquestioned extra-
legal customary practices alongside the availability of a formal framework of
state laws, themselves influenced by apswara conceptions – to be drawn on
or ignored at the discretion of customary rules. That the Abkhaz want to
maintain the basis of apswara in its lineal descent structures and their direct
democracy is evident.
9.2 Moral economy and trust
I find that the Abkhaz conceptually accommodate what at first glance is a
confusion of pressures from changing modernisation-driven factors and daily
customary practice demonstrated in attitudes to a coexistence of custom and
law, with priority for the first. In another context, that of north Pakistan,
Michael Fischer’s discussion of accommodation of new practices to old
concepts also raises the institutional accommodation of apparent confusion
(2006). In Abkhazia the accommodations are arranged around dominant
custom and a state that is denied free agency, let alone the sole right to
exercise power.
Anthropological discussion of ‘the moral economy’ shows that
societies have been able to reconcile apparent economic and political
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opposites or, more accurately, resist the inequalities that have in most
societies been a feature of private industrial modernisation and the generation
of surpluses to what were earlier perceived as daily needs in societies, as
discussed by Pierre Clastres in a broad panoramic sketch of different societies
where this is the case (1989 [1974]). However, in that work the scholar, as do
others, almost confines his research to hunter-gatherer societies and some that
were introducing agriculture, or had moved in the reverse direction,
instancing North American tribal societies for the latter. For him it is the
political birth of the state that determined those “breaks” in societal
continuities. This is plausibly presented, however debatable might be his
reversing the determinant temporal sequence of economic political (state
formation) direction of change, to one of political  economic (Ibid.: 202),
as Clastres does not agree with Marx’s view on the place of what Clastres
calls the necessarily “despotic” state (Ibid.: 204), in relation to the
manufacture of a surplus and class power. Yet he concluded by leaving open
whether peoples’ histories are about class struggle or struggle against the state
as such (Ibid.: 218). He is also interesting for challenging anyone to define
what the level of a “subsistence economy” is, something that Marshall
Sahlins has looked into, again for “primitive societies” (1972).  James
Woodburn is among those (that include Howe 1978, Renshaw 1988, Flanagan
1989) who have discussed societies that are “assertively egalitarian” (1982:
431) through preventing unequal accumulation by its members, based on
researching the Hadza hunter gatherers of Tanzania. In passing he does,
however, express a regret, that most of the rest of mankind is “so enmeshed in
property relations” that it does not embrace “parity of esteem to hunter
gatherers” (Ibid.: 448). One might mention that in the republics of the Soviet
Union, including Abkhazia, there was assertive egalitarianism, starting with,
for instance, limits on individual land usufruct.  
It is here that the anthropology of the moral economy provides a link
to understanding how the Abkhaz see things and in what direction they might
turn the relationship of custom to state in the future. To be remembered is the
quotation given earlier: “If the law intervenes there will be war.” To those
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words I add those from a villager of whom I had asked who the land I saw
from his house belonged to: “I think my boundary is over there [and he
pointed to a hill] but I have never thought about it. I can only work [i.e.
cultivate] so much, so that is what is mine at present” (personal
communication 2012). I found that was the view of land ‘ownership’ of
others I questioned, that land that was worked by a peasant or a farm could
belong to him (sic) as an individual and member of a lineage. The exceptions
were what are considered communal properties: collective farms and state
land used for agriculture or built on, land left fallow, forests and rivers. The
moral link of fairness was brought by the labouring that determined use rights
in the peasant’s/farmer’s thinking. The state’s job was to help the worker on
the land and that was that.95 
The strength of the ideological legacy about communal land
ownership of Soviet times, taken together with the imagined absence of
individual land ownership earlier, there is no demand for the ‘return’ of land
to pre-collectivisation proprietors that is seen in other ‘modernising’
countries, as described by Derek Fay and Deborah James (2008).96 The fact
that there were the beginnings of capitalist private land allocation in Tsarist
times has become irrelevant as, to quote Balasz Jarabik, “Fiction is often
more important than reality, as it drives the popular narrative” (2014 web
site). 
The theme of fairness and the values that are held to seek it have been
stressed by a multitude of scholars writing about common features in the
societies of the Soviet Union. According to Caroline Humphrey: “From a
series of practices and institutions united by a Soviet moral order, the
fragmented state has become a complex of operations by officials who are
95 In parenthesis I must add that the particular farmer I have just quoted was somewhat
exceptional as his grandfather had privately owned his land, received as a reward for having
been “loyal”, as he put it, to the Tsar and fought against the 1877 Abkhaz uprising against
Russian rule. But the influence of the Soviet period, when land was nationalised, has clearly
left its mark on the thinking of that person whose pre-Soviet grandfather had owned a
clearly-demarcated piece of land.
96 There is nothing similar to the practices in, for example, the once-British colonies of
Kenya, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa where popular movements seek a
restoration of land that was alienated by the colonial powers.
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increasingly rewarding themselves” but “notions of mutual aid remain
influential” (2004: 98). She was writing about Buriatia but the picture is
similar elsewhere. In the same collection of essays, Rigi, writes that in
Kazakhstan: “… there is a sharp contradiction between the ethical values of
the majority of the population […] and the newly established private
ownership of the means of production and the principles of the market
economy” (Op. cit.: 116).
Camps which are divided on which direction the country should take
are taking on organisational forms in Abkhazia. President Ankvab gave his
support to the reformation of what is seen as a ‘presidential party’ called
“Aitaira”, which is described as a “social” movement to support the
government – something that had an existence from 2001 to 2010 to back his
predecessor (ApsnyPress 18.4.2014). An association of oppositional political
groups denounced the government in early 2014 and successfully demanded
its dissolution and replacement by one of “national trust” through a
dubiously-convened “skhod”. Its principal spokesman, Raul Khadzhimba,
blamed the government and, especially President Ankvab, for high
unemployment, the “practical destruction of the village, which for centuries
was the basis for preserving our people, [and] its language”. He asserted:
“Lawlessness, chaos, corruption and criminality on a massive scale have
become the norm …” and called for all people to express their views, as
“since ancient times the people of Abkhazia decided on their fate at national
assemblies” (IA Regnum 30.4.2014). One will note Khadzhimba’s appeal for
a skhod, a customary institution, and also for a government of national trust –
a nod in the direction of the Abkhaz customary striving for reaching
unanimity on issues. At the same time the sharpness of the tone of his
criticism is somewhat new and followed on a major article published in the
country’s official news agency less than five months earlier. Ostensibly on
self-censorship it was a thinly disguised call for open criticism of all
shortcomings and for people no longer to be governed by the fear that any
criticism of conditions in Abkhazia would be grist to the mill of the Georgian
anti-Abkhaz government (Zhidkov 2013). 
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Khadzhimba felt it necessary to make clear that he was dissociating
himself from the coup in the Ukraine: “We are not advocates of ‘maidans’ and
mass disorder but each of us has the legal right directly to express our attitude
to the political powers” (IA Regnum 30.4.2014).   
James Scott has discussed the moral economy as a set of values held
by peasants as “fair” and not based on the economic order of values of
capitalist societies (1976). In a discussion of his work William Roseberry
pointed to Scott’s consideration of “a subsistence ethic” which demands that
“those who appropriate peasant surpluses offer guarantees for the continual
survival of the peasant household”. He also referred to lasting “pre-capitalist
traditions” (2004). As seen in the quotation of an Abkhaz peasant/farmer in
2012 there are other sides to considering an economy moral or fair that
remain from the Soviet period, and also the presence of widespread common
lands before that; so are both of archaic and of more recent vintage.  I found
among the Abkhaz, as I have in other parts of the post-Soviet space, including
the Ukraine and Russia, aspects of a moral outlook on economy that are not
primarily reactions to capitalist social relations, as is found in Scott’s and
Roseberry’s scholarship, and also in E.P. Thompson’s research on what
pertained in 18th century Europe (1975). They regard the value of things
outside of market price determination, as derived from a valuation that is
equal to the input of labour into a product; rejecting its alienation through
market mechanisms. I came across instances of this in Abkhazia, when I have
been offered for purchase buildings, including completed or half-built
factories, at a price determined by what it had cost to construct them and not
what they were “worth” on the market. The point here is that I found that
concepts of a moral economy can also exist in an industrial society. They lie
deep in the consciousness of the Abkhaz and are relevant to my conclusions
in the next chapter.
Preliminary to moving to that, a brief glance at trust and relations
among the Abkhaz. Traditionally relations have not been contractual
obligations but were formed on the basis of trust. That still largely governs,
but contractual relations, however qualified, are encroaching on the person-
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to-person settling of matters that was retained to an extent in Soviet times.
Stephen Gudeman has written of trust (in markets) as “an ambiguous relation,
for it would seem to deny the exclusive presence of the self-interested actor in
the market” (2009: 20). At the same time, contract and individual relations
should not be seen in too simple a way as mutually exclusive. In a discussion
with an Abkhaz who retained Uzbek and Kirgiz labourers to clear his garden
and build on part of it he confessed to me: 
It is strange. I am the employer and we have agreed on payment for their work, but 
they sometimes change the amounts they want; usually wanting less than was 
agreed and sometimes adding labour that they refuse to be paid for. It is strange - I 
am the boss but the Uzbeks and Kirgiz see us as more like equal partners who are 
engaged in a common project. When you were coming here [to the house] today I 
asked them to do something extra because I had a guest coming. They did it and 
when I gave them some money they returned it, one of them saying ‘we have a 
guest coming’, meaning they feel like hosts because you are coming from England 
and they feel they should not let me  (and themselves, so they think) down – so the 
extra work was not for pay. I trust them – doveryayu – and they trust me. It has 
become so relaxing and I sometimes do them favours, such as helping them fill in 
documents and once I arranged for one to see a doctor. It is really the way we like to
do things in the village. Perhaps it is because we were all brought up under Soviet 
power – vlast’; or perhaps it is because one should not take money for everything… 
(June 2012). 
The relationship had much in common with the trust and obligation of
Japanese bankers and clients, and of a Chinese employer and his workers, the
latter as seen in the Chinese film Beijing Bicycle (Xiaoshuai Wang 2001), to
be contrasted with the treatment of a similar plot in what follows on thieves
taking someone’s bicycle in the Italian Bicycle Thieves (Vittorio de Sica
1948).  In the second there are only legal contractual relations, and in the first
these are modified by their being embedded in custom. Indeed, ideas about
fairness, trust and a moral economy are brought together in Abkhaz concepts
and expressed in current debates about apswara and the state. The fair and
moral economy would be embedded trust, in a fair state that was to assist in
the implementation of apswara by the lineages.
Individual relations at times today take the shape of widespread and
socially supported resistance to state law, as individuals still interact on the
basis of a concept of fairness. It might be worth further to study how trust
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might undermine the state’s usurpations – not as a simple opposition to it, but
as a qualification of state powers because the state is not trusted. Lack of trust
has an aspect that can denote not simply that trust is missing but that the state
is untrustworthy – as when a relationship of trust is not with, for instance, me,
but with another person and, therefore, against me. This could be an
interpretation of Michel Foucault’s take on the relationship of state and
‘governmentality’ and points to the importance of avoiding adopting an  over-
polarised vision of the state and the individual. 
When the Abkhaz sometimes involve the state in disputes they are
able to exploit its ‘facilities’ to enact decisions that have been taken under
customary procedures. The state is restrained by Abkhaz lineage influences,
customary institutions for reconciliation and the agents of the state’s
deference to these. The counter-tendency, for the state increasingly to
legitimise growing inequality and private property rights, acts in the reverse
direction.  The powerful customary institutions limit state interference in
direct democracy – making for a major area of complexity in state-building of
the kind witnessed in other countries. This raises the notion or hope of
bringing about a state that only facilitates the operation of apswara’s
customary power in new conditions. Consideration of that Abkhaz ideal gave
rise to my entertaining the thesis that customary practices might be retained
as the basis for state structures beyond the duration of today’s turbulent
circumstances and into a novel social structure founded on direct democracy
– leaving to the state a co-ordinating role. This would involve giving more
attention to the second of Marx’s little-discussed dual characterisation of a
state – that in addition to the defence of the interests of a dominant class or
classes there is the managing of society as a whole, to rein in contradictions
that arise that might lead to its own destruction. I am indebted to Professor
Michael Fischer for the suggestion that developments in computer facilities
such as Twitter could make the state, as normatively perceived, redundant
(personal communication April 2014). Certainly, the massive mobilisation of
people of late around demands and petitions, are understood by participants
as acceptable direct pressure on the state to act as insisted on by a direct
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democracy that bypasses delegated decision-making by the state. The same
principle is recognised for referenda, but these can be manipulated by states.
The element that makes these activities short of being direct democracy is the
latter’s requirement that there should be no delegation to agents, such as the
state, of powers to decide on whether to implement what has been popularly
decided.
From his anthropological study of the different forms of
embeddedness undergone by the changing economy of a Uighur community
in today’s China Chris Hann brings forward persuasive evidence that
embeddedness is possible in multiple ways, as the state itself evolves. Today,
he finds that “the principle of the market [….] is modified by redistribution
undertaken both by the state and by kin and neighbours in accordance with
Islamic precepts” (2009b: 269). The villages studied are “highly autarkic […]
in which most work is unpaid and subject to the patriarchal structures of the
household. […] Labour, land and money have not been reduced to the status
of […] commodities” in a system he calls “embedded socialism” (Ibid.: 270). 
In the conditions of Abkhazia the weakness of those elements of a
state structure that do exist are so conditioned, restrained and kept weak by
customary institutions that most of my Abkhaz informants do conceive of a
state that abides by the stipulations of apswara, what Diamond called “the
order of custom”. It is on the implications of this and whether the state will
become totally embedded into custom that I will conclude this dissertation.
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Chapter 10 Alternatives available for
the future?
[T]he major means of production and distribution ought to be socialised if 
exploitation of the many by the few is to be prevented; if, that is to say, 
egalitarianism in the economy is to be protected. 
Kwame Nkrumah. (1967: 92).
The most fruitful investigative context for my research proved to be what
Ernst Bloch called the identifying of new shoots that are coming into being in
a society (1986), to evidence the possible directions that were offering
themselves for the Abkhaz pursuit of a state based on apswara. This is
consonant with Karl Polanyi’s meaning of “embeddedness” of the economy
in social structure, rather than in separate institutions which take on a life of
their own – “the deus ex machina of state intervention” (1957: 63). It is to be
contrasted with the “formalist” position that holds that change in the relations
of production is mechanically the motive force; something that I identify as
underlying the dispute about the nature of the state between Paul Bohannan
and Max Gluckman.97 Polanyi saw the state as arising from the evolution of
markets that set their own prices, to dominate economics and to supersede the
non-market regulation of prices. In a review of his anthropology, S.C.
Humphreys draws attention to Polanyi’s early inspiration from Marx and
Soviet planning, for his belief in “the social and moral superiority of the
centrally-planned socialist economy, guided by ‘social demand’ rather than by
the demands of the individual consumers” (1969: 4-5). His “substantive”
approach viewed social institutions and not economic determinism as having
primacy in any society. The Abkhaz would subscribe to that through their
social institutions of apswara. 
As demonstrated in cases from the field, Abkhaz perceptions of what
society should be like added up, in the main, to the pursuit of fairness and
97 For Marx’s view that this counterpoising of what he saw respectively as “economism” and
“voluntarism” was a false one, see his Third Thesis on Feuerbach (1973: 92-95).  
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community, and against big inequalities in property ownership. They look
back to many of these values as aspects of the Soviet era. Drawing on Marx’s
(and Ernst Bloch’s) approach helped direct the research into custom and law
not just to see a static image but to what might be the outcome of current
contestation between capitalist state constructions and customary resistance
to keep the state as its adjunct. The invocation of the past by Abkhaz
informants was about how to see the future. My attending discussions among
the Abkhaz, allowed me to participate and proved to be a rewarding aspect of
participant/observation that removed me from the position of being seen as an
outsider looking in. They opened up discussion of perspectives, which is what
my research led me to consider was the most important thread for my topic.
Customary practices, instead of the delegation of powers to state agencies,
make the Abkhaz active participants in the resolution of current problems.
There is present little that resembles being locked by tradition into the past. It
places tradition in the present and, many hope, will remain so into the future,
albeit through changing forms. Customary practices continue nearly a century
after what, in the observation made by Konstantin Paustovsky, a Russian who
was in Abkhazia in the early 1920s, gave it the appearance of  “a country […]
locked as in a coat of mail within an amazing custom” (1966: 15). This “coat
of mail” derives strength from being malleable.
The Abkhaz have retained much of non-state customary practice of
“communalism”. Kwame Nkrumah theorised on how such a way of running a
society could be maintained in a modernised, i.e. industrialised, society:
To be sure, there is a connection between communalism and socialism. […] In 
socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in 
modern circumstances. Thus, whereas communalism in a non-technical society can 
be laissez-faire, in a technical society where sophisticated means of production are 
at hand, the situation is different; for if the underlying principles of communalism 
are not given correlated expression, class cleavages will arise, which are connected 
with economic disparities and thereby with political inequalities; Socialism, 
therefore, can be, and is, the defence of the principles of communalism in a modern 
setting; it is a form of social organisation that, guided by the principles underlying 
communalism, adopts procedures and measures made necessary by 
demographic and technological developments. (1967: 92).
284
Among what is new in the dissertation is its analysis of a society in which the
possibility is entertained of reversing the order of priorities accorded to
customary and legal institutions that we encounter in capitalist-state-ordered
societies.
De Certeau 1984 [1980] and Scott 1976 wrote on how individuals
might interpret and act on what they are presented with, the tactics of
consumer behaviour. I found that the differentiation made by de Certeau
between strategies to define institutions and structures of power, and tactics
to cover what individuals do within the strategies is relevant to the Abkhaz. In
the context of my topic such a differentiation opens up for consideration a re-
conceptualisation of the relationship of “personal” to “public” such as is often
found in anthropological discussions on gender, and “power” in societies that
follow the “order of custom” as against law (Diamond, 1974).
Among the Abkhaz custom is conceived of as a component of a non-
hierarchically morally ordered system for regulating relations which,
therefore, questions the way that ‘legal pluralism’ is usually understood in
Western anthropological writing today, as has been seen in my discussion in
chapter two.
Understandings of the role of customary practices and of law have
relevance to the processes of state and nation-building that has accelerated in
recent times in various parts of the world, in a re-run of the intensive state-
building of the 19th and 20th centuries. The traditional institutions of family
and lineage, shown in dispute resolution and a national belief system – a
non-“institutionalised religion” - exercise a strong hold on popular
imaginings. Changes in such institutions and practices in the pursuit of
modernisation under capitalism disrupt not only those institutions and
practices but also the associated self-conceptions of identity within the
community. They promote modifications and re-conceptualisations through
new laws on property and the civil and criminal codes that could challenge
the very basis on which customary practices are founded or, in the view of
informants in Abkhazia, on which they depend. This is the case even where
outward appearances of “tradition” may cloak new practices and conceptions.
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These countervailing tendencies have been examined through their
manifestations in the field, largely through cases of dispute resolution and the
pursuit of personal and collective objectives, where moves to increase the
role of law at the expense of custom may prove particularly disruptive. This
has provided ethnography for the examination of institutional continuities,
modifications and ruptures as Abkhaz press for their institutions to be
enshrined in a state, to meet the requirements of popular traditional
conceptions.
Having set out to look at the strength of customary regulators of
Abkhaz society I was moved to examining features and concepts that allowed
a take on the linkages that make up the webs that closely tie into each other:
the overlapping of patriliny, exogamy, gender, marriage, religion, space,
environment, ‘otherness’, assimilation, essentialism, blood, lineage and the
multi-ethnicity-nationalist agenda, all topics which merit further detailed
investigation in the field. These are maintained, certainly conceptually,
despite urbanisation, demographic shifts, and some property privatisation,
through the moral economy. For the post-Soviet area, writes Caroline
Humphrey, “as in Soviet times, the political economy of the kollectiv
(collective) – which can of course be defined at many levels from the
household to society as a whole – implied not only enmeshing power
struggles among those situated within but also a ‘moral economy’…” (2004:
xxii).
10.1 A customary state?
Marcel Mauss envisaged the possibility of modern societies becoming based
on the communal values he identified through gift exchange in non-class-
divided societies in the conclusion to his major work of 1925. He did not
discuss the state or political economy but hoped that reason would prevail
through education. That being as it may, he did entertain the possibility of the
extension of social provision and the redistribution of wealth being features
of modern society. Others have addressed the practicalities, as against the
utopian adoption of an idea, for bringing such things into being.
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I am not suggesting a cultural relativist approach in the study of the
Abkhaz and the trends within their society that can lead either to developed
capitalism or to a state founded on direct democracy. The Abkhaz share the
choices that are offered to people in other societies – of how socially to
command the potential offered by economic expansion. This includes the
possible course for increasing class differentiation – capitalism, the root of
the challenge to custom. Can that be avoided or is that trend inevitable?
Whatever the officially-condoned mediation in disputes that involves
the guardians of the shrines and the presence of these guardians on state
ceremonial occasions, the establishment of a consultative Public Chamber for
what is called “civil society”, and the existence of a state-recognised Council
of Elders, it is significant that the recent appointment of judges throughout
the country was of individuals with qualifications that are legal and not
customary (ApsnyPress 30.7.2010), even if judges appear to be as much
under the sway of apswara as other Abkhaz. Informants often spoke of
elements of what the literature in Abkhazia describes in glowing terms as the
virtues of apswara and apsua tsas as becoming lost or as atrophying, while
others expressed the opinion that only the shape of apswara was changing.
Some anthropologists have furnished evidence that it would appear
that states only accommodate customary practices widely when they are weak
(Richard Antoun from a study of Jordan 2000: 443). Paula Garb has written
the same for Abkhazia (Garb 2000: 4). However, Abkhaz informants consider
that the Soviet state tolerated custom to a different degree than has been
shown in scholarship in the colonial and neo-colonial societies of other parts
of the world. I am led to conclude that the hold of customary practices in
Abkhazia will decline should the course of social and economic change that
is now taking place be maintained. Certainly Bagapsh’s words express such
an expectation. Shortcomings in the workings of the state’s institutions,
especially among its enforcers, have opened up space (as is also the case in
other societies with weak state structures) for elements of “law-lessness” that
are also “custom-lessness” of which I cited examples in chapter five that
included the employment of gangsters who by-pass both law and custom even
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if they are dressed up in the understandings of some as customary regulators.
Abkhaz informants find that calls for fairness are not answered by the state
and the egalitarian foundations for “traditional” custom (if such a term is
permissible) are being undermined. The state is trying to reconcile this with
its laws, the wordings of which allow, still today, for a place for the
continuation of apswara and apsua tsas (without naming them) by tolerating
them to the extent to which people are able locally to apply them. I should not
like to underestimate the tenacity with which apswara and apsua tsas are
held as powerful ideals. The contradictions that arise from wanting both
custom and law are illustrated in the several quotations from Bagapsh. For the
time being, at least, the Abkhaz approach to custom and law is an attempt to
treat them as separate entities that are related by the dominance of custom.
The relationship is fluid and scholars must return to and keep an eye on this
topic to see how things work out. Here it is worth taking in some examination
of the matter from other societies which are of interest for comparison.
Bennett refers to Kwame Nkrumah’s support for “the ‘Africanisation’
of the Ghanaian legal system” (Bennett 1985: 14, n.88). Perhaps more to the
point when we consider the course that is currently underway in Abkhazia is
Nkrumah’s contribution to a seminar in Cairo to discuss whether a socialist
order could be arrived at without transiting capitalism and allowing for the
“communalism” of custom (the apswara of the Abkhaz) to be retained: “Only
under socialism can we reliably accumulate the capital we need for our
development and also ensure that the gains of investment are applied for the
general welfare” (Nkrumah 1967:92). Other scholars contributing to the same
seminar where he said that included Soviet Africanist Alexander Sobolev,
who questioned whether “the tribal community” as found in Africa at that
time could sufficiently develop the productive forces he thought necessary for
by-passing capitalism. He only very cautiously considered the possibility that
tribal community could be so reorganised by “perhaps […] preserving the
democratic and collectivist attributes” to the same aim (1967:45). Around the
same time, writing about Mongolia’s experience of transiting from feudalism
to a socialist organisation of society, Academician Bazaryn Shirendyb argued
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that “any country in which pre-capitalist relations prevail can successfully
avoid the distressing stage of the capitalist formation” (1968: 126-7)98.
The possibilities for customary land use have been considered more
broadly in Russia and Germany. In correspondence with Vera Zasulich, a
Russian revolutionary with whom Marx discussed Russian village councils of
elders and communal land holding, the obshchina or mir, we find him
entertaining the possibility that the communalist social structure: “can gain
possession of the fruits with which capitalist production has enriched
mankind, without passing through the capitalist regime” (1985: Vol 24: 346).
Dave Renton cites a draft of that letter, in which Marx rhetorically asks a
question and answers it, as to whether “the agricultural commune” in Russia,
with only elements of private property “must inevitably come to an end?  Not
at all. Its innate dualism admits of an alternative: either the property element
will gain the upper hand over the collective element, or vice versa. It all
depends on the historical environment in which the commune is placed”
(Renton 2001: 76/77). This presence of alternatives might apply to a
consideration of Abkhaz conditions of our time, through the veil of apswara.
The fact that Lenin later believed that the village communes had since
disintegrated, making way for only ‘a capitalist regime’, so that the Zasulich
vision of a direct transition from mir to socialism had lost relevance (Patnaik
2009), does not invalidate an idea that was not new when it was raised again
in the 1960s for ex-colonial countries (witness Nkrumah). Today the Abkhaz
hope to retain the communalism of apswara into modernisation. Such a social
development is not expressed as striving for “socialism”. Neither Bennett nor
have other scholars of law and anthropology discussed in depth this
consideration of carrying forward in time the collectivist practices of non-
industrialised societies and the customary expression of it that still exists
among the Abkhaz, although that was touched on for Albania and China
98 Since the mid 19th century, with the single exception of Japan before the Second World
War, only four countries, with the exception of those that constructed socialist societies, have
escaped the category of “Third World Country”: Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong
Kong; and the countries of eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central  Asia that abandoned
socialism over the past quarter of a century have all experienced severe declines in living
standards, social services and provision  for health, education, child care, old age and the
family, and most are pitched into Third World category of poverty.
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(Mara 1973) but in an article that unfortunately gives few sources from
fieldwork. 
There is a very real sense in which the Abkhaz, through their attempts
to hold onto what they perceive is custom, are seeking in a novel way to
achieve what Herzfeld has suggested should be the object of anthropology
when he asked: “...how can anthropology contribute to a rethinking of the
social that will make it, not the space of regulation, punishment, and blame,
but rather that of relief, care and acceptance?” (Herzfeld 2001:217). There is
room for further research on that.
10.2 Conclusions
I have raised some suggestions about the Abkhaz experience being interesting
for anthropology as a whole on the relationship of custom and law across
different societies and prospects for the future. In doing so, I have had to
question and debate with some generally-accepted approaches in our
discipline. The complexities of this have been made obvious. This suggests
openings for further anthropological research and discussion, and for
continuing attention to field work in Abkhazia, and of looking to the future
for the Abkhaz. Rapid urbanisation and the denuding of villages in Abkhazia
makes current anthropological studies of urbanisation, as illustrated, for
instance in Italo Pardo (2004), Caroline Humphrey (2004) and Giuliana Prato
(2009) relevant to further development of my topic.
Abkhaz battle to hold a set of values and practices together, as their
self-identity is shown and experienced in what they do to preserve their way
of life and manoeuvre within changing circumstances for this, as expressed in
the clash of the practices and bases of custom with laws, illustrated in dispute
resolution. Customary practices are conceived of primarily not as expressions
of individuality but as idiosyncratic enactment of collectivist concepts.
With geographical dispersal of members of long-standing
communities, matters that could until quite recently be communally dealt
with,  relying on traditional customary practices can no longer be done so in
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the old way and recourse to law as an adjunct might provide a compensation
for this. There is the possibility that expansion of computerisation and web
networks can be used to overcome the problems brought for customary
practices by geographical dispersal. Greater recourse to law could, on the
other hand, weaken a pillar of custom – whereby decisions are taken by the
community affected and not by outside specialised state agencies which, at
best, employ delegated powers. In moving to towns young Abkhaz want for
jobs, medicine, ‘things’, etc. that they hear and see presented on television as
available in towns or abroad and not in the villages. The relationship of this to
discussing trends for future development has been signalled.
There are widespread imaginings that there should be law but that
custom should be preserved. The state is not powerful enough to assert a
monopoly regulation of society and it remains to be seen whether this will
remain the case. 
The examination of the radical societal and conceptual
transformations that are underway among today’s Abkhaz provides data to
consider whether there is theoretical value in ‘post-Soviet’ and ‘legal
plurality’ templates.
My fieldwork investigated understandings of custom and law, through
dispute management, to question whether the Abkhaz consider how their
traditional ways, their apswara, can be retained in a society with a written
constitution and laws with state enforcement agencies. The destruction
wrought by the war with Georgia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
its system of social provision, the exodus of half of the population and the
post-war blockade of Abkhazia stimulated a sharp upturn in nationalist
sentiments and drastic measures to ensure survival of the Abkhaz as an ethnic
entity. An important point that emerged from the field was that Abkhaz
“notions of traditional culture” was in the plural, and were sometimes
contradictory and conflicting. Not only are there different opinions but the
Abkhaz often showed themselves to be well aware of this and of the fact that
their expressions were also torn by contradictions between the polarities of
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what were described as “the real” and the hoped for “ideal type” in a
Weberian sense. 
Taking the family as my starting-off point for orientation opened up
opportunities for pursuing a number of relevant sub-topics for the
instantiation of apswara practices through lineages and gender (Karim 1995,
Stone 1985) and more broadly to include relatedness in the sense of
“relatedness [to refer] to any kind of relation between persons, including
those seemingly ‘given’ by biology and/or ‘produced’ via social interactions –
and thus obviously intended to encompass formal and informal relationships
of kinship and much else,”  (Stafford: 37); custom and law relations,
etiquette, beliefs in the supernatural (Clogg 1998, Chirikba forthcoming),
disputes, reconciliation, hospitality, respect for honour, rituals, the role of
elders and belief system, the house and land, as well as obligations and crime,
the economy and politics. Legacies of history (real and imagined) also came
into it as they bolster the essentialised ethnic consciousness of the Abkhaz
self within apswara. Lawrence Krader (Op. cit.: 14) and Ernst Bloch (Op. cit.
at length) both interestingly discussed the impossibility of fully
reconstructing the past because the conditions that gave rise to the past are no
longer present. All these topics deserve further rearch.
 
10.2.1 What found new -  openings for further research
I found that in Abkhaz literature, as in Russian scholarly writings today, what
is called dosudebnoye razbiratelstvo (pre-trial investigation) – what happens
in preparing for the resolution of a dispute before it comes to court is treated
in a formalistic legalistic manner; neglecting what are the most complicated
and detailed activities - the customary aspects that precede or replace the
legal dosudebnoye razbiratelstvo, as shown in dispute resolution. Indeed, at a
conference in Sochi that brought together more than fifty scholars from
Russia, including some from the republics of the north Caucasus and from
Abkhazia, my contribution  was the only one that raised customary
procedures for preparing or avoiding court cases and influencing them, and
on how custom may resolve the bulk of disputes among the Abkhaz (Costello
2013a).
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My findings in Abkhazia question the Weberian theory that holds that
the difference between custom and law lies only in structures of order in
society, and not in them each representing fundamentally different societies.
The opposition of state law and custom was eloquently and bluntly expressed
by an Abkhaz elder: “They (i.e. state officials) do not want to give particular
recognition to custom because what they support (i.e. the laws) can more
easily be got round, but should you violate the customs of the Abkhaz (apsua
tsas) you cannot get away from retribution for what you have done”
(Kamkiia, n.d.). My research found, in agreement with Kamkiia’s findings
that older people (and not only them) ranged, in order of importance for
society, apswara (the Abkhaz moral code) top, then apsua tsas - customary
practice - or atsabyrg –fairness, and only thirdly azakwan -the laws (Kamkiia,
Costello 2013: 42). It confirmed the common belief in the high value placed
on indisputability and sacredness in customary institutions where they operate
without state interference and their distortion. Under apswara everyone
knows the rules and is subject to and accepts their enforcement.
Western anthropology has a high price to pay for the contempt shown
for Soviet anthropology, especially its ethnography. This is becoming
apparent and Katherine Verdery, who has done fieldwork in Romania, wrote:
“the disintegration of Communist Party rule […] will reveal much analysis
after the fact, as scholars develop the hindsight necessary for what they failed
to grasp before” (1996: 19).  Her major post-socialist work, “What is
Socialism and What Comes Next?” did not, however, choose
anthropologically to answer either of the questions, as she kept to an
approach that examined the past of the socialist countries for their official
state similarities through the prism of the émigré Hungarian economist Janos
Kornai (Ibid.:19). Kornai’s theory was that the economy of the socialist
economies was everywhere a bureaucratic “economy of shortage” which was
incapable of responding to popular pressure and he did not delve into
anthropology. Tatjana Thelen, tongue in cheek, says “the careful reader might
wonder if other economies [other than socialist, MC] might not be affected by
shortages as well” (2011:55) and points out that “perspective was to undergo
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a curious shift from focusing on inefficient institutions prior to the change [to
post-socialism, MC] to focussing on inefficient actors after the change”
(Ibid.: 54). The object of that valid criticism is widespread today, is largely
ignored and could do with being researched so as to introduce less hidebound
discussion of previously socialist societies.  
My research involved examining a contemporary issue, but one which
is in part imagined by the Abkhaz to derive from mythology of their past, and
how this is “read”; about “moving forward while looking backwards” in the
words of Paula Garb, one of the few foreigners who studied Abkhaz customs
in the field (2000:7). There is much value in recognising that, but
anthropological theory is hardly likely to be advanced by an approach that
accepts that the past can be more than partial and, in a way, something
‘lingering’, to explain fully current outlooks and actions.
While Abkhaz orally subscribe to the idea of a need for law
enforcement, to the need for government and police, this was, for most
informants, only for the formal accoutrements of a state to be adjuncts to
apswara in order to tackle problems that have arisen from what are described
as the extraordinary conditions of the post-war years which led to the break-
up of communities and resultant crime, disputes over property and damaging
of traditional gender roles. Their conception of the “customary state” is a very
different one from the states of established capitalist political economies.
Dasania’s cited project for a “Parliament of Lineages” illustrates this. With
hoped-for improvements in living standards and stability, and with security
reinstituted, informants spoke of their expectations that there would be a
strengthening of society by making it more community-grounded, by custom,
apswara, and by practices from Soviet times that fitted this. These hopes
were even expressed by those whom I observed not themselves keeping to
traditional etiquette and gender roles in their daily conduct, who were
abandoning communal approaches, and by women who decried the very
inequality of genders they saw as part of custom.
The disruptive effects of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the war and
blockade that followed and the non-recognition of independent Abkhazia by
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other states saved the Abkhaz from joining the headlong rush into so-called
“shock therapy”99 to destroy socialism – led by “Communist” rulers of the
other states. The Abkhaz were fortuitously given something of a ‘breather’ by
being forced to rely entirely on themselves for the survival of their state,
without the advice of neo-liberal experts from abroad. It has not gone through
the period of 'chaos', a term for massive social destruction that provided the
space for self-enrichment of a minority of “oligarchs” at the expense of
everyone else (Nazpary 2001). In Abkhazia the strength of custom pulled the
Abkhaz through. The latter  that has been described for other former Soviet
states . They were, thus, granted time to assess the effects of the “therapy” on
the other, guinea pig states, and today find little in them that attracts in that
capitalist direction for modernisation. Customary practices were strengthened
and now allow the Abkhaz to consider a different transformation of society, a
society over which statist and customary forces are currently competing. The
outcome of this is not settled. 
There is, from the evidence, no intention of having a two-tier system
of laws and courts as found some post-colonial, neo-colonial systems. Calls
are made for another approach: for incorporation of “factually existing sub-
systems of customary laws [sic] into legislation” (Bartsyts n.d.) and such as
Dasania’s project. 
Attention in my research was concentrated on the evidence of
customary practices in the management of disputes. Informants have heavily
qualified support for some laws but generally did not agree with the approach
shown in Bagapsh’s call for law to be supreme (somewhat contravened by his
own practice in the incident with the offending journalist) and looked to
strengthening apswara. 
The question of whether the state as currently conceived and its
mechanisms can be embedded in custom is raised by the Abkhaz from their
experience and their practice of avoiding state intervention. What are
considered the prerogatives of the state in many countries are in Abkhazia
99 The phrase of the US economist Jeffrey Sachs to denote the demolition of socialist
structures and institute neo-liberal total freedom for the market and exclude state
‘interference’ and provision of social services - that impoverished and brought the countries
of the former USSR and of eastern Europe to their knees in the 1990s.  
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those of custom, that is, of extra-legal practices. There are challenges made to
this as some capitalist practices, such as prioritising individual success over
the collective become backed by laws. This not only goes against the
understanding of custom but also against the theoretical basis and memories
of the previous collectivist ideas of the Soviet system. Although customary
practices have not shown themselves able to retain the total hold that its
advocates would wish for, its strength is still evident and, should the direction
of development be changed in Abkhazia towards retaining collectively-owned
property then the subject would need to be re-examined. After all, the
establishment of the Soviet system early in the 20th century by a state did
greatly influence property and power relations to the benefit of collectivity,
and stopped in its tracks the pre-revolutionary reforms that were stimulating
the growth of capitalist relations. The contest between custom and state in the
present takes on a unique form of ‘coexistence in conflict’. People do not go
to court to obtain legitimacy for actions they have or will take in any case. 
State patronage is widely reported today and the subject of who
should hold the purse-strings for disbursements: the president, MPs, local
authorities or whoever, is a matter of contention and dispute. These are only
formally resolved by state agents, but in reality are strongly influenced by the
power of kinship links and pressures. What in reality is opposition to the state
acting outside of apswara is carried out by ignoring it and the state agencies
are powerless to counter custom. This ‘ignoring’ is compounded by judges,
the police and other agents themselves, all agreeing that custom must take
precedence.
The words of Feldbrugge (1977:38) about inevitability cited earlier
are open to question. Judging from Abkhazia, his comment that there was an
automatic decline in ‘traditional’ ways with growth of “urban and industrial
civilization” does not appear to be as automatic as he presented it. It could be
that his mechanical (see O’Laughlin op. cit.) view of change might not stand
up where urbanisation, etc. does not involve underlying changes in the ways
people find to adjust and retain control of processes. Whether the capitalist
state-builders are successful will decide the resolution of the divergences.
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The Abkhaz have recourse to laws  on occasion to fill in gaps (e.g. for
settling property that never was linked to lineage, like flats in town) or to
supplement when custom is powerless to tackle some forms of new crime,
something that is associated in the minds of the Abkhaz with new class
differentiation. The area of what underpins recourse to law does require more
investigation.
Old beliefs are not able to nullify the adoption of laws that now reflect
the end of the Soviet order but are a defence against them being freely
enacted. This raises the question: Can the law continue as an adjunct to
custom or, to put it more strongly, be embedded in it? Custom is conceived of
as an ordering of a non-hierarchically morally ordered system for all-
embracing regulation of social relations. It, therefore, is different in principle
from ‘legal pluralist’ approaches. Some scholars among the Abkhaz favour
codification of social practices (Khashig, 2011, Bartsyts, M. 1999) and there
are a number of works which would present apswara as a set of values and
practices taken out of social, economic and historical context to offer it for
universal application (Yagan, 1999, Kuprava, 2007, Biguaa, 2010).
There is the ‘fitting in’ of new requirements and circumstances, their
rationalisation into an evolving set of the practices and incorporation into
‘custom’. This tallied with the examples of the ideational mechanism for this
in north Pakistan described by Michael Fischer: its application to give a
customary imprimatur of first cousin marriage to one that is not (2006). It is
similar to Roman Catholic Papal mechanisms to bypass, overcome or adjust a
religious ban on divorce by ‘discovering’ circumstances in the family
histories of the partners to a marriage, so as to make the marriage illegitimate
and so to be nullified. 
A related example of incorporation of ‘suppressed knowledge’ that is
practiced among the Abkhaz was given me by David Dasania when he
described how gossip could be opportunistically used to allow for de-
legitimising a marriage (2008, personal communication  n. 0049). Thus, light
can be publicly shed on normally suppressed knowledge about a marriage to
show it was contracted illegitimately – the use of gossip to bring real or
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imagined skeletons out of a person’s cupboard to point to a supposed
incestuous marriage earlier within the partners’ lineages.  Dasania said the
knowledge could be used against marriage partners if they were judged not to
conduct themselves in suitable manner. 
The same covers  known cases of taking a second wife, having a child
other than by the legal father,  woman marrying for security (including
Abkhaz women marrying Uzbek immigrants) and immigrant men marrying
for property and children, especially to have a son. I have described the case
in a village of the acceptance of property inheritance shifting to a female line
as another instantiation of meeting the demand of circumstances. In the words
of a female informant in 2008 (n. 010): “life asserts itself”, who then added:
“not everything changes”. The ways this is applied by the Abkhaz can
provide rich pickings for further students and, especially, to research how
broad its boundaries might be - the boundaries of flexibility and contingency
within apswara. 
 The influence of changing times is acknowledged not only by older
people who regret the passing of what they say (and imagine?) was the rigid
application of customs in times gone by, but I found that apswara is also, and
very much so, argued for by many younger people. 
 I have not gone into the relationships of status, prestige and hierarchy
and that is a topic that deserves further research in Abkhazia and I found
Juliet du Boulay’s work on a village in Greece (1976) a stimulant to
considering such research. 
The study based on cases of disputes, their resolution and
compensation procedures, values, social structures and institutions, and
adjustments adds up to there being a society which is considered as
customary, and is so in the sense that the exercise of power is by no means
all-encompassed by laws, nor regulated by the state’s enforcement agencies,
but largely the reverse. The pressure of developments is in the direction of
growing tension between the egalitarian-based direct democracy of custom
and the values of increasing stratification and hierarchy of nascent class
differences. 
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A powerful customary self-assertion lies in what I have called the
unanimity principle and extra-parliamentary, direct democracy that is aimed
at insisting that the state or local authority has power to endorse or reject the
holding of public assemblies, but that does not affect assemblies in the
villages of Lykhny and Myku [Mokva]” (Ekho Abkhazii 5.3.2013), which
traditionally give voice to the two geographical subdivisions of the Abkhaz.
Notwithstanding that regulation an unsanctioned mass assembly in May 2014
in Sukhum demanded and achieved the resignation of the president and his
government.  So matters are not straightforward in the custom-law tug of war.
The high status of the collective is illustrated by the fact that
according to the Constitution of the Abkhazian Republic (2001: 40) the
President does not have the right to dissolve parliament – that is something
reserved for the members of Parliament themselves, again an approximation
to customary beliefs. 
The further study of this unfolding process will benefit from
discovering what new emerges from the contradictions. It certainly does not
lie in imagining a resuscitation of the past, real or imagined. The extent to
which the past does leave its footprints, I suggest, lies more in the egalitarian
principles of the Soviet period and in mythology about a pre-Soviet state of
social harmony. Further anthropological research among the Abkhaz and in
Abkhazia generally, will provide rewards to investigators of custom and law
and can be well extended beyond the topic of dispute resolution. For the
moment the law is an adjunct to custom.
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(tovarishcheskii sud), in the USSR, an elected public body charged with
promoting the education of citizens to maintain the communist attitude
toward labor and a respectful attitude toward socialist property, to observe the
rules of socialist society (through a fostering of a collective consciousness
and mutual assistance), and to respect the honor and dignity of the Soviet
people. The work of the comrades’ courts consists mainly of preventing
violations of law, preventing formation of an atmosphere of tolerance toward
any antisocial actions, and educating citizens through the force of persuasion
and social influence. The procedure for organizing comrades’ courts and the
competence of such courts are determined by the statutes on comrades’ courts
adopted by the presidiums of the supreme soviets of the Union republics. In
the RSFSR the existing Statute on Comrades’ Courts was adopted by the
Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR dated Mar.
11,1977, with subsequent revisions and amendments. 
Comrades’ courts may be established at enterprises, institutions,
organizations, and educational institutions upon a decision of the general
assembly of the collective of the working people or students. They may be
established on kolkhozes, in apartment houses maintained by housing offices
or apartment house administrations or united into street committees, and in
rural population centers (sic) and settlements upon a decision of the general
assembly of the kolkhoz members, residents of the apartment house, or
inhabitants of the settlement and with the consent of the appropriate executive
committees of the soviets of people’s deputies. Comrades’ courts are elected
by open ballot for a two-year term; their size is determined by the general
assembly.
Comrades’ courts hear various types of cases: violations of labor
discipline, such as absenteeism, lateness, and premature departure from work;
carelessness in work performance; minor offenses committed for the first
time and not representing a grave social danger; petty hooliganism and petty
profiteering; incidences of consumption of alcoholic beverages on the street
or in yards, parks, or other public places; and property disputes between
citizens involving sums up to 50 rubles, with the consent of the disputing
parties.
The statutes on comrades’ courts contain a list of measures of social
influence the courts are entitled to apply to offenders. These measures include
obligating the offender to make a public apology; issuing a comrades’
warning, social censure, or social reprimand; and imposing a fine. In hearing
cases against violators of labor discipline, a comrades’ court has the right to
recommend to the administration of the enterprise that the violator be
transferred to a position with lower wages.
If a comrades’ court finds that a violator should be brought to trial for
criminal or administrative responsibility, it forwards the case materials to the
appropriate bodies (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970-1979).
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The president left, but the sediment remains. Even those who strongly
disliked Ankvab say so.
Why do so many people, even those who did not vote for him, feel offended?
Because no one asked their opinion. Because an anti-constitutional solution
was imposed on them. Because they were threatened with the use of force.
Perhaps many people who are perturbed by the coup would have rejoiced if
Ankvab lost the election. But there was no election. And the game was not
played by the rules.
Over the last few days my friends and I met with different people,
some from the opposition, some from the authorities. We tried to find a legal
way out of the situation. We were alarmed that in a short period of time
important institutions had collapsed in our country, that we were suddenly
thrown far back in our political development, that the existence of the state
was under threat. We were afraid that there would be clashes.
On the third day after the occupation of the administration building
and the television, it was already clear that Ankvab would quit the
presidential post. But why did the opposition not want to stay in the
constitutional field? There was a chance to negotiate the resignation of the
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President and the transfer of powers to the prime minister - that chance was
rejected. Why in recent days was it impossible to reach agreement with the
President on calling a pre-term election, without forcing him to accept an
ultimatum immediately? I am absolutely sure that it would have been possible
to find a legal way to bring about an early change of government. Why was
the opposition in such a hurry? Were they so afraid of the man they called “a
deserter"? Did they want to humiliate Ankvab by means of an ultimatum?
I would like to know whether those guys who occupied the
Presidential Administration and television realize that they ended up there not
because people were afraid of them, but because the President did not order
security officials to resist. It is important that the "victors" understand that.
Because otherwise there will be a state of euphoria at the awareness of their
own "strength" and the temptation to use it again and again. Guys, take a look
at history. You call each other "heroes.” It's not funny, it's sad.
A lot of different things happened during those days. There were
people on the streets peacefully protesting against injustice - I share their
objections. There were young people who sincerely believed they were acting
in a just cause. There were those who forced their way into government
buildings. There were those who skilfully directed these people. There were
representatives of the “power” ministries who tried to prevent things
escalating by holding negotiations. And there were people who were blinded
by hatred and the desire for revenge. There were numerous meetings with
intermediaries – as a people we still have to reap the fruits of those
agreements. There was a people that could see much further than its political
elite could, and which is now at a loss because of the politicians’ unforgivable
myopia.
Yesterday morning, I spoke with one of the opposition, appealing to
his ability to think in terms of statehood. I asked him to think about how
important it is for our country not to cross the line, delineated by the
Constitution. After all, the opposition could get what it wants while remaining
within legal bounds. They didn’t want to, they were in a hurry. I requested
naively: give the people a chance to vote for you as people who respect the
Constitution! I remember 2003, when we similarly tried to persuade the
Amstakhara party not to demand the pre-term resignation of Vladislav
Ardzinba. On that occasion we lasted out until the election.
I do not know who will win the upcoming election, but I do know that
our country has lost a great deal. Ankvab once said in one of his addresses "in
order to destroy me, my opponents are ready to destroy the state." I did not
t h i n k t h a t h i s w o r d s w o u l d p r o v e t o b e s o p r o p h e t i c .
There are many difficulties ahead. We have created dangerous
precedents. We are walking on very thin ice.
We shall have to work for a long time to rebuild what has been
destroyed. A good friend of mine said yesterday: “God forbid that future
generations will have to say, ‘But all the same we had our own state for 20
whole years."





The Council of Shrine-keepers of Abkhazia – zhrets’s - plans to
Make an Official Address-warning to the leadership of the 
country
26.07.2012 20:58 
The Council of Shrine-
keepers expresses its concern
at  the leadership of
Abkhazia’s attitude to its
historical roots and to the
spiritual  inheritance of our
people.
The removal from the
Law “On the Freedom of
Conscience and Religious
Organisations of Abkhazia”
of any mention of the most
ancient Abkhaz religion
Antsw’akhatsara  turn us to
thinking that we ourselves are demonstrating to our youth that they should
live by double standards. When we raise our cups to make toasts then there is
no more god-fearing and god-respecting people in the world. This was
especially so when we stood on the edge of a precipice (as we did in 1992-
1993), but as soon as peace and well-being came we forget about our
(Аныхҧааҩцəәа) Anykha shrines, and what is more, all mention of  our Sacred
shrines ( Святилищах Аныха) is thrown out  of the text of the Law.
Today, unfortunately, Christianity in Abkhazia is in crisis, as has been
seen in the schism in society; Islam preaches its ideals, but our Shrine-
keepers (Zhrets ‘s) are left humbly aside like an unwanted anachronism for
the time being. So, who, then,  are they so disturbing today?
The head shrine-keeper of Abkhazia, Z. Chichba, plans to issue an
Address-warning about the power of Abyzh’nykha (Абыжьныха) whom they
have somewhat forgotten, who for centuries hasprotected our land from dark
internal and external force, not to overstep the mark beyond which comes
general discord and unrest among the people.  
The Abkhaz belief will now be driven underground as in the recent
Communist past. "Анцəәа абзиара ҟаҵа".
Khadzharat Khvartsiya
http://www.facebook.com/hajarat.hvarckya?sk=wall
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